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Abstract 
The commodification of traditional knowledge through intellectual property rights is a 
topic area that attracts strong and highly divergent views. On the one hand there are 
campaigners and academics who reject the notion of commercialisation of traditional 
plant knowledge as 'biopiracy'. Many other researchers treat the concepts embedded 
in the Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) as given and focus instead on the ways in 
which these existing international agreements may be used to ensure more equitable 
benefit sharing and a better protection of indigenous knowledge. 
This dissertation seeks to open up this polarised debate in two different ways. Firstly, 
it seeks to unpack underlying concepts such as property, indigeneity, 
commodification, law and local knowledge by engaging with different theoretical 
frameworks that explicitly examine these concepts. Secondly, much of the debate is 
based on 'ideal models' and essentialised representations of indigenous peoples. 
There is a need to inject more empirical evidence in the debate by exploring the 
meaning(s) of these concepts for indigenous groups and the enactment of these 
concepts by indigenous peoples 'on the ground'. 
Observations from fieldwork with different San communities in Southern Africa 
illustrate how, dependent on local social, economic and political conditions, 
individual and group reflections and positions can vary with regard to intellectual 
property rights over their traditional knowledge. In order to further the debate about 
traditional knowledge and the policies designed to use and protect it, stronger 
contextualisation is required to transcend essentialised thinking by exploring how 
power imbalances, social relations, politics of identity and issues of scale may shape 
the conditionalities for the commodification of traditional knowledge. 
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Chapter I- Introduction 
For more thanfive hundredyears, the envoys of civilization sailed through storms 
and hacked throughjungles, startling in turn one tribe after another of long-lost 
human cousins. For an instant, before the inevitable breaking offaith, the two groups 
wouldface each other, staring - as innocent, both of them, as children, and blameless 
as if the world had been born afresh. To live such a moment seems, when we think of 
it now, to have been one of the most profound experiences that our planet in its 
vanished immensity once offered. But each time the moment repeated itself on each 
ftesh beach, there was one less island to befound, one less chance to start everything 
anew. It began to repeat itself less and less often, until there came a time, maybe a 
century ago, when there were only afew such places left, only afew doors still 
unopened - Adam Goodheart (2000), The Last Island of the Savages 
I Setting the Scene 
With every new year of the 21" Century, the likelihood that any new 'doors still 
unopened' will be found on this planet grows fainter still. However, there are still a 
few known doors that have not yet been fully opened, that have remained tantalisingly 
ajar. One of them is the North Sentinel Island'; although its existence has been known 
for centuries, its inhabitants - anthropologists call them the Sentinelese - have had 
virtually no contact with the rest of humanity. Goodheart (2000) argues that it is not 
certain whether, outside the Andaman Island, there exists any community that has had 
as little contact with 'civilisation' as the Sentinelese. According to the anthropology 
department of the Indian government there is none, a view shared by several 
American anthropologists. After more than 20 years of unsuccessful attempts, Pandit, 
an anthropologist working for the Indian government, made the first contact with the 
Sentinelese in 1991, but the Indian government had decided to stop the gift dropping- 
missions in 1996. In all these years, anthropologists have never progressed much 
further than handing out coconuts to the Sentinelese as they stood on the beach or in 
the surf. Sometimes the interaction of giving gifts was friendly, but several times the 
Sentinelese have aimed their arrows at the contact party. 
1 The North Sentinel Island is the western outlier in the Andaman archipelago which belongs to India 
and stretches between Burma and Sumatra (Goodheart, 2000). 
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Now, just imagine that through remote observations, scientists have noticed that the 
Sentinelese are using a particular plant, endemic to North Sentinel Island, for what 
appear to be medicinal purposes. A research team working for a pharmaceutical 
company decides to mount an expedition. The researchers land in the middle of the 
night and, whilst making sure to act without noise or leave any unnecessary traces of 
their visit, collect a few samples of this plant before returning to their boat without 
encountering the Sentinelese. The researchers take the plant back home and start their 
research to extract its medicinal properties. After 5 years of very expensive research 
in one of the world's best laboratories, there is finally a breakthrough: the team of 
researchers can extract the active ingredient, a unique molecule. In order to protect 
their research findings, the pharmaceutical company for whom the researchers work 
applies for a patent. After the patent office has established that the research findings 
are 'novel', 'useful' and 'non-obvious', the patent is awarded. During those 5 years 
that the company was doing tests, they never contacted the Sentinelese to inform them 
or to ask them permission for carrying out the research and for bringing a commercial 
drug on the market that is derived from the Sentinelese's use of the medicinal plant. 
This fictional account describes an act of 'bioprospecting' which seems to cause no 
negative impacts on the Sentinelese, and which may yield a medicine to benefit 
millions of other people around the globe. Does that mean that the act is morally 
justified? 
In neutral terms, bioprospecting can be defined as the exploration of biological 
resources in the hope of finding commercially valuable compounds for, amongst 
others, pharmaceutical development. As Takeshita (2001) demonstrates, this neutral 
definition is used by the proponents of bioprospecting to demonstrate the positive 
impacts of bioprospecting 2 (see e. g. Brush, 1999; Hayden, 2003b). They argue that 
bioprospecting encourages the discovery of new drugs, it stimulates economic 
development in countries that are rich in natural resources and poor in economic 
resources and it promotes the conservation of biodiversity. However, while 
2 Note that most authors who highlight the positive sides of bioprospecting also stress that the positive 
effects can only be achieved when they are accompanied by critical prerequisites for the realisation of 
the benefits of bioprospecting. 
13 
proponents portray bioprospecting as a 'win-win-win' project, the practice has also 
attracted some fierce criticism under the pejorative banner of 'biopiracy'. One of the 
most 'vigorous' opponents of bioprospecting is Shiva (1997; 2001) for whom the 
process of biopiracy relates to the plunder of natural resources and related knowledge 
of the developing world, and in particular of indigenous peoples, by powerful 
industrial countries (e. g. Martinez Alier, 2000 shares Shiva's strong opinion about 
biopiracy; for a more contextualised debate on biopiracy, see e. g. Stenton, 2004; 
Mgbeoji, 2006)3. 
Besides Shiva, other scholars have also aired their concerns about bioprospecting. For 
example, there is a growing concern that during this process the intellectual property 
rights of indigenous peoples have rarely been respected. Indigenous knowledge has 
often been collected, recorded and placed in the public domain without the prior 
informed consent 4 of indigenous peoples (Dutfield, 2002a). Despite the fact that 
indigenous knowledge is recognised as a valuable source of knowledge, it is still 
considered to be part of the public domain, freely available for use by anybody (Sahai, 
2003; Boyle, 2003). Furthermore, bioprospecting has also been criticised because 
traditional knowledge is commercially exploited on a large scale and only a fraction 
of the benefits flow back to the holders of the traditional knowledge (Bellman, 
Dutfield el aL, 2003; Hayden, 2003a). As a result, there is a growing call for 
traditional knowledge to be protected through international legal measures (Greaves, 
1994; Simpson and Jackson, 1998; Weeraworawit, 2003). This gives rise to an 
obvious question: can intellectual property rights provide such protection? 
There is an extensive literature about the appropriateness of intellectual property 
rights as a tool to protect the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples (e. g. Posey 
and Dutfield, 1996; 1998; Dove, 1996; Norchi, 2000). The concept and legal 
definition of intellectual property rights have been criticised as inadequate and 
3 For an overview of the literature on bioprospecting and biopiracy see e. g. Svarstad (2002); Hamilton, 
(2006). 
' Prior informed consent is not clearly defined, but is a concept that is recognised in international law. 
Posey and Dutfield propose the following definition: "prior informed consent is consent to an activiýv 
that is given after receiving full disclosure regarding the reasons for the activity, the specific 
procedures the activity would entail, the potential risks involved, and the full implications that can 
realistically beforeseen. Prior informed consent implies Me right to stop the activityfrom proceeding, 
andfor it to be halted if it is already underway " (1996: 35). 
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inappropriate for the protection of traditional knowledge for the following reasons: 
intellectual property rights recognise individual and not collective rights; they require 
a specific act of invention; they stimulate commercialisation; they recognise only 
market values; they are subject to economic powers and manipulation; they are 
difficult to monitor and enforce and they are expensive, complicated and time 
consuming (Posey, 2002a). Current intellectual Property laws are also perceived as 
posing a threat not only to the cultural integrity and cultural rights of indigenous 
peoples, but also to their territorial and resource rights (Posey and Dutfield, 1996; 
Simpson, 1997; Simpson and Jackson, 1998; Hayden, 2003b; Greene, 2002; 2004; 
Tucker, 2004; Berman, 2004; Riley, 2004b; Solomon, 2004; Gibson, 2005). 
Therefore, it is widely believed that conventional intellectual property rights in the 
current form should not be applied to traditional knowledge (Pretorius, 2002). 
In short, much of the current discourse about bioprospecting emphasises the 
incompatibility between traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights 
(Hansen & Van Fleet, 2003). The fact that Western companies are using, adapting or 
directly claiming ownership over indigenous knowledge without acknowledgement or 
compensation for the indigenous communities that originally developed that 
knowledge has, so it is argued in the mainstream literature, a negative effect on 
indigenous communities across the world. It seems impossible to commodify and 
commercialise indigenous knowledge without posing a serious threat to, or perhaps 
even destroying, the social structures that have sustained this knowledge on which the 
livelihoods of indigenous peoples depend (Posey, 1990; Mulligan, 1999). Western 
companies that are exploiting the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples 
contribute to the increasing pressure on indigenous societies to survive. When the 
appropriation of natural resources and the related knowledge by powerful industrial 
countries and companies is labelled as a neo-colonial form of exploitation of native 
peoples (Pretorius, 2002), the fundamental question whether the practice of 
bioprospecting is morally justifiable becomes even more pertinent. 
However, answering this question can be more problematic and complex than is 
suggested in much of the literature. The reservations that have been aired against 
bioprospecting and intellectual property rights are comparatively well-defined moral 
issues in the fictitious Sentinelese example; the plant grows exclusively on 
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Sentinelese land; knowledge of its use was exclusively developed by and owned by 
the Sentinelese; who the Sentinelese are, can be easily defined down to the last 
individual; the remote observations and the bioprospecting took place without any 
form of consent or even informal contacts. But then this fictional example is unique in 
its clarity. Issues that appear 'black and white' against the background of the history 
of the Sentinelese might not be so straightforward when applied in a different and 
more realistic context. From an ethical point of view, critiques about the dangers of 
bioprospecting and commodification of traditional knowledge are certainly valuable, 
but it would be wrong to transfer these more hypothetical critiques to a specific case, 
without seeking some 'ground truth', notably by seeking to understand the local 
context and the views of the people whose traditional knowledge is being 
commercialised. 
In this sense, a number of authors have underlined the limitations of existing research 
and have called for new angles of enquiry in ftiture research. The evolving discourse 
on intellectual property rights and traditional knowledge should, first of all, be placed 
in the local social and economic context in which indigenous peoples are living 
(Strathern, 2000). Heath and Weidlich (2003) add that more attention should be given 
to the customary law practices of intellectual property rights. Also, it is important to 
guard against oversimplifying and romanticising indigenous realities and to start 
probing beneath the 'false' generalisations 5 that are currently made to support or 
oppose intellectual property rights in the context of appropriating traditional 
knowledge (Strathern, 2000; Greene, 2004). Furthermore, the search for new 
mechanisms to protect indigenous peoples' traditional knowledge and culture must be 
built from the bottom-up and not top-down (Moran et aL 2001; Tobin, 2000). 
Answers to the problems of using or misusing traditional knowledge can only come 
from indigenous peoples themselves (Riley, 2004a) and solutions can only be 
formulated after rigorous evaluations of actual cases (Greene, 2004). Finally, when 
researching new protection mechanisms, it is important to recognise that indigenous 
peoples do not speak with one voice. The current literature does not allow for a 
5 As mentioned earlier in the introduction, those who oppose intellectual property rights argue that 
introducing intellectual property rights in developing countries will expose indigenous peoples to 
market mechanisms and threaten their pristine subsistence strategies. Those in favour of intellectual 
property rights argue, for example, that introducing intellectual property rights to developing countries 
will stimulate economic development and innovation. 
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diversity in indigenous peoples' values and needs. Neither does it acknowledge the 
threats of conflicts within indigenous communities over the ways in which they 
choose to interact with outsiders and the international community (King and 
Eyzaguirre, 1999). In reality, some indigenous peoples have the opportunity to raise 
their voice and step onto the political stage, while others are marginalised or silenced 
(Castree, 2003). 
Aims 
The need to inject more empirical evidence into the debate about bioprospecting and 
how to protect traditional knowledge, has been addressed in this thesis by exploring 
an actual case study. The focus is on the San of Southern Africa, who have recently 
entered into a benefit-sharing agreement for the commercialisation of the Hoodia, a 
plant traditionally used for its medicinal properties. The San peoples of the Kalahari 
desert in Southern Africa have chewed the Hoodia for thousands of years on hunting 
trips as a thirst quencher and an appetite suppressant. However, a patent was awarded 
to South Africa's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 1998 on 
these qualities without their knowledge. After campaigning for the rights of the San 
peoples, a deal was struck so that the San peoples could benefit from 
commercialisation of the slimming aid T57' (the active ingredient) which was being 
developed. This benefit sharing deal has now been praised by some as a major 
breakthrough and presented as an example of best practice for indigenous peoples 
worldwide. 
The case study allows a closer look, in a local context, at some of the main concerns 
that have been raised in the literature about bioprospecting and the legal status of 
traditional knowledge. As stated above, these include amongst others: (a) the impact 
of intellectual property rights on the societal structure and organisation of indigenous 
peoples and their livelihood strategies; (b) the effectiveness of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) which, together with the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement6 (TRIPs), is one of the main agreements that governs the 
control over biodiversity, traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights and 
6 For more information on the debate about TRIPS, intellectual property rights and traditional 
knowledge, see e. g. McGrath (1996); Correa (2000); Anuradha (2001); Zerbe (2002); Bellmann et al. 
(2003); Dutfield (2002a). 
17 
(c) the assessment of the instruments, such as benefit sharing agreements, that must 
safeguard, protect and balance traditional knowledge. 
Furthermore, this case study also makes it possible to examine the issues of traditional 
knowledge and intellectual property rights in a wider context so particular attention 
can be paid to, for example, the status of indigenous peoples within the state; the level 
of assimilation; the economic means of indigenous peoples; the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and other cultures and societies; the respect by the state and other 
ethnic groups for indigenous peoples' traditions and customs. In order to fully engage 
with this case study, fieldwork was carried out in two consecutive years (for more 
details on the fieldwork and methodology used for the fieldwork see Appendix I and 
2). 
2.1 Original aims of the Fieldwork 
The aims of the fieldwork were twofold 7: first, to map the San's attitude towards the 
Hoodia benefit sharing agreement and second, to contextualise the current debate 
about bioprospecting and intellectual property rights and specifically the criticism 
against it by engaging more closely with the main actors on the ground, viz. 
indigenous peoples themselves. 
With regard to the first aim, the most important task was to evaluate the usefulness 
and fairness of the concepts of benefit sharing and participation rights as the 
mechanisms set out by the CBD to safeguard the traditional knowledge of indigenous 
peoples and consequently the improvement of their participation rights. Although the 
merits and problems of bioprospecting contracts and benefit sharing agreements have 
been explored extensively in the literature (for general comments see e. g. ten Kate and 
Laird, 1999; Laird and ten Kate, 2002; Tobin, 2002; Gollin, 2002; Guerin-McManus 
et aL, 2002; for context specific comments see e. g. Greene, 2004 on Peru; Anuradha, 
2001 on India; Aguilar, 2001 on Costa Rica), the scope of analysis of this case study 
and fieldwork differs from most of the other evaluations in two ways. First, the focus 
is not so much on the main stakeholders that have been involved in the process and 
' While these are the formal aims, the decision to undertake fieldwork was also supported by an ethical 
concern, raised by some in the literature, about the appropriateness of writing about people without 
attempting to seek and to hear their own views and opinions. ýD 
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negotiations of benefit sharing agreements, but mainly on the people on the ground 
who have not been closely involved in the negotiations. Second, the fieldwork 
allowed a contextualisation of the notions of 'fair' and 'equitable' (the two corner- 
stones of the benefit sharing arrangements in the CBD) in a wider discourse of justice 
and from an indigenous point of view. 
With regard to the second aim, the main focus of the research was to contextualise the 
juxtaposition between traditional and Western value systems. It is argued in most of 
the critical literature that, in both legal and ethical terms, the issue of bioprospecting is 
embedded in the Western paradigm of individual property rights through intellectual 
property rights. Therefore, intellectual property rights are criticised for being 
exploitative because they ascribe concepts of ownership and property rights only on 
an individual basis. According to most of the literature on intellectual property rights 
and traditional knowledge, the property rights and ownership concepts of indigenous 
peoples are community-based. As such, the tension between individual property rights 
and community-based property rights must be confronted and placed in context. With 
these so-called diverging property systems in mind, the first fieldwork served to 
develop a clearer picture through observation of how indigenous peoples' community- 
based property system work on the ground and in what sense it differs from an 
individualised Western property system. 
Intermezzo - When reality hits you as a fly on a windscreen 
I can still remember going to the cinema with myftiends to watch this really peculiar 
film about a coca cola bottle and a tribe deep down in the Kalahari. We were in our 
early teens and could not make any sense out of thisfilm, I am not entirely sure, but I 
think we left the cinema before the end of the film. Little did I know that more than 20 
years later, I was actually going to meet the San on their own turf Even more bizarre 
was thefact that the theme of thefilm, viz. how a coca cola bottle - the symbol of our 
global capitalist system, including its trademark - brings nothing but bad luck to the 
tribe, was going to be the topic ofmy PhD. 
In anticipation of the fieldwork, I read n7any books on the San, including the almost 
mythical stories of Laurens van der Post, but some of the more academic 
anthropological works were beyond n7y understanding. Some of these, at that point in 
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my research, rather abstract discussions about the identity of the San in the so-called 
'Kalahari debate' were, just like thatfilm many years ago, completely lost on me. The 
more I read about the San, the more mythical they became. Obviously, I also engaged 
with the more specialised literature on intellectual property rights and traditional 
knowledge. It surprised me that so many of the reoccurring debates in anthropology 
about identity, property, culture and so forth were not prominently explored in the 
intellectual Property rights literature. Ifelt rather lost between these two bodies of 
expertise. no were these people, what makes them so special, are they special? To 
confuse me even more, fellow students questioned me whether my research was not 
going to disturb these people? Would my presence in their communities not upset 
them? I wondered whether I was going to be like that coca cola bottle? 
Ifinally boarded the plane for Windhoek I spent two weeks in Windhoek, mostly in 
the office of the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa 
(TVIMSA), going through the last preparations for the fieldwork On the last day 
before I embarked on the fieldwork; I met unexpectedly what appeared later to be my 
key informants in the first community I was going to visit. Making the most of this 
encounter, I made arrangements with them, I informed then? that I was planning to 
visit some communities and was basically testing the waters. So far so good, they 
invited me to their community and were going to inform the chief of my arrival. We 
made provisional plans that I was going to arrive on the Saturday. The journey took 
longer than I anticipated and instead of getting there on the Saturday, Ifinally got 
there on the Sunday afternoon. Now, judging from what I had been reading about 
indigenous peoples' ceremonies and traditions, I expected a different, non-Western 
welcome. I knew I had to ask permission to the chieffor my stay in the community, 
and I had already acquainted myselfwith the African handshake, but maybe there was 
something else that I was soon going to find out? Slightly nervous and shy I climbed 
out of the car, bracing myselffor a quick lesson in traditional greetings, but nothing 
of the sort. Frans spoke the memorable words: "you are late, where were you, what 
took you so long? ", exactly the same words I hear at home, I am always late. Ifelt 
welcome. 
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2.2 Personal Reflections about the Experience in the Field 
The above anecdote illustrates some of the challenges that can be encountered when 
studying other cultures. While it is certainly important to acknowledge the cultural 
and social diversity when studying indigenous issues, at the same time it is also 
important not to overemphasise this difference through untested assumptions. The 
fieldwork proved to be invaluable in testing my existing assumptions 8 and bringing to 
the fore new questions. 
While the criticism that is aired in the literature about intellectual property rights and 
bioprospecting might make sense in either an abstract and theoretical framework, or 
within the context of the North Sentinel Island, the fieldwork demonstrated that issues 
which may appear 'black and white' during a desk-based study become much more 
shaded when encountered in a specific context. The suggestion is made in the 
literature that indigenous peoples are not only very protective about their knowledge, 
but that the identity of indigenous peoples' is still firmly rooted in pristine cultural 
traditions. The commodification of traditional knowledge is mostly presented as an 
act that (a) indigenous peoples will resist or (b) will be forced upon them and as a 
result will destroy the cultures that sustain this knowledge. The fieldwork was 
revealing in the sense that it showed that the literature about traditional knowledge 
and intellectual property rights is still steeped in the tradition of creating myths when 
dealing with other cultures and societies. Although the 'noble savage' has long died 
out in the field, in the literature the 'noble savage' is very much alive. 
My fieldwork experience highlighted how the controversies over the commodification 
and commercial isation of traditional knowledge in the literature tend to project 
indigenous communities as bounded and discrete whilst simultaneously ignoring the 
changing environment and circumstances of indigenous peoples. While it was 
originally anticipated that the fieldwork could give some contextualised guidance and 
insights into some of the protection mechanisms suggested in the literature (such as 
community-based property rights and customary-based property rights), in reality it 
turned out that some of these concepts were based on assumptions that could not be 
' Based on the literature review I did prior to the fieldwork (Martin and Vermeylen, 2005) but 
undoubtedly also coloured by my own cultural framings. 
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easily justified through field observations. One of the driving forces behind the 
debates about traditional knowledge is the belief that not only indigenous peoples 
themselves, but also their knowledge and property system are entirely the opposite of 
Euro-American knowledge and property systems. While some observations in the 
field confirmed some differences between traditional knowledge and scientific 
knowledge or individual and community-based property rights, the difference was not 
as rigid and sharp as it is sometimes suggested in the literature. Furthermore, on 
occasions the difference between the San individuals and communities seemed as big 
as the difference between the San and Euro-American individuals or peoples. The 
experiences in the field made me realise that the literature about traditional knowledge 
and intellectual property rights which I had read in the first year (i. e. before the 
fieldwork) was not doing justice to the variety of ideas and perceptions that can (in the 
case of the San) be encountered on the ground. The fieldwork did not yield the 
ultimate 'one' truth about the San, who they are, what they want and how they 
perceive the world; and yet, that is what the literature tries to convey: There is an 
insistence in the debate about traditional knowledge that indigenous peoples must 
represent a coherent and authentic voice; it is portrayed as their sole and maybe last 
weapon against the advance of Westernisation. 
In short, the fieldwork brought up the need to question the source of these persistent 
assumptions and portrayals of 'coherent communities', 'community-based property 
rights', 'traditional lifestyles' and 'aversion to commercialising traditional knowledge 
systems'. In order to trace the origins of these assumptions, the focus of attention 
needed to shift. In order to fully understand 'the tragedy of traditional knowledge', 
other angles of enquiry had to be explored. While the aims of the fieldwork did not 
change significantly, the overall aims of my thesis did change markedly as a result of 
(reflections on) my fieldwork. In other words, the fieldwork experience strongly 
informed the direction of my thesis but as a consequence the outcomes of the 
fieldwork played a smaller direct part in the contents of my thesis. 
2.3 Shifting Aims of the Thesis 
The fieldwork experience led to a quest for a different angle on the debate, an angle 
that had more relevance to the situation on the ground. This new angle was eventually 
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found through, and inspired by, the work of Coombe (1998b). In her acclaimed work 
the cultural life of intellectual properties, Coombe argues that much of the current 
debate about intellectual property rights tends to be too abstract and has almost been 
researched in a socio-economic and political vacuum. Especially, the discussion about 
the expansion of intellectual property rights into new areas (such as traditional 
knowledge and cultural heritage) must engage with a wider debate that goes ftn-ther 
than either justifying or criticising intellectual property rights on the basis of Western 
philosophical traditions or utilitarian rationales about property rights. These 
mainstream moral and economic arguments have also been used to comment upon the 
practice of bioprospecting and have often led to discussions mired in polemics. 
Coombe suggests that the controversies over intellectual property rights can be better 
understood and refined when intellectual property rights are examined from a wider 
angle. The same can also be argued for the debate about traditional knowledge. 
There is a need to unpack the underlying concepts such as traditional knowledge, 
commodification, property and indigeneity. Although these notions are focal points in 
the debate over whether or not traditional knowledge should be commercialised and 
whether or not traditional knowledge should be protected through intellectual property 
rights, most of the time these concepts (traditional knowledge, commodification, 
property and indigeneity) have only been partially defined. For example, traditional 
knowledge is (mostly) defined as being the opposite of scientific knowledge; property 
is defined as being either individually-based or community-based, objects are either 
gifts or commodities and being indigenous is based on having specific characteristics 
which are outside Euro-American norms. 
It is argued in this thesis that in order to further the debate about traditional 
knowledge and how it can be used and protected, the first step is to define traditional 
knowledge, commodification, property and indigeneity in a more refined way. This 
requires an engagement with different theoretical frameworks across several 
disciplines that explicitly examine these concepts. Discussing, for example, issues of 
identity, property rights, knowledge and commodification are core activities in 
disciplines such as anthropology, political theory, cultural studies and so forth. In 
contrast to the literature that deals specifically with the problems of traditional 
knowledge and intellectual property rights, disciplines such as anthropology have 
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learned to avoid polarisations and are trying to move away from 'black and white' 
discussions. Instead, they focus more on discovering the nuances that will help to built 
bridges between what seem at first to be two opposing worlds. A similar approach 
will be followed in this thesis. The debate about traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property rights will be revisited and deconstructed from new angles. Persistent 
dichotomies and assumptions will be analysed; where do they come from, can they be 
avoided and how? 
This investigation, i. e. the deconstruction of the assumptions that have been made in 
the current debate about bioprospecting, traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property rights, constitute the first aim of the thesis. Once these have been unpacked, 
the question about the appropriateness of the tools to protect traditional knowledge 
can be revisited; the second aim of the thesis is to examine to what extent 
intellectual property rights are an appropriate tool to protect traditional knowledge. 
The third and final aim of the thesis is to contextualise the current debate by 
focusing more closely on the case study of the San. 
At this point, it is useful to delineate the boundaries of this research. It is argued in 
this thesis that bioprospecting, commodification and commercialisation of traditional 
knowledge cannot be rejected or accepted on the basis of a polarised debate. Ideally, 
as Castree argues "[cjchanging the world entails understanding the world from 
within not from the dizzy heights of abstract theory and ethical oppositionality " 
(2001: 52). This would require, according to Castree, examining: "what kind of 
bioprospecting, for what kind ofbenefits and in which context " (2003: 52)? While this 
sort of study might make sense in an 'ideal' setting such as the one portrayed in the 
fictional Sentinelese story, in the context of the San there is a danger that this sort of 
enquiry would lead to a continuation of portraying the issues in a simplified and 
consequently distorted manner. As observed during the fieldwork, the San cannot be 
simply represented by one voice; opinions differ from community to community and 
even within one community people have different opinions depending on their 
individual lifestory and experience. In this sense, the San's opinion about 
bioprospecting and the management and use of traditional knowledge are more 
personal and anecdotal and 'hard' evidence of a community's united perception is 
much harder to find. While it is feasible to inject empirical evidence into the debate 
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about the process of bioprospecting, as has been done in this thesis with the case 
study of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, discussing the higher moral grounds of 
bioprospecting and intellectual property rights on the basis of empirical research has 
appeared more difficult than was originally anticipated due to the wide diversity of 
communities and opinions and the complexity of the topic matter characterised by 
contradictions, conflicts of interests, doubts, changing motivations, circumstances and 
needs and so forth. Trying to represent this diversity in one coherent opinion would 
not do justice to the findings on the ground and could potentially result in making the 
same mistakes as the current debate, viz. reducing the debate to polarised opinions. 
While it might be feasible and appropriate to represent these different opinions when 
dealing with a small and relatively bounded and coherent community (e. g. the 
Sentinelese or perhaps some of the communities in the Amazon might fulfil these 
requirements) within the context of the San this task is very difficult; there are more 
than 100 000 San living across (mainly) Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and 
Angola. 
As a result, the observations that have been collected during the fieldwork have been 
used in three distinct ways. In the first place, the observations made during the 
fieldwork gave insights to what extent the current debate has been based on ideal 
situations or assumptions (something that can be called the 'North Sentinel Island 
syndrome'). Second, while it is acknowledged that there is a need for injecting 
empirical evidence into the theoretical debate about bioprospecting and intellectual 
property rights, the fieldwork has also shown that this must be done in a careful and 
self-critical manner. Therefore, the data that have been collected about the San's 
opinion about the use and management of traditional knowledge has only been used as 
an illustration to the theoretical debate. This is also reflected in the way the fieldwork 
data and observations are presented in this thesis, i. e. mainly through separate 
narratives in 'intermezzo'. These intermezzi are used, where appropriate, to exemplify 
some of the theoretical findings with observations, quotes and anecdotes from the 
field (for more details on this approach see Appendix 1). In addition, the decision to 
use the fieldwork data as anecdotal and to represent it as a separate story line has also 
been influenced by the belief that it is more appropriate to represent the findings on an 
individual level and the belief that the opinion of an individual must be represented in 
its original format. Therefore, stories that were told by the San, or the researcher's 
25 
own observation will be included as 'raw material' in the intermezzi. Furthermore, 
while this sort of research can be seen as theoretical and abstract, the intermezzi are 
included as a reminder that the research has also a direct bearing on what is, for some 
people, a very harsh reality. Finally, the observations and data of the fieldwork have 
also been used in a more direct way for analysing the Hoodia benefit sharing case 
study because this part of the thesis concerns the evaluation of a process against the 
background of the CBD requirements, which justifies using the fieldwork data in a 
more direct way. 
3 Structure of the Thesis 
Given the fact that the fieldwork observations and data have not been used to illustrate 
the argument in this thesis rather than as central evidence, it is also decided that, 
following the same logic, the description of the methodology that was used during the 
fieldwork should not be part of the main body of the thesis; the fieldwork 
methodology is described in detail in Appendix 1. 
The dissertation consists of three distinct parts. The first part deals with the aim to 
deconstruct the assumptions that have been made in the current debate about 
bioprospecting, traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights. Chapter 2 sets 
out to define traditional knowledge and demonstrates that traditional knowledge 
should not be defined as something that is opposed to scientific knowledge. Instead, it 
is argued in this chapter that more attention should be given to finding areas of 
compatibility between the two knowledge systems. Chapter 3 reflects on the 
commodification debate of traditional knowledge and furthers this debate by 
approaching this topic from a new angle. It is argued in this chapter that examining 
the commodification of traditional knowledge from an anthropological perspective 
can help to deconstruct the current polemics about commodification and show that 
commodification can have different meanings and can serve different purposes 
depending on the lifestory of things or knowledge. Chapter 4 deals with one of the 
most persistent myths in the debate about traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property rights. This chapter will assess the portrayed dualism between individual and 
community-based property rights. It is argued in this chapter that examining property 
relations from a local and contextualised point of view will add richness and a 
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different kind of 'realism' to the debate about intellectual property rights over 
traditional knowledge in comparison to a debate that is based on homogenised 
thinking about property relations, viz. individual versus communal. 
The second part of the dissertation relates to the second aim of this thesis and 
examines to what extent intellectual property rights are an appropriate tool to protect 
traditional knowledge. Chapter 5 questions whether it is possible for indigenous 
peoples to use the current intellectual property rights system to their own advantage. 
The chapter will explore the potential usefulness of the existing intellectual property 
rights regime as a mechanism to help indigenous peoples to exert control over their 
knowledge, both when they seek to protect their culture and when they seek to 
commodify certain aspects of their knowledge. It is argued in this chapter not only 
that the development of intellectual property rights as a tool to empower 
disadvantaged and excluded people runs counter to the logic that has driven the 
development of intellectual property rights to date, but also that the current 
intellectual 'property rights framework would trap indigenous peoples in an 
unrealistically frozen and backward looking identity which may hinder wider 
aspirations to overcome social and economic exclusion. Chapter 6 provides an 
overview of the currently proposed protection tools and assesses whether defensive or 
positive protection mechanisms can redress the imbalanced use of traditional 
knowledge. It is argued that both these mechanisms are too much embedded in the 
dominant ideology of a Euro-American legal, institutionalised and formal framework. 
The challenge emerging from this chapter is to focus on strengthening the recognition 
of indigenous peoples and their needs without capturing them in an 'essential ised'9 
framework that is bounded in time, place and tradition. 
The final part of the dissertation addresses the third aim of this thesis, viz. it 
contextualises the current debate by focusing more closely on the case study of the 
San. Chapter 7 examines whether the CBD can achieve one of its main objectives, viz. 
ensuring fair and equitable sharing of the benefits, by examining the Hoodia benefit 
sharing agreement based on observations made during the fieldwork and interviews 
9 The concept of essentialising will be discussed al great length throughout this thesis, but for the sake 
of clarity, at this point it can be summarised as over-determining the characteristics of specific 
identities, in this case indigenous peoples. 
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with the San. More specifically, this chapter investigates the views and perceptions of 
the San on what embodies 'fairness' and 'equity' in relation to the Hoodia benefit 
sharing agreement. This case study underlines a serious weakness in the CBD as it 
demonstrates how inequities in knowledge and power between indigenous peoples 
and, for example, companies can result in definitions of fairness and equity that are 
predominantly shaped by the latter. Chapter 8 examines the feasibility of introducing 
the concept of legal pluralism into the debate about how to protect traditional 
knowledge. It is argued in this chapter that those scholars who call for customary law 
to play a more prominent role in the development of appropriate rules and 
mechanisms to manage and/or protect the use of traditional knowledge have not so far 
sufficiently inquired how to define customary law; where to find it; and how to 
integrate the - as currently portrayed in the literature - two opposing legal 
frameworks. This raises several wider issues that will be addressed in this chapter: 
viz. what is the role of law in society and what is the nature of customary law in 
national and international law? Furthermore, debating the meaning of legal pluralism 
and the challenges it poses will also highlight the need to revisit and contextualise the 
relationship between Western powers and indigenous peoples in terms of how 
Western law and statecraft have affected the rights, dignity, culture and customs of 
indigenous peoples. Chapter 9 examines the link between traditional knowledge and 
territorial rights. Using the case study of the San as an example, this chapter focuses 
specifically on the role of the state as the key actor in the struggle of indigenous 
peoples to restore their rights over land, resources and knowledge. It is argued that 
territoriality may in fact be a more useful concept to guide the debate about traditional 
knowledge and how to protect it than intellectual property rights. Taking the San as an 
example, it is argued in this chapter that focusing on territoriality also shows that the 
San confront a socio-political climate that drives them to make claims of authenticity 
which inhibit them from developing an 'inside-out' identity. Furthermore, in order to 
grasp the real tragedy of traditional knowledge, attention should be brought back to 
the local, because a better understanding of socio-cultural, economic and political 
settings at the local level will help to inform the relevance of the debate at the 
international level without the latter resulting in essentialising indigeneity. Finally, 
chapter 10 will present the overall conclusions of this thesis. 
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PART I 
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Chapter 2- 'Us'and 'Them' 
10 
Revisiting Definitions of Traditional Knowledge 
I Introduction 
Since the 1960s there has been an increased interest in the revival of traditional 
knowledge for romantic and practical reasons. The romantic reason is linked to the 
political climate of 'counter culture' wherein indigenous peoples are characterised as 
being in complete harmony with nature contrary to Western people who are 
increasingly destroying nature through their lifestyle (Ellen and Harris, 2000). On the 
practical side, traditional knowledge systems are perceived as valid contributors to 
stimulating rural development, especially since development workers have argued that 
industrialised knowledge systems have failed to eradicate poverty in the developing 
countries (Pottier, 2003). For the last two decades, traditional knowledge is also on 
the radar of researchers and development practitioners who argue that traditional 
knowledge is in great danger of becoming extinct if no measures are taken to record, 
protect and preserve traditional knowledge. Looking at these reasons from a 
discursive perspective, the revival of traditional knowledge is linked to the rhetoric of 
sustainable development (Escobar, 1998) and conservation of biodiversity (Blakeney, 
2000) which in turn anchors the debate in the dialectics about relationships between 
culture and nature. 
Returning to the question of how to protect and preserve traditional knowledge, it is 
agreed in most of the literature that safeguarding traditional knowledge through the 
Western legal system of intellectual property rights is challenging the boundaries 
between divergent socio-legal and economic systems (see e. g. contributions in 
Greaves, 1994; Brush and Stabinsky, 1996; Ahrdn, 2002; Riley, 2004a). Some frame 
it as a clash between indigenous and non-indigenous cultures or non-Western 
traditional societies versus Western industrialised societies or traditional versus 
scientific knowledge (Smith et aL, 2000). 
10 The terms traditional knowledge and indigenous knowledge are used interchangeably in the literature 
while strictly speaking not all traditional knowledge is indigenous knowledge. The common approach 
to use both terms interchangeably is also followed in this dissertation. 
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The discussion about appropriate protection mechanisms for traditional knowledge 
has taken centre stage in international fora like the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), TRIPS and CBD. While the relevant institutions dealing with 
intellectual property rights and traditional knowledge have specified the 
characteristics of traditional knowledge, it remains very difficult to define traditional 
knowledge in precise legal terms (Gervais, 2003). This opinion is shared by the WIPO 
which has admitted, after its fact-finding missions with indigenous peoples, that there 
is a real need for terminological clarity (Leistner, 2004). Dutfield (2002b; 2004) has 
summarised how experts have solved this definitional dilemma. Some argue it is 
easier to define what traditional knowledge is not rather than what it is; others 
highlight the opposite traits of traditional knowledge vis-A-vis scientific knowledge. 
In very broad terms, traditional knowledge consists of different categories such as, 
amongst others: folklore, language, agricultural knowledge, medicinal knowledge, 
ecological knowledge and heritage. The WIPO also distinguishes between the tangible 
aspects of traditional knowledge (i. e. genetic resources) and the intangible 
components (i. e. knowledge itselo. For the custodians of traditional knowledge it is 
especially the intangible component that gives value and meaning to traditional 
knowledge (Dondolo, 2005). 
Based on the definitions as compiled in Table 1, two preliminary impressions emerge. 
First, both academic literature and relevant international institutions argue that 
traditional knowledge distinguishes itself from scientific knowledge in the way it is 
generated, recorded and transmitted. Second, traditional knowledge is to a certain 
extent culturally bounded in space and time. In other words, the above definitions 
emphasise two separate categories of knowledge - Western and indigenous - each 
confined by its own characteristics and divergent worldviews including how culture 
and nature are constructed (Agrawal, 1995; Escobar, 1998). 
Whilst acknowledging that there are obvious differences between indigenous and 
Western knowledge (see Table 2), it is argued in this chapter that the definitions (as 
exemplified in Table 1) which overemphasise the difference are dubious. The way in 
which traditional knowledge is currently characterised is another variation on the 
debate over modernity versus traditionalism, a discussion which Ellen and Harris 
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(2000) argue has to be interpreted with caution. The more critical literature engages 
with the definitional problems of traditional knowledge and concludes that the current 
definitions of traditional knowledge are too simple, narrow-minded and unnecessarily 
overemphasise the dichotomy between Western and traditional knowledge (see e. g. 
Nel, 2005; Wallner, 2005; du Toit, 2005; Ntsoane, 2005). 
This chapter will assess in more detail the dualism between traditional and modem 
knowledge; where does it come from, what are the consequences and can the two, at 
first sight, opposing knowledge systems be integrated? Exploring the meaning of 
traditional knowledge is not just an issue of rhetoric or epistemology. The fact that 
international institutions like the CBD and WIPO promote opposing knowledge 
systems by setting boundaries around culture has repercussions on the debate over 
whether and how traditional knowledge should be protected in order to preserve 
biological and cultural diversity. While cultural studies recognise the reality of change 
and the fluidity and permeability of knowledge and cultural hybridity of most 
innovations (see for example Patel, 1996), law, on the other hand, reinforces cultural 
boundaries by virtue of the legal recognition that traditional knowledge is (culturally) 
bounded in space and time (Coombe, 1998a). However, cultural perceptions of 
traditional knowledge might not be as 'innocent' as they may appear at first (Nel, 
2005: 7). The whole debate about what is traditional knowledge is determined by 
underlying epistemologies that in turn are historically and arguably also culturally 
framed. It is argued in this chapter that defining traditional knowledge on the basis of 
fixed cultural stereotypes has implications for the welfare and survival of indigenous 
peoples. The debate about traditional knowledge - what it is and how it should be 
protected - must be considered as part of a process that Stehr (2003) has called 
knowledge politics. The essence of knowledge politics lies in the strategic efforts that 
are undertaken to move the social control of knowledge into cultural, economic and 
political centres of society. The main concern of knowledge politics is generating 
rules and sanctions pertaining to the relevant actors to affix property relations and 
application of knowledge. In this chapter it is argued that the debate about what is 
traditional knowledge must be located firmly in this context of knowledge politics, a 
process that is according to Stehr "interwoven with different cultural, economic and 
historical traditions, institutional designs and legal arrangements - concerning the 
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relations between power and science and of course transnational organisations and 
movements" (2003: 645). 
Table 1: Definitions of traditional knowledge 
The CBD in Article 80), defines traditional knowledge as the knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
WIPO defines traditional knowledge as a subset of heritage whereby heritage is 
defined as "[ ... ] the tradition based literary, artistic or scientific work; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks; names and symbols; undisclosed 
information; and all other tradition-based innovations and creations resulting ftom 
intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific or artistic fields" and tradition is 
defined as "[ ... ] knowledge systems, creations, innovations and cultural expressions 
that have generally been transmittedftom generation to generation, are generally 
regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its territory and are constantly 
evolving in response to a changing environment"" (WIPO, 1998-1999 Intellectual 
Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders, WIPO Report 
on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge, 2001: 
25 available at http: //www. wipo. int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/P d f /Partl. pdf). 
ý - -` Traditional knowledge is used to "[ .. J differentiate knowledge developed by a given 
community ftom the international knowledge system as generated through 
universities, government research centres and industry actors" (Warren, 1998: 13 in 
Gehl Sampath, 2004: 715). 
Traditional knowledge or indigenous knowledge is the unique traditional, local 
knowledge existing within and developed around the specific conditions of women 
and men to a particular geographic area " (Grenier, 1998: 1 in Gehl Sampath, 2004: 
715). 
Traditional knowledge is the j systematic information that remains in the 
informal sector, usually unwritten and preserved in oral tradition rather than texts 
[ ... j [1t] is culturalfly] specific, whereasformal knowledge is decultured" (Brush and Stabinsky, 1996: 4 in Kihwelo, 2005: 345). 
Traditional knowledge is the "[ ... ] knowledge held and used by people who identify themselves as indigenous to a place based on a combination of cultural distinctiveness and prior territorial occupancy relative to a more recently arrived 
population with its own distinct and subsequently dominant culture " (Mugabe, 1999: 
2-3 in Kihwelo, 2005: 346). 
Source: Compiled and sourced from Gervais (2003); Gehl Sampath (2004); Kihwelo 
(2005). 
The chapter will be structured as follows. First, an overview will be given of the way 
in which traditional knowledge is currently assessed in the mainstream literature. 
" Note that the draft report stated that traditional knowledge is also characterised by being developed 
in a non-systematic way. Following a comment of the Future Harvest Centres that indigenous and local 
communities have systematically developed and maintained traditional knowledge to meet changing 
local conditions, the WIPO has changed the working definition accordingly. 
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Particular attention will be given to the depiction of indigenous peoples who 
apprehend the world differently than modem people and how these opposing 
worldviews have influenced the opposite perceptions about what is knowledge, how it 
is generated, recorded and transmitted. Next, it will be examined why there is a 
continuing belief and representation of the different knowledge systems as contrasting 
pairs of opposites. This will be followed by a closer assessment of whether this 
representation is an accurate one which will then lead to an examination of the 
consequences of this misinterpretation. It will be explored whether there is a danger 
that by emphasising the dualistic opposition between traditional and scientific 
knowledge, fundamental areas of compatibility are ignored. Finally, it will be 
examined whether traditional knowledge can be better understood if the focus shifts 
from opposing it to scientific knowledge to a point of finding areas of integration and 
influence. While it is argued in this chapter that traditional knowledge is a concept 
that is difficult to capture in a definition, by deconstructing the current definitions and 
placing the discussion in a historical and political context, a new understanding of 
traditional knowledge emerges that ultimately leads to shifting the centre of the 
argument from traditional to local. 
2 Traditional versus Western Knowledge 
2.1 Indigenous versus Western Worldviews 
f 
It is widely believed and accepted that indigenous peoples 12 apprehend the world in a 
different way than 'modem' people. One of the most striking distinctions between 
these two worldviews is that, in general, indigenous models do not distinguish 
between the biophysical, human and spiritual worlds. Unlike Western models, 
indigenous models do not possess, nor believe, in a strong dichotomy between nature 
and society; instead, the three spheres are tightly grafted in social relations (Escobar, 
1998). 
Not only are human beings related to non-human living organisms, in some 
indigenous communities it is believed that humans can be transformed into other 
living forms through death, rebirth, ritual or shamanism. In other words, ancestral 
12 This argument can be extended to include in more general terms rural communities in developing 
countries (see for example, Escobar, 1998), but within the scope of this thesis the 
focus is limited to 
indigenous peoples only. 
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spirits continue to manifest themselves through the cosmic connectedness with human 
and non-human beings. Posey (2002b), one of the greatest experts in indigenous 
knowledge systems, has argued that it is precisely the local or indigenous knowledge 
systems that can give insights into how the spiritual is attached to the material or in 
more generic realms how culture is embedded in land. The indigenous relation to land 
or the promotion of land as landscape manifests itself in the connectivity between land 
and "history, spiritual being, aesthetic meaning, social relations and concepts of 
nature" (Abramson and Theodossopoulos, 2000: 1). The link between land, people, 
spirits and their combined history transforms landscape into a distinctive cultural fact 
and gives it even a mythical significance (ibid. ). 
Because of the 'sacred' balance between life, land and society, knowledge emanates 
from a spiritual source. It is believed that in the modem worldview knowledge is 
rooted in a linear and scientific base. In the indigenous worldview, spirits are just as 
much part of reality as is the material and some would even argue that it is even more 
powerful. According to Suzuki (1999), "science can never adequately describe the 
holism of indigenous knowledge and belief In fact, science is far behind indigenous 
knowledge because it still sees nature as only objectsfor human use and exploitation 
[ ... J [and] scientific objectivity tends to mask the moral and ethical implications that 
emerge ftom the functionalist anthropocentrism that informs much scientific 
research" (Suzuki, 1999: 72-73 in Posey, 2002b: 30). 
There is a common belief that Western worldviews differ from indigenous ones in that 
the latter's ancestral past is embedded in an immediate present; knowledge is 
culturally contextualised and indigenous peoples retain, through embodiment of 
ancestral spirits, hereditary links to particular land (Smith et aL, 2000). In other 
words, different cultures have divergent understandings of the world and how nature 
and culture is constructed. These opposing worldviews are partly shaped by what, at 
first sight, looks like contrasting values, beliefs and ideologies exemplified in the 
scientific, high-tech 'we' versus indigenous, low-tech 'them' debate (Sillitoe, 2002b), 
an issue that will be discussed in the following section. 
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2.2 Scientific versus Traditional Knowledge 
Agrawal (1995) has classified the distinctions that are made in the mainstream 
literature about traditional knowledge into three categories: substantive, 
methodological/epistemological and contextual. Starting with the substantive 
elements such as subject matter, it is thought that traditional knowledge is mainly 
concerned with the daily livelihoods of indigenous peoples, while scientific 
knowledge focuses on abstract ideas and philosophies. With regards to 
epistemological and methodological differences, it is argued that science is 
characterised by being open, systematic, objective, analytical and builds upon 
previous experiments and experiences; traditional knowledge, on the other hand, is 
based in, and in fact reinforces, 'common' sense. Finally, it is believed that traditional 
knowledge is contextualised and embedded in the daily life of people, while modem 
knowledge is perceived as being abstract and not influenced by the lived experiences 
of the people who generate knowledge. According to this categorisation modem 
knowledge is created in a social vacuum, remote from the lives of people and context. 
In short, science in its search for universal truth favours reductionism, while 
traditional knowledge emphasises the importance of situated knowledges (Curry and 
McGuire, 2002). As exemplified in Table 2, science is usually depicted as more 
rational, theoretical, evidence based and better integrated in comparison to traditional 
knowledge (Sillitoe, 2002a). 
Table 2: Indigenous knowledge versus scientific knowledge 
Features 
Relationships 
Communication 
Dominant mode of thought 
Characteristics 
Source: Sillitoe (2002a): I 10 
Indigenous Scientific 
Subordinate Dominant 
Oral Written 
Teaching through doing Didactic 
Intuitive Analytical 
Holistic Reductionist 
Subjective Objective 
Experiential Positivist 
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2.3 Culturally Bounded in Space and Time 
As briefly touched upon above, suggestions have been made that traditional 
knowledge is bounded and exists to a certain extent in primordial isolation 13 . 
Indigenous peoples are depicted as resisting the forces of globalisation by remaining 
pristine and unchanging. In this respect traditional knowledge is often perceived as 
'local' knowledge strongly tied to a specific place (Nygren, 1999). Consequently, 
knowledge can only be passed on from one generation to another while people 
belonging to another place are excluded from knowledge transfer. In other words, it is 
believed that traditional knowledge is bounded by culture (Brush, 1996a). 
According to Cleveland and Soleri (2002) many researchers differentiate between 
scientific and traditional knowledge in such a way that the latter is pictured in its 
essentialised form, viz. being "organic, holistic, intuitive, local, socially constructed, 
practical and egalitarian" (Cleveland and Soled, 2002: 210). In contrast, scientific 
knowledge is depicted as "rationalistic, reductionist, theoretical, abstract, objectively 
verifiable and imperialistic" (ibid. ). While it certainly must be acknowledged that 
there are numerous differences between the two knowledge systems, the question 
must be asked whether this dichotomy is actually an accurate description of the 
reality. There are authors who argue that the polarities between, for example, oral and 
written, narrative and definitive, fluid and fixed, practical and universal principles are 
too simplistic (see for example Smith et al., 2000; Sillitoe, 2002b; Nygren, 1999). The 
question then arises why there is a continuing representation and belief in the validity 
of depicting different knowledge systems as contrasting pairs of opposites. This 
question will be examined in the following section. 
Modernist and Postmodernist Views of Knowledge Systems 
Pottier (2003) partially answers the above question when he argues that the positivist 
view that knowledge is unitary and systernatised explains why modern scientists 
continue to regard science as superior to traditional knowledge by emphasising 
simplified dichotomies devoid of any real social embeddedness. Other defining 
characteristics have also been attributed to this positivist framework. For example, it 
13 It is important to note that the definition in the WIPO Report acknowledges that traditional 
knowledge evolves in response to its changing environment. 
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is argued that it emphasises competition rather than cooperation, focuses on the 
individual rather than on the collective and stresses regulation rather than 
responsibilities (Smith, 2000). These statements merit examination in more detail of 
the extent to which science has played a role in the history of dichotomising 
knowledge. 
3.1 Modernist View 
As summarised by Curry and McGuire (2002), in the 'Age of Reason' it was 
increasingly believed that everyday knowledge production was inefficient and too 
much based on subjective imageries. Experiences had to be framed in a more 
concrete, universal and truthful way. While it was acknowledged that to a certain 
extent knowledge was a communal product, in the 'Age of Reason' the emphasis in 
knowledge creation shifted towards the individual. The successes of Francis Bacon, 
Ren6 Descartes, Isaac Newton, to name just a few, offered a new way of producing 
knowledge which was later tied to David Hume's empiricism. As a result the 
perceptions of the individual scientist became increasingly more important at the 
expense of community experiences in the process of knowledge production. In the 
quest for certitude, science - in its logical positivist form - separated itself from its 
context and from other forms of knowledge production and, instead, proclaimed 
divergence between different knowledge systems. The strong emphasis on the 
empirical foundation of science was used to downplay the communal aspects of 
knowledge creation. Empiricism could ensure that decision would not be taken on an 
irrational basis; this had to be avoided at all costs because irrationality was the 
antidote to 'universal bedrock principles' (Curry and McGuire, 2002). 
According to Curry and McGuire (2002), this way of thinking about science had also 
repercussions in the way society and politics were perceived. Locke and other 
Enlightenment thinkers universalised European society and its socio-economic and 
political infrastructure by separating themselves from the non-Europeans they 
encountered and whom they considered to be less advanced. The Enlightenment 
philosophical thinking was perceived to be an endpoint in supremacy and anybody 
else was measured against it (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Curry and McGuire, 2002). In other 
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words, the Enlightenment measured how far other people were removed from 
achieving European civilisation. 
Enlightenment worldviews supported a technocratic and social science steeped in 
universal laws of behaviour; 'from then on, social science portrayed the study of a 
particular place as one that produced a deficient version of knowledge " (Curry and 
McGuire 2002: 33). European civilisation universalised its assets, and linked its own 
raison d'6tre to the perceived and purported inferiority of those on the outside of its 
civilisation by systematically minimising and distorting the knowledge of 'others' 
(Curry and McGuire, 2002). 
According to Niezen (2003), Max Weber has justifiably argued that there is a social 
and personal cost to be paid for modernity: "One of the most compelling features of 
modernity is the overwhelming power of bureaucracy and law over tradition and 
charisma" (Niezen, 2003: 141). An authority that adheres to rules and hierarchies 
replaces the comfort of tradition. In modernity there is no place for the combined 
existence of these two systems of legitimacy. Universal bureaucracy has to replace the 
arbitrariness of tradition. According to Weber, Europeans had moved one step closer 
to achieving their goal of social convergence in which all societies resemble the 
leading model of modernity (Niezen, 2003). Or to borrow Giddens' words "inherent 
in the idea ofmodernity is a contrast with tradition " (Giddens, 2004: 36). 
The civilisation equated with modernity came into being because it opposed itself to 
its antithesis, viz. the savage. "In order to define 'us'there must he a corresponding 
'them' against whom 'we' come to recognise ourselves as different" (Shore, 1993: 
782 in Fitzpatrick, 2001: 63). In order to establish an encompassing modernity, 
initially the self created an 'other' against which modernity is constituted, but 
although the 'other' was in the first instance excluded from modernity, the process of 
creating an encompassing modernity could only be achieved when the 'other' was 
eventually included in the modem civilisation. In this sense the 'savage' or the 'other' 
remains excluded from the origins of modernity. The 'other' can never be the same, 
but at the same time is repelled for its otherness. The 'other' is doomed to perpetually 
strive to attain the status of the modem, but will be denied the achievement on the 
basis of his intrinsic 'otherness' (Fitzpatrick, 2001). To conclude, from the moment Of 
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its existence, modemity and its identity can only be attained if the ordered, civilised 
and deterministic characteristics of modem worldviews are opposed by the 
spontaneity and mimetic responsiveness of tradition (ibid. ). In other words, modernity 
has created opposing dichotomies in order to allow its own establishment and 
omnipotence. 
Latour (1993) has argued that in order to understand the great divide between 'them' 
and 'us' we must refer back to the other great divide, viz. the one between humans 
and nonhumans. Unlike many other societies, Western civilisation has to a great 
extent stopped to embrace a symbolic or imaginary representation of nature. There is 
a total dichotomy between, on the one hand, those who were guided in their 
knowledge production by their own cultural and distorted vision they had of nature 
and those, on the other hand, who kept nature and culture completely separate. The 
initial partition between human and nonhumans or between a thing and a sign has led 
to a second fracture, viz. between the moderns and the pre-moderns. Latour (and 
others, see for example Fitzpatrick, 1992; 2001) however, strongly opposes the great 
divides. Instead, he argues, 'we' do not distinguish more between nature and culture 
than 'they' make them overlap. "Or, more exactly, we can now drop entirely the Us 
and Them dichotomy and even the distinction between moderns andpre-moderns. We 
have always built both communities ofnatures and societies" (Latour, 1993: 103). 
3.2 Postmodernist View 
"We Westerners are absolutely differentftom Others! '- such is the moderns'victory 
cry, or protracted lament" (Latour, 1993: 97). Although, as argued above, the 
dichotomy has been mainly based on overemphasised opposites, the great divide, 
however, continues to obsess. In the postmodern era, Western societies are 
nostalgically gazing back to a revisionist history and invoked purity of the 'other' 
(Gough, 2000). There is a strong recognition that difference should not lead to 
dichotomising opposites, but can be part of everyday life. Once drawn, measured and 
deemed savages, the 'other' is now used as a spotlight to highlight rather nostalgically 
how it once was for Western societies, a process labelled by some as "a lament of 
falsely re-collective nostalgiafor some lost sense of spiritualism, family, place [and] 
unity [ ... 
]" (Gough, 2000: 93-94). Precisely this sort of thinking can be found in the 
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conservationist discourse in which indigenous peoples or the other are portrayed as in 
perfect harmony with a pristine nature. There is a great danger that imposing an 
unrealistic and idealised authenticity, to which the postmodem world longs, will 
create an unjustifiable burden to indigenous identity (ibid. ). Despite the fact that most 
indigenous peoples live in circumstances far different from their hunter-gatherer days, 
in order to establish their genuineness they are compelled to choose between identities 
defined by others-modernist in which they are backward, or conservationist in which 
they are in harmony with nature (Martin and Vermeylen, 2006). 
Both the modernist and the postmodernist view of knowledge rely on a categorical 
alienation of traditional knowledge and indigenous worldviews from scientific 
knowledge and Western worldviews (Agrawal, 1995; Nygren, 1999). In scientific 
reductionism, traditional knowledge is seen as a resource of information to be 
validated or nullified by scientists. In the alternative noble savage vision, traditional 
knowledge is seen as an appropriate tool for development although the two seemingly 
opposing views, i. e. modernism and postmodernism, share a surprising commonality, 
viz. sustaining traditional knowledge as the mirror image of scientific knowledge. 
The persistent dichotomy between science and traditional knowledge is the result of 
the 'human cognitive impulse' to simplify and divide the world into just two meta 
categories (Ellen, 2004). The relationship between the two worldviews or knowledge 
systems is considerably more complex. One of the major problems with such an 
opposing classification is that it actually reinforces dichotomies. For example, hard- 
nosed scientists will probably use the dichotomous epistemology to get their argument 
across that science has a higher value. Simultaneously, romantics of tradition can use 
the same epistemology and rhetorics to praise indigenous lifestyles (Sillitoe 2002a). In 
addition, the strong emphasis on differences, which to a certain extent have been 
artificially created, prevents looking for substantial similarities in the two knowledge 
systems (Agrawal, 1995). This issue will be further examined in the next part. 
Falsified Dualism 
As mentioned previously, some of the asserted characteristics of indigenous 
knowledge must be acknowledged for its uniqueness, however at the same time it 
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must be noted that these characteristics are only a crude classification. It may be 
useful as an initial exercise to characterise traditional knowledge as an opposite to 
scientific knowledge, but continuously emphasising that traditional knowledge is 
incompatible to science is not only misleading but also a diversion of the real issues. 
Anthropologists like Ellen (2004) argue that, in order to preserve traditional 
knowledge, there is a need for an integrated theory of science which incorporates both 
traditional and modem knowledge. 
4.1 Deconstructing Polarities 
Western science's origins are usually traced back to the scientific revolution that 
started in 17 Ih Century Europe. However, Western science was not just discovered; it 
built upon existing folk knowledge, both from Europe and later the colonies, through 
systematically creating more scholarly disciplines in order to categorise in a more 
scientific way existing folk knowledge (for example, horticulture grew into botany; 
alchemy grew into chemistry; practical mechanics grew into physics) (Ellen and 
Harris, 2000). This practice of codifying traditional and folk knowledge continued 
during the 19'h Century and resulted in publications and classifications that, although 
presented as Western science, resulted from earlier codifications of traditional 
knowledge (for a concise overview of this practice see for example Ravetz, 1971: 
386-397; Barsh, 1999). Only in the early 20th Century were the ties between science 
and folk tradition disconnected (Ellen, 2002). Once both non-Westem and European 
folk knowledge were sufficiently absorbed in scientific knowledge, local or traditional 
knowledge was rejected as inferior (Ellen & Harris, 2000). The fact that (some aspects 
of) traditional knowledge are part of what is now labelled modem or Western science 
makes it a very difficult task to know where to draw the boundaries between 
traditional knowledge and science (Ellen and Harris, 2000; Ellen, 2004). 
Science and traditional knowledge are not only connected through sharing cognitive 
practices. Ellen (2004) has argued that both science and traditional knowledge share, 
to a certain extent, a framework of assumptions about how the world is constructed 
and how people relate to that world. All human beings in their perception of nature 
distinguish between the empirically observable and the symbolic and mythical values 
attached to these observations. Across different cultures examples can be found where 
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the natural is merged or bluffed with the supernatural or spiritual (e. g. animism, 
construction of monstrous beings). However, within the cultural tradition of science 
the separation between the symbolic and the technical aspects of science has been 
introduced to safeguard the rationality of science (Ellen, 2002; Ellen, 2004). It could 
be argued that science like any other knowledge system has protected the interests of 
a particular local culture, viz. that of scientists whose work conforms to an 
institutionalised model exemplified through different methods such as specific 
language use, specialist terminology, linguistic registers, taxonomic nomenclature, 
methodological protocols, specialist journals and so forth. This makes scientific 
knowledge generation, just like traditional knowledge, a political and social practice. 
Traditional knowledge is the expression of relationships between people, the 
environment and spirits and these relationships are the basis of maintaining social and 
economic links with other people and the world at large (Battiste and Henderson, 
2000). Although the format and output may be different between science and 
traditional knowledge (e. g. academic publications versus story telling), the concept of 
knowledge as a social Practice is just as relevant for science as it is for traditional 
knowledge. Or in the words of Ravetz "the deepest problems in the understanding of 
science are social rather than epistemological" (Ravetz, 1971: 7 1). He continues that 
scientific knowledge is the product of an historical process whereby knowledge 
emerges out of the subjective personal endeavour. He argues that science embodies 
the paradox of the radical difference between science as a creative, personal and 
subjective craft and science as an objective, impersonal knowledge-creating 
mechanism. 
The debate about traditional knowledge is not alone in drawing attention to the 
relationship between knowledge and social relations. The discourse on citizen science 
has also shown how science has come out of the laboratory and is conducted within 
the wider remit of social relations (Leach and Fairhead, 2002). Whether it concerns 
local knowledge, citizen science or high-tech science, all emerge and develop within a 
particular social and institutional context. Instead of explaining diverging knowledge 
systems through emphasising fundamental theoretical and epistemological 
differences, it might be more helpful to acknowledge that knowledge systems are 
political constructs and represent particular social and institutional relations (ibid. ) 
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The acceptance of the idea that all knowledge is socially produced, dissolves the 
theoretical dichotomy between indigenous and scientific knowledge and reveals 
particular social and historical relations and practices which might better explain the 
contestation between different knowledge systems than highly simplified 
dichotomised epistemologies of knowledges (Leach and Fairhead, 2002). This aspect 
will be discussed at more length in chapter 3 when the concept of commodification is 
discussed. 
In their study Feldman and Welsh (1995) have argued that by examining knowledge 
production from a feminist perspective, it becomes clear that science is not so pure as 
is sometimes presented and is a socially constructed activity. In general, knowledge 
systems are less homogenous than often claimed, but rather are fragmented by power 
relations and differences of class, race and gender. In other words, "greater attention 
to the nuances posed byfeminist perspective can challenge some ofthe assumptions of 
a Positivist framework [of science], particularly the tendency towards dualist 
thinking" (Feldman and Welsh, 1995: 3 1). 
4.2 Deconstructing Boundedness of Traditional Knowledge 
Not only has the falsified dualism between traditional and scientific knowledge been 
questioned, but also the boundedness of local knowledge in time and space must be 
criticised. Definitions of traditional knowledge are often linked to its temporal border; 
spatial context and distinctiveness (Nel, 2005). However, traditional knowledge is not 
stationary or unchanging. Instead, it is 'syncretic', meaning that it is in a constant 
process of change, continuously influenced by outside ideas (Sillitoe, 2002b: 13). 
Traditional knowledge incorporates interfaces with other knowledge systems and 
therefore it can be argued that it is socially and culturally embedded (Pottier, 2003). 
Traditional and scientific knowledge do not exist in a vacuum; both have been 
transformed as a result of interaction between Western and indigenous cultures since 
at least the 15 th Century (Agrawal, 1995). 
Statements that indigenous peoples are still living in the past and are unable to 
incorporate new challenges and situations in their knowledge systems must be 
challenged (Smith et al., 2000; Dutfield, 2006). There arc examples of indigenous 
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communities that under the pressure of colonialism have created new practices of 
culture in order to survive. Most of the indigenous communities that have dealt with 
colonialism were able to survive (Layton, 2000), and many of them had to change to 
some extent and adapt to do so. 
Emphasising essentialist and oversimplified taxonomies of difference between 
indigenous peoples and modem people obscures the meaning of traditional 
knowledge. Ontologically fixing indigenous peoples' identity is a reminder of 
colonialism and its attempt to 'other' the indigenous (Nel, 2005). In the attempt to 
reclaim the suppressed identity and knowledge of indigenous peoples, a new form of 
stereotyping has emerged. Where previously indigeneity was defined on the basis of 
race, it is now defined on the basis of an essentialised ethnicity (ibid. ). In other 
words, traditional knowledge is a difficult concept to define or to understand as long 
as it is 'captured within the ambits ofpolitical rhetoric' (Nel, 2005: 5). 
At this point, it is worthwhile to draw attention to the fact that the United Nations 
(UN) working definition of indigenous peoples 14 also emphasises the distinctive 
personality of indigenous peoples: "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are 
those, which having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct ftom other 
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or parts ofthem. Theyform, 
14 The definition of the term 'indigenous peoples' has been controversial and no single fixed definition 
has been agreed (see e. g. Keal, 2003; Niezen, 2003; Kingsbury, 1998). The chairperson-rapporteur of 
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN WGIP) has suggested to use this definition as 
a working definition. It is argued in this thesis that the concept 'indigenous' is difficult to capture in a 
definition and can lead to essentialising peoples' identity; an opinion shared by Kingsbury who argues 
that any formal and strict definition will tend to "reduce the fluidity and dynamism of social life to 
distorted and rather static formal categories" (1998: 414). One of the most controversial points in 
Cobo's definition is subjection to colonial settlement. This has led to a discussion over whether it is 
appropriate to extend the status of indigenous to Africa and Asia. This extension has even been resisted 
by some indigenous leaders from the Western hemisphere who argue that the struggles of the people 
from the decoloniscd world (such as Africa and Asia) are not similar to the struggles of, for example, 
the Aboriginals (Niezen, 2003). Some of the indigenous peoples in the Western hemisphere argue that 
what makes a people indigenous is a shared history of displacement by alien and dominant powers and 
not marginalisation by others with equally strong links to national territories. Regardless of this 
reservation, the concept of indigenous peoples is now more widely accepted in Africa, of which the 
African Working Group on Indigenous Populations is a good example. In order to address the concern 
over defining 'indigenous' in the African context, Kenrick and Lewis (2004) suggest that the Cobo 
definition must also be applied in terms of relationships (e. g. the marginalised position of [former] 
hunter-gatherers) and processes vis-A-vis other people, rather than as abstract categories. Furthermore, 
Africans who live in the same area as (former) hunter-gatherers recognise these groups as 
indigenous 
relative to themselves and refer to them to as 'first people' 
(Kenrick and Lewis, 2004). 
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at present, non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit tojuture generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, 
as the basisfor their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their cultural 
patterns, social institutions and legal systems " (Martinez-Cobo, Study of the Problem 
of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations [UN Doc. 
E. CN. 4/Sub. 2/1983/2 I /Add. ] 1983: 5 in Perrin, 2002: 24). This definition is another 
example of how a focus upon the construction, exclusion, idealisation and exotisation 
of indigenous peoples locates them outside modemity. As Perrin (2002) argues, this 
definition essentialises indigenous peoples. 
In short, ideal assumptions are in danger of leading to cross-cultural misperceptions 
and strategic misrepresentations and can result in a theory that misrepresents the 
context in which knowledge occurs and is experienced. By failing to include broader 
constitutive processes, such as context and social relations, there is the risk of 
obscuring and decontextualising local knowledge (Ellen and Harris, 2000). 
To recapitulate, it is very unlikely that the true meaning of traditional knowledge will 
be found as long as the relation between traditional and scientific knowledge is 
pictured in terms of essentialised binaries of 'them' and 'us'(Smith et aL, 2000). Both 
are complex constructs embedded in a network of social relations. Based on the above 
criticisms and findings it can be argued that although traditional knowledge is 
partially limited by space and time, it is primarily culturally confined. This suggests 
that in order to clarify the meaning of traditional knowledge, the focus of attention 
must shift away from an essentialist framing of time and space towards a broader 
aspect of social relations and context. Ideal assumptions about indigenous peoples' 
identity and knowledge systems are leading to misperceptions and are feeding into a 
theory which decontextualises the way traditional knowledge occurs and is 
experienced. In this sense the politics of identity are forging a unity and cohesion 
upon a particular group of people on the basis of encouraging the continuity of a 
discourse of 'us' and 'them' which often mirrors a distorted view of the 'other' 
(Dondolo, 2005). 
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5 Local Knowledge 
So far, it has been established in this chapter that it would be a great mistake for either 
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples to continuously compose their relations in 
terms of essentialised binaries of 'them' and 'us'. Both are complex and 
interdependent identities and situated in specific historical contexts. Therefore it is 
important that essentialism is overturned by studying the manner in which colonialist 
and post-colonialist constructions of indigeneity have formed and deformed 
indigenous identity. Indigenous identity is anchored in traditional practices, but is 
simultaneously also continuously changing and adapting to new cultural and political 
constructions (Nygren, 1999). In this sense, indigeneity has more to do with the 
encounter with modernity - epitomised in the institutions of the state, capital, science 
and property - than with timeless and locally bounded identities (Escobar, 1998). 
If the primary purpose of defining traditional knowledge is focusing on what 
constitutes traditional knowledge systems and how they can be appropriately 
protected, some have argued that the exercise is ill-served by never making explicit 
the links between power and knowledge (Agrawal, 1995). Scholars engaging with 
feminist theories have argued that the definitional and oversimplified rhetoric of 
traditional knowledge versus scientific knowledge has so far failed to address the 
underlying asymmetries of power and control. However, they argue that it is precisely 
the notion of distorted power relationships that can be held responsible for the 
continued marginalisation of indigenous peoples and the oppression of their 
knowledge systems (Agrawal, 1995). "What is needed is tofind ways to give a voice 
to local knowledges without smothering them in totalising theories" (Turribull, 199 1: 
572 in Nygren, 1999: 282). How can this be achieved? 
This requires, according to Nygren (1999), banning encompassing essentialised 
divides and, instead, re-orientating towards situated knowledge. The new focus allows 
for the recognition of the existing heterogeneous status of traditional knowledge 
whereby it is acknowledged that knowledge is part of an interconnected world and 
therefore tied to the social, scientific and technical networks with which traditional 
knowledge interacts (Hassanein and Kloppenburg, 1995). In short, in order to find 
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appropriate protection mechanisms for traditional knowledge, it is important that first 
of all a better understanding is gained of the hegemonic discourse which, so far, has 
allowed an essentialist and opposing representation of knowledge. This, in turn, will 
require a more realistic understanding of how traditional knowledge interacts with 
other knowledge systems from the perspective of the people that are studied (Nygren, 
1999). Through the interaction with other networks, traditional knowledge is 
simultaneously situated in the local and the global. This is not to say that traditional 
knowledge does not exist (Clammer, 2002). By linking the local to the global and vice 
versa, the fixed boundaries that have been built around traditional knowledge can be 
removed. This opens a new field of inquiry. The principal focus is, according to 
scholars like Agrawal and Nygren, no longer the dichotomy between traditional and 
scientific knowledge, but the hegemonic discourse that authorised essentialist 
representations through a system of power relations. 
It could also be argued that the essentialist portrayal of indigenous peoples and their 
knowledge system is also a product of postmodern cultural studies that have 
channelled their attention to culture and context rather than knowledge and substance. 
Any essentialist definition of culture is focused on the authenticity of identity limited 
in space and time and ignores the fluid character of culture. However, culture and 
cultural theory is mainly a Western concept with a contested and complex history and 
has its roots in the discourse of modernity. The use of cultural theory has also been 
criticised for allowing the dismantling of discourses of colonialism, oppression, 
subjugation and marginalisation (Van Staden, 1998). Furthermore, any definition of 
culture is already culturally determined or, in other words, culture is defined in a 
specific discourse and serves a specific aim, such as the romanticist discourse on 
traditional knowledge (ibid. ). 
However, any definition of culture should represent the space that links the past with 
reality or what Fanon has called "the space of discursive temporality" (Fanon 1986: 
25 in Nel, 2005: 10) or what Bell (1986) calls "ways of life" (in Van Staden, 1998: 
17) . As mentioned 
before, both modem and postmodem scholars make the same 
assumptions about representation and identity: both define these concepts not only in 
a social, but also a historical vacuum in their quest to attain ultimate objectivity. 
However, Wuthnow (2002) has argued that the concepts of knowledge, culture and 
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identity can only be understood for what they are when subjectivity is re-introduced in 
the equation. Notions of embodiment, location and history are the antidote to 
essentialism. In order to understand knowledge production, whether scientific or 
traditional, the value of historically framed and situated experiences must be 
authorised and legitimised. 
The relation between culture, space and identity is not just a natural characteristic of 
every human society, be it traditional or modem. Both the other's otherness and the 
coloniser's own identity are constructed identities and therefore the alleged difference 
between the two sides of the frontier, i. e. traditional versus scientific knowledge, 
should not be the point of departure for any definition of knowledge, culture or 
identity (Boccara, 2003). More attention should be given to the historical socio- 
political and economic mechanisms that have created assymetrical relations in the first 
place. Any knowledge produced cannot be detached from the circumstances in which 
it is produced. Any scholar, either in a formal or informal environment, cannot deny 
the involvement with a particular set of beliefs or social position. Therefore, 
knowledge should not be understood as an a-political concept (Said, 1993). 
The mere fact that some people have been and still are excluded from knowledge 
production makes knowledge production an act of power (Said, 1993; Clarnmer, 
2002). Knowledge creation is never a neutral process (Kassam, 2002). It is a social 
and cultural process guided by aspects of, on the one hand, power, authority and 
legitimacy and, on the other, social struggle, conflict and negotiation (Pottier, 2003). 
Instead of defining traditional knowledge on the basis of its essentialised and arguably 
falsely constructed characteristics, traditional knowledge can be better understood as 
local15 knowledge which is practical, situated in reality, while simultaneously 
recognising that it is constituted in the past but has changed and adapted to new 
constraints. In this sense local knowledge embodies a history of practices and 
represents a body of practices in appreciation of the local historical and cultural 
context. As Ingold has phrased it "knowledge of the world can be described as a 
process of enskillment in the context of our practical engagement with the 
15 Note that in this context the local is not based on an essentialised notion of place (for more details 
see Wuthnow, 2002). 
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environment" (Ingold, 1995; 1996 in Escobar, 1998: 62). It could be argued that, in 
order to appreciate the value of traditional knowledge in discussions of biodiversity 
conservation and cultural preservation of indigenous peoples and their knowledge 
system, a broader framework is needed. Rather than focusing on an essentialised 
coherent indigenous knowledge system, the point of analysis should shift towards the 
concept that local knowledge is responsive to context-specific challenges (Escobar, 
1998). 
Conclusion 
There is a danger that influential ideas of what constitutes traditional knowledge are 
constrained by continuously portraying indigenous peoples as pristine and 
unchanging. The contemporary lives of indigenous peoples are a far cry from the 
idealised past. Imposing unrealistic definitions of authentic indigeneity and traditional 
knowledge might constrain indigenous peoples' socio-economic and political 
capabilities. Ultimately, the debate about what is traditional knowledge and how it 
differs from scientific knowledge is a rhetorical debate that diverts attention from 
more important issues. 
By reducing differences between traditional and scientific knowledge to a dualistic 
opposition, fundamental areas of compatibility are ignored. It must be questioned 
whether it is valid to mark any piece of knowledge as indigenous or Western. It might 
make more sense to acknowledge that the same knowledge can have different logics 
and epistemologies, depending, for example, on the interests it serves or the manner in 
which it is generated. This finding could potentially shed new light on the debate over 
whether or not traditional knowledge should be commodified, how it should be done 
and how it can have an impact on indigenous communities. These questions will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
As a final comment with regards to terminology, since traditional knowledge and 
indigenous knowledge have been widely accepted as terms, they will also be used in 
this dissertation, but this usage in this dissertation should not be read as an acceptance 
of the essentialising characteristics of these terms. 
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Intermezzo I- Forms of Knowledge 
A Story about Hyena, Kamagu 16 , Paracetamol and Cattle 
17 
Karabas -I will never forget him for showing me some glimpses of a more heroic 
past that was never going to be again. 
In every community or village there are always stories about a local hero, somebody 
who is special. It was not any different in Omatako Valley in West Tsumkwe, except 
maybe that they have two heroes. There was this guy who, so I was told, could still 
outrun a springbok, which is the traditional way of hunting; the hunter tires the 
animal by chasing it until the animal is exhausted at which point the hunter can kill 
the animal with his spear. Unfortunately, when I met, in all likelihood, one of the last 
hunters, he was shy and refused to speak to me. Can you blame him? He probably 
sufferedftom 'Kalahari-itis': being tired of researchers. This must be a widespread 
'disease' amongst the San who probably by now know more about social science 
research methods and the piýfalls offieldwork than any nascent anthropologist or 
development worker. However, my key informants kept mentioning that there was one 
other person who I should meet, Karabas. He lived with his family in Bubi se pos, 
about 10 kilometresftom Omatako village; a beautiful drive through the deep sands 
of the Kalahari dunes. 
We set off on a Sunday, early in the morning after sharing breakfast and a cup of tea 
By now, I was used to the fact that I had to perform my morning rituals with a 
captivating audience, although every time I was brushing my teeth Ifelt awkward I 
didn't like spitting out the foam in the sand, the marks that the toothpaste left in the 
sand were still visible by the time I left. I came to see them as a symbol of my position 
as a researcher; when I left, the white marks would disappear and after a few days 
everything would be back to normal, the same poverty the same daily grind until the 
next white in 44 drives into the village and the people of Omatako will hope that this 
time everything will change. The driver(s) of this car will leave more behind thanjust 
'6Kamagu is the local name for devil's claw (see chapter 7 and Appendix 2 for more details on the 
devil's claw). 17 Extracts from field diary. 
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a few perishable white marks in the sand; maybe, just maybe they will be lucky this 
time. 
When we arrived at the homestead of Karabas, he did not look too good, neither was 
he keen to take me for a walk in the bush to show me the food and medicines that the 
San were still gathering. He complained that he felt a bit weak. I knew that the San 
were familiar with 'modern' tablets which they could getfrom the clinic; some of the 
people that I interviewed told me that they preferred the tablets from the hospital and 
they only used their traditional medicines when they did not have the money or they 
were living too far away from the hospital (but there were also people who told me 
the opposite and preferred to take traditional medicines). I only had effervescent 
paracetamol tablets with me and I offered Karabas one so at least I could help to 
reduce whateverpain he wasfeeling and maybe we couldjust sit and talk a bit. When 
the tablet dissolved in the water with noise and bubbles, Karabas thought that I gave 
him something magical; he was well impressed and immediately declared the tablets 
ftom the clinic to be inferior. After half an hour Karabas was in high spirits. He 
claimed to feel twenty years younger and told me he was ready to go. He grabbed his 
leather hunting bag which contained his bow and arrow and I would like to believe 
him that he never goes in thefield without the hunting bag. 
Once again we sat off, this time to the 'real wilderness'. This was proper 4x4 country. 
The faint track was overgrown with the thorniest of bushes who seemed bent on 
scratching away the f 5000 deposit on the hire car. Driving was a nerve wrecking 
experience anyway. It appeared that the San categorised the researchers and 
development workers who visited the communities according to their driving skills. 
Somehow, I managed to impress them and I got the nickname Schumacher. It was not 
so difficult to impress them however. My predecessor, a development worker from 
WIMSA, was such a bad driver that even the San who were always desperate to hitch 
a lift refused to get into his car. His bad driving skills were always used in the other 
stories when people complained about WIMSA and development workers in general: 
'he can't even drive, what can you expect'. So every time we set off on ajourney, and 
mostly I had between 10 to 15 people in my car, Ifelt I was scrutinised and I tried to 
make the ride as smooth as possible. The bribe of lots offresh water and oranges in 
the boot may have helped to smooth the surface. 
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When we got out of the car, Karabas spotted immediately a spoor of some wild dog. 
He told me that they are rare, but do live in that area. Again I was happy to believe 
him; in any case this was toofar awayftom any village so it could not have been the 
spoor of a domesticated dog - maybe it was the spoor of the hyena; I will never know 
and maybe that is for the best. It was a vast area and Karabas could tell me exactly 
where I couldfind what sort of herb, root, medicine, food, etc. For me everything 
looked like dry shrubs asfar as my eye could see, notfor Karabas. He came alive and 
although the paracetamol may have been partly to blame, it was obvious that Karabas 
felt more at home in the bush than in his corrugated iron shed You cannot blame him 
for that - Karabas' shed is surrounded by cattle of a few wealthy Hereros who have 
moved in the area They are farming in an area that has been allocated to the San by 
the government, but the officials do not seem to mind that the Hereros are taking the 
land of the San, that their cattle destroy the bush food and medicines of the San, and 
will leave little grass for the wild animals that will be re-introduced in the 
conservancy. 
I spent one of the most memorable days ofmy six months'fieldwork with Karabas. We 
found some Kamagu, and Karabas started to tell me a story about how the priest used 
San workers to harvest Kamagu. For weeks on end Karabas and other San workers 
stayed in the field harvesting Kamagu, which is, so I read somewhere, quite 
dangerous because you have to dig up the root and run the risk of getting bitten by a 
snake. After a whole month ofharvesting in thefield, Karabas delivered his harvest to 
the priest and in return he was paid f5!. The community in West Tsumkwe has 
decided to stop harvesting the Kamagu because yields were low and other people had 
harvested the Kamagu in an unsustainable way and now they had to waitfor Kamagu 
to grow back. It seemed that even thoughfor some people harvesting Kamagu was the 
only source of income, they refrainedfrom harvesting Kamagu. 
At the end of the day, my two key informants who were both members of the 
conservancy management team started to negotiate the sale of a cow while Karabas 
told me a story about how he fought with a leopard with his bare hands and showed 
me some impressing bite marks on his arm. This was almost surreaL For days, my key 
informants have told me stories about how important the conservancy is and how the 
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future of the San in West Tsumkwe is linked to the success of the conservancy, they 
want to introduce the 'big five' into the area and reduce the amount of cattle and 
goats, and now they are buying and selling a cow. 
There rests one more story to tell about Karabas, the story of the Hyena. During the 
first night in Omatako, the first night in my life I slept (or rather tried to sleep) in a 
tent under African skies, I was listening to the many unfamiliar noises. Some were 
more ftightening than others, but there was one particular noise than sounded really 
frightening, a noise that awakens a little voice in your head that nags 'what on earth 
motivated me to come here? 'Anyway, the noise sounded as if a herd of cows were in 
serious distress. I tried to ignore it, but when I woke up the next morning I was told 
that a Hyena had killed another cow in the village that night. There were two animals 
that ftightened me most, hyenas and snakes (a few weeks later I saw a black mamba 
and a Cape cobra). During my stay in Omatako, the Hyena returned on a regular 
basis to kill a cow or a donkey under the cover of darkness, and the villagers talked of 
little else. When I revisited Omatako village a year later, one of my key informants 
told me immediately that the Hyena was eventually tracked down and killed with bow 
and arrow - by none other than old Karabas, forever my local hero. 
54 
Chapter 3- What Are Commodities? 
Commodifying Traditional Knowledge: Deconstructing Acts 
of 'Sacrilege' and 'Defamation' 
I Introduction 
In the preceding chapter it was argued that traditional knowledge should not be 
defined on the basis of its presumed 'essentialised' character, since it is better 
understood as local knowledge which is practical and situated in a present reality; 
traditional knowledge embodies a history of social practices and an appreciation of 
the local cultural context. A focus on local knowledge allows for the recognition that 
it is part of an interconnected world, tied to scientific and technical networks with 
which it interacts. Through such interactions, traditional knowledge can be 
simultaneously situated in the local and the global. However, the recognition that 
traditional knowledge is situated in the global also means that it is now also more 
valuable to the larger world which influences its fate and may threaten its continued 
existence. For example, as indigenous medical botany increases in commercial value, 
there is a risk that plants will be decimated by overexploitation, leading to the 
extinction of species and a loss of biodiversity. The exploitation is also a challenge to 
the continued traditional utilisation of indigenous knowledge (e. g. as a result of the 
reduced availability of plants) and thereby threatens the livelihoods and the social and 
cultural integrity of the indigenous peoples who developed this knowledge. 
In other words, the growing interest in traditional knowledge raises the question 
whether it is possible for traditional knowledge to be commodified, commercialised 
and become valuable to the larger world without posing a threat to the social 
structures that sustain this knowledge and the livelihoods of indigenous peoples who 
depend on it. While some have argued that the CBD champions commercialisation 
and privatisation of intellectual and biogenetic (traditional) commons as a means to 
protect and preserve traditional knowledge 18 (see e. g. Zerbe, 2002; 2005; Boisvert and 
Caron, 2002) the process of commodification of traditional knowledge has been 
subjected to strong criticism by many academics (see e. g. Nijar, 1996; Dove, 1996; 
" See chapter 6 for further details. 
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Shiva, 1997; 2001; Takeshita, 2001; Heath and Weidlich, 2003; Halbert, 2005). 
Commodification of traditional knowledge has been opposed because 
commodification is seen as a typical characteristic of a market-based economy and 
therefore should not be incorporated into the so-called indigenous economies of gifts 
and reciprocity (see e. g. Gudeman, 1996; Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda, 2002; 
Posey, 2002a). While the very essence of the market-economy is profit accumulation 
and wealth maximisation, the gift-economy is based on the obligation to give 
something back in reciprocity (Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda, 2002). In other 
words, the debate over whether traditional knowledge should be commodified has 
been framed in the discourse of old (anthropological) oppositions between exchange 
in the West, regulated by the market and the process of commodification, and gift- 
giving in indigenous communities, regulated by principles of sharing and reciprocity. 
Some indigenous peoples have rejected the commodification of their natural and 
intellectual resources on the basis of conflicting values between industrialised and 
capitalist economies and local (indigenous) practices and have called the (mis)-use, 
possession and commercial exploitation of their heritage by non-indigenous peoples 
acts of 'sacrilege' and 'defamation' (Greene, 2004). 
The tendency to define commodities in the Marxist tradition, viz. a commodity is a 
product intended for exchange and commodities have emerged as such in the 
institutional, psychological and economic conditions of capitalism, has been widely 
embraced in the literature on traditional knowledge. Publications like Arjun 
Appadurai's (198619) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in cultural Perpsective , 
Margaret Radin's 20 (1996) Contested Commodities and Martha Ertman and Joan 
Williams' (2005) Rethinking Commodification have helped to shed new light on the 
moral, philosophical and cultural underpinnings of commodification. Appadurai 
argues that commodities should be more widely defined than purely as products for 
exchange. He defines commodities in a wider context as things with a particular type 
of social potential and suggests that even gifts could be seen as commodities. In this 
respect, commodities can exist in a wide variety of societies, Western and non- 
Western. Radin rejects the polar opposites of a pure market domain where everything 
is commodifiable and a pure non-market domain where certain things should never be 
19 Republished in 2005. 
20 Republished in 2001. 
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sold or exchanged. She argues that in some instances commodification. is less harmful 
than non-commodification. Ertman and Williams draw attention to the potentially 
empowering role of commodification. 
The current literature on intellectual property rights and traditional knowledge has 
largely failed to recognise the relevance and certainly the consequences of these and 
similar works. Even some of the most recent books on intellectual property rights and 
traditional knowledge, such as Mgbeoji (2006), Halbert (2005) and Gibson (2005), 
fail either to engage with or to have an apt understanding of the specialised body of 
literature on commodification that is exemplified by these three works. The aim of 
this chapter is to explore the potential impacts of the latest thinking on 
commodification on the debate regarding intellectual property rights and traditional 
knowledge. 
It is argued in this chapter that the dichotomy between the commodified concept of 
property in the market and the noncommodified concept of kinship-based property is 
overemphasised in the debate about the commodification of traditional knowledge 
through intellectual property rights. The conventional assumption is based on the 
belief in the existence of two hostile worlds that cannot be reconciled: on the one hand 
there is the world of an economic arena dominated by self-interest (the market) and on 
the other hand there is the world dominated by intimacy and altruism that must be 
protected from the instrumental behaviour of the market (see e. g. Posey, 2002a). The 
belief that these two worlds cannot be linked has been the ruling discourse both for 
economic scholars who defend the freedom of the market and contract and for those 
sceptical of marketisation who oppose a market in sacred things (such as traditional 
knowledge) and worry about other non-market values such as dignity, solidarity and 
equality (Ertman and Williams, 2005). 
The traditional conviction of these two hostile spheres - the market and the non- 
market - represents a distorted view of the market by emphasising its negative 
characteristics of hostility and self-interest while ignoring the more positive 
characteristics like the relational dimension (e. g. the rules that are designed to create a 
fair playing field) that is still part of many commercial relationships (e. g. see Williams 
and Zelizer, 2005). This view is also shared in some of the political and legal theories 
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of property. For example, there is an argument that property relations are a set of 
social relations among persons with respect to things. This view is endorsed by earlier 
legal realists like Cohen (1954) and more recently by critical legal scholars like Singer 
(see e. g. Singer 2000a; 2000b; Singer and Beermann, 1993) who argues that property 
is not merely an individual right, and is not based solely on the notion of self-interest 
or self-reliance. It is, in fact, an "intensely social institution" (Singer 2000a: 3)21. 
From a more historical perspective this view is also underpinned by Alexander (1997) 
who argues that the commodity theory of property 22 is only one half of the story. The 
other half of the dialectic about property, argues Alexander (1997), is the view that 
property also has another function, viz. to create the material foundation for 
maintaining the proper social order (i. e. property comes with obligations); Rose 
(1994) has called this the proprietarian role of property. Alexander continues that 
many scholars have overemphasised the commodity side or market value of property 
and ignored its proprietary role in the historical meaning and role of property, 
specifically in American law. 
In this chapter the debate on whether or not to commodify traditional knowledge is 
furthered by examining the commodification debate from a cultural studies 23 
approach. This chapter will present the viewpoint that the debate about 
commodification has so far been positioned too much in the disciplinary framework 
of law and economics. Therefore it is argued that it is necessary to revisit the debate 
from a cultural studies perspective and build further upon the concept of the cultural 
life of things, first introduced by Appadurai in 1986. Instead of viewing commodities 
and cultures as opposed to each other, the cultural study of commodities focuses on 
the changing meaning of things (including knowledge) when they pass through 
various local and global circuits and cultural meanings, including markets (Radin and 
Sunder, 2005). 
21 For a concise overview of this theory, together with some of the criticism against this theory, see 
Munzer (200 1). 
22 The commodity theory of property is based on the belief that property satisfies individual preferences 
through the process of market exchange or, to use a legal term, 'market alienability'. 
23 Note that culture in this context refers to what has been discussed in chapter 2, section 5, as the space 
that is embedded in 'reality' or 'current way of life' and does not refer to an essentialised definition of 
culture, viz. something that refers to the authenticity of identity. 
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In order to address these issues, this chapter will first examine the contrast between 
the narrow (economic) and broad (cultural) definition of commodities. After 
establishing the main arguments that support a wider definition of commodities, 
attention is turned towards the central debate, viz. can indigenous culture and 
knowledge be commodified? In order to answer this question, new theoretical 
concepts of commodification will be examined by introducing the concept of 
exploring the 'biographical life' of knowledge, culture and things in different cultural 
settings. It is argued in this chapter that examining the biographical life of a thing or 
knowledge from an anthropological perspective will help to determine whether the 
diversion of traditional knowledge from its customary path poses a threat to the social 
structures that sustain the knowledge upon which the livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples depend and whether the diversion is in response to particular changes in the 
socio-economic and political circumstances of indigenous peoples. In short, it will be 
examined whether commodification can be used as a tool to achieve social and 
economic equality. 
2 Definitions 
In general, commodification is the term used by scholars to denote the process by 
which something becoming a commodity. Inspired by the work of Karl Marx, 
commodities are often defined as something with both use and exchange value. As 
such, a commodity is just a thing that satisfies human wants and is perceived as being 
a typical characteristic of capitalism. Appadurai (2005a; 2005b) criticises this 
definition of commodities as objects of economic value for being too narrow and for 
associating commodities only with capitalist modes of production. Appadurai believes 
that commodities can be found in any sort of society, including a non-capitalist one 
because the value of a thing is not in the function of economic exchange only. A 
broader understanding of commodities would define them as goods intended for 
exchange, regardless of the form of exchange. In this sense even things that are 
exchanged in non-monetary economies can be commodities because commodities 
must not only be produced materially through exchanging one thing for another in a 
market place, but must also be perceived as a commodity (see section 3.4 for an 
example) (Kopytoff, 2005). 
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Within the remit of the cultural definition of commodities, a thing becomes a 
commodity when the meaning and the value of the thing itself are deemed appropriate 
for it to become a commodity. In other words, when a thing becomes valued, then, it 
becomes a commodity. In order to establish whether things are valuable and 
meaningful as commodities, the things must be followed through their life cycle 
because the meaning and value are inscribed in their uses and trajectories throughout 
the different stages of their life (Appadurai 2005a; 2005b). While in the economic 
sense a thing becomes a commodity when it has use and exchange value, in the 
cultural sense a thing is a commodity when it is culturally accepted as a commodity 
regardless of its use or exchange value. 
Following the realisation that commodities can be defined in economic and cultural 
senses, the next step is to apply these two different approaches to the debate about 
commodifying traditional knowledge. 
2.1 Economic Perspective 
To recapitulate, the issue that needs to be addressed is to question what should and 
should not be in the market and what are contested commodities, i. e. things that 
should never be exchanged in the market. Answering this question from an economic 
perspective will lead to a polarised debate. At one end of the spectrum, within the 
tradition of the Chicago school of economics or neo-liberal economics, it will be 
argued that everything can be commodified because all things can be exchanged in the 
marketplace for a price, including some controversial things like babies (see e. g. 
Landes and Posner, 2005). Neo-liberal economists will argue that commodification is 
inevitable and good; any legal efforts to prevent the sale of some contested 
commodities are by definition bad. The moral justification for this economistic 
argument is grounded in the belief of the supremacy of private culture. The market is 
perceived as a regulating mechanism that maximises individual preferences and 
returns. However, at the other end of the spectrum the moral neutrality of the market 
has been questioned by those (see e. g. Radin and Sunder, 2005; Radin, 2005; Radin, 
2001) who argue that particular aspects of life should not be for sale (such as 
freedom, sex, babies, etc. ). Scholars like Radin doubt whether the market is in 
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economic terms a neutral institution since, so she argues, the market has a different 
outcome for the poor and the rich. 
A style of argument similar to the latter has been used in the debate about the 
commodification of traditional knowledge, stressing that the spirit of the commodity- 
economy is deeply opposed to the spirit of the gift-economy and therefore traditional 
knowledge should never be turned into a commodity that can be sold and traded in the 
market place (see e. g. Nijar; 1996; Dove 1996; Shiva, 1997; 2001; Takeshita 2001; 
Heath and Weidlich, 2003; Gudeman, 1996; Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda 
2002; Posey, 2002a). However, as argued in great detail in the previous chapter when 
discussing the dualism between indigenous and scientific knowledge, the use of such 
binary typologies (scientific versus traditional knowledge or commodity-economy 
versus gift-economy) obliterates commonalities and continuities between different 
types of economies. This dualism between commodity-economy and gift-economy is 
parallel to the classic typology of social organisation and sensibility - that of rural and 
urban, provincial and cosmopolitan, agricultural and industrial, folk and society, 
named Gemeinschaft und Gesel1schaft by the 19'h Century German sociologist 
T6nnies (2001). However, this 'G and G' typology cannot be applied usefully to 
today's world of postmodernism, suburbanism, mass communication and 
globalisation. The dualism between traditional and scientific knowledge or 
commodity-economy and gift-economy arose in the period characterised by the 
consolidation of Western imperialism and its colonisation of indigenous peoples 
around the world. As such, it was a defining typology for an emergent modernity. 
According to Appudarai (2005a), the exaggeration of the contrast between gift and 
commodity has many sources. For example, there is the tendency to romanticise 
small-scale societies; underplay the calculative and self-aggrandising characteristics 
of non-capitalist societies; and forget that capitalist societies too have a social and 
relational dimension 
24 
. 
Based on the above arguments, it is argued in this chapter that discussing the 
commodification of traditional knowledge while using a purely economic definition 
of commodification restricts the debate. When discussing the definition of traditional 
24 This issue will be further discussed in chapter 4, section 3. 
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knowledge in chapter 2, it was argued that by reducing differences between 
indigenous and scientific knowledge to a dichotomous opposition, potentially 
fundamental areas of compatibility are ignored. It was also argued that it makes more 
sense to assume that knowledge has different logics and horizons, depending on the 
interests it serves or the manner in which it is generated. A similar argument can be 
used when discussing the definition of a commodity. Arguing that indigenous 
peoples' economic systems differ from the capitalist Western economic system 
reinforces unnecessarily the polarities between indigenous and Western societies. This 
is not in the best interest of indigenous peoples and the preservation of their 
knowledge because, as was argued in chapter two, polarities promote hierarchies and 
rigidity. Therefore it is argued in this chapter that in order to save traditional 
knowledge from a range of threats, including corporate expropriation, theme park 
caricature, and extinction, the debate over whether or not to commodify traditional 
knowledge is better served when commodities are studied from a cultural perspective. 
This approach rejects the stark opposition between market-based economies and gift- 
based economies and it does not rule out the commodity status of traditional 
knowledge by definition. Instead, it draws attention to what Appadurai (2005a) calls 
the total trajectory of traditional knowledge through its different life cycles (e. g. from 
being a sacred non-commodity to a consumable commodity) and a closer examination 
of the question why traditional knowledge has diverted from its customary path. Is the 
diversion a sign of creativity or crisis and in case of a crisis was it sparked by 
economic hardship, war or plunder; or is traditional knowledge culturally, 
economically and socially transformed as a result of changing markets and ideologies 
both locally and globally? Furthermore mapping the total trajectory of traditional 
knowledge also allows examination of whether indigenous peoples have the power 
and the capacity to restrict or oppose commodification; or whether they are rather 
embracing commodification and why; or whether traditional knowledge can be both, 
viz. a commodity in one cultural setting while simultaneously being a sacred non- 
commodity in another cultural setting? Examining commodities from a cultural 
studies perspective will allow these questions to be addressed. 
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2.2 Cultural Perspective 
Appadurai (2005a) argues that from a cultural perspective commodities are "things in 
a certain situation, a situation that can characterise many different kinds of things at 
different points in their social lives. This means looking at the commodity potential of 
all things rather than searching fruitlessly for the magic distinction between 
commodities and other sorts of things " (Appadurai, 2005a: 36). Commodities defined 
in this way, Appadurai (2005a) continues, can be disaggregated into three phases. The 
first one symbolises the commodity phase of the social life of things, meaning things 
can move in and out of the commodity state, while such movements can be slow or 
fast, reversible or terminal and normative or deviant. The second stage is the 
commodity candidacy, signifying more of a conceptual than a temporal feature. This 
refers to the standards and criteria (symbolic, classificatory and moral) that define the 
exchangeability of things in any particular social and historical context; it is the 
cultural framework in particular that defines the commodity candidacy of things. The 
final phase is the commodity context in which things may be placed, meaning that 
different social arenas will link the commodity candidacy of a thing to the commodity 
phase of its career in various ways. All these different stages in the social life of 
things emphasise that the process of commodification is heavily influenced by 
temporal, cultural, social and arguably locational factors. 
One of the most important messages in the cultural theory approach towards 
commodities is that they are not just a certain kind of a thing, but rather that all things 
have the potential to become commodities at some point in their biographical life. 
Commodification is only one stage in the life of an object and there are certainly cases 
in which at one time an object is exchanged for some form of compensation (which 
does not per definition have to be money in order to achieve the commodity status) 
but as a result of events and circumstances, the same object may be withdrawn from 
the market and become inalienable. The order of the process can also occur in reverse; 
an object can first be inalienable and then become a commodity. Kopytoff (2005) has 
called this phenomenon the 'biographical' consideration of commodification as a 
process, which is part of the anthropological tradition that uses biographical stories 
(for example, collecting life stories) to understand the cultural settings of a particular 
society. 
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In the next part of this chapter several case studies will be used to examine whether 
the diversion of traditional knowledge from its customary path poses a threat to the 
social structures that sustain the knowledge upon which the livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples depend and whether the diversion is a function of particular changes in the 
socio-economic and political circumstances of indigenous peoples. Kopytoff s (2005) 
analytical tool, viz. studying the trajectory life of a commodity from its biographical 
perspective, will be used to analyse the professionalisation of the San's traditional 
trance dance, followed by a second case study, viz. the changing use of qat. 
3 Biographical Life of Knowledge, Culture and Things 
3.1 Professionalisation of the San's Trance Dance 
The way in which things, including cultural and spiritual artefacts, can move in and 
out of commodity status can be exemplified through a case study of the 
commodification and professionalisation of the San's trance dance, based on 
anthropological studies by Guenther (1999; 2005) and Katz et aL (1997), 
complemented by the author's own fieldwork in the Omaheke region in Namibia in 
the summer of 2004. 
The trance dance has in recent times undergone some radical changes among some of 
the contemporary San, moving increasingly towards a commodified and 
professionalised status. Originally, the dance was performed for its curing ritual, held 
throughout the night around a fire, in which mostly male dancers, either single or in 
groups, dance to the chanting and clapping of women. During the dance the dancer 
reaches a trance stage through which a curing potency (nlum) is activated in the 
dancer's body, which enables the curing of all sorts of illnesses. The San perceive 
nlum to be a personally owned consumable that is shared with the community and is 
given as an unreciprocated and uncalculated gift to people who require it and may 
demand it. The dancer's rewards for giving nlum are not material but moral, such as 
personal satisfaction, the love and respect of the family and the gratitude of those he 
has saved. 
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The trance dance occupies a very central position within the spiritual and social life of 
the San. The symbolic salience of the trance dance is so important among the San that 
those living in an ethically plural community and who have consequently lost many of 
their cultural traits have revived the trance dance (such as the tKhomani San in South 
Africa). However, the quest for the revival of the trance dance already shows signs of 
the new biographical purpose of the trance dance. For example, the San leader, John 
Qace Hardbattle, formed his political action group, the Kgeikani Kweni (meaning the 
First People of the Kalahari), under the motto 'political survival through cultural 
revival', by taking trance dancers to perform at especially strategic meetings with 
politicians, donors or media representatives. 
While a number of the older dancers continue to perform their curing rite in the old 
fashion, viz. as a communal rite executed in the spirit of sharing and cooperation, 
others have professionalised the dance by incorporating a number of significant 
alterations, such as collecting payment, rationalisation and instrumentalisation of 
healing, employment of self-promoting, status-enhancing ritual and mystical props, 
and the expansion of the healer's repertoire of healing practices. Especially, collecting 
payments is a good example of the dance's move towards professionalisation. 
For some of the dancers, healing has become regular work and their only source of 
regular income on which they are dependent to sustain their livelihood. For many 
farm San, performing the trance dance is work and, within the logic of farm work to 
which they have been exposed, work is something for which one gets paid (although 
the trance dancer may make some exceptions when healing their own family 
members). Furthermore, the San copy the model of other medical specialists they 
have been in contact with (whom they refer to as Western doctors) and who charge 
the patient for their services. Not only must the patient pay for the service of the 
trance dancer, on some occasions the trance dancer expects to collect a fee from 
people just watching the dance, like tourists. 
Sometimes the healer does not get paid for his service, mainly for two reasons. First, 
people simply do not have the resources to pay him or, secondly, for cultural reasons 
people continue to believe in the values of the pre-capitalist hunter-gatherers' society, 
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viz. sharing and reciprocity. Following the logic of these values, the dancer receives 
either no return payment or the transaction is delayed indefinitely. 
Along with the professionalisation of the trance dancer, the trance dance is also 
becoming commodified in the sense that a monetary value has become attached to the 
dance. The dance has become a product and service and while, in the past, the 
motivation and validation to perform the dance was communal, diffuse and 
indeterminate, now it has become mercenary, tangible and calculable. The 
commodification of the trance dance plays itself out within a particular social context. 
When the dance is performed for the other San, the trance dance will still follow, to a 
great extent, the basic format of the original trance dance and may contain some 
elements of curing. However, when the dance is performed for Western tourists, the 
dance is substantially altered and is devoid of any elements of curing and reaching the 
stage of trance is only simulated. In other words, the trance dance in its original status 
co-exists, to a certain extent, with the professionalised and commodified trance dance. 
The trance dance has become commodified to such an extent that non-San business 
oriented people are now copying the San dances which, in turn, reinforces the 
commodified nature of the dance. 
What is the explanation for the transformation of the trance dance from a ritual 
performance carried out in the spirit of sharing and moral interaction to a rational 
service performed for a fee by a professional dancer for a client? Both internal and 
external factors can explain this. With regards to the latter, over the past decades the 
San have been confronted with many economic, social and cultural changes and many 
of the San are now living in a cash economy. Getting money for labour is now a 
commonly accepted fact in most of the San communities and this has started to 
displace the traditional sharing ethos. This also had repercussions for the trance dance 
which is now increasingly validated and transacted through money. Ultimately, this is 
leading to the objectification and depersonalisation of the dance. 
With regard to the internal factors, Guenther (2005) has identified five explanations 
for the commodification and professionalisation of the dance. The first is the erosion 
of the sharing ethos as a result of the San becoming part of the cash economy; second, 
depersonalisation of the relationship between the 'patient' and the trance dancer; 
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third, disassociation of the professionalised trance dancer from his community; fourth, 
scepticism in the community of the trance dancer's capabilities; and finally, 
competition between the trance dancers. 
To summarise, the above case study shows that the diversion of a thing from its 
customary path can be brought about through both internal (e. g. changing symbolic 
values) and external (e. g. changes in the socio-economic situation) circumstances. 
Cassanelli's (2005) case study of the changing use of qat underwrites this finding. 
3.2 The Changing Use of Qat 
According to Cassanelli (2005), analysing a commodity or a thing from its 
biographical life leads to the conclusion that a commodity responds to supply and 
demand in the economic sphere, but equally the symbolic value of a thing or a 
commodity can also change in response to social and political pressure. Cassanelli 
illustrates this with a case study of the changing rituals and use of qat, a small shrub 
whose leaves, stem and bark are chewed for their stimulating effect in northeast 
Africa. Ever since a production, distribution and consumption ban on qat was 
imposed in 1921, both the economic value and the cultural meaning of qat have 
changed from being a customary practice related to spiritual and sacred properties to a 
more secular use as a form of recreation within a specific social context. While 
traditionally the cultivation of qat was limited and only a few people in the 
community were allowed to grow it, the use of qat as a consumer good has also meant 
that it is now grown on a much larger scale. Cassanelli argues that the study of the 
changing economy of qat production, trade and consumption allows an ethnohistorical 
study of the cultural transformation of contemporary northeast Africa, ranging from 
the changing values of society to changes in agriculture, commerce and family life 
whereby the biographical life of qat has evolved from being a spiritual 'good' towards 
a consumable commodity. 
The above examples show that both the trance dance and qat have, what van 
Binsbergen (2005b) calls, 'parallel life stories'; a phenomenon that van Binsbergen 
further illustrates with the example of the sangoma cult. Sangomas are practitioners of 
herbal medicine and divination in traditional and rural societies throughout Africa, 
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and the practice is strongly rooted in a belief in ancestral spirits. While the sangoma 
cult can certainly be interpreted as a text-book example of commodification in the 
urban setting of Francistown in Botswana, at the same time the recent re-introduction 
of the cult by other people in another area of Francistown has re-established the 
traditional values of the cult in its sanctification of place and person. The new 
practitioners of the cult confront, rather than celebrate or embrace, the 
commodification aspects of the cult. In this way the vital and spiritual meaning of the 
cult, which has been lost through commodification, so it is argued by the more 
traditional Sangomas, has been restored. 
While the first two case studies of the trance dance and the use of qat illustrate that 
something that was originally not a commodity can become a commodity through 
internal and external changes and pressure, the last example of the sangoma cult 
shows that something that already was a commodity can become decommodified. 
This raises the question whether the original cultural meaning of a traditional artefact, 
service or ritual can be restored when the commodity status is reversed. 
3.3 Decom modification Process 
Harding (2005) examines whether the repatriation of an indigenous artefact could lead 
to a decommodification process of the artefact 
25 
, viz. returning the object to its prior 
status and context. Consistent with the tradition of the biographical life of things, 
Harding argues that the value and the meaning of an object are not restricted to the 
process of the last transaction. Instead, the meaning and value of an object are always 
the results of its cumulative biography. No matter how questionable it was to remove 
an artefact from its original settings and subsequently commodify it, simply returning 
the object will not undo or erase the commodification, argues Harding. She continues 
that, first, the entire history is embedded in the object and, secondly, the 
commodification of the object is often one of the main things that makes repatriation 
so valuable. In this sense the object symbolises a clash between the homogenising 
25 For more information on the debate about intellectual property rights and indigenous artefacts, see 
e. g. Nicolas and Bannister (2004) and for more information about the return of indigcnous cultural 
items, including human remains, to indigenous communities, see e. g. McLaughlin (2002). 
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forces of a larger society that pushes toward commodification and the heterogeneous 
singularising 26 (i. e. decommodification) tendencies of smaller cultural groups. 
However, Harding's argument can be further refined by arguing that whether the 
process of repatriation can be viewed as proper decommodification depends on the 
social function of the returned object. For example, when samples of the hair and skin 
of Truganini (the so called "last Tasmanian") were returned by Britaiws College of 
Surgeons to Bruny Island, these remains were cremated or buried according to the 
Tasmanian Aboriginal tradition 27 . Based on this example, 
it could be argued that the 
remains of Truganini were decommodified by giving her a ritual cremation. As 
Harding argues, while repatriated indigenous cultural artefacts displayed in tribal 
museums are not only a (symbolic) memento of the complete history of the artefacts, 
including their colonial and commodified status, they also function as a reminder of 
the fact that indigenous peoples are now actively seeking ownership over their 
cultural artefacts as part of their search for and creation of a new cultural identity. 
According to Harding, this process is linked to commodification. 
The above case studies have been used to demonstrate that things, including cultural 
and spiritual artefacts, can move in and out of a commodity status. What remains to be 
examined in this chapter is whether all things at some stage in their life cycle are 
potential candidates for commodification. In other words, are some spiritual and 
cultural objects or symbols indeed sacrosanct and therefore protected from a 
commodity status? This issue will be discussed next. 
3.4 Restrictions on Commodification 
Davenport's (2005) comparative study of economic systems in the Eastern Solomon 
Islands can give new insights. Davenport has built further upon the reasoning of 
Bronislow Malinowski, one the greatest anthropologists in the 20th Century, that a 
distinction must be made between ordinary commodities, which are exchanged 
through the usual channels like markets, and valuables, which are only exchanged for 
" The full meaning of the term 'singularisation' will be further explained later in the chapter. 
27 Truganini's skeleton was displayed in a Tasmanian museum until 1947. In 1976 her remains were 
cremated and her ashes scattered on Bruny Island (information on Truganini can be found on the 
wesbite of the European Network for Indigenous Australian Rights, see 
http: //www. eniar. ora. /news/Trup, anini. html - accessed on 31 July 2006) 
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an equal valuable and in a specific ritualised context. Davenport has found that the 
communities on the Eastern Solomon Islands also attribute two different value 
systems to objects and symbols. On the one hand there is material and economic 
value; on the other hand, there is mystical and spiritual value. While economic value 
is achieved from labour and the object is treated as a commodity that can be bought, 
sold or traded on the market, spiritual value is still linked with the supernatural and 
therefore the object is not marketable and subsequently will never achieve a 
commodity status. While it would be impossible to generalise on the basis of this 
example, it can be argued that there are indications that some things, throughout their 
life cycle, remain sacred or spiritual and will, on first sight, never become a 
commodity. Kopytoff (2005) would agree with this argument. He concludes that 
every culture or society, including Western societies, mark some parts of their 
environment as sacred or ensure that some things remain what Kopytoff calls 
singular, meaning that some things can not be commodified. 
To recapitulate, by focusing on the social history or the biographical life of things it 
becomes clear that commodification is certainly not a one-sided process whereby, for 
example, indigenous communities are forced to submit to commodification as a result 
of globalisation. Instead, the above case studies have shown that things can slip in and 
out of a commodity status and that communities like those in the examples can make 
choices over which aspects of their culture can become commodities and which not. 
Arguably, external and internal socio-economic changes might pressure people into 
making such choices, but it would be erroneous to assume that indigenous peoples are 
by definition helpless victims of the commodification process. Davenport (2005) 
shows that, while some of the materials and activities he had studied on the Eastern 
Solomon Islands were clearly valued for their spiritual values, the same materials and 
activities also had an economic value. The people themselves decided which aspects 
of the materials and activities had economic value and which parts were set aside for 
spiritual value and were therefore not part of the commodification process. The same 
cycle can also be identified in the other case studies. For example, the San's trance 
dance is for some San (e. g. for the San who have worked for many generations on 
farms) a professional and commodified dance, while for other San, usually in a more 
traditional cultural setting, the trance dance is still a non-commodified ritual. 
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In other words, there is strong evidence that undermines the validity of a generic 
binary perspective in which small-scale societies (i. e. more traditional) are seen as 
resisting commodification while complex societies (i. e. more industrialised) not only 
embrace, but also enforce commodification upon small-scale non-Western societies. 
However, this is not to argue that small-scale societies will always embrace 
commodification; there are things or objects that are indeed sacred or special and as 
such cannot be commodified. While particular cultural settings and meanings might 
explain why some communities or societies might still resist commodification of 
various materials and rituals, Kopytoff (2005) argues that in small-scale and to a 
certain extent uncommercialised (to use a romantic notion) societies the drive towards 
commodification was restricted by both the absence of a developed monetary system 
and the lack of technological development to support a commoditised society. The 
rapid introduction of new technological developments in non-Western societies has 
opened up previously closed areas to commodification. 
However, two further remarks must be made to balance Kopytoff s conclusion. First, 
the spread of Western capitalism must not be interpreted as the sole culprit in the 
destruction of pristine indigenous communities. For example, K6hler (2005) argues 
that long before the arrival of the white colonisers the Baka people (Pygmy people in 
the northwest part of the Republic of Congo) were already exposed to the concept of 
commodification through their contact with other local people such as the Bantu. The 
frequent contact between the Baka hunter-gatherers and the Bantu agriculturalists 
gradually exposed the Baka to the concept of commodification. 
Second, the introduction of money does not automatically mean that people will 
change their perception about commodities so that the society will subsequently 
embrace commodification as a generally accepted phenomenon. For example, while 
money had been part of the French economy for centuries before 1789, it was only 
with the French Revolution that the French people changed their mind about 
commodities (Reddy, 2005). This shows that the introduction of money, or any other 
4symbol' of capitalism for that matter, is in some cases not enough to cause people to 
adopt a commodified market system. Reddy's case study shows strong indications 
that a shift in thinking about some aspects in society, such as political institutions, the 
social hierarchy, the opinion of 'ordinary' people, ideological control and commercial 
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dependence contributed to a greater extent to this shift in thinking about commodities 
than the introduction of money or industrialisation. 
The same conclusion can be drawn for the examples used in this chapter. Even when 
small-scale societies increasingly become embedded in a market economy, this does 
not necessarily mean that every aspect of that culture will become commodified. On 
the contrary, based on the examples given in this study, it can be concluded that the 
underlying social structure of a particular society plays an important role in this 
process. There will certainly be examples that prove the opposite, viz. that some 
small-scale societies were forced through external factors such as colonial supremacy 
to become encapsulated in the first world as an underclass (see e. g. Lee, 2005). 
However, in order to further the debate about the commodification of traditional 
knowledge, it is important to acknowledge that indigenous peoples are not just 
helpless victims who submit to globalisation and commodification, but that they are 
capable and often participating actors who can make commodification work to their 
advantage (van Binsbergen 2005a). The focus on commodification as a tool to achieve 
social and economic equality is a very contested topic and merits more attention. The 
last part of this chapter will explore this currently emerging debate on 
commodification (see e. g. Ertman and Williams', 2005 edited volume on rethinking 
commodification). It will be examined whether their argument that commodification 
can be a liberating act can make sense in the context of the commodification of 
traditional knowledge. 
Commodification as a Liherating Act 
In their book Rethinking Commodification, Martha Ertman and Joan Williams (2005) 
argue that it is time to change the debate about commodification and go beyond the 
traditional yes-no question of whether or not to commodify. They argue "[ ... j against 
the [traditional] vision of a world bifurcated into separate hostile spheres whose 
boundary is policed by commodiflication anxiety" (2005: 4). According to the so- 
called new commodification theory, and under certain conditions, commodification 
can be an act of empowerment and emancipation. 
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While previously Radin (2001) argued that poor and subordinated people were likely 
to engage in 'desperate' exchanges, the latest works on commodification argue that 
the ability to commodify things is in fact a liberating act but, so they argue, the poor 
often have neither the ability nor the right to commodify. Early commodification 
theorists argued that the role of law is either to prevent commodification in some 
things or at least to regulate trade in a more equal manner. The new commodification 
scholars, on the other hand, argue that law should facilitate trade in a wide range of 
things that were previously labelled by the old-style commodification theorists as 
contested commodities, including sex (i. e. prostitution; see e. g. Nussbaum, 2005; 
Lucas, 2005), body parts (see e. g. Cohen, 2005) and culture (see e. g. Harding, 2005; 
Austin, 2005). However, the new commodification scholars also argue that while the 
range of things that can become commodities should be extended, it is equally 
important to focus on processes of social change so that some people would not have 
to engage with 'desperate' exchanges as the last resort to improve their lives. 
Radin and Sunder (2005) argue that commodification can only become an act of 
emancipation and liberation when poor and subordinated people are sufficiently 
involved in setting out the rules and meaning of the exchange or commodification 
process. This means that in order for commodification to work in the best interest of 
indigenous peoples, it is important that local settings are not taken for granted. There 
is a need to have a critical understanding of historical trajectories and to question 
underlying power structures that dominate local settings. In practice, this means that 
the focus of attention should shift from the yes-no question on commodification 
towards the empowerment of those who want to use their traditional knowledge and 
resources in order to improve their livelihood. Observations from the first fieldwork 
(see chapter I and Appendix I and 2 for more details on the fieldwork) will illustrate 
this further. 
During the fieldwork in Namibia and South Africa, it was established that for the 
San 28 (at least those that were interviewed) many of the natural resources (e. g. forest 
plants, timber, medicinal plants) and the knowledge over these resources have 
economic value. The San also realised that other people have or are developing an 
28 For more information on the San's perceptions on commodifying and commercialising knowledge, 
see Appendix 2. 
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interest in these resources for their economic value. In most cases the interviewees 
were not reluctant to use their natural resources and their knowledge of these as an 
economic resource. They argued that they needed to improve their economic situation 
and were convinced that full control over their natural resources (including trading) 
could be helpful in their struggle to alleviate their poverty. The San used a similar 
argument when they decided that instead of contesting the Hoodia patent they would 
rather get something out of it and started negotiations with CSIR in order to get some 
of the benefits (for more information on the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, see 
chapter 7). 
However, at the same time some people, mostly elders, emphasised that while they 
recognised that the San's medicinal plant knowledge had use and exchange value for 
outsiders (other local ethnic groups or Euro-Americans), they also continued to value 
the medicinal plants for symbolic and ritual reasons. This finding chimes with 
Malinowski (1935) and Davenport's (2005) argument that communities make a 
distinction between ordinary commodities and valuables and that one thing can 
simultaneously have an economic or material value and a mythical or spiritual value 
(for more detail see page 3.4 of this chapter). 
In general, most people that were interviewed seemed keen to start using their 
medicinal knowledge and set up partnerships with other people so they would make 
some money; however, they were worried that they did not know how to do this and 
felt ignorant and vulnerable. They argued that in order to start trading their 
knowledge, they must first feel comfortable that the contract and trading agreement 
was compatible with their own traditional rules of how knowledge is passed on 
between different parties. They would not trust an agreement that would not respect 
the San's traditional rules and customs. 
This example shows that some indigenous peoples are willing to use some of their 
knowledge as a tool for poverty alleviation, while at the same time this knowledge can 
retain its spiritual or symbolic meaning for their own use. Therefore it can be argued 
that commodification, when done in a fair and equitable way so people can derive 
economic and social value from it, is not per definition a bad thing that threatens the 
social integrity of indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, there are hardly any examples 
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where commodification of traditional knowledge has unambiguously led to an 
improvement of the social and economic position of indigenous peoples (see chapter 
7). There is a need to shift attention away from the polarised debate on 
commodification as an act of sacrilege and defamation, and focus instead on 
examining whether commodification can be or can become an act of empowerment. 
There are many obstacles that need to be overcome before such empowerment can be 
achieved. However, as indicated by the San, the first step in the right direction is the 
recognition of indigenous peoples' own rules and customs of how knowledge is 
passed on. In short, condemning commodification of traditional knowledge suppresses 
the possibility for indigenous peoples to contest the current balance of power and 
inhibits indigenous peoples from gaining control over their own lives and culture. 
Conclusion 
Just as it was concluded in chapter two that there is a danger that influential ideas of 
what constitutes traditional knowledge are constrained by continuously portraying 
indigenous peoples as pristine and unchanging, a similar problem occurs in the debate 
over whether traditional knowledge, customs and cultures should be commodified. By 
examining the social life or biographical stories of things, it becomes obvious that 
things are not static and unchanging, but have a rich story line embedded in a complex 
web of social relations and history. While from an ideal theory approach outright 
dismissal of commodification might be morally justifiable, from a more pragmatic 
approach it, would be more beneficial to question the socio-economic and political 
institutions that are responsible for subordinating indigenous peoples. It might very 
well be that claiming (cultural) property rights through commodification is the only 
option available to some indigenous peoples to improve their lives. 
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Chapter 4- What is Property? 
'Demystifying'and 'Decolonising' Property Relations in 
non-Western Cultural Settings 
I Introduction 
So far this thesis has already exposed and analysed two persistent dichotomies, viz. 
traditional versus scientific knowledge (see chapter two) and gifts and sharing versus 
commodities (see chapter three). The language used by multilateral agencies and 
some academics is framed in oppositional terms following generalisations about the 
differences between Euro-Americans and indigenous societies. It has been argued in 
the previous chapters that polarities promote hierarchies and that difference does not 
necessarily equate to opposition between the two societies; it makes more sense to 
assume that knowledge (chapter two) and things (chapter three) have different logics 
and horizons, depending on the interests they serve or the manner in which they are 
generated both in Western and non-Westem cultural settings. Before it can be 
examined in chapter five whether the current intellectual property rights framework 
represents the right tool for the protection of traditional knowledge, there remains one 
more dichotomy to be explored, viz. individual versus community-based property 
rights. This chapter will assess in more detail the dualism between individual and 
community-based property rights; where does this dualism come from; what are the 
consequences and is this bifurcated view of property relations accurate? Furthermore, 
it is argued in this chapter that examining property relations from a 'local' and 
6 contextual ised' point of view will add richness and a different kind of realism to the 
debate about intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge in comparison to a 
debate that is based on homogenised thinking about property relations, viz. individual 
versus communal. 
Theories about the meaning of 'traditional knowledge', Gcommodities' and 'property' 
are tainted by the discourse of an international community (e. g. Non-Governmental 
Organisations [NGOs], United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation [UNESCO], WIPO and other multilateral agencies) that has a track 
record of stereotyping traditional communities as the binary opposite of Western 
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communities, with little regard to the realities of their socio-economic and political 
life (Kirsch, 2004; Hirsch and Strathern, 2004). One of the most persistent 
dichotomies repeatedly used in the rhetoric of cultural property claims is the Euro- 
American belief that collective or communal rights offer a valid alternative to 
individual or private rights (Hirsch and Strathern, 2004). The categorical distinction 
between individual and private ownership on the one hand and communal and 
collective ownership on the other has its roots firmly established in Euro-American 
property theory. However, it is very unlikely that an alternative property model in a 
non-Western cultural framework will resemble the stereotypical communal property 
model (Strathern, 2004a). As a result of the binary opposition between traditional and 
scientific knowledge, gift giving and commodities and individual and communal 
rights, a particular interpretation of indigenous communities perpetuates that is often 
far removed from reality on the ground (Kirsch, 2004). 
For example, whereas Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP), argues that heritage is a 
communal right associated with a particular family, clan, tribe or kinship group, one 
of the most respected anthropologists of our time, Marilyn Strathern (2004b), argues 
that the notion of communal rights does not do justice to the complex and socially 
diverse framework of property rights in the non-Westem communities she has 
researched. Strathern (2004b) argues that if cultural property is considered as a kind 
of communal right, a bounded body that can claim communal rights must be invented. 
A new social entity has to be created, defined by its own perception of 'community' 
and based on the rights that it perceives as being part of its common heritage. As such, 
declaring collective rights over knowledge on the basis that it is part of a distinct 
culture has become a powerful construct in the politics of identity creation (Kalinoe, 
2004). While Strathern argues that in principle there is nothing wrong with this 
because new social entities have come into being throughout history, she reflects that 
whenever people claim rights over resources, it is never as united as people like Daes 
would like to believe. Every society, even the most egalitarian, will have people with 
different social positions which will entitle them to special rights over specific 
resources. 
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Strathern (2000) makes another interesting point when she argues that both advocates 
and opponents of intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge have 
embedded their argument in the framework of Euro-American property theory. While 
the advocates argue that intellectual property rights are a legal instrument that will 
allow indigenous communities to assert claims on the international stage that were 
previously thought impossible, critics argue that not everything can be considered to 
be owned because ownership implies the right of alienation and would erode the 
characteristics of collective ownership which is the typical form of ownership among 
indigenous communities. Strathem argues that criticising intellectual property rights 
for their individualistic notions strongly resembles the general disapproval of 
intellectual property rights that has been aired for the last three hundred years. 
Protesters have been arguing against private intellectual property rights in favour of 
communal forms of ownership on the basis that ideas are free goods and common 
property and should therefore not be controlled through a system of private property 
rights. 
The same type of discourse has been used by the international community in the fight 
against the exploitation of indigenous peoples' tangible and intangible resources and 
in the remedies they have proposed to stop the 'plundering'. The model of collective 
rights has been praised as the solution to curb the individualistic notion of intellectual 
property rights, as a tool to protect specific resources, as well as to preserve the 
seemingly 4pristine' characteristics of indigenous societies (such as the free sharing of 
knowledge). From an ethical point of view, critiques about the dangers of individual 
property rights and commercialism are valuable, but it would be wrong to transfer 
these critiques to a specific context without verification on the ground. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, commodification of traditional knowledge is not always a 
one-sided process and the continuous portrayal of indigenous peoples as helpless 
victims who submit to globalisation is not always accurate. Therefore, the notion that 
indigenous peoples have a collective model of properties must be questioned against 
empirical evidence. 
What may sound convincing in international fora is not necessarily a valid 
representation of the relationships which exist on the ground (Strathern, 2000; 2004a; 
2004b). For one thing, the dominant discourse on intellectual property rights and 
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traditional knowledge raises questions about what is a community and who has the 
right to share. In order to have a proper debate about intellectual property rights and 
traditional knowledge that eventually will lead to fair and practicable solutions, it is 
important to have a thorough understanding of the 'real' socio-economic and political 
life of indigenous communities and how their property systems work. If an 
appropriate system for the protection of traditional knowledge is to be developed, it is 
necessary to form a thorough understanding of what property may be in both Western 
and non-Western cultural settings. This will be the main scope of this chapter. 
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, it will be examined how indigenous 
peoples' property relations are organised followed by how the property relations are 
portrayed in the current intellectual property rights literature. Next, the framework of 
individual and community-based property rights will be assessed. The last part of this 
chapter will introduce a new framework for analysing property models that goes 
beyond the dichotomous portrayal of individual versus community-based property 
rights. 
2 Property in Non- Western Cultural Settings 
2.1 Definition of Property 
Although the theoretical meaning of property has been researched at great length, 
there is still not a conclusive and universally accepted definition of what property is 
(Hann, 1998). One reason why this has proven so difficult is that property rights are 
surrounded by rules to define and enforce them and by opposing 
ideologies to justify 
and legitimise them (Ingold et aL, 1997b). Another problem 
is that property has been 
examined from different disciplinary perspectives 
29 
, with 
little synthesis across the 
different perspectives. 
29 von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) offer a good overview of the different disciplinary perspectives 
on property, which can be summarised as follows. Political theorists like, for example, Locke, 
Rousseau, Engels and Marx have mainly examined the sources of legitimate property rights, 
emphasising in their analysis issues like the role of the state, social justice and equity, the relationship 
between power and property and the balance between the rights and freedom of individuals versus the 
needs of the collective of which the individuals are part. Legal scholars have also focused on the 
distinction between private and public property, but have also addressed the question of what sort of 
social actors should hold property rights and the relationship that (should) exist(s) between the multiple 
holders of rights in a single good. AnthropologistS, on the other hand, have mainly dealt with the 
problems of comparison across different cultures and societies focusing, for example, on the role of 
kinship in property management, on situations of legal pluralism, and generally deconstructing many 
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As discussed already in the previous chapter, there are different views on the idea of 
property. In general terms, property can be defined in two ways (Pipes, 2000). In the 
first definition, property refers to the right of the owner(s) to exploit assets to the 
exclusion of everyone else and to dispose of the assets by sale or otherwise. In the 
second definition, property is defined not as a right over things, but as relations in 
respect to things. In this definition property rights refer not to the physical possession 
or the relation between the owner and a thing, but to the relationship between the 
owner and other individuals in reference to things. The second definition that 
describes property relations as social relations between people is almost like a 
textbook anthropological definition: "The essential nature ofproperty is to befound 
in social relations rather than in any inherent attributes of the thing or object that we 
call proper Property, in other words, is not a thing, but a network of social 
relations that governs the conduct o eople with respect to the use and disposition of )fp 
things" (Hoebel, 1966: 424 in Hann, 1998: 4). This chimes with the findings of the 
previous chapter wherein it was argued that property is a social institution. However, 
as Hann cautions, the strict demarcation between things and social relations in the 
anthropological definition may be too restrictive. Therefore, he argues, property 
relations are social relations whereby "[t]he word property is best seen as directing 
attention to a vastfield of cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well 
as material contexts within which things are recognised and personal as well as 
collective identities made" (Hann, 1998: 5). The advantage of this definition is that it 
has less ethnographic 'baggage' and is very similar to the concept of the biographical 
consideration of commodities discussed in chapter two. Just like with commodities, 
the biographical story of property relations can be used to gain a better understanding 
of property as a social institution in a particular environment or society. It will 
therefore be used as a reference point for the analysis of property in this chapter. 
Western assumptions. Finally, economist , have mainly focused on the theoretical significance of 
property in managing the social and economic effects of managing scarce resources in order to satisfy 
human needs optimally. Most economists maintain the theoretical distinction between various types of 
property (open access, common property, private property and state property). 
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2.2 Property in (Former) Hunter-Gatherer Societies 
Contrary to popular beliefs, property as a concept also exists in non-Western societies. 
Discussion of property rights in hunter-gatherer societies has always been a very 
popular theme, as exemplified in the work of Ingold et aL (1997). Especially the 
question of whether hunter-gatherers hold property communally or individually has 
been a very contested area in anthropology. For a very long time the debate was 
divided between those who agreed with the view of Morgan (1877) that property was 
held communally, and those who followed Lowie (1928) who argued that property 
was held individually. However, nowadays anthropologists agree that both group 
rights and individual rights co-exist in (former) hunter-gatherer societies. 
Furthermore, it is also argued by anthropologists, following Gluckman's position 
(1965) that it is often futile to categorise property according to whether it is 
individually or communally held because, often, both individual and group rights exist 
for the same item (Barnard and Woodburn, 1997). 
Ingold (1986) agrees that this categorisation is essentially meaningless in the context 
of property in hunter-gatherer societies. He argues that, instead, it makes more sense 
to isolate particular forms of possession (e. g. land, tools, garnered food, hunted 
animals, knowledge, artefacts and so forth) and examine how ownership of these 
resources is defined in each society individually. Distinguishing between different 
hunter-gatherer societies is important because Woodburn (see e. g. Woodburn, 1982; 
1998; 2005) has argued that hunter-gatherers with a simple form of social 
organisation, viz. immediate-return systems, have different perceptions of property 
than hunter-gatherers with a more complex social organisation, viz. delayed-return 
systems. The former type of social organisation is characterised by an economic 
system in which people usually obtain an immediate return for their labour, and use 
this return with minimal delay and therefore place minimal emphasis on property 
rights. In delayed-return systems, on the other hand, people place more value on 
property rights which are usually linked with delayed yields on labour. 
in discussing property rights in hunter-gatherer societies, Barnard and Woodburn 
(1997) distinguish between five different property categories. Each of these categories 
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will be briefly discussed, focussing specifically on the rights that are linked to each 
category and how these rights are organised. 
The first category consists of the rights over land, water sources and ungarnered 
resources (like fixed assets, ritual sites, dwelling sites, hunting sites and so forth). 
Access to this type of property in immediate-return societies is, in principle, equal to 
all, but can become restricted when there is fierce competition over use of scarce 
resources. In general terms, people are naturally endowed with unconditioned rights 
of personal access to land and ungamered resources. When access is sought to another 
person's area, permission must be sought but this is in most cases easily obtained. 
Although land is divided in separate territorial categories belonging (usually) to one 
extended family, the land cannot be alienated and it is rare to refuse access to the land 
to outsiders. Property rights in this first category should not be confused with 
exclusive possessive rights; instead, possession should be more defined as custodial 
rights in the sense of having a duty to look after the land and the (ungamered) 
resources on behalf of the collectivity (Ingold, 1986). In delayed-return societies (e. g. 
Australian Aboriginals), on the other hand, access to land is more complicated and 
restricted because in these systems it is stressed that land and people are not separate 
entities and as such people draw their subsistence from their links with the land and 
with the Sacred beings who in their Dreanitime wanderings created both land and 
people. 
The second type includes rights over movable property such as weapons, clothing, 
cooking pots, beads, and so forth. This kind of property is personally owned, but is 
constrained by custom. People make their own weapons and other tools, and property 
rights are allocated to these things on the basis that individuals are entitled to hold 
property over the things they have produced with their labour (in chapter 5 this 
principle will be further examined in relation to Locke's labour theory). Another 
important rule is that people are not allowed to accumulate movable property beyond 
what they need; anything they posses in excess must be shared with others - this is a 
moral obligation. 
A third form of property rights applies to rights over food, such as meat, vegetables, 
seeds and nuts and other harvested food. For this sort of property the same rules apply 
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as for the previous category. Initially, food belongs to the person who has worked for 
it, but food must be shared when more is harvested than is needed for immediate 
consumption or when somebody else in the community is hungry. With regards to 
large animals more specific rules are applied. For example, when an animal is killed 
by more than one arrow, usually, the owner of the arrow that first hit the animal is the 
owner of the animal. However, when the hunter kills an animal with an arrow that he 
has borrowed from another hunter, usually the animal belongs to the hunter who owns 
the arrow. However, regardless of who is the initial owner of the carcass, eventually, 
it is obligatory to share the meat with all the people in the community with the owner 
receiving no more meat than everyone else. The owner receives hardly any social 
recognition as the provider of the meat. His achievement is often belittled in a practice 
known as 'insulting the meat'. Sharing the food and in particular large animals is not 
frequently practiced in delayed-retum societies; they usually have methods to store 
the carcass and the hunters are usually under less social pressure from the other 
community members to share the meat. When sharing takes place this is usually 
limited to people with whom there is a kinship relationship and tends to create 
reciprocal indebtedness. Furthermore, transactions in these societies, like sharing a 
large animal with kinship, are linked with gaining a higher status position. 
The fourth category of property rights applies over certain capacities and functions of 
specific people (e. g. rights over hunting labour, sexual capacity, reproductive 
capacity, and so forth). Such rights are not common in immediate-return systems, 
where kinship is not a mechanism used to control rights over other peoples; for 
example, men do not have any special authority over their wives. In delayed-return 
societies, on the other hand, there are frequent examples where women are treated as 
jural minors which allows men to have certain rights over the women and the products 
of their labour. 
The final form of property rights has already been discussed to a certain extent in 
chapter 3 and is the right over knowledge and intellectual property, like rights over 
dances, songs, sacred knowledge, ritual designs, and so forth. Individual rights over 
songs, dances and so forth are very common in delayed-retum societies. Sometimes 
such individual rights are held by a person on behalf of a clan or lineage and can only 
be transferred to another member of the same clan. However, there are also examples 
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when individuals hold property rights over, for example, songs and rituals on their 
own behalf (see Morphy (1997) and Keen (1997) for examples of individually owned 
intellectual property rights and Simet (2000) for an example of group-based 
intellectual property rights). In immediate-retum systems, on the other hand, 
knowledge is more often freely shared. Even though some people might possess 
special healing powers (e. g. the San's trance dance - see previous chapter for more 
details), these powers are also used for the benefit of the entire community. While 
knowledge can be individually owned, similar to the principles that apply to meat, the 
individual is obliged to utilise this knowledge for the shared benefit of the 
community. 
To recapitulate, based on the above, it can be argued that the concept of individual 
property rights over movable property (both tangible and intangible) does exist in 
(former) hunter-gatherer societies on the basis that labour is recognised as a principle 
that attributes property rights to individuals. However, other principles, like the 
obligations of sharing and gift-giving, override this basic one which makes the 
distinction between individual and community-based property rights very blurred. Just 
as for immovable property, parts of the land can be individually owned (usually 
linked to a specific function) but possession is more defined as fulfilling a custodian 
role for the benefit of the community. 
Although this very brief description of the property rights system in hunter-gatherer 
societies does not do justice to the diversity of different systems in different 
communities and the complexity (e. g. the range and depth of different property 
principles) of the principles that guide the development of property rights in any one 
society, the above illustrates that property in hunter-gatherer societies is based on a 
broad analytical concept that extends far beyond the dichotomy between individual 
and community-based property rights. As will be discussed in more detail in section 5 
of this chapter, the above examples show that people can have a bundle of rights with 
regard to different objects. This bundle of rights can vary according to the relationship 
between different property holders and different property objects and extends beyond 
having rights only; it also includes obligations. While it has been established that 
indigenous peoples' property systems are characterised by multifunctional 
relationships vis-A-vis people and property objects, in the next part of this chapter a 
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short overview will be given of how indigenous peoples' property rights systems are 
portrayed in the mainstream literature (especially non-anthropological) on intellectual 
property rights over traditional knowledge. 
3 The Danger of Oversimplifying and Romanticising Indigenous 
Realities 
So far the mechanisms proposed to regulate the protection of traditional knowledge 
have mostly been based on the assumption that traditional knowledge is communally 
owned (see e. g. Kuruk 30 , 1999; Rodriquez Stevenson, 2000; Grad, 2003; Godshall, 
2003) without considering any nuances in the organisation of property in a local 
context (Simet, 2000). For example, Cottier writes: "the idea of appropriation is 
strange to [indigenous peoples] and therefore it is argued by indigenous 
organisations that the approach of modern IPRs is not suitable "(Cottier, 1998: 572). 
or according to Khalil (1995: 241) "one important distinction between the West's 
property system and that of indigenous communities in developing countries is that 
whereas that of the West is founded on the spirit of individualism, the former is 
grounded on notions of collective ownership". Britz and Lipinski (2001) not only 
argue that indigenous perceptions of ownership rights are community-based, but also 
state that in some cultures "[ .. ]ownership, akin to Western traditions, is 
antithetical" (2001: 235). 
As discussed above, concepts of ownership or individual property rights over 
knowledge are not necessarily absent from many traditional societies, but these 
individual rights are often accompanied by certain duties. In indigenous societies, 
each member has individual rights and collective responsibilities and both are 
inextricably linked. Therefore, the failure of the current intellectual property rights 
system to protect indigenous knowledge is at least as much related to the lack of 
defined responsibilities as to the supposedly collective nature of customary rights over 
traditional knowledge (Dutfield, 2004). 
Interestingly, the critical legal scholar, Joseph Singer, has argued in The Edges of the 
Field (2000a) and Entitlement (2000b) that even Euro-Arnerican property law has 
30 Kuruk (1999) focuses mostly on folklore, but also mentions that with regard to rights over land and 
resources and knowledge there is a tension between individual and communal rights in Africa. 
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never given owners rights without also giving them responsibilities. However, in what 
Singer (2000b) calls the ownership model, more emphasis is given to the rights 
owners have over the things they own than to the obligations or limits that come with 
the property rights of the owners. In other words, while at first sight both indigenous 
and Euro-American property models are based on the principles of rights and 
obligations, it can be argued that one way in which the indigenous property model 
distinguishes itself from the Euro-American one is in the stronger emphasis it places 
on obligations and duties rather than ownership rights. This difference can be partially 
explained by the fact that the property rights of indigenous peoples are usually user 
rights. This concept of usufruct implies automatically more a duty of care than 
ownership rights. 
The danger is that oversimplifying or even mystifying property relationships in 
indigenous societies may lead to policy prescriptions of little value once they are 
applied in a particular case. One of the recurring themes in this thesis, regardless of 
whether traditional knowledge (see chapter 2), commodities (see chapter 3) or 
property relations are discussed, is the observation that indigenous peoples continue to 
find themselves dominated by Western cultural underpinnings. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the portrayal of indigenous peoples as the homogenised and idealised 
6other' leads to a situation whereby the needs of indigenous peoples are defined in 
association with prevailing generic images of indigenousness. For example, if 
indigenousness is defined as a state of backwardness, indigenous peoples' needs 
might be translated into progress and development. But if indigenousness is presented 
as in harmony with the state of nature, indigenous peoples' needs are associated with 
preserving the conservation of their culture and knowledge (Blaser, 2004b). With 
regards to bioprospecting, the latter perspective is more commonly adopted. 
As already mentioned in chapter 2, using different definitional perspectives for 
portraying indigenous peoples as part of opposing political perspectives is not a new 
phenomenon. In the 17 th Century, Hobbes (1651) typified hunter-gatherers as 'the 
primeval state of humanity, living lives described as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short' (Panter-Brick et al, 2001: 5). Dryden (1670), on the other hand, defined 
foragers as 'living in a state of grace from which the rest of humanity had fallen', 
using the famous phrase the noble savage to describe them (Panter-Brick el al., 2001: 
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5). Later, Rousseau romanticised further the idea of 'noble savage' with moral 
overtones to contrast the corruption of Western society (Schrire, 1984). 
However, the danger of politicising indigenousness is that indigenous peoples 
increasingly have to rely on claims of ethnic and cultural authenticity in their struggle 
for legitimacy, even when the persistent dominant image does not reflect the real 
identity of indigenous peoples. In that respect indigenous culture and indeed 
indigenous identity needs to be 'demystified and decolonised' (Battiste and 
Henderson, 2000). Euro-American perspectives on culture, be it cultural differences 
or policies, are invariably cast in an "all-pervasive, unavoidable imperial setting" 
(Said, 1993 in Battiste and Henderson, 2000: 14). This raises the question: what is the 
identity of indigenous peoples? There is a central contradiction in attempting to define 
the identity of indigenous peoples. On the one hand, there is the present status of 
hunter-gatherers who, as a result of increasing contact with the world, are or are 
becoming sedentary agriculturalists and semi-proletarian labourers. On the other hand, 
their knowledge, identity and cultural base remain substantially rooted in their hunter- 
gatherer histories. This theme will be further discussed in chapter 6 and 8 when an 
assessment will be made of whether community-based intellectual property rights are 
an appropriate tool to protect traditional knowledge. 
In short, it can be argued that while formal legal codes such as individual and 
communal property rights may play an important role in Western societies, a broader 
analytical concept must be applied to understand the concept of property in other 
societies (Hann, 1998; Hirsch, 2002). One way of extending the scope of analysis is to 
include the institutional and cultural contexts within which property codes operate. 
Nevertheless, as argued earlier in this chapter, the dichotomy between individual and 
communal property rights has become the dominant framework to analyse property 
relations both in the context of the dominant Western liberal property model and in 
the context of an alternative property model. The discourse of both the proponents of 
the liberal paradigm as well as those who criticise the liberal property model is 
embedded in the dominant view of individual versus communal property. Exporting 
this rhetorical model to non-Western cultural settings becomes even more problematic 
when it is considered that the Western rhetorical property model has, even in the 
Western context, been questioned for its empirical validity. Hann (1998) and von 
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Benda-Beckmann et aL (2006) argue that the Western property model idealises 
individual ownership and ignores different kinds of rights and obligations linked to 
different property objects and property holders. As a result, in the Western property 
model individual property holders have been given far stronger formal rights than 
they used to have in' social and societal contexts where rights are more bounded by 
association with responsibilities and obligations. Nevertheless, the supremacy of 
individual ownership is considered to exemplify the ideal property situation to which 
all property systems, both Western and non-Western, should aspire (ibid). However, 
as Hirsch (2002) argues, to fully engage with the debate about traditional knowledge 
and how to protect it requires questioning prejudices and misconceptions about 
'others' (i. e. indigenous peoples) and their organisation and perceptions of property 
(relations). 
4 The Danger ofDichotomising Individual and Communal 
Property Relationships 
Anthropologists like Malinowski (1935), Polanyi (1957) and Bohannan (1963) have 
criticised the practice of imposing Western property conceptions in other cultures and 
argued that pre-capitalist societies should be analysed with a more appropriate set of 
tools. This view is shared by contemporary anthropologists like the von Benda- 
Beckmann's who argue that it is crucial to resist the temptation to categorise property 
with the simple universal typology of private, state, communal and open access (von 
Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006). 
Classifying property into the four categories of open access, private property, 
communal property and state property and specifically emphasising the dichotomy 
between individual and communal property are, according to von Benda-Beckmann 
and von Benda Beckmann (2006), the most misleading concepts in the interpretation 
of property systems. For a long time, communal property was interpreted as having 
very negative economic connotations; it was dismissed as backwards in terms of 
social and legal evolution and it was perceived as an obstacle to economic and 
commercial development. More recently, the merits of communal property have 
become more recognised again and it is now often seen as useful for the protection of 
natural resources and for sustainable resource management. However, von Benda- 
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Beckmann and von Benda Beckmann (2006) argue that, in general, most policies 
based on communal property rights have had limited success because they have, so 
far, not given appropriate attention to the nature and distribution of concrete property 
relations that connect actual property objects and holders 31 . 
The 'practical' meaning of communal property (see section 2 of this chapter) is not 
easily captured and differs widely from the theoretical meaning. For example, it can 
incorporate different categories of property relations within the same society, such as 
a mixture of individual and group rights or a bundle of rights which different people 
can have over the same property. Under communal property, a wide variety of 
concretised property relations can exist, ranging from some held by larger and smaller 
groups, and some held by married couples and individuals. In other words, 
interpreting communal rights as a homogeneous category distorts the complexity of 
property relations between different groups and individuals. 
The experience of community-based forestry management in Cameroon is a good 
example of a policy which failed mainly because it was drafted on the basis of a naYve 
and decontexualised conception of community, indigenousness and property 
(Burnham, 2000). Aid programmes, sponsored by government donors and local and 
international NGOs, have promoted community-based forestry activities in the belief 
that these projects can empower local communities and can contribute to sustainable 
environmental management. Burnham (2000) argues that the management 
programmes were based upon prevalent Western notions of pristine rainforests 
inhabited by indigenous peoples whereby pristine rainforests are defined as 'primeval 
Edens' only recently being threatened by the demands of modern society; indigenous 
peoples are portrayed in very restrictive manner which does not reflect their social and 
political position. Burnham demonstrates that there is ample evidence from around the 
world that tropical rainforests are often anthropic landscapes, meaning that forests 
have been altered over the years by human impacts. In short, Burnham argues that 
despite the fact that government aid agencies and NGOs use the terms 'indigenous 
31 The distinction that von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-beckmann (2006) have introduced 
between categorical and concrete property relations is an important concept. It helps to explain the 
recurrent failure of property policies that are mostly based on categorical property relations which are 
theoretical and abstract and do not reflect the concrete, 'real' property relations on the ground that are 
usually more complex and diverse than the theoretical property frameworks. This aspect will be further 
discussed in section 5 of this chapter. 
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peoples', 'community-based conservation' and 'participatory development', they 
hardly engage with the local situation in the rainforests. According to Burnham, these 
'blind spots' for the local social and political environment cannot simply be 
interpreted as symbols of ignorance or insincerity. Instead, these 'blind spots' are 
indicators of a strategy that explicitly ignores the local situation and complex contexts 
when rainforests policies are formulated. Fashionable theories, assumptions and 
generalisations of community-based property are used as bases "that serve to oil the 
wheels of organisational consensus " (Burnham, 2000: 52). Images of indigenous 
peoples, common property, community and so forth are used in a timeless and a- 
historical manner. According to Burnham "[a] word like community, as presently 
used in notions of traditional or indigenous communities or community-based 
conservation or community forest management, serves as a myth like legitimising 
function in constructing idealised (and often idealistic) de-historicised social 
scenarios that underpin policy conceptions and discourses. Embodied in these notions 
of community is an image of small-scale, culturally uniform collectivity, governed by 
an integrated code of customs or traditions which provide effective mechanisms of 
sustainable resource allocation and dispute regulation. Absent from this 
conceptualisation are all the elements of cultural or class difference, of legal 
pluralism, [ ... J that would call into question the putative autonomy of this idealised 
community, or render it problematic for cooption to the project of rainforest 
conservation and management" (2000: 54). 
Burnham's example calls attention to a few important issues. He argues that, just as in 
the days of the colonialist regimes, modem day overseas aid and conservation projects 
employ the legal fiction or myth that 'primitive' societies are living as a coherent 
homogenous group-based society devoid of any notions of individual property. While 
in the past these misperceptions were introduced as an excuse to claim so-called 
6 fi vacant' land in the absence of a private 'master', in more recent times the iction of 
communal property rights serves the economic and political agenda of those who are 
not living in these environments (Le. donor agencies and NGOs) (von Benda- 
Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 2006). Furthermore, this case study also shows 
that property rights in non-Western cultural settings are embedded in a wider set of 
social relations and are contested in a wide variety of different legal systems (legal 
pluralism) that can be locally, ethnically, religiously or territorially defined. These 
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findings add a new dimension to the property debate and shift the area of attention 
away from the dichotomy between individual versus communal property rights 
towards the question of whose laws and whose decisions prevail - e. g. is it customary 
laW32' state law, Islamic law, international law or a combination thereof that will 
decide who has what rights over which resources? 
In other words, regardless of whether it concerns natural resource management or 
intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge, the crux of the debate does not 
lie in the dichotomy between individual versus communal property rights. Any sort of 
policy that is based on simplistic assumptions regarding communal property is 
doomed to fail for its lack of understanding that there are other issues at stake - such 
as which and whose legal framework will prevail. It is much more important to 
consider property regimes as being embedded in larger social, economic, political and 
legal constructs than to focus narrowly on the proprietary terms of individual versus 
communal property rights (which is in any case largely a Euro-American construct 
that was exported, together with other ills of imperialism, to non-Western cultural 
settings during the colonialist era). 
To recapitulate, throughout history European property concepts have been transferred 
to the colonies where they were subsequently assimilated and given the same legal 
and social status as in Europe (i. e. individual and communal property rights). This 
type of practice has been criticised by Bohannan as 'backward translation' (1969: 410 
in von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 13) or 'jamming into categories' by Nader (1965 
in von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 13). As a result any proper understanding of and 
appreciation for alternative ways of organising property relations has been seriously 
hampered. To use the words of von Benda-Beckmann, "[g7iven the many substantive 
and structural differences between cultural and legal systems, such jamming of 
foreign cultures' legal concepts and rules into categories of one's own inevitably 
leads to a backward translation which distorts the systems of the other " (2000: 15 1). 
The Western colonising approach, when describing property and analysing other non- 
Western property concepts, has led to a situation of ethnocentric bias and distortions 
32 The concept of customary law will be examined in more detail in chapter 8; within the remit of this 
chapter it suffices to define custom as something that consists of contemporary practices which draw 
on tradition insofar as tradition is part of the present (Strathern, 2004b), 
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by exporting idealised property models which are not an accurate reflection of the 
relationships which exist on the ground (this will be further discussed in the next 
section). There is thus a clear need for a new approach to the comparison of property 
concepts across different cultures. von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) argue that new 
criteria need to be developed for facilitating a cross-cultural comparative analysis of 
property relationships; the new framework they propose will be further examined in 
the next section. 
5A New Analytical Frameworkfor Analysing 'Alternative' 
Property Relationships 
According to von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006), the lack of a rigorous analytical 
framework to examine property relations across different cultures can be redressed by 
returning to earlier foundations such as the concept of property as a bundle of rights. 
While this concept can be very useful, they argue, it has rarely been used consistently. 
When used appropriately, a bundle of rights approach can assist in highlighting that 
property relations are expressed in various ways in different societies and in different 
periods of history. Such relations are expressed at three levels that include: first, the 
social units (e. g. individuals, groups, lineages, corporations and states); second, the 
construction of valuables as property objects; and third, the different sets of rights and 
obligations social units have with respect to such objects. 
In this respect a bundle of rights approach compares with the biographical life story of 
things, a concept that has been introduced in chapter 3 to argue that things and 
knowledge can have multiple cultural meanings and functions depending on time and 
place. Von Benda-Beckmann et al. use the metaphor of a bundle of rights to 
conceptualise: 'first [ ... J the totality ofproperty rights and duties as conceptualised 
in any one society and second, [ ... ] any specific form such as ownership, which by 
itself can be thought of as a bundle " (2006: 15). They also use the concept to first 
[ ... J characterise the specific rights bundled in one property object and second, to 
characterise the different kinds ofproperty held by one sociely " (2006: 15). 
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von Benda-Beckmann et aL (2006) also argue that in order to grasp the full meaning 
of property, it has to be analysed at four different analytical levels or layers at which 
property manifests itself - i. e. ideologies, legal systems, actual social relationships 
and social practices (as simplified in Figure 133). Property has a different meaning in 
each of these layers. In previous theoretical frameworks these layers were often 
reduced to one or two - viz. legal and ideological - while the other two layers - viz. 
the actual social relationships and social practices - were simply ignored or 
misinterpreted by jamming them into the imported ideological or legal analytical 
framework. Furthermore, they argue, it is also important to acknowledge that, within 
the legal and ideological framework, property can have different sources of legitimacy 
- i. e. local or traditional law, state law, international law and religious law. All these 
factors and layers must be taken into account when examining property relations from 
an empirical, descriptive and analytical approach. 
All the layers, as identified above, interact and interrelate in various ways, but a broad 
distinction can be made between two general types of property (as simplified in 
Figure 1). The first are what von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) call concrete property 
objects (first and second layer), relationships and rights which occur when people use, 
transfer, inherit or dispute a relationship with a property object. Concretised property 
relations are expressed through actual social relationships between actual property- 
holders with respect to concrete valuables. The second are categorical property 
objects (third layer). These manifest themselves in laws and rights that are reproduced 
and changed and in which the nature of property law is explained, discussed or 
disputed in settings such as courts, parliaments, mass media, academia and local fora. 
In other words, categorical property relations are linked to a legal-institutional level 
and include categories of property relations that are constructed by specific property- 
holders, property objects, and the rights and obligations attached to these. 
The fourth layer, ideological property relations, falls according to Von Benda- 
Beckmann et al. (2006), outside the remit of both categorical and concrete property 
objects and therefore must be treated as a separate phenomenon. Ideological property 
relations express themselves through general cultural ideals, ideologies and 
33 In Figure I actual social relationships and social practices are bundled into one category, viz. 
concretised property relations. 
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philosophies. Competing ideologies (e. g. capitalism versus communism or welfare 
state ideologies versus neoliberalism) differ in their representation and justification of 
both legal-institutional property relations (categorical) and existing social, quotidian 
(concrete) property relations. 
Types of Property Relations 
Categorical* Ideological" 
normative & legal 
institutional concepts 
regulations 
Concretised* ** 
social actual 
practices social 
property 
relations 
*legal-institutional property relations 
"general cultural ideas, ideologies and philosophies 
***existing social, quotidian property relations 
Figure 1: A typology of property relations (adapted from von Benda-Beckman et aL, 
2006). 
As highlighted by von-Benda-Beckmann et aL (2006), a bundle of rights approach has 
many advantages. For example, it allows a detailed identification of who has what 
rights under a private and communal property rights system and will show that private 
property actually means much more than just individual ownership, e. g. it can include 
private property held by groups, associations or corporations while communal 
property can be held by two people, some or all members of villages or the entire 
state. Furthermore, it will also allow distinctions between different sorts of rights that 
can be held under communal property, such as private or ownership rights and use 
rights. As briefly mentioned earlier, most property scholars have so far failed to 
distinguish between categorical and concrete property relationships and focus mainly 
on legal-institutional (categorical) and ideological property relations while ignoring 
actual, concretised property relations. von Benda-Beckmann et aL (2006) argue that 
both categorical and concrete property relations should be examined; while 
concretised property relations are to a large extent shaped by categorical property 
relations, they are different social phenomena and are constrained and enabled by 
different social interactions (categorical e. g. by changes in land law; concrete e. g. by 
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influx of new immigrants as a result of drought). Finally, property ideologies, legal 
institutions and concretised property relations are all part of a wider socio-economic 
and political context which influences the conditions under which social interaction 
takes place. While von Benda-Beckmann et aL (2006) acknowledge that property 
ideologies and legal rules are certainly important sources through which people can 
rationalise and contest their property relations, it is rather the social relationships and 
daily social practices that will have a greater bearing on people's dealing with 
property. This issue will be further discussed in chapter 8 wherein different sources 
and layers of law making are explored. 
To summarise with von Benda-Beckman et al. 's own words, "[pjaying attention to 
the systematic nature ofproperty and to the contexts in which property relationships 
andproperty practices are embedded allows one to study property change in its wider 
contexts [ ... j The 
layers have to be analysed in their mutual interdependence, and 
none should be privileged over the others. We think that such an approach is an 
advance over institutional approaches that either put too much emphasis on the 
categorical legal institutional ftameworks (rules of the game) or treat institutions as 
compounds in which complexes of norms, rules and behaviors that serve a collective 
purpose are lumped" (2006: 30). Nuijten and Lorenzo (2006) underwrite this more 
contextualised approach and argue that, indeed, many studies on property rights (such 
as studies on community-based resource management) assume that in most societies 
an institution exists that sets out in a formal way the rules with respect to property 
relations. However, they confirm the earlier findings in this chapter, that property 
relations are not so direct and linear and are often more complex; so they argue that in 
order to understand property relations on the ground a more sophisticated framework 
of analysis is required. Nuijten (2005) sets out, in an earlier study, these requirements 
which are very similar to the framework that von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) have 
suggested for studying property relations in a more contextualised manner. Nuijten 
(2005) acknowledges the fact that Property rights are closely linked to other socio- 
economic and political conditions and that property relations are embedded in the 
wider field of social relations. More concretely, Nuijten suggests, that examining 
property relations on the ground requires mapping and analysing, for example, the 
power structures between different networks (e. g. different groups claiming rights 
over the same resource), the influence of formal and informal law and procedures, the 
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role of formal and informal organisational structures and the role of various 
organisational structures and different positions of power on the ground between 
institutions and different groups of people. 
In short, the European dichotomy between individual and collective property 
continues to dominate popular and academic thinking about property. When European 
colonial powers conquered Africa (and also the Indian subcontinent) they decided that 
either a native 'chief was the private landlord of all the territory in his area, or in 
other cases, the colonialist powers decided that an entire village, tribe or community 
were the collective owners of this territory (Hann, 2000). Neither of these models 
captured the actual hierarchy of rights and obligations in these societies. A similar 
approach can be identified with regards to traditional knowledge. In many cases (see 
section 3 of this chapter), it is argued that a particular tribe owns collectively their 
environmental and cultural knowledge without doing any justice to the complex 
bundles of rights and obligations that prevail, arguably in all societies (see e. g. Hann4 
[2000]) but certainly in indigenous peoples' society. As will be demonstrated in other 
chapters (mainly in chapters 6 and 8) there are other problems with community-based 
(intellectual) property rights over traditional knowledge, but within the remit of this 
chapter it can be argued that the investigation of traditional knowledge and property 
cannot be confined to ideological or legal-institutional approaches. As discussed in 
this chapter, a contextualised understanding of property is needed and this requires 
examining property relations in a wider social, legal, cultural and political context. 
This assessment goes beyond classifying property as either individually or 
collectively owned, but considers the bundle of rights people actually have in concrete 
or actual social (property) relationships which are usually more complex and multi- 
layered than the general and abstract categorisation of individual or community-based 
property rights (for an example of how property rights are organised in a particular 
context see section 2.1.4 of chapter 9). 
34 Hann (2000) argues that even the most collectivist system still has individual rights over many items 
of personal property (examples are given in section 2.2 of this chapter), while even the most extreme 
neo-liberal regimes will still depend on a set of conditions that can only be maintained by the state. As 
such the notion of ownership cannot just be regulated by private law, but must open up to aspects of 
authority, citizenship and social cohesion, which are all notions that are regulated through public law. 
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6 Conclusion 
The challenge emerging from this chapter is to further deconstruct and challenge the 
naYve and idealised portrayal of non-Western property relations that persists amongst 
many international institutions and property scholarship dealing with intellectual 
property rights and traditional knowledge. While current theoretical frameworks of 
property have disembedded property relations from other social relations, it is argued 
in this chapter that the embeddedness of property in other socio-economic and 
political frameworks must be reorganised in order to understand the full meaning of 
property relations in other cultures. The dominant ideology stresses the dichotomy 
between individual and communal property rights. In this chapter it is argued that this 
bifurcated view of property relations hampers the unravelling of fuzzy and 
complicated rules in existing social relations. Therefore it is argued that new 
approaches to property theory, like the bundle of rights approach by von Benda- 
Beckmann et aL (2006), are needed and must be utilised in order to unravel 
indigenous peoples' property relations. 
The following chapters (and in particular chapter 5 on intellectual property rights, 
chapter 8 on customary law and chapter 9 on territorial rights) benefit from the 
suggestion of von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) that property rights must be 
examined within their wider socio-economic and political context. Particularly when 
analysing some of the suggested mechanisms to protect traditional knowledge, 
attention will be given to the social embeddedness of property in both formal or 
categorical and informal or concretised institutions. Consequently, any suggested 
solution to settle disputes about intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge 
will be a compromise between categorical and concretised property relations that have 
influenced the (property) relationship between different cultures in the past and the 
present. 
Based on the findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that there is a real danger 
that any of the protection mechanisms so far proposed in the literature and by 
international institutions (e. g. community-based intellectual property rights or 
customary law based intellectual property rights) are based on primarily a legal- 
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institutional and ideological understanding of indigenous' property relations and 
therefore portray only, at best, half the truth of the property relations on the ground. 
At worst, the suggested protection mechanisms portray a distorted and dangerously 
simplified and nalve view of a complex web of social relations; in that sense, these 
mechanisms may inadvertingly further the colonisation of indigenous property 
regimes. These issues will be examined next, beginning with the concept of 
intellectual property rights in chapter 5. 
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PART 11 
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Chapter 5- Can Intellectual Property Rights Protect 
Traditional Knowledge? 
I Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was concluded that traditional knowledge can have different meanings 
in different contexts and as such the commodification or economic use of traditional 
knowledge is not per definition opposed by indigenous peoples. Some traditional 
communities acknowledge the economic value of their traditional knowledge and 
condemn not so much the concept of commodification, but rather the 'unfair' 
exploitation by corporate powers (Tawanda Magaisa, 2006; Cottier and Panizzon, 
2004). In other words, indigenous peoples' acceptance of commodification in 
principle does not equate to the acceptance of a commodification practice that is 
driven by more powerful external actors. Where indigenous peoples value traditional 
knowledge as an economic resource, they are looking for specific protection 
mechanisms that can help to prevent unauthorised use by third parties and regulate an 
equitable process of collaboration and compensation for the authorised use of 
traditional knowledge. 
However, it was also argued in chapter 3 that there are some objects that are not 
perceived as being appropriate for exchange. Rowlands (2005) refers to them as 
objects in social motion that resist commodification. For such objects, indigenous 
peoples are looking for protection mechanisms that can restrict access and create legal 
and technical barriers in order to recognise the exclusive property rights of indigenous 
peoples over their own cultural property. In both cases - either as a matter of 
regulating economic justice or protecting cultural integrity - some indigenous 
peoples, activists and scholars are seeking to use intellectual property law to provide 
indigenous peoples with the legal rights to have exclusive control over their 
traditional knowledge. 
This chapter will assess in more detail to what extent the concept of intellectual 
property rights is an appropriate tool to protect traditional knowledge. An assessment 
will be made both of the protection of traditional knowledge as an economic resource 
and of the protection of traditional knowledge as an expression of cultural identity or 
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heritage. The debate about traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights 
provides an opportunity to examine the boundaries of the meaning of intellectual 
property rights. Within the current intellectual property system, traditional knowledge 
does not fulfil the requirements of being patentable. This makes it even more pertinent 
to question whether the current intellectual property rights framework can be applied 
to traditional knowledge. Building ftirther upon earlier observations of legal scholars 
(see e. g. Sunder, 2000) and anthropologists (see e. g. Brown, 1998; 2003; 2005), it is 
argued in this chapter that claims of intellectual property rights over cultural identity 
will demand a significant shift in intellectual property law. The main historical 
purpose of intellectual property law has been to grant an extensive monopoly right 
over the economic exploitation of ideas, expressions of ideas and distinctive words 
and symbols in order to protect investments and create incentives for future 
investments (Abbott et al., 1999). In this sense, it is understandable that indigenous 
peoples are considering using intellectual property law when they want to protect 
traditional knowledge as an economic resource. However, using intellectual property 
rights as a tool to protect culture seems more problematic because, at first sight, 
intellectual property rights is above all a legal instrument to establish a tradeable 
commodity: "Where law has traditionally allocated rights to exclusive control and 
exclusion over intellectual products in order to provide economic incentives for 
production, it now contemplates awarding intellectual property rights in order to 
protect the identity of the property owner MY, (Sunder, 2000: 71) In other words, the 
underlying purpose of intellectual property rights is to turn knowledge into a 
marketable commodity and not to conserve knowledge in its cultural context (Heath 
and Weidlich, 2003). 
Depending on what exactly needs to be protected, viz. traditional knowledge as an 
economic resource or traditional knowledge as an expression of cultural identity and 
integrity, different issues must be raised and assessed. Starting with traditional 
knowledge as an economic resource, two concerns are raised in the literature that will 
be further explored. First, questions are asked about the distributive aspects (i. e. equal 
wealth distribution) of the increasingly internationalised intellectual property rights 
system (see e. g. Aoki, 1998; Chander, 2003). Second, prominent intellectual property 
35 Note that this quote and in particular the link between intellectual property rights and economic 
incentive is more relevant for patents than copyrights. 
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rights scholars like Boyle (2003) and May (1998; 2000) criticise intellectual property 
law for its capacity to restrict access and use of knowledge or information. Some 
indigenous peoples oppose this view that traditional knowledge is part of the public 
domain or global commons and some are demanding more protection of their 
knowledge through a framework of intellectual property rights (see e. g. Brown, 2005). 
Open access advocates, on the other hand, regard intellectual property law as an 
inappropriate constraint on information that leads to overprotecting the public domain, 
a phenomenon that both May and Boyle call the 'second enclosure movement'. 
In other words, using intellectual property rights in order to protect traditional 
knowledge as an economic resource provokes a debate on two fronts. First, it must be 
questioned whether intellectual property law can accommodate indigenous peoples' 
objectives for greater distributional justice. Second, it stimulates a debate on whether 
the quest of the open access movement to leave knowledge in the public domain is in 
the best interest of indigenous peoples, especially since some indigenous peoples want 
to create legal and technical barriers to seal off knowledge. 
With regards to protecting traditional knowledge for its cultural integrity, it can be 
argued that this debate touches upon the binary dilemma between 'open' and 
genclosed' access, but it also raises a new issue. It must be examined whether 
intellectual property rights is the appropriate tool for indigenous peoples to (re)gain 
and maintain full control over their culture in the interest of their cultural survival. 
This issue is linked to a debate similar to that addressed in chapter 2, viz. whether 
culture is bounded or static or is culture fluid and changing? Following the arguments 
put forward in chapter 2, it is argued in this chapter that by using intellectual property 
rights as a tool to protect culture, culture not only becomes bounded but also some 
aspects of identity politics are introduced. Identity politics may create a discourse that 
reinforces essentialised identities and cultural orthodoxy and stifles autonomy. There 
is a real danger that creating intellectual property rights in culture assumes and 
enforces a cultural homogeneity that, as has been argued in the previous chapters, will 
rarely exist in the modern world. 
In much of the literature this debate has been kept separate, viz. economists and legal 
scholars have concentrated on the issue of whether intellectual property rights can be 
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used as a tool to protect the economic value of traditional knowledge, while 
anthropologists have tended to focus more on the debate over whether special 
property rights should be granted over culture. However, within the scope of this 
thesis, both debates will be explored in more depth. From a socio-cultural and 
historical perspective (see chapter 3 on the biographical life of things and knowledge) 
there are clear indications that some fori-ris of traditional knowledge (e. g. medicinal 
knowledge) can be valued simultaneously, for example by the San, for both their 
spiritual and economic value. Protection is therefore sought for both types of value. 
Although Coombe (1998a) argues that indigenous peoples in the South (Asia, Latin 
and South America and Africa) have a more pragmatic approach (i. e. emphasise the 
short-term economic benefits) towards intellectual property law than indigenous 
peoples in the North (e. g. Australia, United States, Canada and New Zealand) who are 
more concerned about their sovereign rights and self-determination 36 , it is argued in 
this chapter that the San's quest for protecting traditional knowledge is steered by 
both the urge for economic justice and sense of self-determination 37 . 
At this point it is important to delineate again the boundaries of this research. The 
management of indigenous knowledge through intellectual property rights is a topic 
that attracts strong and highly divergent views. The critics of the commodification of 
traditional knowledge have portrayed the debate about the divergent socio-legal and 
economic systems as a clash between indigenous and non-indigenous cultures or non- 
Western traditional societies versus Western industrialised societies and traditional 
versus scientific knowledge. As already mentioned in the introduction, the main aim 
of this research is to open up this polarised debate by unpacking such concepts as 
knowledge, commodities, property and indigeneity. In the previous chapters it was 
36 Although there is no hard evidence, this difference in attitude towards intellectual property rights 
may be linked to the different socio-political and above all, economic position between these two 
different (geographical) groups of indigenous peoples. 
37 The concept of self-determination and group claims within the UN system and human rights 
framework is a very difficult and contested topic. Exploring the complexity and contestations is beyond 
the scope of this chapter and thesis. In general terms, three distinct categories of self-determination or 
group claims can be identified: a) claims to equality of treatment and satisfaction of basic needs; these 
claims assert the logic of human dignity and non-discrimination; b) claims to restored, autonomous 
nationhood expressive of primary political identity that is incompatible with assimilation within 
existing political entities; c) claims to statehood reflecting a collective struggle to achieve control over 
distinct territorial units entitled to full membership rights in international society; these claims invoke 
the logic of self-determination of peoples (Falk, 2000: 127-134). For more information on the debate 
about the (re-) emergence of indigenous rights in contemporary international law see, for example, 
Pitty, 2001; Muehlebach, 2003; Bowen, 2000; Ivison, 2002; 2003; Williams, 2003; Sanders, 2003; 
Wiessner, 2003; Daes, 2003; Venne, 1998). 
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demonstrated that, by engaging with several theoretical frameworks which have been 
underexplored in the mainstream literature on intellectual property rights and 
traditional knowledge, bridges can be built between (what may initially appear to be) 
polarised concepts. The main message that has been put forward so far in this thesis is 
that to a large extent the portrayal of polarised worldviews has been based on 'ideal 
models' and an essentialised representation of indigenous peoples. By contextualising 
knowledge, commodities and property, a new perspective emerges, viz. that 
indigenous peoples are not per definition anti-market and the market space is not per 
definition anti-indigenous. It is argued in this thesis that the acceptance of what are 
largely artificial and romantic divisions of indigeneity and commercialism results in 
an a priori exclusion of indigenous peoples from the marketplace. Such an exclusion 
denies them the opportunity to (at least partially) determine their own boundaries with 
regards to commodifying their knowledge. 
The analysis of intellectual property rights in this chapter will limit itself to those 
topics that are deemed useful within the remit of this thesis. The 'unfairness' of our 
current economic system in general and intellectual property law in particular has 
already been examined to a great extent in the existing literature (see e. g. Dutfield, 
2002a; 2004; Bellmarm et aL, 2003; Drahos and Mayne, 2002; Perelman, 2003). 
Equally, the ('unfairness' of the) technicalities of the patent system (like the 
requirements and the scope and range of patent matters) are beyond the scope of this 
chapter; other researchers have covered this already (for recent work see e. g. Mgbeoji, 
2006) and it will therefore not be repeated here. Neither will this chapter engage with 
the polarised criticism that can be found in the biopiracy discourse; for an overview of 
the literature on biopiracy see e. g. Takeshita (2001); Svarstad (2002); Hamilton 
(2006); for more critical literature see e. g. Shiva (1997; 2001); Martinez Alier (2000); 
Stenton (2004). Based on the fieldwork observations (see intermezzi and Appendix 2), 
it is felt that this thesis can and should contribute more to the debate on traditional 
knowledge and intellectual property rights by examining to what extent traditional 
knowledge can be utilised for social justice and economic redress. In this respect it is 
assumed that the moral, ethical and technical problems of our current intellectual 
property rights system have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere (for a recent 
overview see e. g. Gibson, 2004; 2005 and Mgbeoji, 2006). Although this chapter will 
engage with some of the mainstream criticism, this is always within the remit of the 
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main research question of this chapter, viz. is it possible for indigenous peoples to use 
the current intellectual property rights system to their own advantage. 
The first part of this chapter will examine whether intellectual property rights can be 
used as a tool to provide economic justice. In order to answer this question, the history 
of the legal institution of intellectual property will be explored. Drawing attention to 
the historical trajectory of intellectual property law is useful for two reasons. First, it 
will reveal the existence or absence of precedences in the use of intellectual property 
law to accommodate indigenous peoples' objectives for greater distributional justice. 
Such a critical analysis of the history of intellectual property law has been largely 
neglected in the literature on traditional knowledge. Second, much of the mainstream 
literature on traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights has engaged with a 
polemical and dichotomised analysis of intellectual property law. This thesis seeks to 
break with this politicised thinking on intellectual property law and traditional 
knowledge by examining the issues from new angles which have so far been 
underexposed in the mainstream literature. Exploring the possibility to develop 
democratic intellectual property rights by linking intellectual property law to more 
explicit human rights values will follow the historical analysis. This in turn will be 
followed by an analysis of the debate on whether or not traditional knowledge should 
stay in the commons. Next, the debate about using intellectual property rights as a tool 
to protect culture will be further examined. Finally, the findings of this chapter will be 
assessed through the lens of von Benda-Beckmann et Ws (2006) typology of 
property relations (see chapter 4, section 5). 
2 History of International Intellectual Property Law 
2.1 The Greek and Roman Period 
The concept of intellectual property has a long history in Western culture 38 . Its roots 
can be traced back to classical Roman law, and specifically to the writings of Gaius. 
Gaius divided law into categories relating to persons, actions or things. He then 
subdivided them into corporeals that were existent and tangible, e. g. land or gold, and 
" Stengel (2004) points out that intellectual property has existed ever since the early formations of 
communities. He refers to tribal signs, signalling the tribe to which someone belongs, as the first form 
of protected signs and, as such, intellectual property. 
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incorporeals that were non-existent and subsistent, e. g. inheritance (Parry, 2002). 
Incorporeal things were "super-imposed by the mind into the corporeal world" 
(Drahos, 1996: 16). This Roman categorisation of corporeals and incorporeals is 
rooted into the Stoic notion of incorporeals. 
For the Stoics, four things were considered to be incorporeal: time, space, the void 
and lekta, the latter embodying the meaning of words. In the context of intellectual 
property rights, it is the notion of lekta that demystifies the boundary between 
corporeals and incorporeals. The Stoics made a clear distinction between the physical 
form of communication, words (corporeals), and their meaning (incorporeals). 
Meaning could only be tangible when it was communicated. The Stoics' belief that 
the meaning of words can only emerge when physically represented set the path for 
development of intellectual property rights. 
In short, it was already during the Greek and Roman period that one of the most 
important guiding principles of intellectual property law was established, viz. the 
process of accrediting new categories of incorporeals, which is needed in order to give 
them formal recognition as a new class of property (Parry, 2002). Drahos (1996) 
argues that this evolution shows that property law increasingly has become 
dematerialised, which has led to the belief that more and more abstractions can 
become the property of individuals, including the ideas and writings of inventors and 
writers. Once the law recognised property rights for these abstractions, the way was 
open for the concept of materiality that governed the property relations of the 
marketplace. 
Although intellectual property in any form (such as patents or copyrights) did not 
emerge in Greek or Roman society, the conceptual roots of intellectual property law 
can be traced back to the Greeks and Romans in the sense that they encouraged the 
notion of the individual as creator of art, which in turn sparked the desire to own ideas 
and knowledge (May and Sell, 2006). 
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2.2 The Middle Ages 
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the desire to own ideas and knowledge continued 
to exist (May and Sell, 2006). Newly formed guilds 39 recognised that knowledge was 
valuable; they were looking for rights of exclusive control and exploitation of the 
specialised knowledge of their own members. A proprietary form of trademark was 
developed as a method to differentiate between the goods of different guilds. 
Although the guilds never referred to their craft knowledge as intellectual property, 
they embraced the idea that the knowledge of their guild could become more valuable 
by making it scarcer through closer protection mechanisms in the form of a tight 
system of guild membership and a form of trademark protection. 
At the same time, guilds also started to recognise that individual members had an 
exclusive right to certain knowledge such as a newly designed pattern or figure (ibid). 
Other members of the same guild could not copy these new patterns. The knowledge 
that was used to create these new figures and patterns belonged to the individual and 
had to be recognised as that person's own effort. 
At the end of the Middle Ages, sovereigns offered patentlike privileges (called 'letters 
patent') in order to stimulate the introduction of new processes or practices in their 
kingdom (ibid). The British monarchs especially encouraged the importation of new 
skills and techniques because they felt that England was lagging behind in comparison 
to other European economies. Technology transfer was at the heart of this desire to 
establish patentlike protection in order to limit import and stimulate export. In other 
words, the letters patent or letters of protection were in fact a method for encouraging 
the migration of skilled artisans into the kingdom. Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) 
argue that, for most of their history, intellectual property rights are not seen as 
property rights, but rather as a mechanism that grants monopoly privileges. Initially, 
these monopolies were created by states or kingdoms that used this privilege for their 
own purposes; in many cases, they were used to fund wars. Through the letters patent, 
the monarch was given the power to foster the growth of industry. However, over 
time patents were not only given to reward inventions; patents were also usually given 
39 This was particularly important at the end of the 13 Ih Century and beginning of the 14 th Century. 
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to individuals in order to protect their sole right to practice a particular trade, to 
supervise an industry and to influence certain import and export restrictions. 
With regard to early copyrights, after the fall of the Roman Empire recognition of the 
rights of the artist was abandoned. Copyrights were only recognised during the 
Renaissance when the innovation of the printing press stimulated the distribution of 
written knowledge through trade. Until then, literary culture was predominantly an 
oral culture which, so it has been argued, limited the need of literary rights (what 
would later become copyright) in the artists' own stories (ibid. ). 
2.3 The Territorial Period 
Despite the fact that the idea about owning knowledge can be traced back to earlier 
periods in history, it was only in the 151h Century (1474) that the first formalised 
patent system was developed, in Venice. A legal and institutional form of intellectual 
property rights acknowledged the ownership of knowledge with the main purpose to 
promote innovation (ibid). For about two centuries, many European countries 
recognised patents, but the granting of patents was subject to political power and 
personal relationships until Britain established modem legislation to govern 
intellectual property by using a systematic method of granting initially patents and 
later copyrights (the Statute of Anne in 1709). The British Statute of Monopolies 
(1624) became the model for intellectual property law elsewhere (Machlup, 1999). 
However, while the Statute took away the monopoly rights of individuals, the 
privileges of the corporations remained intact (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002). 
Although each country had different ideas about the nature of the inventor's legal 
right40, the patent system that was spread to other countries recognised the system of 
protecting the inventor through statutory law. It was mainly new technologies that 
spurred the development of legislative innovations. In the early stages, with France 
being one of the exceptions, intellectual property law was not justified on the basis of 
moral rights or natural rights of the author or the inventor. Patents emerged in order to 
40 For example, France recognised the property rights of the inventor in his invention and, deriving 
from it, his right to obtain a patent; America did not express an opinion about the property question, but 
recognised the inventor's right to a patent; Britain recognised the monopoly character of the patent and 
regarded it still as a grant of royal favour but in practice allowed the inventor's claim to receive a 
patent; and Austria insisted that the inventor had no right to protection but was granted a privilege in 
the public interest (Machlup, 1999). 
108 
allow the distribution of particular technological advances which would benefit the 
ruling class through wealth creation. It was only later when the range of intellectual 
property broadened (both geographically and in the scope of protection) that the 
justifications of moral and natural rightS41 were used in the Anglo model of 
intellectual property law (Sell and May, 2001). However, patents were also used as a 
tool for protectionism (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002). 
Between 1850 and 1873 there was the rise of an anti-patent movement (ibid. ). For 
example, in Germany several trade associations recommended the abolition of patent 
law on the basis that it was injurious to common welfare. However, in 1873 the anti- 
patent movement lost out to the propaganda campaign of the pro-patent movement. 
The anti-patent movement attacked patents because they posed a threat to the highly 
valued free trade system (May and Sell, 2006). This was the first time in the history of 
intellectual property rights that the tension between the two concepts - free trade and 
intellectual property law - was highlighted. Interestingly, under the current TRIPS 
regime it is argued that "a market intervention that permits limited property rights 
over valuable intangibles is felt to be consistent with rules that promote trade 
liberalisation" (Dutfield, 2002a: 18). Just like current intellectual property rights 
critics, the free trade liberals of the 19th Century criticised the monopoly aspects of 
intellectual property rights and argued that invention as a process was social, objective 
and a product of technological change, rather than the product of the invention of an 
individual's genius (ibid. ). Furthermore, they argued that it was not clear whether 
individuals need the incentive of a patent to invent, an argument that was used by tile 
proponents of intellectual property rights. Only when the patent advocates promised 
to limit the patentees' monopoly power through a system of compulsory licensing (i. e. 
patentees could license others to use the invention at reasonable compensation) did 
the advocates of free trade accept the idea of patenting (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; 
Machlup, 1999). 
With regard to the protection of intellectual property at an international level, during 
this period which Drahos (1998) calls the 'territorial period', there was an absence of 
international protection: intellectual property rights did not extend beyond the national 
" These rights were already used as ajustification in, for example, France. 
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territory of the sovereign who had granted the rights in the first place. Because 
intellectual property rights in country A did not confer protection in country B, 
intellectual property owners were faced with a classic free-rider problem. This 
problem led to a greater interest in international cooperation between different states 
on intellectual property. 
2.4 The International Period 
International cooperation manifested itself first in the form of bilateral agreements 
between countries that were worried about the free-riding problem. For example, 
Britain found that many of its writers' works were reproduced abroad without 
granting permission or receiving compensation. Much of the unauthorised 
reproduction took place in America. Britain responded to this by passing Acts in 1838 
and 1844 that protected works first published outside Britain. These Acts were based 
on a strategy of reciprocity; foreign works would only gain protection in Britain if the 
relevant state agreed to protect British works. America, on the other hand, took a 
different turn and it not only granted copyright protection to its own citizens and 
residents, it also encouraged the piracy of such workS42,43 (Drahos, 1998; Ben-Atar, 
2004). 
The international development of intellectual property law was also encouraged by the 
increasing political acceptance of the idea that patents were justified on the basis of 
the natural right of inventors to own their invention (May and Sell, 2006). A shift in 
thinking about intellectual property law and the need for greater protection in order to 
curb the free-rider problem led to a situation where in 1883,69 international 
agreements were in place, most of them dealing with trademarks (Drahos, 1998). 
However, the bilateral agreements were not sufficiently satisfactory and eventually 
the Paris Convention of 1883, dealing with industrial property, and the Berne 
Convention of 1886, dealing with literary and artistic works, were established. Both 
42 The US position towards intellectual property law has evolved over the years from scepticism to 
vigorous advocacy for the expansion of global intellectual property law. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to go into detail of this evolution, but more information on this can be found in May and Sell 
(2006), Ben-Atar (2004) and Drahos and Braithwaite (2002). 
43 Prior to the TRIPs agreement, India was another example whose patent system favourcd 
development priorities (Dutfield, 2004). The TRIPs agreement allows India less flexibility in terms of 
adapting the patent system to national requirements (for more information in India and TRIPs see e. g. 
Cullet and Raja [2004] and for more information on the Indian Biological Diversity Act of 2002 see 
e. g. Sagar [2005]). 
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Conventions were based on the idea that a unified international patent and copyright 
system was very much needed and both set a minimum standard of rights which states 
had to recognise. The international secretariats of the two Conventions were merged 
in 1893 to form the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property, which was followed up by a new organisation in 1967, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which became an agency of the United 
Nations (UN) in 1974. 
Although during this period states had agreed upon certain foundational principles, 
such as the principle of national treatment, there was no harmonisation of technical 
rules. For example, the US used the 'first to invent' patent system, while other 
countries used a 'first to file' patent system. Civil code countries recognised the 
doctrine of moral rights for authors while common law countries did not. It was felt 
that there was an increasing need to harmonise intellectual property law. 
2.5 The Global Period 
After the Second World War, more and more developing countries started to join the 
Paris and Berne Conventions. Governance of these Conventions is under the principle 
of one-vote-one-state which led to the result that Western states could be outvoted by 
a coalition of developing countries. Developing countries were hoping that a reformed 
international intellectual property law system could cater for their development needs. 
For example, in 1967 India lobbied heavily for signing the Stockholm Protocol which 
gave developing countries greater access to copyright materials. During the 1980s 
developing countries also tried to reform the Paris Convention and pushed hard for 
more liberal provisions on compulsory licensing. Countries like India wanted to have 
better and more access to technologies (especially in the health care industry) than had 
been protected through patents. Although the developed countries and specifically the 
US did not like these developments, free-riding had to be tolerated to some extent 
because the international intellectual property law system lacked effective 
enforcement mechanisms, apart from the possibility to appeal to the International 
Court of Justice. 
III 
Prior to settling the enforcement of intellectual property law on an international level, 
the US addressed this issue through a series of bilateral strategies against countries 
that the US considered to have inadequate levels of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement. In 1984, the US added intellectual property to their list of 'Section 
301' trade issues: countries that were found to provide insufficient intellectual 
property protection were filed under 'Section 301' which meant they could face trade 
sanctions as long as they did not provide adequate protection (Drahos, 1998; Drahos 
and Braithwaite, 2002; May and Sell, 2006)44. 
Simultaneously, a number of US industries started to lobby hard for much stronger 
intellectual property laws. While companies owning luxury brand goods sought better 
trademark protection, pharmaceutical companies and agricultural chemicals 
companies sought higher levels of patent protection, followed by music, film and 
software companies who demanded stronger copyright protection (May and Sell, 
2006). Under pressure from these sectors, not only did intellectual property 
protection become a high priority on the domestic political agenda, these corporations 
also succeeded in institutionalising their request for better protection mechanisms 
more globally. Sell (2003) argues that the globalisation of intellectual property law 
originated in the US. The advocacy of some important industry associations and some 
well-connected corporate players played a critical role in developing support for a 
trade-based approach to intellectual property. 
Companies like DuPont, Monsanto, Dow, Union Carbide and Pfizer, who had 
experienced golden years as a result of cartels and price fixing 45 , realised that the 
price of research and development (R&D) continued to rise and it became harder and 
harder to invent and introduce new products to the market (Drahos and Braithwaite, 
2002). Furthermore, the government started to take stronger antitrust actions. This 
" Kuruk (2004) has suggested that a similar principle of reciprocity (i. e. a mutual exchange of 
privileges) can be put forward by the developing countries to the TRIPs Council in order to demand the 
inclusion of traditional knowledge protection in the existing intellectual framework on the basis of 
reciprocity. 
45 Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) give numerous examples of information cartels across different 
industries in the period between the two world wars. For example, IG Farben used its stock Of patents 
in synthetic rubber to strike deals with DuPont and Standard for the rubber markets. The tendrils of 
patent law reached into all aspects of the rubber markets and related chemical industries. IG Farben 
agreed to pass on to Standard any patents it acquired in the chemical field relevant to the oil 
business 
and in exchange Standard offered control to IG Farben of chemical patents that were not strongly 
related to the oil industry. 
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made it more difficult for companies to acquire small companies for their knowledge 
and the big companies had to stop their price fixing and cartel forming behaviour. 
Instead, they now had to develop their own new products and bear the costs of R&D. 
Furthermore, established companies (like Pfizer and Monsanto) also faced increasing 
competition from generic manufacturers. It is important to note that, according to 
Drahos and Braitwaite (2002), the 'knowledge cartels' were not so much about 
sharing knowledge or achieving efficiency or avoiding duplication of research as 
about privatising the knowledge that would give the holder of the patent the power to 
discipline the market. 
By the time of the launch of the Uruguay Round of trade talks in 1986, developed 
countries' governments, led by the US, were becoming increasingly keen to include 
intellectual property rights in the negotiations on trade relations. This move was 
prompted by an increasing awareness of the expanding possibilities for technical 
appropriation of knowledge, alongside the growing threat of pirated reproduction and 
distribution of knowledge-based products (May and Sell, 2006). Developed countries 
were eager to move the intellectual property negotiations from the WIPO into the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) where their negotiating power was 
better because of the weaker presence of developing countries (Pretorius, 2002; 
Kuanpoth, 2003). On 15 April 1994, this process concluded in Marrakech with the 
signing of the Final Act embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. It contained a number of agreements including the establishment 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS is an 
annex to the Agreement which establishes the WTO). 
The main purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to promote the harmonisation of 
national intellectual property law regimes. The agreement has been made binding on 
all members of the WTO. As stated in the preamble, TRIPS introduces new rules and 
disciplines for global trade concerning the provision of. adequate standards and 
principles concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual 
property rights; effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related 
property rights and; effective and expeditious procedures for the multilateral 
prevention and settlement of disputes between governments. 
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May and Sell (2006) argue that although the TRIPS agreement represents an 
important moment in the history of governance of intellectual property law, the global 
intellectual property regime is now more than ever criticised for the fact that all rights 
seem to reside with the owners of intellectual property, while the duties reside with 
the users of intellectual property. The Agreement has been accused of regulating 
technological protectionism aimed at consolidating a situation wherein only Northern 
countries can generate innovations that Southern countries have to buy at inflated 
prices (Correa, 2000). In this respect it has been argued that the TRIPS agreement had 
a negative impact on access to essential drugs in developing countries (see e. g. 
Balasubramaniam, 2002)46. Concerns have also been raised over using trade access as 
a means of imposing Western intellectual property rights laws through the TRIPS 
Agreement. There is a danger that this will result in monopoly control by 
multinationals over production and distribution; that innovation in the public domain 
will be privatised and commercially exploited; that customary practices of sharing 
knowledge and skills will be undermined; that the TRIPS Agreement will deepen the 
North-South rift; that it will facilitate and encourage 'biopiracy'; and that 
communities and cultures may be damaged by the forced introduction of Western 
intellectual property rights principles, which in turn might lead to a further erosion of 
the right of self-determination (Simpson and Jackson, 1998). Furthermore, leading 
economists from developing countries have also concluded that there is evidence that 
many of the current social and economic problems in developing countries can be 
linked to the introduction of stricter intellectual property laws as a result of the 
implementation of TRIPS (Khor, 2002). 
This list of concerns is certainly not exhaustive (for a recent overview of the concerns 
about TRIPs for developing countries see e. g. Kongolo and Shyllon, 2004). The 
problems that are listed above have been chosen to highlight that, since the creation of 
the TRIPS Agreement, questions about the international political economy of 
intellectual property law have become more pertinent. As Aoki (1998) argues, 
increasingly doubts are raised whether the flow of benefits of international intellectual 
46 Through the South African Medicines Act, South Africa was able to take ceratin regulatory steps to 
ensure access to HIV/AjDS medication (for more information on this case, see e. g. 
Halbert [2005: 97- 
111]). 
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property protection may be skewed to the advantage of the economies of developed 
countries. 
2.6 Discussion 
Looking back at these historic developments, questions must be raised over to which 
extent the current intellectual property rights system favours the holders of intellectual 
property rights, i. e. Western multinationals, and to what extent it serves a wider public 
interest (Aoki, 1998; Khor, 2002). May and Sell argue that "the history of intellectual 
property was not (and is still not) a neutral, functionally driven set of improvements 
towards an 'optimal' legal settlement that is naturally just" (2006: 204). While 
technological improvements might have driven the process forward to turn ideas, 
knowledge and innovations into property, looking at the evolution and history of 
intellectual property law it becomes clear that strong intellectual property rights 
regimes have so far mainly served the purpose of wealth maximisation for a few 
powerful economic actors. 
From a historical perspective, it also becomes clear that the basis for the justification 
for intellectual property rights has evolved. While earlier in history patents were 
granted to introduce new technologies into the country and monopoly privileges were 
given not to the inventors but rather to those who brought in the patent, from the late 
I 9th Century patents were usually justified as a direct reward for labour 47 (Locke), as 
47 Locke's labour theory is based on the principle that people can claim property rights over products 
that they have removed from nature and to which they have added value through their labour. Property 
rights therefore protect individual interests relating to the investment of labour. Furthermore, a person 
owns his/her body; therefore that person is also entitled to own what he/she does with that body, 
namely its labour (Hettinger, 1989). Proponents of intellectual property rights have argued that 
propertising ideas on the basis of Locke's theory is justified because: 'first ... the production of ideas 
requires a person's labour; second, ... these ideas are appropriated 
from a "common" which is not 
significantly devalued by the idea's removal; and third, ... ideas can be made property without 
breaching the non-waste condition" (Hughes, 1988: 300). However, within the context of intellectual 
property rights, Hettinger (1989) and Spector (1989) argue that the value of an intellectual object does 
not consist solely of the value of the object on its own and the value added by the labourer, because 
intellectual objects are social products. Therefore the creation of an idea is not the brainchild ofjust one 
person, it is based on the ideas and thoughts of many people. Another problem that 
Hettinger has 
identified with the concept of granting intellectual property rights on the basis of the right to the 
fruit of 
one's labour is the fact that often the value of the object is disproportionate to the effort 
that the 
labourer has put into the object. The value of intellectual work consists of more than 
just the amount of 
labour that has been put into the work; it also includes luck and natural talent 
(Martin, 1995). 
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part of the rights of individuals to be associated with their innovations" (Hegel) or to 
ensure that resources were used efficiently (utilitarian). However, the acceptance of 
the rights of owners to own intellectual property analogous to the rights of owners to 
own material property can be contested (for more details see footnote 47 and 48). 
Nevertheless, various groups continue to use the arguments from natural law or from 
economic efficiency to justify intellectual property rights. May and Sell (2006) argue 
that philosophical justifications of intellectual property rights are only used to mask 
the monopolistic interests and political mobilisation behind the development of a legal 
institution (i. e. intellectual property law) whose main purpose is to create (in the 
words of Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002) 'knowledge cartels'. As Drahos and 
Braithwaite argue, a patent system that prevents selling cheap medicines to poor 
countries cannot be called utilitarian (the greatest happiness of the greatest number). 
Nor does it make sense to call intellectual property rights 'natural rights' akin to the 
rights of liberty when these natural rights are owned and traded by corporations. Nor 
does intellectual property law fulfil the criteria of distributive justice when intellectual 
property is used to transfer wealth to a small group of rich and developed nations at 
the expense of other nations. John Rawls' approach to property attempts to address 
48 The personality or self-developmental justification for intellectual property law draws on the work of 
Hegel. According to Hegel, property can be justified because it is linked to the existence of the free 
individual who is recognised as a free individual by others. Other people show respect to the person 
who owns property by not trespassing on his property, which also reflects their acceptance of him as a 
person (Resnik, 2003). Ownership over property protects the individual from the unreasonable rights 
and interests not only of other people in the society but also from state intervention in their lives 
(Resnik, 2003; May, 1998). Hegel also makes some observations about intellectual property (Drahos, 
1996). When products of the mind are externalised, others may produce them because for Hegel the 
whole purpose of intellectual products is for them to be recognised by others so that they become the 
basis for leaming by others. This point of view is strongly utilitarian; the best way to promote scientific 
progress and development is to protect scientists from thievery. Hegel further argues that communities 
themselves have to define their legal appropriation boundaries within the intellectual systems as long as 
the systems respect the leaming needs of others and future generations. In this respect, Hegel 
recognises the importance of the intellectual commons (Hughes, 1988). Very importantly, Hegel's 
justification of intellectual property rights shows a striking resemblance not only to the Stoics' and 
Romans' condition of materialising incorporeals in order to claim property rights and justify 
intellectual property rights, but also to the concept that intellectual property rights allow monopoly 
rights over abstract objects that can be bought and sold in the marketplace as commodities. Whether 
Hegel's self-expression theory can provide a justification for claiming intellectual property rights over 
knowledge has been questioned for the following reasons. First, intellectual property rights are, 
according to Hegel, mainly a capital asset, meaning that intellectual property rights have a greater 
ability than any other property to provide economic security (Hughes, 1988). However, 
justifying 
intellectual property rights on the basis of providing economic, security is in some respects a very 
narrow justification: it only focuses on economic utility and excludes social utility. 
Also, Hegel's self- 
expression theory as justification for intellectual property rights might not work 
for everybody; this 
concept can cause difficulties when it is applied to people who are not recognised 
by others, including 
the state, as equal individuals with the same rights and 
duties as the majority. 
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problems such as distributive justice in society (Resnik, 2003). Although Rawls 
allows for some social and economic inequalities in society, these inequalities are 
strictly not permitted if they interfere with basic liberties or undermine fair equality of 
opportunities (Rawls, 1971; Resnik, 2003). 
While some indigenous peoples, like the San, are showing an interest in the 
'conditional' cornmodification of their knowledge to improve their socio-economic 
position in society, on the basis of the above historical analysis of intellectual property 
law, there are no indications that intellectual property rights can fulfil these objectives 
of equal wealth distribution. As will be shown in chapter 7 when the Hoodia benefit 
sharing agreement will be discussed in more detail, engaging with intellectual 
property rights presupposes the possession of power. However, people like the San 
are turning to intellectual property rights in the hope that they can use their knowledge 
to redress a historical situation of social, economic and political oppression and 
subordination. It is highly unlikely that intellectual property rights are going to be the 
right tool to achieve justice, certainly as long as indigenous peoples are not 
sufficiently empowered to bargain on their own and on equal terms about their 
knowledge. Therefore more efforts are required to empower indigenous peoples prior 
to such negotiations. The weak social and economic position of many indigenous 
peoples implies the need for an alternative model for intellectual property rights that is 
more democratic and that serves human rights values. Can the current intellectual 
property rights system be adjusted to a fairer system when it is linked to a human 
rights framework? In an ideal world, human rights should guide the development of 
intellectual property and intellectual property rights should serve to further the 
development of human rights (Drahos, 1996; Cornides, 2004) and it should serve the 
interest of the public instead of the interest of only a few already privileged people 
(Drahos, 1998). The next part of this chapter will explore this ideal model in more 
depth. 
Democratic Intellectual Property Rights 
Some institutions, like the Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights, argue that there is a conflict between the realisation of 
the TRIPs Agreement and the protection of economic, social and cultural rights (see 
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e. g. Tobin, 2001; Helfer, 2003). For the Sub-Commission, human rights law is more 
important than intellectual property law. In August 2000 it adopted a resolutioný9 that 
deals with this matter: "Since the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement does not 
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, 
including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications, the right to health, the right to food, and the right to seIr-determination, 
there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied 
in the TRIPs Agreement, on the on hand, and international human rights law, on the 
other" " (Commission on Human Rights, 2000). 
The statement of the Sub-Commission reveals a concern that the balance between 
private interests (i. e. the interest of the creator or inventor) and public interests has 
been lost and that private economic interests are now favoured. Moreover, the 
expansion of private intellectual property claims into areas that were previously in the 
public domain, such as the privatisation of works of cultural heritage and the 
biological and ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples, is also noted as being a 
potential threat to human rights. Members of the Sub-Committee also reflected that 
uniform and strict intellectual property models that might be appropriate in developed 
countries are very likely to disadvantage developing countries because of the high 
development costs of patents. In relation to this, the Sub-Commission also states that 
the current intellectual property rights regime favours: economic interests, in particular 
of multinationals, at the expense of the development of developing countries 
(Chapman, 2002). The WIPO does not share this concern and considers human rights 
law and intellectual property law as being compatible; the tension is seen as only a 
question of finding the right balance between granting economic incentives for 
inventors and authors and access for the public (Helfer, 2003). 
In 2001 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR, 2001) also 
issued a statement on intellectual property and human rightS51 - The key message was 
" Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights', Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, Fifty-second session, agenda item 4, E/C. 4/Sub. 2/2000/7, adopted 17 August 2000. 
'0 Resolution on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, UN E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2000/7. 
51 Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Follow-up to the day of general discussion on Article 15.1 (C), 26 November 2001. 
E/C. 12/2001/15,14 December 200 1. 
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that both international trade and intellectual property regulation, including the TRIPS 
Agreement, must conform to international human rights law (Chapman, 2002). The 
statement also indicates that the human rights obligations of state parties can by no 
means be subordinated to international trade or intellectual property agreements. 
Furthermore, the Committee emphasises that intellectual property regimes must 
promote and protect all human rights, including those in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the fundamental human rights 
principles such as: equality of all persons and their equal standing before the law; the 
right of everyone to be consulted and to participate in significant decision making 
processes that affect them and the need for accessible, transparent and effective 
accountability mechanisms. The statement also refers to the principle of self- 
determination, and in particular national sovereignty over wealth and natural 
resources. Very importantly for indigenous peoples, the Committee mentions that the 
human rights approach of intellectual property must focus in particular on the needs of 
the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and communities (Chapman, 
2002). 
In addition, the ESCR Committee stresses the need to balance the protection of public 
and private interest in knowledge. Private interests should not be unduly advantaged 
and public interest in enjoying broad access to knowledge should be given 
considerable attention. The committee perceives intellectual property rights as 
instrumental because they are first a means by which states seek to provide an 
incentive to stimulate innovations and creativity and second they primarily protect 
business and corporate interests and investments. Human rights on the other hand, are 
more fundamental because they are derived from the dignity of human beings and, in 
some cases, groups of individuals and communities (Chapman, 2002). 
To summarise these concerns, current intellectual property law serves mainly an 
economic interest, while from a human rights perspective, intellectual property should 
seek to balance the protection of the rights of inventors or creators on the one hand 
and the rights of society on the other. As Chapman (2002) argues, a human rights 
approach to intellectual property could potentially highlight new goals of intellectual 
property. It could embody more than just an economic relationship of maximising 
economic benefits; it could be a social product with a social function of improving 
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social welfare. But in order for intellectual property rights to comply with the new 
goals, intellectual property rights must first be consistent with other international 
human rights frameworks. In this respect Article 15 of the ICESCR can be used as a 
relevant proxy. Any form or level of intellectual property protection must at least 
facilitate and promote cultural participation and scientific progress in such a manner 
that all members of society both on individual and collective level can benefit. 
"The right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications" (Article 15.1 (b)) consists of three components: first a right of access to 
beneficial scientific and technological developments; second a right of choice in 
determining priorities and making decisions about major scientific and technological 
developments and lastly a right to be protected from possible harmful effects of 
scientific and technological development, on both individual and collective levels 
(Chapman, 1998). 
According to Chapman (1998), a human rights approach, based on the provision of 
Article 15.1, to intellectual property rights would demand from state parties a certain 
form of sensitivity and consideration for those groups who are absent from the 
decision making process about intellectual property rights. These groups are the poor, 
the disadvantaged, minorities, women, rural residents, indigenous peoples, and even 
(arguably) the future generation. Ultimately, intellectual property rights operating in a 
framework of human rights should improve the status of the vulnerable instead of the 
current regime of accruing wealth for the affluent and investors. After all, the right of 
self-determination, which is part of the ICESCR and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), emphases the right of all members of society to 
participate in decision making about their governance and common future. This 
should also include a human right to participate in societal decision making about the 
development of science and technology. Reality shows a different picture. Policy on 
technology and science is very much directed from the top and it is very unlikely that 
this process will change in the near future, especially with the increasing pressure of 
economic globalisation. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8, 
section 2.1, the human rights framework in general, has been criticised for its limited 
liberatory and emancipatory capabilities vis-A-vis the vulnerable. In this sense it is 
not only the framework of intellectual property rights that is not responsive towards 
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the needs of indigenous peoples; arguably the whole body of human rights is criticised 
for its lack of focus on improving the situation of the poor in, for example, Africa (for 
more details see Appendix 3). 
"The right of everyone to benefitftoni protection of the moral and material interests 
resultingftom any scientific, literary or artistic production ofwhich that person is the 
author" (Article 15.1(c)) imposes an obligation on state parties to protect the moral 
and material interests of authors and inventors. In order for patent provisions to be 
consistent with the human rights norms, the following considerations for intellectual 
property legislation should be taken on board by state parties: consistent with the 
understanding of human dignity in the various international human rights instruments 
and the norms defined therein; promoting scientific progress and access to its benefits; 
respecting the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity and 
encouraging the development of international contacts and cooperation in the 
scientific and cultural fields (Chapman, 1998; Coombe, 1998a). 
Unfortunately, as Chapman (1998) concludes, Article 15 of the ICESCR is one of the 
most neglected provisions within the international human rights framework. 
Implementation and monitoring of these rights has been difficult for two conceptual 
and methodological reasons. First, the implications of economic, social and cultural 
rights are less accepted or understood than the civil and political rights of the 
(ICCPR). Second, in contrast to civil and political rights (with the exception of labour 
rights), ICESCR rights are not part of domestic or international jurisprudence. For 
example, the provisions in Article 15 of the ICESCR (cultural life and scientific 
advancement) were not considered to be human rights when the UN Declaration was 
discussed in 1948. 
Based on the above, it seems that the first step in reducing the tension between human 
rights and intellectual property rights consists of finding a right balance between 
private and public interests. However, economic globalisation and the increasing 
privatisation of science have made it even more difficult to achieve a balance between 
private and public interests. Commercialisation has introduced market considerations 
in the conduct of science and has changed intellectual property from a tool to provide 
incentives to inventors or creators to an economic mechanism that encourages 
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investments of the (often corporate) inventor. However, most state parties to the 
ICESCR report developments in the protection of intellectual property rights, which 
indicates that there is potentially a customary norm of recognition of intellectual 
property rights as a cultural right in international human rights law (Coombe, 
1998a). 
In this way, intellectual property rights would place less emphasis on private 
monopoly rights and would better serve the public interest. 
However, defining what is in the best interest of the public is potentially a contested 
issue (Kansa et aL, 2005). In the first place, defining the public interest requires 
delineating the boundaries of the public domain and questioning the legal construction 
of the intellectual public domain (Aoki, 1998). Some scholars (see e. g. Boyle, 2003; 
May, 2000; Halbert, 2005) argue that the public interest is best served by reining in 
the privatisation and profit maximisation of intellectual property law. 
Simultaneously, leaving the biological and cultural resources of developing countries 
and indigenous peoples in the common domain is effectively putting them up for 
potential exploitation by third parties (mostly from developed countries). In other 
words, when defining the public interest, a choice must be made between two binary 
schemes. On the one hand, the traditional knowledge movement seeks recognition for 
its heritage, knowledge and property through claiming (exclusive) property rights. On 
the other hand, the open knowledge movement seeks to keep information in the public 
domain to encourage knowledge sharing and creativity which, so they argue, is in the 
best interest of the public. 
This debate, whether access and use of knowledge should be restricted or opened up, 
is rooted in the same tradition of dichotomous thinking that has been exposed in the 
previous chapters. As argued in chapters 2 and 3, this dichotomous thinking denies the 
recognition that objects and ideas circulate between different, what Christen (2005) 
calls, social modalities. Just as it was argued in chapter 4 that it is erroneous to divide 
property rights between private and common, so is it also inappropriate to generalise 
about knowledge as being either in the public or private domain, a polarised situation 
that, according to Kansa et al. (2005), is reinforced 
by the current intellectual property 
rights framework that leaves indigenous peoples only with the choice of 
'all-or- 
nothing' protection. These issues will be 
further discussed in the next part of this 
chapter. 
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Romantic Notion of the Public Domain 
Scholars of the open access movement (see e. g. Boyle, 2003; Halbert, 2005) argue 
that leaving information and ideas in the public domain enhances a 'semiotic' 
democracy, by which they mean a world in which all people and not just the powerful 
have access to empowerment. However, as Chander and Sunder (2004) argue, these 
scholars (in all likelihood unwittingly) turn a blind eye to the fact that throughout 
history the public domain has been an 'open' terrain for exploiting the land, resources 
and knowledge of disempowered and subordinated people. Locke's terra nullius 
argument, in the Second of his Two Treatises of Government, exemplifies this 
thinking (Martin and Vermeylen, 2005). 
Locke 52 argues that aboriginal people - who appear to lack an established system of 
property and who limit their activity to hunting and gathering - are in a pre-political 
stage of nature. Conversely, European society represents the most advanced and 
civilised stage because of its established legal system of property, political society, 
and commercial market-oriented agriculture and industry (Locke, 1963). 
Locke asserted that aboriginal people have property rights over only the fruits of their 
labour, such as the fish they catch and the berries they pick, and not over the land 
itself. Consequently, anyone can appropriate and settle on aboriginal land without 
consent as long as the land is uncultivated, or vacant (which is land used for hunting 
and gathering) and there is enough good land left in the commons. If the aboriginals 
want to defend their property, which they have mistakenly considered theirs for 
millennia, that is a violation of natural law for which they may be punished and killed. 
To explain why the Europeans have property systems and institutions like government 
while the aboriginals lack them, Locke said that aboriginals have no need for them at 
their level of economic development. 
Other Europeans who actually observed and studied hunter-gather societies came to a 
different conclusion. They recognised that the four criteria of nationhood in 
" Locke commented mainly on the European colonisation of the Americas. 
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international law were present in those societies. There was a permanent population, a 
form of government, a recognised occupation of territory over time, and the ability to 
enter into relations with other governments (Tully, 1994). From the aboriginal point 
of view, the European settlers appropriated land that was part of their nations. The 
land was not owned in the Western sense, but it was under aboriginal occupation and 
jurisdiction. 
Prior to Locke, there is evidence in the writings of Vitoria (cc. 1486-1546) and Las 
Casas (1474-1566) that aboriginals were recognised as comprising indigenous 
societies with distinct political entities and territorial rights (Marks, 2003). Vitoria and 
Las Casas were members of the Spanish School of the 16th Century, which considered 
the Spanish presence in the Americas and the subjugation of the Indians. Las Casas 
was a great defender of the rights of the Indians, and the Spanish School became the 
foundation of a particular legal tradition that is recognised as one of the first schools 
of thought on indigenous rights. 
Contrary to Locke, both Vitoria and Las Casas believed in the universality of human 
rights and the equality of humans. Las Casas' views reflected his concern with the 
material welfare and physical survival of the Indians. For him, indigenous rights 
included material security, cultural integrity, and political autonomy, comparable to 
the modem concept of self-determination. He devoted much of his life to the 
protection of the Indians and the restoration of their former (pre-colonial) status. In 
recognising that the Indians were equal to the Spanish, Las Casas denied terra nufflus. 
He argued that labelling Indians as barbarians in effect created terra nullius. 
Chander and Sunder argue that the idea that all people can equally use a resource in 
the public domain presumes a romantic notion of the commons. Scholars like May 
(2000) and Boyle (2003) argue that leaving information in the public domain 
stimulates liberal values like free speech and free access as well as innovation. 
Chander and Sunder (2004) argue that although some aspects of the open access 
movement must be applauded, at the same time they are concerned that emphasising 
libertarian values might disregard the claims of particular groups like indigenous 
peoples who are seeking property rights over information to redress their concerns 
over equality, wealth distribution and justice in general. No matter how strong is the 
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evidence that new property claims are encroachments on the public domain, in reality 
the current construction of the public domain often excludes the most disadvantaged 
and subordinated groups such as indigenous peoples. It may very well be that 
claiming property rights over information that is currently held in the commons is the 
only way for indigenous peoples to take control over their knowledge and satisfy their 
societal ideals (Chander and Sunder, 2004). Or in other words, indigenous peoples' 
acceptance of commodification in principle does not equate to the acceptance of a 
commodification practice that is driven by more powerful external actors. 
In other words, assessing whether it is valuable to leave knowledge in the public 
domain will depend on how the commons are constructed. While scholars (e. g. May, 
2000; Boyle, 2003) of the open access movement 53 argue that privatising the 
commons usually leads to breaking down a more communal social order and to 
handing over the wealth of the commons to a few powerful individuals or 
corporations, the concept of open access fails to acknowledge sufficiently the lack of 
ability for all commoners to exercise their control and freedom (ibid. ). As will be 
demonstrated in chapter 7,8 and 9, indigenous peoples often lack basic rights and the 
power imbalance vis-a-vis indigenous peoples is particularly strong; therefore leaving 
traditional knowledge in the open domain is not always a favourable option for 
indigenous peoples. Furthermore, some indigenous peoples may, in all likelihood, 
oppose the concept of leaving knowledge in the open domain so other people can 
continue to make use of their knowledge; instead, some indigenous peoples are 
striving to gain equal (exploitation) rights over their own knowledge and as such 
leaving knowledge in the public domain would therefore not be an option. 
o summarise, it is more important to consider property regimes (as explained in 
chapter 4) as being embedded in larger social, economic, political and legal constructs 
instead of focusing on the proprietary terms of individual versus communal property 
53 The origins of the open access movement can be traced back to the software industry and in 
particular the operating system 'Linux' which puts private property and freedom of contract in the 
service of the public domain through relying on an agreement called the General Public License (GPL). 
Software licensed under GPL is freely available for others to use, copy, distribute and modify (Chander 
and Sunder, 2004). Another open access movement is the 'Creative Commons' project which started at 
the Stanford law school and uses a similar strategy as Linux, viz. structuring the public domain through 
licences. The Creative Commons allows artists, musicians, academics and so forth, to offer their work 
to the public domain within predefined terms. In other words, the property rights of, for example, the 
artist are given up (with some reservations) in favour of public access and use (ibid. ). 
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rights. Similarly, it is important to see and define the commons and the public interest 
as being embedded in realities which exist on the ground rather than concentrating on 
the dialectic relationship between the public domain and intellectual property. In this 
sense the open access model is very similar to the ideological property model, which 
has been explained in chapter 4. Both the ideological property model and the 
ideological definition of the commons are expressed through general cultural ideals, 
ideologies and philosophies which differ in their presentation from, what has been 
called in chapter 4, categorical and concretised property relations or in this case 
categorical (legal-institutional relationship in the commons) and concretised (i. e. 
existing and quotidian property relationship in the commons) situation of the 
commons. From a concretised perspective, it is important to realise that some are 
better able to exploit the commons than others and as long as the commons are 
defined in a romantic (or ideological) way, its emancipatory potential will remain 
largely hidden. 
Defining the notion of commons into either open or closed divides indigenous 
systems into these two categories. As mentioned in chapter 2 and also affirmed by 
Christen (2005), indigenous systems rely on a continuum. Any regulation that relies 
on a division between traditional knowledge and scientific knowledge, commodity 
and non-commodity, individual and communal ownership or open and closed access 
to the commons reinforces a socio-political landscape which at best limits the options 
for indigenous peoples and at worst denies them the right to pursue development 
strategies as they see fit. In this respect, claiming intellectual property rights over 
cultural identity (in addition to or as opposed to intellectual property rights for 
economic reasons) raises the concern that this approach would reinforce a fixed 
meaning or static content of indigenous peoples' identity and knowledge, which is an 
approach that has so far been contested in this thesis. These issues will be discussed 
next. 
5 Intellectual Property Rights and Cultural Identity 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and following the findings in chapter 
3 that some objects (both tangible and intangible) may resist commodification, 
indigenous peoples are looking for a protection mechanism that can give them 
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exclusive property rights over their cultural property. According to Sunder (2000), 
indigenous peoples are claiming intellectual property rights because, on the one hand, 
they are concerned that their identity has been misinterpreted by other people and, on 
the other hand, they fear that the exploitation of their culture by outsiders will 
ultimately pose a threat to their own cultural survival. Some indigenous peoples, 
scholars and activists argue that intellectual property rights over culture can act as a 
source of empowerment and end the oppression of indigenous peoples. Some 
advocates of intellectual property rights over culture further argue that the claiming of 
property rights can be seen as a signal of power relations. Claims of property rights 
over culture are thus seen as acts of empowerment for indigenous peoples because it 
allows them to prevent foreigners and outsiders from further (mis)using their culture 
(Sunder, 2000). 
The discourse on cultural property rights reflects the current and prominent view of 
culture as being a concept that is embedded in the continuity and integrity of a group 
or nation's identity. In this sense, argues Leach (2003), cultural property is 'defined' 
(e. g. by international institutions like UNESCO) as an inalienable possession of 
objects that resist transaction (or what has been called in chapter 3 commodification), 
and only acquires value through other mechanisms than exchange (e. g. as gifts). In 
other words, the value of cultural property is linked to concepts such as completeness, 
authenticity and possession by one particular culturally defined group of people and 
as a result culture is seen as incompatible with any form of commodification. 
5.1 Criticising the Bounded view of Culture 
However, both Brown (1998; 2003) and Christen (2005) argue that these new forms 
of cultural property come with certain risks. By turning culture into property, the uses 
and meaning of culture and property will be defined by and directed by law. The 
result may be that culture becomes standardised and subject to strict legal conditions. 
This will restrict the possibility to create and recreate culture, which can be highly 
problematic since cultures are negotiated, defined and produced through social 
interaction inside and outside communities (Nagel, 1994). Emphasising the 
inalienability of culture (a policy that UNESCO endorses) will dissociate the 
relationship between two parties and so will make culture static and unchanging 
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(Leach, 2003). Furthermore, treating culture as something that belongs to a particular 
group emphasises the wholeness of the object (ibid. ). 
Sunder (2000) agrees that intellectual property rights not only legally enforce cultural 
boundaries, but also privilege essentialised orthodox cultural interpretations over 
contemporary and more realistic cultural interpretations. In this way, intellectual 
property rights over culture come to assume a cultural homogeneity that is extremely 
rare in the modem world. There is a real danger, argues Sunder, that by claiming 
intellectual property rights in culture, indigenous peoples are seeking cultural survival 
by turning the clock back to a (distant) past when cultures were still isolated and 
homogeneous. 
In their struggle for empowerment, indigenous peoples confront a socio-political 
climate that drives them to make claims of authenticity (Vermeylen and Martin, 
2006). The discourse, wherein the debate about intellectual property over culture is 
conducted, is a prime example of such a socio-political and legal construction of 
authenticity. Although Halbert (2005) argues against intellectual property rights over 
culture, her rhetoric that indigenous peoples need "to develop and assert 
deontological claims about sacredness and the noncommodifliability of life" 
(2005: 144) is still a good example of a one-sighted view of indigeneity and 
authenticity (see chapter 3 for a more contextualised and empirically grounded debate 
on commodification). 
5.2 Images of Indigeneity 
In other words, the needs of indigenous peoples are often defined in accordance with 
dominant images of indigeneity that serve certain interests (Blaser, 2004a). 
Depending on whether they are viewed as being in a state of 'backwardness' or in 
'harmony with nature', a discourse of progress or conservation is mobilized by 
activists, governments, NGOs, and indigenous people themselves. In practice, as 
argued in chapter 2, this inhibits indigenous peoples from developing an inside-out 
identity, one that flows organically from their changing status, a status far removed 
from an idealised primitive past. Their identity is forged in the context of a power 
asymmetry, so that they have to position themselves between mutually exclusive 
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identities defined by others, viz. as a backward people in modernist discourse or as a 
natural people in conservationist discourse. 
Those who argue that indigenous people should claim property rights over culture on 
the basis of their identity continue to believe - erroneously - that indigenous 
communities are homogenous and can be represented with one voice (on the 
heterogeneity of communities see Appendix 5). While it is acknowledged in the 
literature that indigenous societies do not constitute a homogeneous group and can 
range from groups who live deep down in the Amazon and have little contact with 
other groups to groups who own casinos (see e. g. Tunney, 1998), such a diversity can 
also be found in one indigenous group. Where society once enforced assimilation on 
indigenous peoples, it now enforces re-traditionalisation. With regard to intellectual 
property claims, this is an example of how indigenous peoples are required to link 
their relationship with culture and knowledge to concepts of (a homogeneous) 
identity, ethnicity and personhood. 
If human rights are going to play a normative role in the debate about intellectual 
property rights, it is important that it becomes accepted that indigenous peoples have a 
say in development planning and that they must have the right both as individuals and 
as a group to make decisions about their own land, natural resources, identities, 
culture and political participation (Hitchcock, 2002). The international discourse on 
indigenous identity is very much based on the assumptions that indigenous peoples 
are distinguished from other marginalised minorities by their unique relationship to 
land, the fact that they are different, their 'otherness' or their pre-modem identity 
(Sylvain, 2003). These assumptions can also be found in the strategic discourse that is 
used for claiming property rights over traditional culture and knowledge. 
If indigenous peoples are going to be successful in creating and enforcing the 
necessary institutional infrastructures for gaining rights, it is necessary to accept that 
their real identity is not a 'primitive' one, but an identity that has been forced upon 
them as a result of historical processes and the prevailing political economy. In the 
case of the San, their activism reflects their experiences of dispossession, 
marginalisation, exploitation and stigmatisation. Acceptance of their emergent 
identity is critical for the empowerment of the San and the improvement of their 
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material conditions (ibid. ). This requirement sits uncomfortably with the enforced 
identity of 'noble savage' that has been created as a prerequisite for claiming cultural 
property rights. Overemphasising the identity discourse as a requirement for claiming 
cultural property, especially when it is based on a manipulated or constructed identity, 
might distract attention from more pressing problems of poverty and economic 
inequalities. Indigenous issues have become inseparable from class issues. Rights are 
not just instruments of law; they are also an expression of a moral identity as a people 
(ibid. ). 
Allocating property rights over culture on the basis of ethnicity needs to be 
questioned. The San that were interviewed (see Appendix 2) have indicated that their 
quest for recognition of their knowledge and rights over resources is linked to their 
struggle for gaining equal citizenship. In the context of traditional knowledge, 
claiming property rights over knowledge and culture on the basis of ethnicity means 
highlighting the 'otherness' and 'pristine' uniqueness of one's own identity. The 
4 ordinary' San on the ground have not expressed an interest in this option. In order to 
achieve control over resources and knowledge, social mobility is required and it is 
highly contestable that further alienating themselves from other social groups will 
stimulate this process (Widlok, 1999). The San value access to mainstream society 
without being enforced to further erode what little is left of their cultural traditions, 
but this does not mean that they show a willingness to use their tradition as a political 
weapon. Using the vision of the San as First People seems mainly a strategy adopted 
by donors, NGOs and the elite of tribal politicians (hence the difference made above 
between leaders and ordinary San54) and its overall effectiveness must be questioned. 
For one thing, it can be argued on the basis of the fieldwork that it does not reflect the 
San's own opinion or self-image. 
This position, that allocating intellectual property rights on the basis of ethnic identity 
is difficult, does not mean that the author agrees with Kuper's (2003) argument that 
indigenous peoples are not entitled to claim privileged rights over others on the basis 
of their indigenous status. Involvement in the ongoing debate (see e. g. Kenrick and 
Lewis, 2004) on rights and the use of the term 'indigenous' is beyond the scope of this 
5' The observation that tribal leaders propagate a revived traditionalist ideology has also been noted by 
Schr6der (2003) and Rata (1999; 2000). 
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chapter. However it is important to point out that, when indigenous peoples seek to 
redress (for example) appropriation of culture, they often find themselves having to 
present themselves to the outside world through an image that does not resonate with 
their daily reality; "they have to display naivety by maintaining a tradition untainted 
by change" (Kentick and Lewis, 2004: 8). Indigenous peoples are not using this 
'image' to seek privileged rights, but they are "constrained to present their cultures in 
ways that reinforce the dominant societies' worldview " in order to gain equal rights 
(Kentick and Lewis, 2004: 9). A similar strategy can be observed with regards to 
intellectual property rights. 
5.3 Shifting Concepts of Culture 
While some indigenous peoples will insist that the right to be different lies within 
culture, Gray (2004) argues that the controversy over the question as to whether there 
can be a right to cultural identity remains, regardless of whether that right is granted 
through intellectual property rights or any other rights-based policy. One reason why 
claiming intellectual property rights over culture is such a contested phenomenon is 
the fact that culture is already a shifting concept ranging from culture as a trait (which 
assumes that culture is tangible, continuous and bounded), culture as a meaning 
(culture is a web of meanings which must be interpreted) and culture as a process 
(dynamic view of culture as something that is regularly created) (Gray, 2004). It is 
argued in this chapter that intellectual property rights in culture still falls within the 
remit of culture as traits. As exemplified in chapter 2 and 4, some of the UN 
documents (e. g. the CBD, Working Group in Indigenous Populations) stem from this 
framework in which it is argued that cultural traits such as knowledge, language, 
religion and material culture must be protected. However, such an approach with 
regards to cultural heritage would lead to defining culture as a folkloric, static notion 
buried in tradition (Gray, 2004). 
In other words, there is a real danger that claiming intellectual property rights in 
culture will reinforce a hegemonic interpretation of culture, in the sense that culture is 
conceived as a total and coherent body of behaviour and beliefs that normally does 
not 'survive' abrupt alterations (Ivison, 2002). In short, law interprets culture (this 
will be further discussed in chapter 8, section 3.2) as "a continuous and integrated set 
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of practices and beliefs held by a particular people occupying a distinct territory" 
(Ivison, 2002: 35). Moreover, significant legal decisions concerning the rights of 
indigenous peoples (see chapter 9, section 4) have tied recognition of, for example, 
land rights 55 to the continuing presence or continuity of a 'traditional' or 'customary' 
way of life. In short, both national law and international law dictate the contours and 
content of the claims and even of indigenous peoples' identities by defining culture as 
a trait (Cowan et al., 200 1). 
However, as Gray (2004) has pointed out, culture can also be defined in a different 
way, viz. as meaning or as a process. For example, anthropologists argue that culture 
should be seen as a process, thus emphasising its dynamic and creative character (see 
e. g. Coombe, 1998b). Anthropological theory now rejects the above concept of 
culture as something that is integrated, harmonious, consensual and bounded (Merry, 
2001: 41). Instead, anthropologists now understand culture as something that is 
historically produced, globally interconnected, internally contested, and marked with 
ambiguous boundaries of identity and practice (ibid. ). However, as argued above, law 
does not engage with the latter definition and reinforces indigenous peoples to engage 
with the older concept of culture in their search for self-determination. 
Indigenous peoples seek protection over culture to assert their own cultural views and 
self-determination over and above the views of outsiders. In this sense, claiming 
rights over culture is for indigenous peoples a socio-political act which includes 
questioning the invasion of their territories, the disintegration of their identities, their 
historical position of subordination and becoming an underclass and so forth. In other 
words, seeking cultural protection is, for indigenous peoples, another aspect of 
claiming (indigenous) rights. It is very doubtful that intellectual property rights which 
in their current form are focussing on culture as a trait rather than a process, can be a 
flexible enough or powerful enough instrument to be of much use in that respect. 
Therefore other protection measurements and other legal regimes should be reviewed 
to see if they can deal more appropriately with the problem of how to protect and use 
traditional knowledge in a more equitable way. 
" See for example Clifford's account of the Masphee Indians' courtroom battle in order to win a 
land 
claim, which so it aspired later, they could only win if they could prove to the courts 
that they 'were 
now' and 'have always been' a tribe (Cowan et aL, 200 1). 
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Greene (2002) argues that the protection and use of traditional knowledge should not 
be seen in terms of intellectual property but suggests focusing instead on territorial 
rights for indigenous peoples. He explains that the concept of territoriality is not a 
new one; for decades it has played a central role in indigenous peoples' struggle for 
land rights. Without sufficient access to (ancestral) land, indigenousness is 
undermined, local culture cannot be maintained and associated oral knowledge will 
rapidly degrade. In that sense, the material claim to land is linked to the political and 
moral claim to self-determination. According to this principle of territoriality, it might 
be better to define traditional knowledge in terms of access to territory rather than to 
knowledge. Using a strategy of territorial rights for the protection of traditional 
knowledge could be beneficial in three ways. First, it reinforces explicitly the politics 
of self-determination that indigenous peoples are already demanding. Second, the 
focus on territoriality could stimulate in some cases a political confrontation with the 
state. Third, it stimulates them to ask some fundamental questions about what should 
and should not be considered as a resource or what should or should not become 
accessible to market concepts of property and commodification. However, it remains 
to be seen whether Green's concept of territoriality can transcend the essentialisation 
of indigenous peoples' identities and cultures. This will be examined in chapter 9. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the potential usefulness of the existing intellectual property 
rights regime as a mechanism to help indigenous peoples to exert control over their 
indigenous knowledge, both when they seek to protect their culture and when they 
seek to commodify (certain aspects of) their knowledge. These two potential purposes 
of intellectual property rights are suggested in the literature, but the analysis presented 
in this chapter shows that both are problematic. The history of intellectual property 
rights shows that they were invariably developed as tools to strengthen the exclusive 
ownership over knowledge by already relatively powerful actors. This means that the 
development of intellectual property rights as tools to empower disadvantaged and 
excluded indigenous peoples would require a process that runs counter to the logic 
that has driven the development of intellectual property rights to date. Similarly, the 
current intellectual property rights framework is of questionably utility for the cultural 
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protection of indigenous peoples as it traps them in an unrealistically 'frozen' and 
, backward' looking identity which may hinder their wider aspirations to overcome 
social and economic exclusion. The weak social and economic position of many 
indigenous peoples implies the need for an alternative model for intellectual property 
rights that is more democratic and that serves human rights values. 
The previous chapter (chapter 4) presented the multi-layered property framework of 
ideological, categorical and concrete property relations of von Benda-Beckmann et 
al. (2006). The classification derived from this framework (see Figure I in chapter 4) 
will be used here to draw a number of conclusions about the appropriateness of 
intellectual property as a protection mechanism for traditional knowledge. Intellectual 
property rights emphasise the categorical (i. e. legal-institutional) property relations 
over intangibles. In other words, intellectual property law clearly fits within the 
categorical or legal-institutional framework of property relations. This is one of the 
main reasons why the debate about protecting traditional knowledge with intellectual 
property rights has been so difficult. From a strictly legal-institutional perspective, 
traditional knowledge does not fulfil the criteria for patentability and there seems to 
be insufficient goodwill among the main players in the WTO to extend the scope and 
range of intellectual property rights to include traditional knowledge. 
Opponents to intellectual property rights, on the other hand, have mostly been 
concerned with ideological property relations (e. g. by focusing the discussion on 
individual versus community-based property rights). Especially, the debate about 
whether knowledge should stay in the commons is in principle a debate largely driven 
by an ideological or, in the terminology of this chapter, a romantic notion of the 
commons. Attempts to democratise intellectual property law will be challenged by 
realities on the ground of which power differences and lack of civil society amongst 
indigenous peoples are two main examples. Looking at the issue from a historical and 
philosophical perspective, it becomes clear that intellectual property rights are not 
appropriate tools to create a civil society; it is rather that civil society is a prerequisite 
for successfully claiming property claims over intangibles (and also tangibles for that 
matter) by indigenous peoples. This issue is further explored 
in chapter 9, section 4.3. 
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Based on fieldwork observations and the more critical literature on culturalism, it can 
be argued that the San's claims of intellectual property rights over intangibles are 
mainly driven by utilitarianism (e. g. to improve their livelihoods, to gain more 
autonomy or to achieve equal citizenship) which is consistent with the concretised 
type of property relations. However, by paying attention to the wider socio-economic 
and political context within which property relations (i. e. intellectual property rights) 
are currently expressed, it becomes clear that when expressing their claims, 
indigenous peoples must contest current property relations and rationalise their claims 
by focusing on the ideological type of property relations. 
So while ideological, categorical and concretised property relations are all part of a 
wider socio-economic context, indigenous peoples have to express their property 
relations mainly through a rhetoric of ideological property relations. This results in a 
situation wherein property law reinforces an essentialised view of culture and identity 
and fails to accommodate alternative and more diverse notions of culture which may 
be experienced by indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples need a more flexible and 
concretised framework (i. e. based on quotidian social practices) for protecting their 
traditional knowledge. It is obvious from the above observations that the existing 
intellectual property regime is not going to be an institution that is sympathetic 
towards the claims and needs of indigenous peoples. For one thing, intellectual 
property law is firmly grounded in either categorical (i. e. legal-institutional) property 
relations or, for those who oppose it, it is grounded in ideological property 
relationships. While the former almost rules out the participation of indigenous 
peoples per definition through power differences, the latter either imposes a re- 
traditionalisation of indigenous peoples' identity or creates a further impasse by 
leaving knowledge in the common domain. 
Given the above criticism, the conclusion from chapter 4 must be reaffirmed. Using 
intellectual property rights for the protection of traditional knowledge is a highly 
contestable and difficult strategy. The current intellectual property rights framework 
fails to provide adequate protection. This means that other solutions to protect 
traditional knowledge should be explored and tested. In the next chapter, two 
diverging strategies will be further analysed, viz. defensive and positive protection 
mechanisms; the latter requires a new legal system, the former builds further upon the 
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existing system. In chapter 7 and 8 two positive defensive mechanisms will be 
analysed in more detail. In chapter 7 the pragmatic approach of compensation will be 
analysed by examining the fairness of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement. In 
chapter 8, a customary law based approach will be further scrutinised. Finally, chapter 
9 presents an assessment of the extent to which a strategy outside intellectual property 
law may better accommodate indigenous peoples' claims and needs. 
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Chapter 6- Defensive and Positive Protection Mechanisms 
of Traditional Knowledge 
I Introduction 
It was argued in chapter 5 that the current framework of intellectual property rights 
fails to provide adequate protection for traditional knowledge; therefore it was 
suggested that other solutions to protect traditional knowledge must be sought and 
tested. This chapter provides an overview of the currently proposed protection tools 
and assesses whether these mechanisms can redress the imbalanced exploitation of 
traditional knowledge. For the last two decades, the concern to protect and strengthen 
traditional knowledge systems has gained in importance at the international level. For 
example, international institutions like the CBD, the WIPO's Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore (WIPO-IGC) and the WTO in the 2001 Doha Declaration have begun to 
outline the general principles for a system for protection of traditional knowledge. 
In general terms, the proposed solutions, which are mainly legal ones, can be divided 
into two categories, viz. defensive and positive protection (see Table 3). The 
defensive protection measures are modifications or enhancements of the existing 
intellectual property laws. The positive protection mechanisms, on the other hand, 
require a completely new system (sui generis) which will demand active and 
committed participation of all the parties involved - such as local and indigenous 
communities, NGOs, activists, national governments, international community, and so 
forth - and therefore will be more difficult to achieve in practice than positive 
defensive protection (Dutfield, 2004). Sui generis traditional knowledge protection 
(sometimes also called 'sui generis intellectual property protection' and often 
shortened to 'sui generis protection' or 'sui generis law') encompasses a legal system 
for the protection of knowledge that, although it shares some characteristics with 
intellectual property, is unique in the sense that it protects the new subject matter of 
indigenous and local peoples' knowledge (Halewood, 1999). 
Some (mostly developing) states have already enacted specific or sui generis 
legislation that governs the use of indigenous and local knowledge. Other states 
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regulate the protection and use of traditional knowledge through their national access 
laws (regulated through the CBD) which may incorporate provisions that relate to the 
use of traditional knowledge. These national regulations about the use of traditional 
knowledge (both direct legislation or through national access laws), together with 
international initiatives such as the CBD, increasingly govern the collection and 
dispersal of traditional knowledge while simultaneously imposing a variety of 
conditions on potential users or collectors of traditional knowledge (Drahos, 2000). 
However, the main question remains whether these legislations (both defensive and 
positive protection measures) will give indigenous peoples sufficient control over the 
use of their knowledge. 
Table 3: Defensive and positive protection mechanisms for traditional knowledge 56 
Defensive Protecýion Positive Protection 
Inalienability Rules 1) Traditional Knowledge 
Prior Art Database 
Preventing traditional - Traditional Knowledge 
knowledge from being Digital Library (e. g. 
misappropriated. India) 
- Community 
Biodiversity Registers 
(e. g. India) 
2) Disclosure of Origin 
Contract Rules 1) Liability Rules 
(bioprospecting 
Mainly for situations negotiations) 
where there is already a - International body of traditional Collaborative 
knowledge in circulation; Biodiversity Group 
based on the principle 'use Program (ICBG) 
now, pay later'. Agreements (e. g. Peru) 
Property Rules 1) Sui Generis Laws 
- National Statutes for 
(Exclusive) rights for the use of traditional 
owners with a right to knowledge (Peru) 
refuse, authorise and 
determine conditions for 
access to traditional 
knowledge. 
56 This list is not exhaustive, but covers the main protection mechanisms as identified in the literature 
(see e. g. Dutfield, 2004). 
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As argued in chapter 4, the current intellectual property rights framework ignores 
distributive justice and, instead, emphasises the technological and economic 
advantage of a few Western (corporate) powers. Therefore, any of the proposed 
protection mechanisms must at least fulfil the requirement of creating a more equality 
minded protection framework that will give indigenous peoples equal exploitation and 
protection rights over their traditional knowledge in comparison with the current users 
of that knowledge, i. e. corporate powers. 
I 
In this respect, Chander and Sunder (2004) argue that intemational law has recently 
accepted the fact that some resources (like the global commons such as outer space, 
deep seas and Antartica) need special protection regimes in order to constrain the one- 
sided exploitation of these resources 57 . When natural resources become more 
valuable, regardless of whether the concern is for oil, minerals or plants, society 
encounters a reoccurring problem, viz. allocation of rights over these resources 
(Cottier, 1998). Gradually, this process of allocating rights over natural resources in 
the global commons has been guided by ethical values and claims that express and 
symbolise concerns over equity and distributive, inter- and intra-generational justice. 
Similar issues must be raised and addressed when discussing rights over traditional 
knowledge. 
57 For a comparison between, on the one hand, the international law regime of the commons such as 
the deep ocean bed, outer space and Antartica and, on the other hand, knowledge in the commons see, for example, Chander (2003). For a more general overview of the international law regulations with 
regards to the global commons see, for example, Vogler (2000). With regard to the mining of the deep 
seabed, according to Vogler, the regulations are a good example of a regime that fulfils the needs and desires of developing countries. Developed and developing countries have negotiated extensively over 
the regime that is to govern the exploitation of the deep seabed. The US proposed a first-come first- 
served' system, with an international involvement limited to the creation of an international registry of 
claims (to secure the first claimant's property rights) and to setting aside a small percentage of revenues from exploitation for sharing with landlocked states. The developing states objected to this plan and 
argued that this would principally only be beneficial for the developed states because of their 
technological advantage. Ultimately, the regime negotiators (with the exception of the US) agreed to a 
plan that balanced the need to make exploitations worthwhile with the desire to share the benefits of 
that exploitation with less developed countries. The resulting UN Convention of the Law of the 
Sea 
(UNCLOS) declared the high seas and their deep seabed resources to be the common heritage of 
mankind. Mining would be permitted, but only under a regime that would benefit all states, not 
just the 
mining state. Under this regime, a private company seeking a mining permit must 
first attract a state 
sponsor and then apply to the International Sea-bed Authority, an international organisation created 
by 
the 1982 Convention. Applying the fair division of 'I cut, you choose' the company submits maps of 
two sites to be mined (I cut) from which the Authority chooses one 
for itself and the other for the 
company (you choose). The Authority's development division, the 
Enterprise, then has the right to 
develop the site reserved by the Authority. The proceeds from the mining. 
of the Enterprise will be 
shared equitably among the states of the world, taking into particular 
consideration the interests and 
needs of developing states. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts. Part I provides an overview and assessment of 
the main defensive protection measures with a particular focus on two mechanisms, 
viz. the requirement of disclosure of origin and prior art databases. Part 2 will 
examine positive protection tools consisting of, on the one hand, liability rules and, on 
the other hand, property rules. Part 3 will identify and discuss the shortcomings of the 
current proposed protection mechanisms vis-A-vis the positions taken and 
requirements of indigenous peoples and their organisations. The final section, Part 4 
will provide a discussion of how to approach the reconciliation between the law's 
development of protection mechanisms and indigenous peoples' concerns. 
2 Defensive Protection Mechanism 
The two most important defensive protection mechanisms that will be discussed in 
this chapter are, first, requirement of the patent applicant to disclose the origin of the 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge relevant to the invention and, 
second, to compile databases of published information on traditional knowledge in 
order to make it possible for patent examiners to identity potentially novelty- 
destroying prior art (Dutfield, 2004). Both proposals fall within the remit of the 
current patent system and, unlike the positive protection mechanisms that will be 
discussed hereafter, would not require substantially new legislation. The main 
purposes of these protection mechanisms are twofold. First, they fulfil the 
requirements of the CBD, viz. to provide proof that the transfer of the resources and 
associated knowledge has taken place in accordance with the regulations of the CBD 
and national law. Second, these defensive measurements are also seen as a means of 
preventing traditional knowledge from being misappropriated. 
2.1 Disclosure of Origin 
In order to support the CBD's provisions on Access and Benefit Sharing agreements 
(ABS), proposals have begun to emerge to change the procedures of patent 
applications (Tobin, 2004). A number of mechanisms have been proposed to ensure 
that the acquisition of intellectual property rights complies with the principles and 
objectives of the CBD (Vivas Eugui, 2003), viz. the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. It has been suggested 
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that applicants for patents must be able to indicate in their application the origin of 
genetic material used, the extent to which it was used and the conditions under which 
it was acquired. While the European community has supported this, primarily 
voluntary, disclosure agreement, developing countries demand more stringent 
procedures. They argue that patents should only be accepted when evidence of origin 
and of prior informed consent (permission given by traditional knowledge custodians 
to use traditional knowledge) for use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
can be given in the patent application. Proposals from developed and developing 
countries for modifications to international intellectual property law to include 
disclosure requirements tend to be divided between mandatory and voluntary 
provisions. For example, Switzerland has recently proposed changes to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) to incorporate voluntary disclosure requirements, while 
India and Brazil, for example, have proposed amendments to the TRIPS agreement to 
include mandatory disclosure requirements (Tobin, 2004). 
The disclosure of origin is like an official certificate that recognises the legal origin of 
or legally authorised access to a particular genetic resource or piece of information 
linked to traditional knowledge (Vivas Eugui, 2003). In this sense the requirement of 
disclosure of origin can be used as a tool to prevent illegal access to and use of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge by non-authorised third parties within the 
intellectual property system (ibid). 
Not only is disclosure of origin an important protection measurement for developing 
countries, the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the CBD has also recognised the 
potential of this mechanism. At the sixth meeting of the COP, the Bonn guidelines 
were adopted which requested from countries with users of genetic resources under 
their jurisdiction to consider 'measures to encourage disclosure of the country of 
origin of the genetic resources and the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous and local communities in applications for intellectual 
property rights. However, some members of the COP are unconvinced about the need 
for certification and disclosure of origin, and a few (e. g. Australia and Canada) are 
opposed, including the US which has only an observer status in the CBD (ibid. ). 
Those who oppose the disclosure of origin argue that this measure is incompatible 
141 
with the TRIPS agreement. As indicated above, there are various options for 
disclosure of origin and Vivas Eugui (2003) has identified the following four options: 
2.1.1 Mandatory Disclosure Requirement 
The mandatory disclosure requirement implies that disclosure of all information 
available about the genetic resource will be obligatory. This requirement is intended 
to help realise fair and equitable benefit sharing as required by the CBD. This can be 
achieved through establishing that that resources and traditional knowledge were 
acquired in conformity with the biodiversity access and benefit sharing regulations in 
the source countries and Article 80)58 of the CBD (Dutfield, 2004). Failure to meet 
the mandatory disclosure requirement could have three possible legal consequences: 
abandonment of the procedure; relative nullity 59 and suspension of the process; and 
revocation of the patent. The latter approach has been chosen by, for example, India in 
its Patent Act of 2002 60 which regulates, inter alia, that patents may be revoked on the 
ground: "that the complete specification does not disclose or wrongly mentions the 
source or geographical origin of biological material usedfor the invention" (Indian 
Patent Act, 2002 in Vivas Eugui, 2003: 203) and "that the invention sojar as claimed 
in any claim of the complete specification was anticipated having regard to the 
knowledge, oral or otherwise, available within any local or indigenous community in 
India or elsewhere " (Indian Patent Act, 2002 in Vivas Eugui, 2003: 204). 
2.1.2 Voluntary Disclosure Requirement 
The voluntary disclosure requirement is the system that is applied in the 1998 
Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological inventions of the EU. Failure to 
meet the voluntary disclosure requirement does not result in legal sanctions. The 
directive indicates in its preamble: "whereas if an invention is based on biological 
material ofplant or animal origin or if it uses such material, the patent application 
should, where appropriate, include information on the geographical origin of such 
material, if known; whereas this is without prejudice to the processing of the patent 
applications or the validity of rights arisingfrom granted patents " (Directive on the 
58 The CBD promotes the negotiation and creation of legal solutions to benefit sharing with indigenous 0 
peoples at the national level through Article 80). For more detailed information on Article 80) see 
section 3.1 of this chapter and chapter 7 in general. 
59 Relative nullity means violating a rule intended for the protection of the parties. 
60 Other regions or countries that have opted for the mandatorY requirement are the Andean Community 
and Brazil. 
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Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions of the EU, 1998 in Vivas Eugui, 
2003: 204). 
2.1.3 Ex Posteriori Mechanism of Unfair Competition: the Clean Hands Doctrine 
According to this approach, when an entity or individual has committed fraud or 
violated competition rules, this entity or individual will have the right to a patent 
without the derivative rights (i. e. exclusive rights) until the infractions are corrected. 
This view is based on the 'clean hands theory' from common law. 
2.1.4 Effective and Parallel Follow-Up of the Patent 
This option is followed in Denmark and Norway. The disclosure of origin is requested 
on a voluntary basis, and without the effect of nullity when insufficient information is 
produced. However, the intellectual property authorities, in conjunction with the 
environmental authorities, investigate the composition and source of compounds 
claimed in relevant patent applications. if it turns out that the compounds have been 
used illicitly, sanctions can be established according to civil, environmental or 
criminal law. 
One of the main problems with the disclosure requirement is the fact that it remains 
unclear whether it is compatible with the TRIPS agreement. Discussion within the 
TRIPS Council and the WIPO support both arguments (Vivas Eugui, 2003). 
Arguments against the requirement of disclosure have been based on the 
incompatibility of such a requirement with Articles 27.161 2962 , 30 and 62 
63 of TRIPS 
and because it places a new condition on patent filing procedures that is not allowable 
under the TRIPS regime. Arguments in favour of the disclosure of origin requirement 
rely on a more interlinked and reasonable interpretation of Articles 164 8.165 27,30 
and 62 of the TRIPS which would result in the acceptance of this type of measure. 
61 The disclosure requirement would add another substantive condition to the traditional conditions of 
novelty, inventive step and industrial application; this would be in breach with Article 27.1. 
62 Article 29 establishes the formal conditions for granting a patent and disclosing the origin is not 
necessary or relevant for the majority of cases according to this article. 
63 Article 62 establishes the conditions for the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property rights 
and it is argued that including the disclosure of origin would impose high and exaggerated 
administrative costs to patent filing and therefore be an unreasonable requirement. 
64 Article I allows members to apply the provisions of the TRIPS agreement according to their own 
legal practice and as such would allow the inclusion of the disclosure of origin. 
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According to Dutfield (2004), the TRIPS agreement would not be violated if it would 
be required in the patent application, first, to describe in general terms the relevant 
genetic material and traditional knowledge and, second, to submit documentary 
evidence that ABS regulations were complied with. However, according to Dutfield, 
the TRIPS agreement would be violated if the patent application required disclosure 
of the geographical origin of the relevant genetic material and associated traditional 
knowledge. This would require a revision of the TRIPS which in all likelihood, would 
be opposed by countries like the US. 
2.2 Traditional Knowledge Prior Art Databases (inalienability) 
One of the most important criteria for awarding a patent is novelty. When it can be 
demonstrated that the subject of the patent for which protection is sought is based on 
prior art, for example through a published description of the medicinal properties of a 
Particular plant, the requested patent will be denied by the patent office (Sahai, 2003; 
Chander and Sunder, 2004). However, Western patent offices are usually not aware of 
prior art relating to medicinal plants or other traditional knowledge and therefore face 
a difficult challenge in assessing novelty. This can lead to a situation where a patent is 
mistakenly granted by the patent office even though the patent is based on prior art. 
The granting of patents to neem-derived products (see Box 1) is a good example of 
the failure of patent offices to examine prior art related to traditional knowledge. 
Box 1: The neem patents (adapted from Dutfield 2002a: 66; 2004: 53). 
The neem tree has been the subject of a large number of patents, exceeding 40 in the US alone and at least another 150 worldwide. The inventions described in most of the 
neem-related patents used public domain traditional knowledge as a starting point of 
the 'invention'. These patents have provoked a lot of controversy, especially in India, 
where most of the traditional knowledge custodians live. There have been at least two 
patent challenges: first, the European Patent Office (EPO) patent for the fungicidal 
effects of the neern oil (Patent No. 436 257 BI) owned by W. R. Grace & Co and, 
second, the US patent for a storage-stable azadirachtin formulation (Patent No. 
5124349) which is also owned by W. R. Grace & Co. The challenge to the former 
patent succeeded in 2000 when the EPO revoked the patent on the grounds of lack of 
novelty and inventive step. 
65 Article 8.1 allows the flexible interpretation of the agreement in order to provoke measures that serve 
the public interest. 
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In order to reduce the risk that patents are awarded for products that are based on 
traditional knowledge, some countries are creating traditional knowledge databases 
(TDKs) in which they store information related to heritage and traditional prior art 
(such as traditional medicinal plant knowledge). The two best-known examples of 
TDKs are: the Traditional Chinese Medicine Patents Database which records 
traditional acupuncture, herbal medicines, animal-derived drugs and mineral drugs in 
a format searchable by patent examiners; and the Indian Traditional Knowledge 
Digital Library (TKDL) (see Box 2) to record systematically, in digital form, 
knowledge of Ayurveda which is a traditional Indian system of medicine 66 . Collecting 
and recording the traditional knowledge in a database prevents the unauthorised use of 
the traditional knowledge and makes knowledge inalienable from the public domain 
(Chander and Sunder, 2004). At the international level, the World Bank has started to 
collect African and other regional indigenous knowledge in a database with the 
objective of hosting an international storehouse of global prior art. 
Box 2: The Indian Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) (adapted from 
Sahai, 2003: 172-173). 
To prevent biopiracy, the government of India is developing a digital database of 
public domain traditional knowledge related to medicinal plants. It is proposed to 
make this digital database available to patent offices all over the world so that 
examiners are aware of the prior art relating to a particular medicinal plant. The 
TKDL project will cut the costs of fighting legal battles against such patents. The cost 
of contesting a patent at international level over a three to five-year period can be very 
high. A joint project of the National Institute of Science Communication (NISCOM) 
and the Central Department of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy, the 
TKDL is based on an innovative software program which facilitates the classification 
of traditional knowledge, making it compatible with the International Patent Classification. An interdisciplinary team of 30 Ayurveda experts, five patent 
examiners and five IT experts have already transcribed about 8000 formulations of the 
35,000 slokas pertaining to Ayurveda. The information will be made available in 35 
languages including all major Indian and foreign languages. Plants and knowledge 
that are not in the public domain are not going to be placed in the public domain. In 
addition, a National Innovation Foundation (NIF) has been set up with the intention of 
building a national register of innovations, mobilising intellectual property protection, 
setting up incubators for converting innovations into viable business opportunities, 
and helping in nationwide dissemination. 
Besides storing traditional knowledge in the 
TKDL, India is also documenting 
indigenous knowledge through Community Biodiversity Registers (CBRs), also 
66 The database also includes knowledge about yoga, unani and 
siddha. 
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called People's Biodiversity Registers (PRBs) (Sahai, 2003; Utkarsh, 2003), in which 
people's knowledge of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources are 
recorded in the hope that these registers can protect the intellectual property of the 
community members and can promote equitable commercialisation of the knowledge 
through benefit sharing agreements (Utkarsh, 2003). The CBRs or PBRs are databases 
collated on village level, usually developed by a team of local school teachers, 
students, NGO researchers and villagers (see Box 3). Biodiversity registers from 
villages can also be put together at the level of talukas (counties), districts, states and 
the whole nation, in the form of computerised databases. The CBRs or PBRs are 
recognised by the Indian Biological Diversity Bill as a way to ensure access and 
benefit sharing. 
Box 3: An example of a Community Biodiversity Register (CBRs) (adapted from 
Sahai, 2003: 172). 
Gene Campaign has undertaken work on recording indigenous knowledge among 
three indigenous groups (the Mundas and Oraons in South Bihar, the Bhils of Madhya 
Pradesh and the Tharus of the Terai region). Medicinal plants and knowledge of their 
use for human and veterinary care has been collected with the help of educated tribal 
youths. Elders in the villages, medicinal practitioners and traditional healers were 
consulted in the process of collating and interpreting information. The documented 
knowledge has been put into manuals for the local peoples who now use them as 
practical healing guides. During the data collection exercise, Gene Campaign also 
conducted a public education programme, informing community members about new 
national and international developments that are aiming to prevent the unauthorised 
use of traditional knowledge. Gene Campaign has made the local peoples more aware 
of their rights so that they are now aware that their knowledge belongs to them and 
cannot be used without their permission. 
According to Utkarsh (2003), the development of PBRs or CBRs offers a number of 
advantages and important lessons for other countries. First, traditional knowledge can 
be better protected from biopiracy through publicity (claims of prior art) rather than 
through secrecy. Second, the community-based registers can help to promote 
sustainable local use and trade. Third, compiling the registers can help to revitalise 
local traditions that are on the verge of extinction. Fourth, the exercise of collecting 
the information will help to promote the preservation and sharing of knowledge 
within the community. Fifth, in order to capitalise on the usefulness of the community 
registers, the knowledge must also be computerised at the national level so it can 
serve as a database of prior art. 
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However, according to Chander and Sunder (2004), the traditional knowledge 
database approach carries a significant risk. They argue that by placing the traditional 
knowledge in the public domain, it becomes easier for companies to use this 
knowledge as an unauthorised stepping-stone for new inventions. TKDL can only 
prevent patents that cover products that are based on straightforward copying of 
traditional knowledge, but cannot prevent patents for products that have used 
traditional knowledge to invent substantially new products even though the initial 
ideas come from traditional usage. Therefore India has decided to make the TKDL 
only available to patent offices and under a non-disclosure agreement. In other words, 
the TKDL approach offers both advantages and disadvantages. It establishes the 
ingenuity of traditional communities and prevents the patenting of at least some of the 
knowledge they hold. On the other hand, improvements upon traditional knowledge 
may still be patentable. Moreover, according to Chander and Sunder (2004), by 
preventing monopoly rights in certain information through patents, the TKDL 
approach might reduce the economic value of traditional knowledge and therefore 
reduces the possibility of benefit sharing agreements between local communities and 
companies. 
Dutfield (2004) also doubts whether traditional knowledge databases can stop patents 
being granted to third parties who have used traditional knowledge for their invention. 
While it can certainly stop patents like the turmeric patent67 that was characterised by 
the absence of novelty, in most cases the patent is based on building further upon 
traditional knowledge and it remains uncertain whether traditional knowledge can be 
described in such a way that it constitutes novelty-defeating prior art. Tobin (2004) 
and Mgbeoji (2001) further argue that databases and registers alone will not provide 
sufficient protection of traditional knowledge. They state that these databases and 
registers should be seen rather as one element in a wider system of traditional 
knowledge governance together with other measurements such as customary law and 
sui generis law and policy. 
67 In 1995, a US patent was awarded to the University of Mississippi Medical Center. The patent 
covered a method of promoting wound healing by administering turmeric. However, in India the 
healing properties of the turmeric plant arc common knowledge and is known as a 'classic 
grandmother's remedy (Dutfield, 2002a). Eventually the patent was revoked on the basis of its lack of 
novelty (ibid. ). 
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Tobin (2004) and Mgbeoji (2001) agree with Chander and Sunder (2004) that placing 
traditional knowledge in the public domain as a protection tool against biopiracy can 
effectively amount to the renunciation of rights over such knowledge. Furthermore, 
Tobin (2004) argues, community registers developed and maintained by local and 
indigenous communities can indeed facilitate the process of defining rights over 
community knowledge within a community; however their legal effect as a means for 
protection of traditional knowledge outside the community is limited in the absence of 
recognition of the status of most of the community registers under national (India is 
an exception) and/or international law. Tobin (2004) also highlights that, to date, the 
majority of traditional knowledge held in databases is not under the control of 
indigenous and local communities. Third parties such as research institutes, national 
archives, NGOs, commercial organisations and international bodies manage the 
registers, often without any specific agreement or input of indigenous peoples 
regarding their use. 
3 Positive Protection Mechanism 
While the defensive protection mechanisms, as discussed above, have tried to adapt 
the existing forms of intellectual property rights in order to protect traditional 
knowledge, an alternative approach is the development of a sui generis regime. This is 
a legal regime of its own kind that is specifically adapted to the nature and 
characteristics of traditional knowledge. Many academics and NGOs have argued that 
it is very unlikely that defensive protection mechanisms will provide adequate 
measurements "because of the inherent mismatch between the protection that was 
createdfor finite, inanimate objects coming out of industrial activity, and theflowing, 
mutable and variable properties of biological materials and associated indigenous 
knowledge' (Sahai, 2003: 173). Although the TRIPS agreement refers specifically to 
the possibility of a sui generis intellectual property rights system and, consequently, 
the concept has received considerable attention in the literature, little progress has 
been made in terms of actually implementing this kind of protection. In the next 
section of this chapter two different sui generis approaches will be discussed, viz. 
liability or contract rules and property rules. 
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3.1 Liability or Contract Rules 
The positive protection measurements are based on an entitlement theory which 
operates either as a property regime or a liability regime. While a property regime 
(which will be further discussed in section 3.2) vests exclusive property rights in the 
owners who have the right to refuse, authorise and determine the conditions for access 
to the property in question, a liability regime is based on a compensatory 'use now, 
pay later' approach (Dutfield, 2004). According to Dutfield (2004) a sui generis based 
liability regime is useful in particular in countries where a body of traditional 
knowledge is already in the public domain. He argues that in such a situation a 
property regime would not be able to prevent (mis)appropriation because traditional 
knowledge which has fallen into the public domain can no longer be controlled by its 
original holders or custodians through a property regime. In that case a pragmatic 
approach will be more beneficial. One option is to allow and regulate the use of 
traditional knowledge on the condition that the original holders or custodians are 
compensated for the use of their knowledge. 
There are different ways to organise such compensation schemes. One of the most 
popular ways is through contracts between indigenous communities and research 
institutions (see Box 4 for an overview of some cases). Biodiversity Prospecting 
Contracts (BPCs) are most frequently used for regulating formally binding 
relationships between providers and users of genetic resources (Tobin, 2002). The 
scope of the contracts varies and includes material transfer agreements, licensing 
regimes, memoranda of understanding and sale of raw material (Gollin, 2002). 
Determining whether BPCs fulfil the criteria of the CBD has been the subject of a 
polarised debate. While some argue that BPCs are just another tool that encourages 
biopiracy because of the huge power imbalance during negotiations between 
(multinational) companies on the one hand and indigenous peoples or source countries 
on the other (see e. g. Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda, 2002), others have argued 
that BPCs provide the means by which source countries and indigenous communities 
can achieve more equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the utilisation of their 
resources and knowledge (see e. g. Tobin, 2002). Tobin (2002) argues that there are 
examples of BPCs that have created new opportunities for indigenous peoples to take 
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increased control over their knowledge and have stimulated capacity building for both 
the source country in general and indigenous peoples in particular. Furthermore, some 
of the BPCs promote awareness of both the commercial and non-commercial (e. g. 
local needs) value of genetic resources and related knowledge. In other words, BPCs 
have the potential to fulfil the requirements of the CBD. One example of a BPC 
agreement is the Peruvian ICBG agreement (see Box 5). 
Although indigenous peoples were involved in the negotiations of the ICBG 
agreement, not all Aguaruna federations welcomed the agreement. This led, in turn, to 
a concerted effort by a number of NGOs to further undermine the agreement (Tobin, 
2004). One of its most controversial aspects was the fact that not all of the relevant 
indigenous groups were part of the negotiations and as a result some of them objected 
to the agreement. ICBG tried to rectify the situation by arguing that it would ensure 
that the benefits would be equitably shared between the Aguaruna, Huambisa and 
Jivaro peoples, some of whom were not part of the original negotiations. 
Box 4: Some cases of contracts between indigenous communities and institutions 
(adapted from Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda, 2002: 106). 
A Quichua community in Ecuador was compensated with the building of an airport in 
exchange for shamans' knowledge. The airport was also needed by the business itself 
(Shaman Pharmaceuticals from California) for the transport of tropical forest plants to 
its headquarters, where they were used in research for pain relief and diabetes 
medicines. 
Inl992, Merck laboratories signed a contract with the Biological Institute of Costa 
Rica (INBIO), by which services of collection and preparation of a great variety of 
plant and micro-organism biodiversity were sold. The exact terms of the contract 
regarding economic contribution, amount of samples, and the role of indigenous 
communities, are kept a secret. Critics of the agreement argue that it will not 
guarantee a halt to deforestation and genetic erosion in Costa Rica, nor in 
neighbouring countries that share the same genetic resources. 
In the 1970s, the University of Illinois started research on medical plants in 
biodiversity-rich tropical countries, to examine the possibility of developing 
medicines. Since 1990, the University of Illinois has used letters of intention and 
letters of collection to formalise relationships with indigenous communities, as well as 
contracts defining shares in royalties in case of commercial results from research. 
Research on agents against cancer, undertaken in conjunction with the National 
Cancer Institute, and the acquisition of plants for biological evaluation, with the 
participation of Glaxo Laboratories, have been two of its projects. The recognition of 
intellectual property rights on the use of traditional medicine may go to the consultant 
who collects the information, to the indigenous community, or to a medicine man, 
shaman or any member of the community. 
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Recent anthropological studies and evaluations of the ICBG agreement in Peru 
(Greene, 2002; 2004; Rosenthal, 2006) have come to the conclusion that 
bioprospecting agreements are very complex and face many challenges such as: the 
identification of appropriate representation of community interests; the engagement 
with different cultures, politics, local governance and identity; the social context; the 
identification of the relevant social unit (defining the community) with which to 
collaborate (e. g. is it the village, municipality, the clan, the entire language group, 
those who inhibit the bioregion). One of the most critical issues that needs to be dealt 
with in these bioprospecting contracts, and which is also a requirement of the CBD, is 
how to get consent of indigenous peoples to use their knowledge. Again, this raises a 
whole new debate with questions such as: what is consent; how does one obtain it; 
from whom does one obtain it; what constitutes evidence that one has obtained it; and 
who decides that consent has been achieved? 
Box 5: The case of the Peruvian ICBG agreement (adapted from Tobin, 2004: 4-8). 
One early example of indigenous participation in bioprospecting negotiations came 
within the framework of the International Collaborative Biodiversity Group Program 
(ICBG), coordinated by the US National Institute of Health. The ICBG program has 
funded collaborative bioprospecting arrangements in many parts of the world, 
involving a wide range of academic, commercial and community partners. The 
program promotes amongst other things the collection of genetic resources with 
traditional use for the development of new medicinal products. In the early years of 
the program a number of projects were established involving traditional knowledge, 
including projects in Peru, Nigeria and Suriname. In the latter two cases 
intermediaries negotiated agreements in a manner which created benefit sharing 
opportunities for indigenous peoples. However, only the Peru ICBG actively involved 
indigenous peoples' organisations in the negotiation process itself The Peru ICBG 
agreements were negotiated in 1994-1996 in a largely unregulated environment. The 
agreements involved a number of US and Peruvian research institutions. The Peru 
ICBG agreements are a complex set of related contracts, including an overarching 
bioprospecting agreement involving the research parties and the Aguaruna 
federations, and a license option between the research parties and Searle & Co. The 
agreement reflects the concern for: protecting the rights of the indigenous 
organisations which are part of the agreement; securing equitable benefit sharing; and 
establishing precedents to redefine the nature of property rights over knowledge and 
I prevent its use contrary to the morals of its indigenous custodians. 
In his recent study of probably the two most prolific bioprospecting agreements - the 
Peruvian ICBG Agreement with the Aguaruna people and the Mexican ICBG 
Agreement with the Maya people in Chiapas (for more information on the Chiapas 
case see e. g. Berlin and Berlin, 2003; 2004; Hayden, 2003a; 2003b) - Rosenthal 
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(2006) has drawn a number of conclusions regarding the success and failure of 
contract based sui generis protection mechanisms and in particular of bioprospecting 
agreements. First, the existence and role of (pre)existing representative indigenous 
governance is very important in order for the agreement to be participatory and 
successful in terms of meeting the needs of the communities involved. Second, getting 
consent is linked to the formation of Western-style organisational structures amongst 
indigenous groups that can be held accountable and are perceived to be authoritative 
amongst the community members. Third, it is important that indigenous communities 
can get themselves organised so there is no need to be represented by other (non- 
indigenous) parties in the negotiations. The latter tend to be rather paternalistic and 
often misrepresent the needs and demands of the peoples they represent (Rosenthal, 
2006) which leads, as argued in chapter 2 (section 4.2) and chapter 5 (section 5.2), to 
essentialising images of indigenousness. Therefore it is better to work with 
autonomous indigenous representational authorities rather than working through 
nationally defined institutions. Finally, it can be argued that it is better to distinguish 
between consent for use of traditional knowledge and consent for sharing of benefits. 
For the latter a western style democratic governance structure might be more 
appropriate than for the former. Gaining consent for the use of traditional knowledge 
should be more embedded in traditional governance structures. 
In other words, it remains a challenge to ensure that contractual agreements serve the 
local needs of indigenous peoples while simultaneously achieving the national 
(through national access and benefit sharing laws) and international (through the 
CBD) requirements of promoting equitable partnerships. As will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7, and as can be concluded from Rosenthal's analysis, much of the 
debate around bioprospecting and benefit sharing agreements is still embedded in a 
Western style framework which not only complicates but hinders building up a 
relationship with indigenous peoples. Tobin (2002) argues that a range of issues will 
affect the outcome of any negotiation including: what induces parties to negotiate 
agreements; the negotiating strengths and weaknesses of the parties; and whether 
there is clear national legislation regarding ownership of resources. With regards to 
the latter the Expert Panel on Access and Benefit-Sharing, a body of 50 international 
experts meeting at the invitation of the Secretariat to the CBD in Costa Rica 
in 1999, 
came to the conclusion that legislative and administrative 
frameworks are essential 
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prerequisites for the successful implementation of contractual sui generis agreements 
(Tobin, 2002). 
In this respect BPCs can act as an incentive to legislation to develop national access 
and benefit sharing (ABS) measures. According to Tobin (2002) ABS legislation 
appears to have developed faster in those countries where highly visible biodiversity 
prospecting activities have led to increased public interest and national debate 68 . For 
example, in Costa Rica, interests and concerns that have been raised about the 
activities of the National Institute of Biodiversity (INBio) helped to stimulate a 
participatory national debate which eventually led to the adoption of a comprehensive 
national biodiversity law in 1999. Something similar happened in Cameroon. The 
need to ensure adequate protection of medicinal plants in an agreement with the US 
National Cancer Institute led to the inclusion of access and benefit sharing provisions 
for genetic resources in the new 1994 Forestry Law. And as will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section, in Peru, the ICBG project has strongly influenced the 
preparation of a sui generis law for the protection of indigenous collective property 
rights. 
68 For an overview of national access and benefit sharing laws, see, for example, Thomas (2005), but 
the existing and draft access legislation can be summarised in five basic approaches that countries are 
taking (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Legislative options for genetic resources access and benefit-sharing, and selected countries 
considering or pursuing each ovtion Wanted from Glowka. 1998 in Barber et al.. 2002: 376). 
Access and Benefit Sharing Legislative Selected Countries Pursuing these Options 
Strategy Options 
General environmental framework laws (which Gambia, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Uganda 
only enable future legislation on ABS) 
Framework sustainable development, nature Costa Rica, Eritrea, Fiji, Mexico, Peru 
conservation or biodiversity laws (which establish 
some ABS principles but require further 
legislation) 
Specific stand-alone national laws or executive The Philippines, and at the state level, Sarawak 
orders that regulate access to genetic resources (Malaysia) 
Modification of existing laws and regulations - Nigeria, Malaysia and at the state level West 
such as those governing wildlife, national parks, Australia 
forestry and fisheries - to include ABS provisions 
Regional framework legislation (establishing Countries of the Andean Pact; regional framework 
common principles and procedures but requiring agreements or legislation also under discussion by 
follow-up national legislation) countries grouped in the Association of South- 
East Asian Networks (ASEAN) and the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
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3.2 Sui Generis Property Rules 
Although the CBD has been criticised for not explicitly recognising the existence of 
property rights and not explicitly creating property rights over traditional knowledge 
(see e. g. Tobin, 2001), Article 80) of the CBD requires states to take active measures 
to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
and local communities; to promote wider use of traditional knowledge with the 
approval of and involvement of the holders of the relevant knowledge; and to 
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits. Nevertheless, there are only a very 
few countries who have passed legislation providing positive sui generis protection 
measurements for traditional knowledge 69 . Peru is one of these few (for legislation in 
African countries see Box 6). In 2002 the Peruvian Government agency (the National 
Institute for the Defence of Competition and Intellectual Property [INDECOPI]) 
passed legislation, known as the Regime of Protection of the Collective Knowledge of 
Indigenous Peoples (see Box 7), to protect the collective knowledge of the Peruvian 
indigenous peoples (Dutfield, 2004). The idea for developing national legislation to 
protect traditional knowledge in Peru was based on earlier attempts by the Andean 
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) which had in 1996 
adopted in Decision 391 a Common System on Access to Genetic Resources. Article 
7 of Decision 391 recognises the rights of indigenous, local and Afro-American 
communities to control access to and use of their traditional knowledge, subject to 
69 For a comparative summary of existing national sui generis measures and laws for the protection of 
traditional knowledge see WIPO document WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/4 
(http: //www. wit)o. int/documents/en/meetinp-s/2003/igc/pdf/grtkfic5inf4.12df -accessed on 14 
February 2007). This survey documents and compares the existing sui generis measures and policy 
options that have been implemented by the following member states: African Union (African Model 
Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the 
Regulation of Access to Biological Resources of 2000 [for more details see Box 6]); Brasil (Provisional 
Measure NO. 2186-16 of 2001 Regulating Access to the Genetic Heritage, Protection of and Access to 
Associated Traditional Knowledge); China (The Patent Law of 2000 and the Regulations on the 
Protection of Varieties of Chinese Traditional Medicine); Costa Rica (Law No. 7788 of 1998 on 
Biodiversity); India (Biological Diversity Act of 2002); Peru (Law No. 27,811 of 2002 Introducing a 
Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological 
Resources); Philippines (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997); Portugal (Decree Law No. 118 of 
2002 Establishing a Legal Regime of Registration, Conservation, Legal Custody and Transfer of Plant 
Endogenous Material); Thailand (Act on Protection and Promotion of Traditional Thai Medicinal 
Knowledge, B. E. 2542) and USA (Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 and other Relevant Measures). 
Other relevant WIPO documents are: 1) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5nwhich surveys national experience 
(http: //www. wivo. int/documents/en/meetings/2003/ip, c/pdf/izrtkf ic 5 7. pdf - accessed on 14 February 
2007) and 2) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 which 
develops a general understanding of principles of sui 
, rtkf 
ic 5 8. pdf generis protection its/en/meetinf-, s/2003/i--c/pdf/e 
accessed on 14 February 2007). 
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national law (for more information on Decision 391, see for example Tobin, 2001; 
Ruiz, 2003; Dutfield, 2004). 
Box 6: Legislative developments in African countries 
The African Model Legislation for the Regulation of Access and to Biological 
Resources 70 requires communities' consent as a condition for the access to genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge. The African Model Legislation is especially 
interesting in the sense that it not only regulates access, but also intellectual property 
rights in its model law. Furthermore, the African governments participating in 
drafting the model law shared the view that the concept of intellectual property rights 
as expressed in the TRIPS is alien to Africa's understanding of property and rights 
(Ekpere, 2003). The African model law is supposed to be used as a model for the 
development of national legislation in African countries. However, the development 
of national laws based on this model has been slow even though the idea of 
developing sui generis legislation has been accepted by most African states (ibid. ). In 
terms of developing, implementing and adopting the model law on a national level, 
four categories can be identified. The first category comprises countries (South 
Africa, Egypt, Namibia and Zimbabwe) with several variants of sui generis systems, 
embodying components of the model law and having internal capacity for their 
implementation. For example, Namibia drafted in 2003 the Access to Genetic 
Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge Bill, which explicitly recognises in 
Article 3 that the ownership of all traditional knowledge and technologies associated 
with any genetic resource vests in the local community who holds such knowledge 
and identifies in Article 4 (2)(d, e) several Community Intellectual (property) rights 
relating to traditional knowledge and technologies with genetic resources. The process 
of enacting legislation in South Africa to promote, develop and protect indigenous 
knowledge systems is a lengthy one. An initial draft bill was tabled in parliament in 
1997, with a new draft appearing in 2000. A further draft is currently being prepared, 
together with a draft policy (for more information on South Africa see, for example, 
Wolson, 2003). The second category consists of countries having enabling legislation 
pending in parliament, such as Kenya (see for more information Otieno-Odek, 2003; 
Dutfield, 2004), Uganda and Nigeria. The third group are countries of French- 
speaking West and Central Africa that are members of the Organisation Africaine de 
la Propri&6 Intellectuelle (OAPI). Legislation common to all OAPI members states 
was signed in 1977 to protect intellectual property in 16 countries of West and Central 
Africa (for more information on the agreement see for example Zoundjihekpon, 
2003). Through the revision and ratification of the Bangui Agreement the OAPI 
members are adopting the sui generis system based on the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). The last category are those countries 
that are contemplating the possibility of developing a sui generis system of protection 
similar to the African model law or other forms of legislation. The majority of African 
countries belong to this category. 
70 http: //www. wipo. int/t idf - accessed on 14 February 2007. For an 
analysis of the drafting and implementation see e. g. Zerbe (2005). 
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Despite the protection provisions for traditional knowledge in the Peruvian law, it has 
not received wide support from the Peruvian indigenous peoples. The indigenous 
communities regret the limited opportunity for their informed participation in the 
preparation of the law. Right from the initial drafting procedures, indigenous peoples 
have drawn attention to the limits of the process of securing indigenous participation 
(Tobin, 2001; 2004). 
The legislation has also been criticised for the fact that it pays more attention to the 
establishment, regulation, facilitation and commercialisation of traditional knowledge 
rather than to the recuperation, consolidation and strengthening of traditional 
knowledge, the latter being more important for the Peruvian indigenous peoples 
(Tobin, 2001). Tobin argues that the proposed legislation has failed to secure better 
human rights for indigenous peoples prior to or as a precondition to developing access 
and benefit sharing mechanisms. Prior to the development of any access or benefit 
sharing agreements, indigenous peoples should have been sufficiently informed and 
consulted in order to develop regimes which reflect indigenous peoples' aspirations, 
interests, needs and customary practices and laws. Instead of focusing on improving 
the human rights position and empowerment of indigenous peoples, the Peruvian 
legislation has rather focused on the objectives, form and technical content of sui 
generis legislation. 
Furthermore, the scope of the law does not cover traditional knowledge as a whole, 
but only the collective knowledge of indigenous peoples relating to the properties, 
uses and characteristics of biological diversity (Venero Aguirre, 2003). In this respect, 
according to Tobin (2001; 2004), the Peruvian legislation only incorporates the 
protection of Western style know-how, inventions and processes and ignores 
indigenous innovative practices. Or in other words, the Peruvian legislation, by 
emphasising the protection of only the properties, uses and characteristics of 
traditional knowledge has categorised traditional knowledge in Western intellectual 
property terms and has thereby dismembered traditional knowledge from its local 
context. As discussed in chapter 2, one of the main characteristics of traditional 
knowledge is its embeddedness in a changing local context that is responsive to new 
needs and innovations. However, defining traditional knowledge in an intellectual 
property rights discourse (i. e. properties, uses and characteristics) reduces it to static 
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and fragmented knowledge devoid of any interrelationship between the various 
elements that make traditional knowledge so valuable for indigenous peoples. 
Finally, Tobin (2001) argues that any sui generis legislation should, in the first 
instance, have as its primary objective the strengthening of traditional knowledge and 
innovations systems in their local context. Instead of focusing only on the commercial 
application of traditional knowledge with third parties in the sui generis legislation, 
more attention should be given to the development of appropriate incentives for 
recovery, protection and promotion of the wider use of traditional knowledge within 
the communities and local contexts. 
Box 7: The Peruvian regime of protection of the collective knowledge of indigenous 
peoples (adapted from Tobin, 2004: 8-9). 
In 2002 Peru adopted the first comprehensive legal regime for the protection of the 
collective rights of indigenous peoples over traditional knowledge relating to 
biological diversity. The law recognises that rights over traditional knowledge spring 
not from any act of government but from the existence of the knowledge itself The 
law declares traditional knowledge to be the cultural patrimony of indigenous peoples, 
thereby recognising intergenerational and intragenerational rights and responsibilities 
relating to it. Access to and use of knowledge which is not yet in the public domain 
requires prior informed consent and a license for commercial use. According to the 
law, the benefits accrued from the use of traditional knowledge must be shared not 
only with the contracting indigenous communities but also with the wider indigenous 
community through an Indigenous Development Fund, managed by indigenous 
peoples. A highly significant aspect of the law is its recognition of a right for 
indigenous peoples to share in the benefits derived from the use of their traditional 
knowledge which has already fallen into the public domain. This is an important 
precedent, in essence supporting the proposition that the rights of indigenous peoples 
over their traditional knowledge are not necessarily exhausted by the fact that such 
knowledge has somehow found its way into the public domain. The Peruvian law 
gives the national INDECOPI the responsibility to help indigenous peoples to protect 
their knowledge by establishing both an open and a confidential register of 
knowledge. 
This would require that protecting and promoting traditional knowledge should be 
read in conjunction with human rights law (see chapter 5, section 3 for the link 
between protecting traditional knowledge and human rights) and customary law (see 
chapter 8). Appropriate protection must not only result in the prevention of 
unapproved use of traditional knowledge; it must also, as Tobin (2001) argues, 
prevent the erosion of knowledge. Sui generis legislation certainly can fulfil the first 
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requirement; however, as demonstrated by the Peruvian legislation, the current 
proposals of sui generis legislation treat traditional knowledge as static in the same 
manner as, for example, the CBD and WIPO (see chapter 2 for a critique on the 
definition of traditional knowledge in the CBD and WIPO). Therefore, Tobin argues 
"fthej protection of traditional knowledge requires the development of mechanisms 
which enhance the ongoing utilisation of knowledge " (2001: 63). This makes it even 
more important that indigenous peoples are closely involved in legislation or rule 
making; indigenous peoples must be the final arbiters of what happens to their 
knowledge and the form of the protection mechanisms. Examples from national sui 
generis legislation, however, show that legislative proposals are imposed upon 
indigenous peoples without their (appropriate) consent and as a result, this sui generis 
legislation is at risk of being counterproductive. 
The Philippines 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) is another case in point. 
While the IPRA is one of the strongest national laws protecting indigenous rights and 
one of the most comprehensive examples of a national legislation attempting to 
implement the principles found in the CBD Article 80) (Barber et aL, 2002), in a 
recent workshop on benefit sharing 71 Professor Alvarez Castillo (2006) has argued 
that there are some serious issues for concern with regard to genuine prior voluntary 
and informed consent in the Philippines concerning indigenous peoples. Even though 
the two examples (the B'Iaan and Mangyan case) analysed by Alvarez Castillo relate 
to agreements between mining companies and indigenous communities, the 
conclusions drawn by Alvarez Castillo are illustrative of the problems and issues 
indigenous peoples face with sui generis legislation in general and access and benefit 
sharing agreements in particular. In both cases the mining companies with the 
(indirect) support of the state and its agencies have violated the requirements of the 
laws in the Philippines dealing with indigenous peoples (i. e. the Constitution, the 
Mining Act and the IPRA). The vulnerable position of indigenous peoples, resulting 
inevitably from their illiteracy, poverty and disempowerment, compromises their 
agency and autonomy to discuss the agreement on equal terms. When indigenous 
peoples can display sufficient autonomy and agency and, as in the case of the 
" Workshop on Prior Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing (funded by the Wellcome Trust). June 
2006: Kalk Bay, South Africa. 
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Mangyan people, vote against the mining agreement, the state will facilitate and 
support the commercial interest of the company even if this requires violating the 
Philippines' national laws concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. These 
examples show that protecting traditional knowledge goes further than just 
4protecting' traditional knowledge from unauthorised use; protecting traditional 
knowledge is in the realm of a wider struggle of indigenous peoples for democratic 
rights and equal citizenship. These issues will be ftu-ther discussed in the last part of 
this chapter. 
4 Discussion 
The main question that still needs to be addressed is whether the positive sui generis 
protection measures will give indigenous peoples sufficient control over the use and 
management of their knowledge. The answer is partially given by a Canadian 
indigenous peoples' organisation, the Four Directions Council, in a paper that the 
Council submitted to the Secretariat of the CBD in 1996 in which they argued that: 
"indigenous peoples possess their own locally-specific systems ofjurisprudence with 
respect to the classification of different types of knowledge, proper procedures for 
acquiring and sharing knowledge, and the rights and responsibilities which attach to 
possessing knowledge, all of which are embedded uniquely in each culture and its 
language [and for this reason] any attempts to devise uniform guidelines for the 
recognition and protection of indigenous peoples' knowledge runs the risk of 
collapsing this rich jurisprudential diversity into a single model that will not fit the 
values, conceptions or laws of any indigenous society " (Four Directions Council, 1996 
in Dutfield, 2004: 124). 
In other words, there is a real danger that the proposed institutional sui generis 
systems are inappropriate for the protection of traditional knowledge for the following 
reason. The essential element for any new form of protection must be flexible enough 
to accommodate, what the indigenous peoples of the Four Directions Council have 
called, the jurisprudential diversity. This conclusion resonates with earlier research 
findings. For example, Simpson (1997) has argued that any sui generis regime should 
be based on the rights of indigenous peoples to create this regime based on their own 
customary practices and laws, and that the essential element of a sui generis regime 
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should be the creation of an entirely new approach to the protection and management 
of indigenous peoples' knowledge and culture. It would be erroneous or even a 
contradiction in terms to assume that the new sui generis regime should be a 
continuation of or be founded on pre-existing or previously imposed rights. The 
meaning and strength of a sui generis regime should lie in the fact that it allows for 
revival and reinvigoration of the principles and laws that have protected indigenous 
peoples' patrimony and knowledge for thousands of years. In other words, the 
purpose of a sui generis approach should not be the creation of laws in the tradition of 
Western jurisprudence. 
Simpson's observations and conclusions reflect the findings in chapter 4 that any 
policy that is based on largely a Euro-American legal construct is flawed and likely to 
fail. The novelty of the currently proposed sui generis regimes does not lie in the fact 
that they recognise indigenous peoples' customary law, but lies in the fact that they 
recognise collective rights over knowledge and as such try to protect them. This 
approach of sui generis community-based intellectual property rights, is a protection 
mechanism that has also been advocated by a number of authors (see for example, 
Mgbeoji, 2001,2006; Gibson, 2004,2005; Zerda-Sanniento and Forero-Pineda, 2002; 
Aguilar, 2001). 
Gibson's (2005) work on community resources merits further attention. Although 
Gibson recognises the need for a legal framework that vests the authority for 
management and regulations of ownership of traditional resources in the community 
and according to customary laws, she then goes on to argue that her community 
resource model will achieve legitimacy through adherence to the existing international 
and legal system. Furthermore, Gibson also argues that her model allows that "those 
seeking access to, or commercialisation of, community resources may rebut the 
validity of the claim made by a particular community. This may be a rebuttal of the 
claim to community (and therefore necessarily a rebuttal of the presumption that the 
knowledge is traditional), andlor a rebuttal of the presumption of traditional 
knowledge. It is necessary for a just and acceptable international law that this is 
possible. " (2005: 287-288). 
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Gibson's first statement - that her community resource model will achieve legitimacy 
through the existing international and legal system - is at best an ungrounded claim or 
conjecture. By contrast, other researchers who have specialised in studying the socio- 
political and economic position of indigenous peoples in the national and international 
arena (for example, Keal, 2003; Widlok and Tadesse, 2005; Wright, 2001; Mamdani, 
2005) have suggested that indigenous peoples have struggled to preserve their identity 
in their encounters with colonialism and postcolonial nation states, both on a national 
and international level. These scholars further argue that these encounters have 
resulted in marginalising indigenous peoples which raises questions about the moral 
capacity of our institutions that regulate the relationship with indigenous peoples (this 
issue will be further explored in chapter 8, section 2.2). 
Gibson also claims that those who seek commercialisation of traditional knowledge 
can (under a 'just and acceptable international law') try to rebut concepts of 
community and/or traditional knowledge. This is a dubious claim, both in the light of 
Gibson's professed wish to put indigenous peoples on an equal footing with 
commercial third parties, and in view of indigenous peoples' marginalised and 
subordinate position in society. As is demonstrated by the example of the Philippines 
where the government simply chose to overrule the consent of indigenous peoples, it 
would be naYve to rely on such legislation. Gibson's arguments are ftu-ther 
undermined by the lack of uniform interpretation of 'equity' or 'justice' in 
international law, the differing value systems between indigenous cultures and 
international law (both are discussed in chapter 7), and the debatable meaning(s) of 
community (see chapter 9). 
In more general terms, and analogous to the findings in chapter 4, the concept of sui 
generis community-based intellectual property rights (as proposed in national sui 
generis law and in the literature) unnecessarily emphasises the dichotomy between 
communal and individual property rights. As argued in chapter 4, the crux of the 
debate about how to protect and manage traditional knowledge does not lie in this 
bifurcated view of individual versus community-based property rights, but rather in 
the question of whose legal framework will prevail in drafting the measures to protect 
and manage traditional knowledge. The protection mechanisms that have 
been 
proposed so far, both in national sui generis law and 
in the literature, are a 
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continuation of an institutional and legal Euro-American construct that ignores the 
local context of law making and regulation. As argued by Dutfield (2004), any sui 
generis regime that fails to collaborate very closely with indigenous peoples and to 
incorporate their own legal system is doomed to fail. 
However, there are strong indications that as long as indigenous peoples' socio- 
political and economic position remains precarious, it is very unlikely that they will 
be able to take control of their own destinies and to benefit from the use and 
commercialisation of their own knowledge. Simpson (1997) argues that the 
development of a sui generis approach to the protection and management of 
traditional knowledge is a manifestation of the rights of indigenous peoples to self- 
determination. The rights claimed by indigenous peoples with respect to access to 
natural resources and protection of traditional knowledge are part of a bundle of rights 
claimed by indigenous peoples, including, inter alia: rights of ownership of lands and 
territories; rights to self-determination; rights to exercise customary law in accordance 
with their social and cultural practice; the right to be legally and politically 
represented by their own institutions; and the right to control the ownership of 
traditional knowledge (Aguilar, 2003). In this respect, it has been assumed (see for 
example Dutfield, 2004; Greene, 2002,2004; Tucker, 2004) that indigenous peoples 
empowered with rights to control access to their lands have a better chance of 
preventing misappropriation of their knowledge and of negotiating more favourable 
bioprospecting agreements. However, the measures that have been discussed in this 
chapter fail to incorporate the demands for land and self-determination and as such 
might potentially further erode the socio-economic and political position of 
indigenous peoples and could therefore be considered as counterproductive. 
Arguably, and as observed by leading anthropologists (see for example Tobin, 2004; 
Greene, 2002,2004) and the author's own fieldwork, biopiracy is only one of the 
many threats to traditional knowledge and may be for that matter not 
be the most 
urgent or dangerous one. As will be demonstrated 
in chapter 9, one of the most 
serious threats to traditional knowledge 
is the continuous loss of land: indigenous 
peoples are displaced from their environment associated with their 
knowledge or their 
local habitat is being degraded by more powerful ethnic groups moving into the area 
(see chapter 9). In both cases the environment associated with their 
knowledge is lost 
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to them. Therefore, any policy that wants to redress this unsustainable situation needs 
to go beyond intellectual property protection and should focus on strengthening the 
recognition of indigenous peoples and their needs without, as argued in chapter 2 and 
3, capturing them in an essentialised framework that is bounded in time, place and 
tradition. 
Conclusion 
The challenge emerging from this chapter is to develop national and international 
traditional knowledge legislation that captures and is consistent with and 
complementary to customary law and practices of indigenous communities. While 
current sui generis legislation has focused on regulating access and use of traditional 
knowledge by recognising collective property rights over natural resources and 
associated traditional knowledge, it is argued in this chapter that these regulations are 
inappropriate because they are embedded in the dominant ideology of a Euro- 
American legal institutional framework. Principles of equity or a fair distribution of 
rights and benefits need to be based on a multiplicity of legal regimes and values. 
Legal institutions like, for example, the Convention on Biological Diversity certainly 
have their utility, but at the same time, as indicated in the above analysis, legal 
regimes can also function as barriers which will hinder indigenous peoples in their 
empowerment and achievement of self-determination. In this respect, it will be 
examined in chapter 7 whether the CBD can achieve one of its main objectives, viz. 
ensuring 'fair' and 'equitable' sharing of benefits, by examining the Hoodia benefit 
sharing agreement based on observations made during the fieldwork and interviews 
with the San. 
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164 
Chapter 7- Contextualising 'Fair' and 'Equitable': the San's 
Reflections on the Hoodia Benefit Sharing Agreement 
I Introduction 
For centuries, indigenous peoples have been marginalised as a voiceless underclass, 
whose rights to land, resources and traditional knowledge were violated. Their rights 
are now better recognised in international agreements such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). While it has been argued in chapter 6 that legal 
institutions (like the CBD) are certainly valuable, at the same time it was also argued 
that such legal regimes and institutions can also function as barriers which hinder 
indigenous peoples in their empowerment and achievement of self-determination. A 
good example of such a contested regime is the CBD. Prior to the CBD, access to 
biological resources was managed by the 'common heritage of mankind' doctrine, i. e. 
anybody is entitled to access and use natural resources. While the CBD formally 
replaced this doctrine with national sovereignty as the guiding principle to govern 
control over biodiversity, the CBD is also heavily criticised for its attempt to reconcile 
the Northern control over biotechnology with the Southern control over biodiversity 
through a system of, on the one hand, sharing genetic resources, technologies and 
innovations, and on the other hand, the protection of genetic resources by either 
patents, effective sui generis systems or a combination thereof (King & Eyzaguirre 
1999; Zerbe, 2002). Furthermore, the fact that the CBD recognises the importance of 
indigenous peoples in the process of maintaining biological diversity does not mean 
that their rights over traditional knowledge are now fully recognised (Posey, 2002a), a 
finding that is also confirmed in chapter 6. On the contrary, the CBD has been 
criticised for not requiring the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions with 
regards to access to resources and the use of their traditional knowledge by others 
(Coombe, 1998a). 
While in chapter 6, a general assessment was made of several sui generis regimes, this 
chapter will focus more specifically on the requirements of benefit sharing agreements 
(which represent one of the sui generis options). One of the main objectives of the 
CBD is equitable benefit sharing ftorn the use of biodiversity. In recent years, 
pharmaceutical companies who have patented medicines based on indigenous 
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knowledge are increasingly accepting the idea that those indigenous peoples must be 
financially compensated. Some companies are adopting more integrated approaches to 
benefit sharing and offer both monetary and non-monetary benefits over different time 
periods (ten Kate and Laird, 1999). While such distributive agreements are clearly a 
great improvement on the previous practice of uncompensated appropriation, there are 
still questions over the moral validity and the actual social consequences of these 
particular approaches to the commodification of indigenous knowledge. 
For one thing, while the CBD demands equitable benefit sharing from the use of 
biodiversity, it falls short of defining fairness or equity. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the concepts of 'fair' and 'equitable' within the context of the Hoodia benefit 
sharing agreement involving the San peoples of Southern Africa, by investigating the 
views and perceptions of the San communities on what embodies fairness and equity 
in relation to the agreement. This case study underlines a serious weakness of the 
CBD as it demonstrates how significant inequities in knowledge and power between 
indigenous peoples and companies can result in definitions of fairness and equity that 
are predominantly shaped by the latter. 
This chapter will be structured as follows. First, it will discuss how the notions of 
'fair' and 'equitable' are described in the CBD. Second, these notions will be 
contextualised in a wider discourse of justice to investigate common understanding of 
these terms, followed by mapping fairness and equity from an indigenous point of 
view based on previous research findings from a case study in the mining industry. 
Third, it will assess whether the San perceive the Hoodia benefit sharing as a model of 
good practice. Finally, it will discuss why the Hoodia agreement has failed to fulfil 
some of the expectations of the San. 
2 Notions of 'Fair'and 'Equitable'in the CBD 
The CBD states that national governments have sovereign rights over their biological 
resources and requires that access to these resources be conditional on the prior 
informed consent of source-country governments and on mutually agreed terms 
(Articles 15.4 and 15.1 respectively). The doctrines of sovereign control and equitable 
benefit sharing expressed in the CBD are now increasingly incorporated in national 
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legislation (see Artuso, 2002). Among its objectives, the CBD mentions the 'fair' and 
'equitable' sharing of benefits resulting from commercial and other uses of genetic 
resources (Article 15.7). Article 80) stipulates that in cases where the knowledge of 
indigenous and local people has contributed to the commercial or other uses of 
biological resources, the benefits must also be shared with the indigenous and local 
people (Mulligan, 1999). While the CBD creates the obligation to respect, preserve 
and maintain traditional knowledge, innovations and practices, and promote its wider 
use, with the approval of indigenous and local communities, it does not describe how 
this is to be achieved (Tobin, 2001). Therefore, the Convention Secretariat started to 
collate case study information about the implementation of access and benefit sharing 
(ABS) programs. However, 'fair' and 'equitable' remain undefined in the CBD and 
widely divergent opinions continue to exist over the interpretation and 
implementation of these terms (Henne, 1997; Mugabe et aL, 1997; Mulligan, 1999; 
Artuso, 2002). 
In 2002, Article 15 of the CBD was elaborated with the Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilisation ('Bonn guidelines'), which can be applauded for recognising the need for 
participation of stakeholders, other than governments, in the implementation of the 
Convention and for introducing a new ethic to the CBD. For example, prior informed 
consent (PIC) is set as a precondition for access while bottom-up approaches are 
advocated to promote the direct participation of indigenous communities (Herkenrath, 
2002; Tully, 2003). In Appendix 2 of the Bonn guidelines 'fair' and 'equitable' 
benefit sharing is defined as something that goes beyond financial remuneration to 
include non-monetary benefits such as access to and transfer of technology, training 
and joint research, acknowledging sources, reporting research results, scientific 
cooperation, institutional capacity building, employment opportunities and ongoing 
relationships (Tully, 2003). Furthermore, it is acknowledged in the Bonn guidelines 
that the national authorities or the parties that are involved in the specific access and 
benefit sharing (ABS) agreement decide what is 'fair' and 'equitable'. This 
recognition, that the ABS agreements should reflect the value system of the parties 
involved, raises questions about what may constitute 'fair' and 'equitable' 
compensation or sharing of benefits when the parties' value system diverge. 
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3 'Fair'and 'Equitable'in Negotiations with Indigenous Peoples 
Questioning what is just compensation, how such benefits would be distributed, what 
'fair' and 'equitable' mean, and how these objectives might be operationalised opens 
a Pandora's box (Posey, 1990; Dutfield 2004). Posey (1990) argues that working 
together with communities, to study the social impacts and to determine what 'just 
compensation' should mean, would be more effective than hundreds of national and 
international laws. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 1998) 
agrees that defining the objectives 'fair' and 'equitable' depends on the value system 
upon which the judgment is based. O'Faircheallaigh (1998) stresses that the ability to 
define inequality from an indigenous point of view requires an understanding of the 
interaction between indigenous peoples and the companies involved. This implies 
that it is important for indigenous peoples to understand the process behind benefit 
sharing agreements as compensation for the commercial use of traditional knowledge 
by pharmaceutical companies, especially if indigenous peoples' strategy is aimed at 
maximising the benefits they derive from resource development and minimising the 
costs imposed on them. O'Faircheallaigh (1998) argues that theoretical insights into 
what constitutes equitable benefit sharing are indispensable, but at the same time it 
must also be questioned whether those theoretical frameworks are appropriate for 
indigenous societies; do they address issues which are important to indigenous 
communities and on what sort of values are they based? Justice can mean different 
things for different persons and even different things to the same person in different 
situations (Bourassa and Strong, 2000) but by contextualising 'fair' and 'equitable' it 
is possible to highlight common understandings of these terms; this may potentially 
help to define the notions more precisely in the CBD. 
Different benchmarks can be used to define fairness. According to Franck (2002), 
fairness in international law or any other legal system - i. e. including benefit sharing 
agreements - is based on substantive or distributive justice (i. e. the 'right' distribution 
of costs and benefits) and procedural justice (i. e. the 'right' proceSS)72. For a system of 
72 This chapter is not concentrating on what justice means from a general philosophical or ethical point 
of view, but on the meaning of 'fair' and 'equitable' in the context of the CBD and benefit sharing 
agreements. This is why an analysis of important works on justice, like Rawls (197 1), is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Furthermore, as Falk Moore (2005) argues, Rawls theory of justice is based on a 
hypothetical original condition; Rawls calls this the 'original position' (1971: 12 in Falk Moore, 2005: 
9) which does not correspond with an actual historical state of affairs but is purely 'mythical'. By 
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rules to be fair, it must contain a framework of formal requirements about how rules 
are made, interpreted and applied. Franck further argues that these rules must operate 
in a context of community whereby a community is based on a common, conscious 
system of reciprocity between its members who share a system of not only legal but 
also moral obligations that arise from the shared moral sense. Lu (1998) supports this 
view in her description of justice as an image of 'bond' and the requirement to 
recognise our common humanity despite power differences in society. On a similar 
note, Bystr6rn et aL (1999) stress the importance of a 'relation-based' approach, 
which confirms the central role of ethics in human knowledge, and focuses on the 
process and the mutual understanding of the desired outcome. From this perspective, a 
transaction or indeed a benefit sharing agreement will be perceived as 'fair' and 
4equitable' when it is judged to be so according to the opinion of all the stakeholders. 
This requires mutual respect and mutual understanding of each others' world view, 
which in turn calls upon trust-building and careful identification of representatives to 
engage in a negotiation. 
Western businesses who seek to negotiate with indigenous peoples must somehow 
operationalise these generic reflections on 'fair' and 'equitable'. Good practice 
examples on benefit sharing of indigenous plant knowledge are urgently needed, but 
some useful lessons may be learned from other industries dealing with indigenous 
peoples. In a mining industry case study, Whiteman and Mamen (2002) argue that not 
enough attention is given to the degree of perceived fairness of procedures and the 
process of decision making from an indigenous point of view. They suggest that 
examining justice from an indigenous cultural perspective requires expanding on the 
conventional dimensions of distributive, procedural and interactional justice. In 
practice this means that examining issues of fairness from an indigenous standpoint 
must go beyond the conventional dimensions and take into account other aspects such 
contrast, Falk Moore argues, anthropologists are not concerned with this original position and 
concentrate on actual situations in existing living situations when examining issues related to justice. 
Therefore, this chapter draws more on empirical work that examines applied aspects of justice within 
the context of resource management and benefit sharing between indigenous peoples and other 
stakeholders. As ethical concepts, 'fair' and 'equitable' are subjective terms and therefore incapable of 
objective definition. Nevertheless, by contextualising 'fair' and 'equitable' it is possible to highlight 
common understandings of these terms; this may potentially help to define 'fair' and 'equitable' more 
precisely in international legal documents such as the CBD. 
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as the legacy of colonialism, forced assimilation, human rights abuses and loss of land 
rights (Whiteman and Mamen, 2002). 
According to Husted (1998, in Whiteman and Mamen, 2002: 301-302) procedural 
fairness manifests itself in three ways: choice (whether or not people can choose to 
participate in decision making), voice (ability to influence decision making) and 
feedback (explanations given by decision makers to justify their decision). It is 
important to understand these elements from an indigenous cultural perspective. For 
example, with choice, decisions should be made in the natural environment of the 
indigenous community. With regards to voice it is important to recognise that the 
ability to participate also depends upon language skills. Perceptions of procedural 
justice are 'further influenced by the degree to which the process incorporates 
capacity building mechanisms that can educate localpeoples andprovide them with a 
full understanding of [e. g. benefit sharing agreement] its impacts, benefits and 
mitigation options " (Whiteman and Mamen, 2002: 301). 
In addition to voice or input in decision making, shared power in decision making is 
another key element of procedural justice for indigenous peoples. Hierarchical 
approaches to decision making (e. g. by government, corporation or NGO without 
community consent) may ignore the indigenous process of decision making. In terms 
of feedback, non-indigenous stakeholders (e. g. a pharmaceutical company) must 
realise that procedures for explanation and justification may also be culturally framed 
(Whiteman and Mamen, 2002). Indigenous peoples' perceptions of procedural justice 
will be framed within the tenets of traditional law so appropriate feedback may have 
to include social, environmental and spiritual reasoning. 
While procedural justice encompasses formal structures, interactional justice 
represents informal interactions between parties. Interactional justice will ensure that 
stakeholders are treated with social sensitivity. For indigenous peoples this means that 
they are approached with respect, politeness, kindness, honesty and consideration. 
Perceptions of trust, transparency and inter-cultural respect will also play an important 
role. For example, indigenous peoples may demand that their indigenous way of life, 
culture and spiritual beliefs are respected. Furthermore, indigenous peoples are likely 
to demand 'compensation' for historical injustice. Indigenous perceptions of 
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interactional justice may also depend on whether or not previous conflicts over natural 
resources are acknowledged by the other stakeholders and whether substantial efforts 
are made to heal and achieve reconciliation (Whiteman and Mamen, 2002). 
According to Whiteman and Mamen (2002) the main concern of distributive justice is, 
on the one hand, the equity or the fairness of the outcome, and on the other hand, the 
settlement or decision making process in the eyes of the individuals or groups affected 
by the decision. They propose that an indigenous framework for distributive justice 
needs to be based on principles of traditional law and should incorporate social, 
environmental and spiritual dimensions in addition to economic outcomes. 
The indigenous sensitivities reported by Whiteman and Mamen (2002) might not 
necessarily be universal, but their findings (in addition to providing a checklist) 
highlight the importance of going into the field to elicit, explore and reflect on the 
views of indigenous peoples who are affected. Unfortunately, recent studies on benefit 
sharing agreements, such as Wynberg's (2004b) work on the Hoodia benefit sharing 
agreement, has omitted this crucial contextualising. Therefore, the case study of the 
Hoodia benefit sharing agreement with the San will be revisited with the aim of 
examining to what extent the practices and processes arising from that agreement are 
deemed 'fair' and 'equitable' in the eyes of these indigenous peoples. 
4 San Views on the Hoodia Benefit Sharing Agreement 
As already briefly mentioned in the introduction, San is the collective name for the 
oldest surviving ethnic groups of Southern Africa. Originally hunter-gatherers, they 
have lost out (often violently) to successive groups of pastoralists and agriculturalists. 
Scattered around the Kalahari basin, surviving communities are now amongst the 
most marginalised and stigmatised in their respective countries. The San have signed 
a benefit sharing agreement with South Africa's Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) regarding the commercialisation of the Hoodia plant, as is detailed 
in Table 5 (for more information see Stephenson, 2003; Wynberg, 2004a; 2004b; 
Martin and Vermeylen, 2005)73 . The extent to which this agreement can be seen as a 
73 The Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA) has assisted the San 
during the negotiations. WINISA is a San-owned organisation which was established in 1996 following 
repeated requests by the San for such an organisation. The main aim of WIMSA is, amongst others, to 
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model of good practice will be assessed on the basis of procedural, interactional and 
distributive justice and the community impacts as interpreted by the San. 
Table 5: Some key facts of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement 
Time line Hoodia benefit sharing 
agreement 
For thousands of years the San have 
used the Hoodia as an appetite and 
thirst suppressant. 
1963: knowing about its use by San, 
CSIR (a state-owned South African 
research institute) starts researching 
the Hoodia and "discovers" its 
appetite suppressant quality P57. 
1996: CSIR begins filing patent 
applications for P57 around the 
world. 
1997: CSIR signs contract with 
Phytopharm, which allows the latter 
to further develop the P57. 
1998: UK Patent is secured for P57. 
1998: Phytopharm signs sub-licensing 
agreement with Pfizer to develop and 
commercialise P57. 
2001: Survival International informs 
San (WIMSA) about the P57 patent. 
2001: Negotiations start between San 
and CSIR about the P57 project & 
apologies from CSIR for not 
consulting with the San. 
2003: Benefit sharing agreement 
between CSIR and the San. 
2004: Pfizer pulls out, new agreement 
with Unilever. 
Terms of benefit sharing agreement 
- CSIR will pay the San 8% of all the 
milestone payments it receives from 
Phytopharm. 
- CSIR will pay the San 6% of all the 
royalties that CSIR receives. 
- San have proposed the following in 
terms of distribution of the profits 
from the Hoodia: 
- 75% equally divided between the 
San of Namibia, Botswana, 
Angola and SA; 
- 30% of each country's money 
should cover the administration of 
the country's San Council 
- 70% should go to development 
proj ects; 
- 10% as working capital to the 
Hoodia Benefit Sharing Trust; 
- 10% to be kept by WIMSA as an 
emergency reserve; 
- 5% to WIMSA for administrative 
purposes. 
4.1 Background and Methodology 
Two recent studies have criticised the Hoodia agreement. Dutfield (2004) has noted 
that the San's traditional and customary knowledge of the useful characteristics of the 
Hoodia cannot be patented, while a scientific explanation of the Hoodia's 
effectiveness is sufficient to merit the award of a patent. Secondly, he notes that the 
Hoodia patent fails to refer to the relevant traditional knowledge of the San. Wynberg 
assist the San in gaining political recognition at all levels; to assist the San in gaining better access to 
natural resources (WIMSA, 2004). 
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(2004a) argues that one of the main problems with regard to benefit sharing 
agreements is the absence of effective legislation and institutions that are powerful 
enough to control access and enforce conditions for benefit sharing. She further 
argues that this lack of power in terms of implementation is reinforced by the weak 
role the government has played in the process. The South African government has 
failed to provide guidance in matters that are deemed to be crucial if an equitable and 
optimum outcome is intended. 
Wynberg laments the absence of prior informed consent from the holders of 
traditional knowledge (the San) and she poses similar questions as have been posed in 
chapter 6 with regards to consent (see chapter 6, section 3.1): "no qualifies as the 
righffiul community or groupfrom whom consent should be obtained? Can knowledge 
be attributed to a single group or individual? Is the privatisation of traditional 
knowledge through intellectual property rights not contrary to the belief of many 
communities that such knowledge is collectively held, for the benefit of the broader 
community? Can bioprospecting in fact deliver development benefits and social 
justice? " (2004a: 24 1) 
In order to fully and rigorously address these concerns, empirical research is needed. 
The author carried out fieldwork, inter alia, to find an answer to the following 
questions: to what extent can the outcomes and procedures of the benefit sharing 
process be regarded as fair, just and equitable to the San peoples? What are the social 
implications of the benefit sharing agreement for the San communities? 
The fieldwork was carried out in three San communities in Namibia (Omatako, 
Vergenoeg and Blouberg) and one San community in South Africa (Andriesvale) in 
the period July-October 2004. The communities were selected to capture some of the 
diversity of circumstances in which the San may find themselves, including culture, 
geography, the situation with regards to land rights and general socio-economic 
conditions. The San's perceptions of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement were 
collected through the use of participant observation, collecting life stories and over 
100 informal conversations and interviews (a detailed description of methodology and 
of the communities visited is provided in Appendix 1). 
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4.2 Procedural and Interactional Justice 
With regard to procedural justice, two major concerns can be identified. First, doubts 
must be expressed to what extent the process can be characterised as participatory. 
For example, in Namibia only a handful of all the interviewees knew about the 
Hoodia benefit sharing agreement; the vast majority of the people interviewed had 
never heard about it, let alone had their opinion sought prior to signing the agreement. 
The interviewees in Namibia who have heard about the agreement could be described 
as the 'elite' San, i. e. the individuals who have been elected as representatives for the 
community in organisations like the San Council and the Working Group of 
indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA). The situation in South Africa 
was slightly better. The community members who were interviewed knew about the 
agreement, but the majority complained that their opinion was not sought prior to 
signing it. They lamented the lack of communication between the 'elite' San and the 
majority of the community. None of the community members interviewed was able to 
relate any details of the contents of the agreement. For example, they did not know 
that the royalties are to be shared equally between the San in South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana and Angola 74; they did not know for what purposes the Hoodia was going 
to be used; they were not aware that Pfizer had pulled out of the deal; nor were they 
involved in the new negotiations between CSIR and Unilever. 
Apart from being non-participatory, the process can also be criticised for its failure to 
create an environment that could have assisted the San in their negotiations. As 
confirmed by Wynberg's (2004a; 2004b) policy-based observations, communities 
dealing with bioprospecting and benefit sharing agreements require legal and strategic 
assistance in dealing with these issues. This has clearly been absent in the case of the 
Hoodia agreement. Only a few people were selected to represent the interests of their 
communities and they lacked the appropriate knowledge and skills for effective 
negotiation of intellectual property rights and benefit sharing agreements. During the 
fieldwork, people who are part of the Hoodia Trust Fund complained that they were 
" In a recent workshop (funded by the Wellcome Trust; September 2006: Andriesvale, South Africa) 
on the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement which was attended 
by several San communities from South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana, the San from Botswana argued that they were entitled to receive a 
larger share of the benefits than South Africa considering the 
fact that the San population in Botswana 
is considerably larger than the San population in South Africa. Axel Thoma, the previous coordinator 
of WIMSA, argued that the San of Botswana did not have a say in this and that they had to follow the 
rules as being set out by WIMSA. 
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not adequately trained by the CSIR to manage the project and the potentially large 
amounts of money that could be accrued once the Hoodia product is commercialised. 
Stories were told that it took them two years to open a bank account and none of the 
Hoodia Trust Fund members had any knowledge of accountancy. They further 
complained that their requests for training and assistance were denied by the CSIR. 
Complaints were also voiced about their (non-San) representatives, that they have no 
clear understanding what benefit sharing agreements entail. After attending a 
workshop about the pros and cons of benefit sharing agreements (which was 
organised by academics), people involved in the Hoodia Trust Fund argued that they 
have made crucial mistakes and that neither the San nor their representatives knew 
about alternative ways of organising benefit sharing agreements. High profile leaders 
in the community complained that the agreement was closed under conditions set out 
by non-San peoples and that the San's opinion was not only not respected, it was not 
even sought. 
4.3 Distributive Justice 
Looking at the agreement from the aspect of distributive justice, three comments can 
be made. First, the benefits that the San will receive from the milestone payments (8% 
of the payments that CSIR will receive from Phytopharm) and the royalties (6% of the 
payments that CSIR will receive from Phytopharm) may sound reasonable at first, but 
their actual value is not clear at this stage. The fact that the Hoodia will no longer be 
commercialised as a drug (as intended when the benefit agreement was signed) but as 
a food supplement will lower, in all likelihood, its total market value and thus the 
benefit share that the San have been expecting. 
The second concern that needs to be raised with regard to distributive justice is that 
the San who have been interviewed were not so much interested in monetary benefits, 
but would rather receive non-monetary benefits like schools, hospitals, access to land, 
agricultural projects, housing, etc. They argued that distributing money was 
problematic for three reasons. First, they were worried that the money would not be 
used for the right purposes and would be mainly wasted on alcohol. Second, they 
were also worried that even when the money was managed through a trust fund, this 
could raise problems because the management of the trust fund was so far non- 
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transparent. Third, there was a general consensus that the CSIR, or any other company 
or third party for that matter, could not be trusted. Especially the San in Andriesvale 
argued that in the past they were promised a better economic life by the South African 
government when some of their land was returned. They now complained that these 
had been 'empty' pre-election promises; in reality, the economic situation was not 
further improved and they were still dependent on government aid and were not able 
to start their own 'development projects'. Furthermore, they argued that in the long- 
term, non-monetary benefits would be more beneficial than monetary benefits because 
the improvements with non-monetary benefits would be more sustainable and less 
dependent on issues like trust and dependency. 
In short, the findings based on the fieldwork indicate that those who have been 
interviewed have a different perception of distributive justice than monetary benefits 
alone. For example, questions were asked about why they were not more closely 
involved in the scientific work of the CSIR. They showed a keen interest to learn from 
the Hoodia project and they wanted to understand the scientific and chemical process 
behind the P57 compound. Ultimately, they wanted, in due time, to have San 
researchers working with their own traditional medicinal plants either with or without 
the support of the CSIR. So far they were disappointed in the level of cooperation 
between the CSIR and the San community members; they felt themselves to have 
been left behind by the CSIR. 
In addition to questions about the level and type of benefits, there are questions about 
the beneficiaries. Some anthropologists (e. g. Widlok, 1999) claim that the current 
botanical knowledge of the San does not surpass that of neighbouring agriculturalists. 
Furthermore, the Hoodia grows in Namibia only in areas which are currently not 
inhabited by the San; fieldwork observations confirmed that it is no longer known to 
or used by the San. The Nama and Damara in Namibia, on the other hand, are still 
using the Hoodia. While the San are clearly the oldest surviving indigenous group of 
Southern Africa, botanical knowledge that would have been exclusively theirs has 
since passed on to other groups of more recent ancestry or arrival. Some of these 
groups have interacted with the various San groups to the extent that they are 
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ethnically (Nama) or linguistically (Nama and Damara 75) linked 76 . It should be clear 
that controlling the appropriation of knowledge through allocating exclusive property 
rights on the basis of ethnicity is neither practicable (ultimately requiring DNA tests) 
nor desirable as it can increase racial animosity and tension with the official, non- 
ethnic policies of post-apartheid states. 
4.4 Community Impacts 
Doubts must be raised if either the outcome of or the process behind the benefit 
sharing agreement have respected one of the prevailing ethical norms in the San 
society, viz. egalitarianism. The San's society has been described by anthropologists 
as one which functions free of hierarchy and power structures and without formal 
political institutions (Lee, 2003; Guenther, 1999; Woodburn, 1982). Decisions are 
taken through a process of intensive talking and lively discussions or, in other words, 
through consensus. The idea is that all members of the community should have the 
chance to contribute to the debate before a decision is taken. This guarantees that all 
people have had access to information and each and everyone can contribute to the 
formation of this information (Guenther, 1998). 
Looking at the situation in the field, both in Namibia and South Africa, a schism can 
be identified between 'ordinary' community members and 'elite' community 
members. In their struggle for the recognition of their basic human rights, the San 
were pressured by NGOs , donors and governments to organise themselves and 
appoint leaders. Increasingly, it is expected that the San speak with one voice. During 
the fieldtrips in Namibia, numerous San complained about their leaders. Their 
behaviour in community meetings provided visible evidence of their higher status. For 
example, meetings were partially conducted in Afrikaans, while outside the meetings 
75 The Damara language is very closely linked to that of the Hai//om San who also call themselves in 
some circumstances Damara. 
76 WIMSA admitted that in retrospect it would have been better to sign a memorandum of 
understanding with the Nama people in order to avoid further conflicts about Hoodia ownership issues. 
The coordinator of WIMSA also mentioned that the San, for future reference, would be willing to share 
the benefits with other ethnic groups like the Nama in cases where the boundaries of ownership are 
vague and contested. As a specific example, WIMSA is currently seeking a memorandum of 
understanding with the Nama and Damara people about ownership of Brandberg rock-art (Personal 
communication with Jorarn /Useb from WIMSA, 18 August 2005, Windhoek). The previous 
coordinator of WIMSA, Axel Thoma, on the contrary, disagrees with /Useb's statement and argues that 
the knowledge about the Hoodia only belongs to the San; a statement he recently confirmed during a 
workshop (June 2006: Kalk Bay). 
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people communicated in their native language. It has been reported by key informants 
during the fieldwork that using Afrikaans, the language of the whites and the outside 
world, signifies a certain status. 
Similar observations can be made for the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement. One of 
the CSIR's prerequisites for starting the negotiations about the benefit sharing 
agreement was that the San had to organise themselves in such a way that it was 
easier for the CSIR to deal with them (e. g. setting up a Board of Trustees). They 
expected that the San would speak with one voice and a few people should represent 
the entire community. The San's identity is highly diversified and consequently it can 
be expected that opinions about intellectual property rights and benefit sharing tend to 
differ widely across communities (for more details see Appendix 2). For example, the 
San in Vergenoeg were more confident about the results of a monetary benefit sharing 
agreement than the San in Blouberg. The confidence of the San in Vergenoeg can be 
attributed to the experience of trust and confidence building, skills the San have built 
up over the years as the result of the positive impacts of the Sustainable Harvested 
Devil's Claw Project (SHDC)77 . Even though this example shows that the San in 
different communities have previously been exposed to different aspects of 
commodification and commercialisation of plants and knowledge, they are still 
77 The SHDC project started as a pilot scheme in 1997 in Vergenoeg. The NGO Centre for Research 
Information Action in Africa Southern African Development & Consulting (CRIAA SA-DC) started to 
organise groups of registered harvesters in order to set up networks of knowledge exchange about 
sustainable resource use and sustainable resource management. Harvesters became increasingly 
involved in ecological surveys to determine sustainable harvesting quotas and to monitor compliance 
with the surveys and quotas. Prior to the establishment of the SHDC project, the circumstances under 
which the harvesters had to work were described by CRIAA SA-DC (2003) as follows. Harvesters 
could not bargain from a position of strength and were forced to sell at whatever price they could get. 
Often they only obtained a price of less than N$I. 0077 for a kilo of dried and sliced Devil's Claw. 
However, harvesters were also paid in alcohol or other consumer goods. The harvesters had no direct 
contact with the exporters and were abused by a strong force of middlemen. Furthermore, the 
harvesters had no idea for what purposes the Devil's Claw was being used, outside their own local use; 
neither did they have an idea where it was going once it was sold. Harvesters were not aware of 
ecological and sustainability issues and, very importantly, had no voice in the industry or the 
opportunity to take up issues with other stakeholders. According to CRIAA SA-DC (2003), this 
situation changed completely when the SHDC project was started. In 2002, the harvesters received a 
guaranteed minimum of N$20.00 for a kilo of dried and sliced Devil's Claw. Since the installation of 
the pilot scheme, the harvesters deal directly with the exporters and are able to develop a practical and 
operational relationship with them. They have an understanding of what the product is used for and 
have in some cases met the importers of their products. It raised the harvesters' profile at national and 
international Devil's Claw stakeholder forums. It can be concluded that the SHDC project has made the 
San in Vergenoeg aware that their natural resources are valued in the marketplace and that they have to 
take control over the harvesting and selling of their products in order to get a fair price. This has made 
them more attentive to the importance of control and ownership of natural resources and the related 
knowledge over these resources. 
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expected (see e. g. Chapter 6, section 4 for a discussion on Gibson's (2005) 
community resource model) to represent themselves as one community sharing the 
same expectations and beliefs with regards to the commodification and sharing of the 
benefits of the Hoodia agreement, regardless the fact that the communities have their 
own unique history and, to a certain extent, identity 78 . 
Unravelling the San's identity reveals that different San societies have been 
characterised by a diverse set of cultural and social characteristics (Guenther, 1999). 
At one end of the spectrum, there are the nomadic family-based foragers who lived, 
until recently, in relative isolation. At the other side of the divide, there are the more 
sedentary multi-band and politically more organised groups who have lived, for 
hundreds of years, in political and economic association with their agro-pastoral 
neighbouring groups 79. For the latter group, the foraging mode of subsistence and the 
socio-political organisation underwent some significant changes: from hunting- 
gathering to gathering-hunting, from foraging-fanning to fanning-foraging and from 
labour for cattle to labour for cash (Guenther, 2002). The more nomadic foragers, like 
the JuPhoansi in Nyae Nyae (Namibia) and the JuPhoansi in Dobe (Botswana), were 
able to resist for a longer time the effects of Western colonisation. Eventually, they 
too fell victim to the introduction of the Western style nation-state 80 , christianity and 
new technology (Kent, 2002). Just like most of the other San, the Nyae Nyae and 
78 For a detailed ethnographic overview of the cultural and social differences between various Khoisan 
? eoples, see, for example, Barnard (1992). 
9 The fact that the San's cultural identity is multi-layered and complex has led to a fierce debate 
amongst anthropologists, called the Kalahari debate, arguing whether the San - both historically and in 
more contemporary settings - can be labelled as hunter-gatherers. The revisionists (e. g. Wilmsen 1989; 
Gordon and Douglas, 2000) do not recognise the San as hunter-gatherers. For them the San are 
impoverished, marginalised and cattleless peasants who have been dominated by their neighbours ever 
since the Bantu moved into their territory roughly two thousand years ago. The San were forced to hunt 
and gather because they were poor. As a result the San lost their cultural autonomy long before the 
arrival of European colonialists. The poverty and exploitation of the San is not a recent phenomenon, 
but a continuity of the past. For thousands of Years the San's foraging culture has been rooted in 
poverty and it has long ceased to be connected with their ancestral, pre-iron age, culture. The 
traditionalists, on the other hand, argue that the San's 'slave-like' position was not created by the 
arrival of the Bantu but the European settlers. During their interaction with the Bantu, the San were 
able to maintain their cultural autonomy. The San's hunter-gatherer culture only came under pressure 
where they had to compete with the European settlers for the scarce resources and land (Kent, 2002). 
For a more detailed overview of the Kalahari debate, see, for example, Kent (1992). 
'0 Brooks (2002) shares this vision that the most dramatic transformation of foragers has been 
instigated by the adyent of the nation-state and its attempt to settle nomadic people within clearly 
defined territories. Brooks (2002) backs up this statement with examples from Tanzania and the D. R 
Congo where either through adoption of socialism or failure to create a state-level society, nomadic 
people were able to continue their traditional forager lifestyle. 
179 
Dobe San also eventually became clients, proletarians and labourers dependent upon 
local, national and even world economics (Lee, 2002). 
It may be practically impossible to negotiate with a group of more than 100,000 
people, but enforcing a managerial style that sits uncomfortably with their traditional 
values has led to tensions amongst the San. A society that was previously 
characterised by egalitarianism and avoidance of prestige is now faced with a new sort 
of San elite who are visibly better off (houses, cattle) and consider themselves 
superior to other community members. Furthermore, the difference between the 'elite' 
San and the 'ordinary' San has been aggravated through the lack of communication 
between the two groups. Concerns must be voiced that this process of acculturation 
will be further fed by the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement. People who were 
interviewed also expressed their worries that once the money of the Hoodia benefit 
sharing will be distributed to the communities, through the trust funds, tension will 
erupt in the community. In short, the way in which the Hoodia benefit sharing 
agreement came into being shows that it mainly regulates an economic relationship; 
the main concern was redistribution of money and no attention was given to the social 
impacts of the agreement. 
It was also noted that the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement has raised high and 
somewhat unrealistic expectations. The San believe that they are sitting on a potential 
goldmine and that they will become multimillionaires overnight. The recent signing of 
a new bioprospecting agreement between the San of Southern Africa and the CSIR 
has reinforced this feeling. The new agreement regulates a partnership between the 
South African San Council and the CSIR with regards to researching the indigenous 
knowledge of the San people on the usage of indigenous plants, to the benefits of both 
parties, as claimed in the joint press release. The leader of the South African San 
Council argues that the agreement is beneficial in the sense that it records the San's 
indigenous knowledge for the purpose of conservation, proof of ownership and 
possible use of the San knowledge in future development projects. Two weeks prior to 
the signing of the agreement, when community members in Andriesvale were 
questioned about their opinion about this new agreement, they were not aware of it. 
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Furthermore, they seemed reluctant to sign such an agreement for two reasons. First, 
some argued that the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement has so far shown no concrete 
results and question why they should already sign a new agreement. Second, some 
people felt very uncomfortable with the idea of generating together with a third party 
a database of their traditional knowledge: they feared that they would lose control 
over their resources and knowledge and had fundamental problems with this concept 
of joint partnership unless the terms and conditions were clear from the start. This 
distrust amongst the San towards the concept of generating a traditional database 
reflects some of the'reservations that were identified in chapter 6 (see section 2.2). 
Anthropologists have also identified the importance of trust among members of ethnic 
groups and trust in the system as important concepts in San societies (Hitchcock, 
2002). In other words, the new agreement shows the same flaws as the Hoodia benefit 
sharing, viz. not being participatory. Consistent with Greene's (2004) suggestion, it 
could be argued here that raising the expectations that large sums of money are going 
to be transferred to the San may have been an effective strategy (although there is no 
proof of a deliberate strategy) to persuade local communities to accept the Hoodia and 
the new bioprospecting project. 
5 Discussion 
This assessment shows that the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, whilst being an 
improvement on the previous practice of uncompensated appropriation, has not 
fulfilled the expectations of the San in terms of distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice. This failure is not simply a cultural misunderstanding. The crux 
of the problem lies in the power-inequalities between the parties, which is exacerbated 
by the San's precarious socio-economic position as a stigmatised underclass 
consisting of impoverished and widely scattered minority communities. The CSIR has 
stressed the economic concept of distributive justice, while the San's concept of 
distributive justice clearly extended beyond the financial benefits. The processes 
behind the benefit sharing negotiations between the San and the CSIR are equally 
problematic. They failed to incorporate all stakeholders and there is a danger that as a 
result of the negotiations a schism has been created in a community that until recently 
was known for its egalitarian structure. The findings in this case study clearly lend 
support to Moran's (2004) view that a benefit sharing agreement can only be equitable 
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when all participants have an equal standing when decisions are made and that there is 
a danger that powerful stakeholders assume that indigenous peoples share the same 
values, traditions and methods of governance. The findings also chime with Green's 
(2004) observations in Peru on the problems of indigenous collectives having to 
develop a centralised representative authority in order to be able to negotiate with 
'Western' pharmaceutical businesses. 
The breakdown of traditional governance structures and their replacement with Euro- 
American forms of government is a typical phenomenon that can be found in diverse 
indigenous' cultural settings. For example, Schr6der has examined the structure of the 
American tribal councils and concluded: 'Yarfrom establishing democracy, however, 
the new tribal government system has obviously privileged two groups [ ... J: a 
nouveaux riches elite [ ... ] and an emergent bureaucratic elite [ ... ]. The tribal system, 
while excluding most tribal members from a realistic chance of running for office, 
offered these groups the opportunity to consolidate their power in a system of 
inequality and developing class relations " (2003: 441). While the San have certainly 
not reached the stage yet to have a nouveaux riches elite, there are clear indications 
that a bureaucratic elite is becoming established in some of the more (in the 
geographical sense) strategically located communities. For example, it was observed 
during the fieldwork that those communities that are located close to main roads, 
clinics, schools, tourist facilities (e. g. conservancies) or other governmental facilities 
usually already have a more regulated leadership structure. Even when the leadership 
structures in these communities are still partially based on traditional governance 
structures, the fact that their communities are strategically placed means that these 
peoples are often more targeted by capacity building exercises led by NGOs and 
(local, regional and national) government. As a result, these communities are 
becoming more exposed to Western style governance. It is precisely the leaders from 
these strategically placed locations that have been either informed about or have 
participated in the Hoodia benefit sharing negotiations. 
In their quest for human rights and social justice, the San have been engaged in a long 
and draining struggle to get their land and resource rights recognised by their 
respective Southern African governments (Hitchcock, 2002). In this respect, the 
Floodia benefit sharing agreement could be applauded as a small but important victory 
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in their continuing fight for justice. The interviewees in Andriesvale applauded the 
agreement for the opportunity it gave them to raise their voice: the Hoodia case 
attracted worldwide attention and has put the San and their plight 'on the map'. They 
were proud that they were able to reach an agreement with an institution like the 
CSIR. They argued that the closure of the Hoodia, agreement was mainly the result of 
their successful land claim in South Africa 
81 
. Gaining access to 
land has built up their 
confidence and gave them the courage to start negotiations with the CSIR. This 
demonstrates yet again that equitable benefit sharing is difficult to achieve without a 
wider empowerment of indigenous peoples. Regaining land and resource rights is a 
key element in this but so is the importance of (respect for) customary law. To 
paraphrase Petrus Vaalbooi (former chairperson of the South African San Council): 
"We have our own laws, why do we have to be ruled by Western law and 
regulations "? (Fieldnotes October 2004). 
On a broader level, it must be questioned whether achieving 'fair' and 'equitable' 
benefit sharing agreements are not a myth as long as "[ ... ] enclosure is the rule as 
soon as [it is proved that traditional knowledge] has economic value" (Dutfield, 
2004: 59). The CBD must be questioned for its belief that private property rights drive 
the most efficient and sustainable use of biological resources. It champions 
commercialisation and privatisation of intellectual and biogenetic commons whilst 
simultaneously allowing some benefit sharing provisions for the indigenous peoples 
in the hope that this will allow them either to maintain control over their knowledge, 
or at the very least to benefit from the commercial isation of this knowledge (Martin 
and Vermeylen, 2005). The CBD regulates this by combining conservation with 
commodification through the concept of bilateral market contracts between the 
holders of traditional knowledge and the users of the traditional knowledge. This 
approach overlooks the ethical dilemma over whether traditional knowledge has 
fallen 
in the public domain or has been appropriated (Dutfield, 2004). Second, as this case 
study demonstrates, the holders of traditional knowledge (i. e. indigenous peoples) can 
hardly be described as equal partners in the bargaining when their land and resource 
rights and their indigenous laws are not already acknowledged. This case study thus 
highlights the intrinsically problematic nature of the CBD as a construct which on the 
8' For information about the land claim see Robins (2001); Sylvain (2002) and Chennells (2003) 
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one hand accepts a 'western' notion of exclusive ownership of knowledge and on the 
other hand seeks to offer justice to indigenous groups whose values and traditions are 
very different and (consequently) whose position in society is very weak. 
The idea that biodiversity and traditional knowledge can be preserved through market 
mechanisms in general and specifically through efficient bargaining, is a concept that 
has been inspired by the Coase theorem 82 (Boisvert and Caron, 2002). While in the 
past biological and genetic resources have been used and appropriated without any 
contract between the users and custodians (e. g. local community, farmers, shaman, 
etc. ) of the biological resources, in conformity with the Coase theorem, the CBD 
appeals to decentralised regulation of resource exploitation (Boisvert and Caron, 
2002). In order to deal with the issues of mutually profitable access to biological 
resources and the conservation of biological diversity, the CBD promotes "the 
exclusive and transferable rights to genetic resources, species and, if possible, 
ecosystems to allow the creation of markets guaranteeing their efficient allocation" 
(Boisvert and Caron, 2002: 152). In order to achieve this, the CBD restates the 
sovereignty of the states over their biological resources (Article 3); promotes the 
preservation of the knowledge, innovation and practices of indigenous and local 
82 Coase (1960) examines the contractual relationship between the beneficiary and the harmed person. Coase illustrates this relationship on the basis of different case studies among which the now famous 
case of the dentist and the confectioner (Sturges v. Bridgman) (Coase, 1960). For many years, a 
confectioner used in his business specific machinery that caused his neighbour, the dentist, no harm 
until the dentist started to occupy a new room right next to the confectioner's kitchen where his 
machinery was installed. The noise and vibrations from the confectioner's machinery prevented the 
dentist from using the new consultation room. The dentist decided to take legal action in order to 
prevent further use of the machinery by the confectioner. The court decided that the dentist had the 
right to prevent the confectioner from using his equipment. Coase (1960) argues that another option 
would have been available if the two parties had agreed to bargain. The dentist would allow the 
confectioner to continue using his machinery if the confectioner would have paid the dentist a sum of 
money which was greater than the loss of income which the dentist would suffer if he had to move to a 
more costly or less convenient location or from curtailing his activities at this location or from building 
a separation wall to limit the noise and vibration impact. The confectioner would be willing to pay this 
amount if the sum that he had to pay to the dentist was less than the fall in income if the confectioner 
had to move his business to another location. "The solution of the problem depends essentially on 
whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner's income than it subtracts 
ftom the doctor's" (Coase, 1960: 9). Or in other words: "What has to be decided is whether the gain 
ftom preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of 
siopping the action which produces the harm" (Coase, 1960: 27). This will be determined through 
negotiations until a contract will be closed that regulates both private and social concerns whereby the 
government, through regulation, will mainly deal with the social concerns (Brush, 1996b). "Instead of 
instituting a legal system of rights which can be modijied by transactions on the market, the 
government may impose regulations which state what people must or must not do and which have to be 
obeyed" (Coase, 1960: 17). 
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles with appropriate rights (Article 8j) and 
formally extends the scope of intellectual property rights to include intellectual 
property rights over life forms (Article 16-5). 
However, it must be questioned whether the Coasian negotiation model is an 
appropriate model for bioprospecting agreements. The application of the Coase 
theorem depends on a set of assumptions that are often not met in the case of 
bioprospecting agreements. For example, the Coasian negotiation model requires, 
amongst other things, that the interested parties are well defined and property rights 
are assigned. However, one of the major parties of this contract, the local custodians 
(i. e. the indigenous peoples) are often not recognised as equal partners in the 
bargaining and the legal status with regard to property rights over resources and 
knowledge is often fuzzy and unclear. Although the CBD recognises the need to 
protect indigenous peoples and their traditional knowledge, no international 
instrument is currently in place to grant intellectual property rights to the benefit of 
indigenous peoples (Brush, 1996b). On the contrary, the current practice (see chapter 
6) shows that some states want to keep sovereignty over genetic resources and prevent 
others, such as indigenous peoples, from participating in the financial benefits that can 
result from the appropriation of biological resources by third parties. Furthermore, the 
CBD promotes mainly bilateral negotiations between states and private firms to 
negotiate access to and exploitation of biological resources which results in excluding 
indigenous peoples from signing contracts on their own terms with (transnational) 
corporations. In other words, while the outcome of an (equitable) Coasian negotiation 
model depends on actors reaching a common understanding of the rules and what 
these rules entail, with regard to bioprospecting agreements the outcome of the 
negotiations is often the adoption of rules and norms pertaining to one party which is 
usually the most powerful one. For the negotiations to be successful in achieving 
equity and efficiency within a market framework, the negotiations should focus on 
finding workable compromises. 
To summarise, the bad implementation of the negotiation model reaffirms the weak 
status of indigenous peoples. Reality shows that it is very likely that the negotiations 
will take place between the two most powerful actors, viz. the national state and the 
multinational corporations, while excluding the weak actor, viz. the indigenous 
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peoples, from the bargaining table (Brush, 1996b). Besides, mounting transaction cost 
might prevent or obstruct the bargaining process. For example, prior to starting 
negotiations with indigenous peoples, it might be necessary to decide who is going to 
represent the indigenous peoples, where are they located and whether they need 
education prior to starting the negotiations. In reality, it can be noticed that in order to 
avoid high transaction costs the negotiations only take place between the most 
powerful actors, in this case the pharmaceutical company and the national 
government. This practice is re-affirmed in the CBD, which has drawn a legal 
framework in which access to biological resources is regulated and controlled by 
states (Boisvert & Caron, 2002). The mechanisms that are put in place in the CBD to 
recommend property rules are based on the transfer and exploitation of resources that 
require prior informed consent and compensation on the basis of bargaining. 
However, this measure assumes that the power of the actors is equal. 
An equal and fair distribution in the market can probably be best achieved when it is 
proactively linked to democracy (Drahos, 2002). If intellectual property rights and 
benefit sharing agreements have to live up to the expectation of equal distribution of 
welfare, it must be argued that this can only be achieved in a democratic regime that 
allows equitable bargaining between interest groups. This can only be reached when 
all the parties that are involved in the bargaining process are equally well-resourced 
and well-informed interest groups. However, as argued in previous chapters (5 and 6) 
intellectual property rights and benefit sharing agreements promote a regime that 
bears more the characteristics of coercion than democratic bargaining, a finding that is 
also shared by Drahos (2002). 
6 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this chapter, what constitutes 'fair' and 'equitable' is an ethical 
judgement. An agreement becomes acceptable only when all the parties that are 
involved in the agreements agree, on the basis of a common assessment and mutually 
accepted value statements, that the agreement is indeed 'fair' and 'equitable'. The 
main problem is that it is difficult to reach a consensus on a set of conditions that are 
prerequisites for a 'fair' and 'equitable' relationship. Unfortunately, the CBD does not 
provide any clear guidelines. Assessing the Hoodia benefit sharing has highlighted 
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that the San have their own perceptions of what embodies distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice. 
As a result of the lack of clear guidelines in the CBD, the definition of 'fair' and 
'equitable' is left to the stakeholders to negotiate. There is thus a real danger that the 
serious inequalities in knowledge and power between indigenous peoples and 
pharmaceutical companies will result in definitions that are predominantly shaped by 
the latter. If the CBD is to be truly participatory and democratic, it will have to 
encourage more inclusive bottom-up approaches that are guided by the values and 
preferences expressed by indigenous peoples. This will be particularly challenging in 
the cases where the power imbalance is particularly strong, e. g. where indigenous 
peoples lack basic ownership rights over land and resources and where indigenous 
peoples own legal and governance rules are not respected. This suggests that the CBD 
has further structural flaws in its failure to address issues of, on the one hand, 
customary law and, on the other hand, land, resource and self- determination rights of 
indigenous peoples. While the latter will be discussed in chapter 9, chapter 8 will 
focus on protection mechanisms based in customary law. 
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Intermezzo 2- The Blue Doors of the Kalaharj83 
I had already spent two months in the field in Namibia researching the Hoodia and I 
still had not even seen a single Hoodia plant. I was eager to go to Andriesvale in 
South Africa because I knew it was still growing there so I couldfinally taste the 
Hoodia. Despite the fact that I had been camping in the Kalahari for two months, I 
actually had put on some weight from all the peanut butter that I had eaten - little 
else was available, durable and practicable for lunch in the Kalahari - so I was keen 
to test the Hoodia. There was also another reason why I was so much lookingforward 
to my visit to the Kalahari in South Africa; I was finally going to meet Petrus 
Vaalbooi, the chairperson of the South African San Council, and David Kruiper, the 
so-called 'traditional' leader of the community. These two highly charismatic men 
played a very dominant role in the BBC documentary on the Hoodia and were 
portrayed in the video as almost mythicalfigures in the Hoodia saga. 
From Upington (the nearest town and gateway to the Kalahari) I managed to get in 
touch with my key informant to make the final arrangements for my visit. My 
instructionsfor how tofind the community could not have been clearer: "after driving 
for about 100 kilometres, take a right turn and lookfor the blue garage door". This 
was a good exercisefor some probing, but no matter how hard I tried to askfor better 
directions, the best I could get was the blue garage door. Once more, I set off I 
embarked on what appeared to be one of the most scenic routes on thisfieldirip. High 
red sand dunes as far as I could see, it was indeed magical. After about 100 
kilometres there was a crossing and I could "take a right turn " and miracles do exist; 
there was a blue garage door, but hang on did my key informant not say on the left 
side, this blue door was on the right side, I got it wrong. After some enquiries, Ifound 
out that I had to drive for another 10 kilometres and there I shouldfind 'my other 
blue garage door'. In the Kalahari news can travel surprisinglyfast and by the time I 
found the right blue door, people ftom the community were waiting and makingjokes 
about my bad sensefor direction; I definitely would make a bad Iracker. 
83 Extracts from field diary. 
188 
The next da I was going to try to arrange an interview with Petrus Vaalbooi and y 
David Kruiper. I appeared to be lucky in that it was ýpension day'. A heavily 
armoured vehicle pulled up and government officials started to distribute cash for 
pensions and child support. Although it was mostly older people and young mothers 
with their children that were hanging around to get their money, the security 
measures reminded me of war-zone footage on the evening news. Fortunately it did 
not take long before my key informant introduced me to Petrus VaalbooL I was 
nervous to meet him but he was very charming and was happy to 'chat' with me 
(extractsftom the conversation are attached below). 
I was already told that arranging a meeting with Petrus was going to be easy, but 
arranging a meeting with David was going to be more challenging. The community 
was split between two camps, the Vaalbooi 'clan' are perceived as being the 
modernist, and the Kruiper 'clan't are the more traditional San. My key informant 
was a member of the Vaalbooi 'clan' and was reluctant to help me to get in touch 
with David Kruiper. When I saw David collecting his pension money I tried to 
arrange a meeting. He seemed very disoriented but nevertheless we arranged a time 
for the next day that I was going to visit him. He livesfar awayfrom the community in 
a ýpan' between two high sand dunes. My key informant refused to assist me in this 
visit because she was afraid thatfights would break out between her and her 'rival' 
who acted as a 'guardian'for David. She arrangedfor a little boy to help mefind the 
windingfootpath to David's 'house'while she was waiting in the car with the doors 
firmly locked David lookedfrail and ill and he wasjust not in the mood to talk to me. 
It did not take long or other people knew I was sitting there with David trying to strike 
up a conversation. Other people showed up, drunk and aggressive. Before I realised 
it, fights broke out and the situation got completely out of hand. I felt very 
disillusioned as I hasted back across the dunes to the car. 
For months, I had had very high expectation about my interviews with Pelrus and 
David. I knewfrom what was portrayed in the literature that these two men have very 
different ideas about the Hoodia and the benefit sharing agreement and I had hoped 
for such a long time that I could explore that difference in my research. The whole 
experience also told me a lesson that with this sort offieldwork sometimes you have 
no control of where the research is taking you. For two months, I tried to get 
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information about the Hoodia benefit sharing in communities that never heard about 
it, even though WIMSA told me otherwise and when I finally arrived in 'the 
community' that was central in the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, Ifound to the 
community was split into two and beset with problems. A week after I left the 
community the South Aftican human rights commission started the long awaited 
inquest into several unresolved murders and all the other problems the community 
was facing (see chapter 7for more details). The community was nervous about this 
visit ftom the human rights commission and there were days during my visit when 
A ndriesvale seemed like a pressure cooker about to explode. 
Myfieldwork was drawing to a close but my key informant insisted that I could not go 
back to England before I tasted the Hoodia. There was no way my small car could 
manage the road that would take us to this famous plant. However we managed to 
arrange transport and on the back of a small open pick-up truck I went for a ride 
through the Kalahari, joined by some elderly members of the community. A few days 
earlier the first rains had arrived The pans were filling up with a few millimetres of 
water and I could see the first grass sprouting. Great numbers of magnificent birds 
seemed to have appeared out of nowhere and the men who joined me spotted these 
birds quicker than my eyes could follow. It was so obvious that for all of us this 
afternoon drive through the Kalahari was a beautiful and serene experience. For the 
San there was a huge sense of belonging and they showed how proud they were about 
their land For me, it was the first time in three months that Ifelt a strong bond with 
the Kalahari and the San and the thought that I had to go back to Cape Town the next 
day made me sad The Hoodia had tasted very bitter but somehow the whole 
experience had awoken in me a tastefor more. 
I was finally able to revisit the communily in A ndriesvale a few months ago. Petrus 
Vaalbooi is no longer the chairperson of the South African San Council and has 
withdrawn himseýfjrom the community. David Kruiper hadjust lost his wife a few 
da before I saw him again and was clearly still grieving. This time we talkedfor a YS 
long time but he seemed very tired and had aged a lot. It was obvious that both David 
and Petrus who were once the most respected elders in the community have now been 
replaced by a younger generation. 
190 
Excerpts from an Interview with Petrus Vaalbooi, a Leading Figure of the 
tKhomani 
Getting the land has been the start for us, so we could start talking [ ... ]. the 
government is putting the bushman together bit by bit. After the signing in 99 we 
had 
to wait and wait. Our development plan was lying on the table of the premier in 2000, 
and it was only signed in November 2003: just before the election. (We were told) all 
must vote ANC. The ANC signed, the government signed. But they also made the laws. 
The laws [ ... J we cannot access them. 
That is goodfor those who know how to go 
beyond the law. That which we have gained they tried to take from us. A policeman 
was there when a man was shot on our land; that policeman was shooting himseýf. 
Until now the murderer has not been named. A man was shot, a bushman on his own 
land that the government had given him. How do you think a person shouldJeel? How 
do you think a person would think about the government? They come here with nice 
stories, but there is no solution, no clarification. We don't know what is going on, 
they (the police) don't answer. 
Finances are our undoing. Our council works from day to day, doing what we can. 
We are representing 3 different groups. We have problems here, things that have gone 
wrong and need to be repaired We need transport to get people together, like the 
council of elders, to talk about these problems. This is where the benefit sharing 
agreement can help us. If later there will be profits, then this 6% can be used in the 
area to everyone's benefit like the Alama, to tackle unemployment. 
We have been negotiating over benefit sharing with (the government oo Kwazulu- 
natal, where the rock art is. There we have realized how strong the laws are, how the 
laws are 'boss' over what are the belongings of the Bushman. The people we talked 
with tried to pull us in a certain direction, but we have talked hard, we 
have talked 
strong: you are using our belongings, you are using us. You are taking all the 
decisions, but we want to come and hear, we want to come and share. Our names are 
there to get the money, but we are not there (i. e. there is all the information and 
merchandise on 'bushman' rock paintings to attract tourist money, but the San are 
shut out from the management of this heritage and from benefiting from it). 
191 
The government is the key. 
In the Gemsbok Park we have now shares, we can exercise commercial and symbolic 
rights. There is thisjointly owned lodge which is supposed to provide benefits to both 
the San and the Mier communities. But this process is still not coming off the ground. 
(What happens to) the park is (in the hands of) the minister, the majority (ANC 
government). 
I don't want to hear about 'recognition'. we want our inheritance, we want full 
ownership, we seek evidence to reestablish our ownership. We want to own, we want 
to talk, we no longer want others to talk over us. There is big difference with CSIR, I 
can talk to them. We have a good relationship now, it doesn't make me feel bad orfeel 
ashamed You get to know each other and if something is wrong we contact each 
other directly to hear what is going on. Dr Horak is a good teacher, we learn from 
him. The relationship with him is close, right and beautiful - regardless of colour or 
race- so we are comfortable with each other. He is helping us to talk to the 
government to try to get the authorisation 84 . 
We had a meeting with Dr Boesak, from the Commission of Language and Religion, 
who was looking into issues about the Nama and the San to report back to the 
government. But we are the owners of the land, we want to talk to the government 
ourself We can get on that plane in Upington and to for a direct meeting with the 
government. 
I had to leave school [ .. J. I speak some English but now that I have to represent the 
San, I try to clarify myseýf in the language that I can speak best (Afrikaans). 
We should have more rights, cultural rights ... South Africa belongs to the bushmen, 
bushmen's land, but accommodation is possible. We had a conflict with park 
authorities in Capetown on the 13'h ofDecember 2000. We were lookingfor apiece of 
ground to create a cultural display. They told us we were not allowed to cut down the 
84 Petrus Vaalbooi's opinion differs from the opinion of other community members. Petrus Vaalbooi 
has participated in the Hoodia negotiations while the community members who have not directly been 
involved in the negotiations do not trust the CSIR. 
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trees or even some branches. I told them we had no problems with trees. Who brought 
them here? I said let Jan van Riebeek come, grab those trees and go back We don't 
lack trees; South Africa used to have trees. And it was the same for land They 
introduced other trees and disturbed the tradition. They cut down the (native) trees 
but now we are not allowed to touch their trees. 
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Chapter 8- Myths and Stories 
Exploring the 'Real' Grounds of Customary Law 
I Introduction 
It was discussed in chapter 6 that any sui generis protection regime should 
be based 
on indigenous peoples' own customary practices and rules. While 
it was concluded 
that the currently proposed sui generis regime is in fact a continuation of, or is 
founded on, pre-existing Western property rights system, it was also argued that the 
true meaning and strength of a sul generis regime should lie in revival and 
reinvigoration of the principles and laws that have protected indigenous peoples' 
patrimony and knowledge for thousands of years. The main finding in chapter 6 was 
that the sui generis approach to the protection of traditional knowledge has so far been 
very limited in scope because it has been too heavily embedded in the tradition of 
Western jurisprudence. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that a bifurcated 
view of. scientific versus traditional knowledge (chapter 2), commodity versus gift 
(chapter 3) and individual versus community-based property rights (chapter 4) 
unnecessarily emphasises a dichotomy between the global (i. e. Euro-American 
societies) and the local (i. e. indigenous peoples) and that this ultimately leads to 
essentialised definitions of tradition, knowledge and indigeneity. It was argued in 
chapter 4 that this bifurcated view should be abandoned in favour of a debate on the 
question of whose legal framework will prevail in drafting the measurements to 
protect and manage traditional knowledge. Analogous to the assessments and findings 
of the previous chapters, this chapter will examine whether this dichotomy between 
global law (Euro-American legalistic framework) and local law (customary law) is 
justified within the debate about how to protect traditional knowledge. 
It is certainly tempting to distinguish between Euro-American and indigenous legal 
systems considering the different history, social organisation and values of these two 
groups. Nevertheless, such generalisation can be problematic. Borrows (2002) argues 
that such a bifurcated view distorts and simplifies aboriginal principles with the 
danger that aboriginal law is portrayed as subjective and, as such, defined as non- 
legal. Furthermore, he argues, dichotomising between the two legal systems can lead 
to a misinterpretation of the foundation of law by detaching the Euro-American legal 
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system from its cultural context. Legal sources - both Western and aboriginal ones - 
are grounded in the complex spiritual (or religious), political, economic and social 
conventions and customs of particular societies. Borrows (2002) also argues that a sui 
generis conception of indigenous peoples' rights needs to incorporate 
both legal 
perspectives, i. e. Euro-American and aboriginal law. The purpose of a sui generis 
regime would be to establish a new body of law that bridges 
Western and non- 
Western (in this case indigenous) legal cultures. In this respect, a sui generis regime 
could contribute to the harmonisation of two cultures by giving equal weight to each 
perspective and ensure that the new legal regime that incorporates 
different legal 
sources (legal pluralism) is impartial and free of bias towards either of the two legal 
systems. 
However, with regards to protecting traditional knowledge and as argued in chapter 6, 
the current sui generis legislation is inappropriate because the proposed regulations 
are embedded in the dominant ideology of a Euro-American legal institutional 
framework while it is obvious that, when deciding upon indigenous issues, it is 
pertinent to draw upon indigenous legal sources more explicitly. In other words, the 
challenge is to develop a sui generis regime that finds a way to incorporate indigenous 
law into the legal procedures and decision making while avoiding portraying 
indigenous law as a local customary norm that is culturally bounded, socially 
constructed (to fit within a Western legal framework) and immutable and therefore 
perceived as completely the opposite to formal law that is defined (unjustifiably, as 
will be explained later in this chapter) as rigorous and free from any embeddedness in 
culture or local context. 
A closer examination of the feasibility of introducing the concept of legal pluralism 
into the debate about how to protect traditional knowledge would raise several wider 
issues: viz. what is the role of law in society and what is the nature of customary law 
in national and international law? Furthermore, debating the meaning of legal 
pluralism and the challenges it poses will also highlight the need to revisit and 
reassess the relationship between Western powers and indigenous peoples in terms of 
how Western law and statecraft has affected the rights, dignity, culture and customs of 
indigenous peoples. 
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It is argued in this chapter that those scholars who call for customary law to play a 
more prominent role in the development of appropriate rules and mechanisms to 
manage and/or protect the use of traditional knowledge have not so far sufficiently 
inquired how to define customary law; where to find it; and how to integrate the - as 
is often portrayed in the literature - two 'opposing' legal frameworks. It is identified 
in this chapter that one of the main reasons for this oversight is the fact that most of 
the literature engages with a one-sided framing of law as having a positivist outlook, 
i. e. being descriptive and prescriptive. However, it is argued in this thesis that law 
should be defined from a different angle, namely as something that offers an insight 
into the community that law is to serve. Linking law more closely to social sciences in 
general and specifically to anthropology can help to achieve this (Donovan and 
Anderson, 2003). 
According to Falk Moore (2005), an anthropological approach to developing legal 
systems allows law to be framed in the social, political, economic and cultural context 
of the enforceable norms. This chimes with the framework that has been proposed in 
chapter 4 to examine property relations in non-Western cultural settings, viz. 
examining legal rules that regulate property relations in a wider socio-economic, 
political and cultural context. Such framing allows, according to Falk Moore (2005), 
the scope and range of law to be widened to encompass, besides the formal socio- 
legal juridicial institutions in different cultural settings, also law-like activities and 
processes characterised as informal and unofficial across different societies. The 
central tenet of this argument is that even in the Euro-American legal setting, formal 
law is by no means the only source of organisational social order. It is argued in this 
chapter that this proposition is embedded in a new field of inquiry that examines law 
as narratives and rhetorics with a specific focus on examining the relationships 
between stories and legal arguments (for an overview of this field of inquiry see e. g. 
Brooks and Gewirtz, 1996). 
Treating law as a narrative or a rhetoric means, in practice, looking at facts rather than 
rules. This approach focuses not so much on the norms that are the foundation of law, 
but rather on how law is constructed and framed and how it can involve its audience. 
As such, Gewirtz (1996) argues, law is not just a mechanism that draws up policies 
that shape culture; on the contrary, law becomes almost like an, 'artefact' that reveals 
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a specific culture. The central inquiry is about the story of law and not the rule of law. 
The attention should subsequently be focused on those who are the subject or object 
of law and specifically to those who, as Wright (2001) argues, have been kept 
subordinated by formal law such as indigenous peoples, women etc. 
In chapter 2 it was argued that traditional knowledge is defined in the international 
policy arena in a way which enforces an essentialised identity upon indigenous 
peoples. Similarly it is argued in this chapter that there is a real danger that the 
international community of policy makers and scholars views customary law as 
requiring a certain kind of predefined authenticity and representation of indigenous 
peoples' legal systems. There is a prominent risk that this new layer of essentialising 
will lead to a situation wherein: "[ .. I legalprocesses open the door to voices only as 
they represent [in an] "authentic" manner certain prefigured communities or social 
identities [ ... j" (Mertz 1994a). To avoid this situation it is argued in this chapter that, 
within the tradition of the disciplines of legal anthropology and law and society, more 
careful attention should be given to the voices of those who have had the least access 
to the official channels of law making, viz. indigenous peoples. 
One way of achieving this is through examination of the stories, ceremonies and 
traditions of indigenous peoples through which they express their legal norms and 
values. Borrows (2002) has illustrated that indigenous peoples' narratives reveal the 
deeper principles of order and disorder of a community and therefore can serve as a 
source of authority for drawing up customary law that is untainted by colonialist and 
post-colonialist framing. 
The chapter starts by addressing two possible frameworks of law making, viz. a top- 
down approach and a bottom-up approach. So far, contrary to what they may aspire 
to, most of the current protection mechanisms that have been proposed in international 
fora and academic literature fall under the banner of a top-down approach. A critical 
assessment of the philosophical and historical underpinnings of this top-down 
approach to law making will reaffirm earlier findings that there are some serious flaws 
in such an approach towards protecting traditional knowledge. The chapter will, then, 
examine in section 3 an alternative approach towards law making. Alternative 
epistemologies will be explored in the search for a legal framework that can support 
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the claims of indigenous peoples. A postmodern approach to law making offers some 
possibilities. However it is not without its own problems; both possibilities and 
challenges of a postmodern approach will be discussed. Finally, sections 4 and 5 will 
explore in more detail the possibilities, requirements and challenges that are 
encountered when developing a legal framework that is based on the concept of legal 
pluralism. 
Law Making - the Top-Down Approach 
2.1 Human Rights Framework 
One of the major concerns addressed in chapter 6 and 7 is the lack of direct 
involvement and participation of indigenous peoples in drafting legislation concerning 
the use and protection of their natural resources and related knowledge. International 
institutional frameworks like the CBD do not accommodate (sufficiently) the 
particular needs and interests of indigenous peoples (e. g. land rights). Indeed, 
according to Young (1990 in Keal, 2003: 174-176) one the main criteria for justice is 
precisely the facilitation of participation of different groups, including indigenous 
peoples, in decision making. Young (1990) labels any denial of participation as a form 
of institutionalised domination and oppression; the latter exemplified by any of the 
following five forms: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism and violence. Keal (2003) agrees that as long as the participation of 
indigenous peoples, both in national and international politics, is not recognised by 
national governments and the international community, doubts must be raised about 
the moral legitimacy of the institutions that deal with indigenous peoples; or to phrase 
it more subtle: the tendency toward 'Eurocentrism' in international law needs further 
questioning. The 1989 ILO Convention 169 in Indigenous and Tribal Peoples is 
another case in point. Although the Convention recognises the rights of indigenous 
peoples "to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects 
their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or 
otherwise use "", it is still strongly criticised by indigenous peoples for not referring 
more explicitly to the right of self-determination and its lack of implementation 
guidelines with regards to the doctrines of consultation, participation and choice 
(Kingsbury, 1998). 
85 ILO Convention No. 169, Article 7. 
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In his recent study of the relationship between international law and third world 
resistance, Rajagopal (2003) concludes that there is a real need for subordinated 
groups, like indigenous peoples, to contest the hegemonial power of international law. 
He argues that international law is still an elitist discipline which is primarily 
concerned with the consolidation and expansion of its international institutions across 
the globe, while at the same time ignoring the role of the local as an agent of 
institutional change. International law's reluctance to engage with mass movements 
and popular protests has been a central aspect of its history. International law has 
always been closely linked to the liberal theory of politics (i. e. central focus on state 
sovereignty). Even though the much acclaimed human rights discourse appears to 
challenge the liberal conception of politics; modem law, nevertheless, still objects to 
collective resistances. This liberal legal model has been challenged by the more 
critical (legal) scholars (such as critical race theorists, critical legal thinkers and 
feminists) for being a technocratic-rational model of law that fails to engage with the 
everyday legal challenges of ordinary peoples. While international law remains 
trapped in an institutional practice, scholars like Raiagopal (2003) and Otto (1996) 
argue that international law should accommodate the concerns of subaltern 
communities who could give a new meaning to international law through their own 
lived action. 
So far, indigenous peoples are making use of three well-established frameworks - 
viz., human rights, self-determination 86 and minority rights 87 _ when claiming, 
amongst others, greater participation rights (Kingsbury, 1998). Within the remit of 
this chapter, more attention will be given to the debate on human rights, while self- 
determination rights will be further discussed in chapter 9 when land rights and the 
concept of territorial resource rights will be analysed in more detail. 
Rajagopal (2003) laments the fact that one of the main resistance strategies that is 
perceived as legitimate within the international legal framework is based on a 
86 Kingsbury (2001) extends this list with two more claims, viz. historic sovereignty claims and 
'indigenous peoples' claims. The latter extends beyond existing regimes of human rights and minority 
rights. 
97 For a discussion on minority rights in general and more specifically in comparison to indigenous 
peoples' rights, see for example Kymlicka (1998). 
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discourse of human rights; a rights-based structure that has been critically assessed by 
many, as briefly discussed hereafter. One of the most frequently cited problems with 
human rights is its lack of recognition of group rights and its failure to banish the 
continued exclusion of indigenous peoples from political, economic and social 
participation (for an overview of a critical approach to global human rights see Evans, 
1998) This will be further expanded in the next part. 
One of the more substantial concerns that have been raised in the literature on human 
rights is the alleged universal nature of human rights (for an overview of different 
viewpoints, see Hayden, 2001). From a philosophical point of view (see section 2.2 
for more details) human rights are supposed to be rights that all humans have simply 
because they are human. In this view, called universalism, human rights belong to all 
persons, in all places and at all times. The other view, relativism, argues that moral 
norms and values are historically and culturally determined and as such human rights 
cannot be universal. Scholars who advocate relativism think that each society has the 
right to determine which duties and rights are legitimate; in other words human rights 
may differ from one society to another. This debate between universalism and 
relativism has been going on for many years. A full engagement with this debate lies 
outside the scope of this dissertation but within the remit of this chapter one issue in 
this debate will be explored in more detail. 
While there is a growing consensus in the West that human rights are universal rights, 
this opinion is opposed by the critics, often from non-Western parts of the world, who 
argue that economic, cultural and political realities can differ from place to place and 
this fact should not be ignored or dismissed (Tharoor, 1999). Waltz (2002) agrees that 
the claim that human rights is a Western concept is hard to deny, but simultaneously 
argues that until recently, little was actually known about the political history of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This hiatus has fostered a number of myths 
and assumptions, including an exaggeration of the historical role of the larger Western 
states in advancing human rights norms on a global scale. Waltz argues that recent 
historical research (see e. g. Morsink, 1999) has shed some new light on the political 
history of human rights which shows that the Universal Declaration is principally a 
negotiated text in which many states participated, including those who now claim that 
human rights are too closely based on Western values and norms. 
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While Waltz's claim and Morsink's historical research may bear some truth, 
nevertheless it is difficult to accept the argument of Donnelly (1989) and others that 
human rights are universally legitimate and inclusive. Questioning the universality of 
human rights is, according to Donnelly, merely self-interested posturing, concerned 
not with rights but with regime maintenance, and not with 
development but with the 
personal interests of officials (Donnelly, 1989: 189 in Niezen, 2003: 97). However, 
the opposite can be argued. The research findings of Wright (200 1) and Niezen (2003) 
have shown that indigenous peoples were left out when the process of negotiating 
human rights standards was started. They argue that none of the representatives of 
exclusively oral societies, still common in the mid 20th Century, were consulted; the 
negotiations only involved societies that were accustomed to bureaucracy and formal 
legal procedures. Defenders of the universal value of human rights have underplayed 
this divide, but the fact that indigenous peoples' claim for recognition has to be 
embedded in the human rights rhetoric rekindles the debate about universalism versus 
relativism. 
Closely related to this theme of relativism and rights is the debate about the limited 
liberatory and emancipatory capabilities of the human rights framework in non- 
Western cultures (see e. g. Mutua, 2002; An-Na'im and Hammond, 2002; Chanock, 
2002; Wright, 2001; Bradley and Petro, 2002; Massa Arzabe, 2001; Steiner and 
Alston, 2000; Chandler, 2001 - see Appendix 3 for more details on these scholars' 
arguments with regard to the shortcomings of the human rights framework). 
Most of these scholars argue that the Eurocentric history of international law in 
general and human rights in particular can be held accountable for some of the bias in 
international law against resistance by various subaltern groups. In order to fully 
understand and appreciate the debate about international law and human rights it is 
necessary to examine more closely the historical writings which have shaped this 
debate. The following short overview of the philosophy of international law and 
human rights will be mainly based on Hayden's (2001) account of the history and 
theories of human rights, followed by a more critical assessment based on the work of 
Henderson (2000) and Douzinas (2000). 
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2.2 The Philosophy of International Law and Human Rights 
Our present thinking about human rights is shaped by the philosophical ideas that 
characterised the 'Age of Reason' or the 'Enlightenment'. These philosophical ideas, 
known as the Natural Law doctrine, are grounded in Greek philosophy (e. g. Plato and 
Aristotle), Judeo-Christian scripture (e. g. Thomas Aquinas) and Roman moral and 
legal thought (e. g. Cicero). In general terms, natural law theory holds that there are 
higher laws of nature which are often perceived as being part of the law of God. These 
laws contain moral norms and prescriptions about the right sort of conduct. Human 
beings, through their use of reason, are able to act in accordance with the universal 
values of natural laws. By doing so, human beings bring about the moral and political 
order which is required for the common good. In other words, natural law thinkers 
argue that human beings share a common ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong and are able to deduce rules of moral conduct in harmony with the universal 
nature of right and wrong. 
At the beginning of the 17th Century, natural law theory became secularised by the 
Dutch legal philosopher, Hugo Grotius, who argued that natural law can be regarded 
as independent of God. For Grotius, natural law is a mandate of right reason, meaning 
it conforms to the rational and sociable nature of humanity, including the power and 
ability of judging what is right. Grotius has been influential for modem thinking about 
human rights by associating rationality with the idea that each person possesses rights 
simply by being human. 
The idea of reason (or the ability to judge what is right) became an important concept 
for a new school of philosophers who developed the idea of natural rights. Natural 
rights thinkers (e. g. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes) argued that some essential 
features, which are common to all people, grant certain inherent rights in human 
nature, such as those to life, liberty, property and happiness. One of the core ideas of 
natural rights theorists is that human beings have some basic rights simply because 
they are human beings, which makes these rights also universal. It has been argued 
that these rights existed prior to any form of political society and therefore these rights 
could not be taken away. This coincided with the idea that the role of government is to 
protect the natural rights of its subjects. The natural rights philosophy has laid the 
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foundation for the two key concepts of human rights theory, viz. freedom and 
equality. 
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant proposed a moral and political theory that 
combined the ideas of reason, equality and freedom into the theory that human beings 
are an "end in themselves". In lay terms, this means that human beings should be 
respected as autonomous persons. Or in other words, civil society must protect each 
person's freedom, which the person can exercise under the influence of rationality and 
as such framed by duties ofjustice and morality. 
Not every philosopher, though, agrees with these concepts of universal rights. For 
example, Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx criticised the above rights. Others, like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill did support the natural rights theory, but 
gave a different explanation for the functioning of rights in society. More recent 
philosophers (e. g. Thomas Pogge, 1995 and Martha Nussbaum, 1997 both reprinted in 
Hayden, 2001) view human rights as important components of social justice. They 
define human rights as moral claims or entitlements to social goods such as liberty, 
income, wealth, education, health care and so forth. The so-called Contemporary 
European philosophers, better known as postmodernist, have challenged these 
justificatory arguments for human rights. Starting with Nietzsche's criticism against 
the Enlightenment's humanism and universal moral claims, the metaphysical ideals 
about human nature and humanity in general have been rejected. The postmodernists 
argue that the doctrine of human rights cannot be justified by any supposedly 
theoretical foundation: Part 3.1 of this chapter will explore in more depth a 
postmodern approach to (international) law. 
Regarding the role of government, Henderson (2000) - one of the first North 
American Indian legal scholars - argues that Hobbes' construct of the state of nature 
and the subsequent artificial creation of the modem state have been used as principles 
that allowed domination and oppression of indigenous peoples. According to 
Henderson, Hobbes argued that the state of nature consisted of individuals who were 
free and equal and who lived in natural organisations such as family or household. 
Even though individuals could live in freedom and equality, the scarcity of resources 
led to competition, distrust, war and conquest. In order to save individuals from this 
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state of natural passion and aggressions, a 'man-state' led by an absolute sovereign 
must be created. Hobbes also argued that the state of nature (characterised by being 
brutish and a state of war) did not exist everywhere; the 'savages' of America were, 
according to Hobbes, a good illustration of the negative state of primal chaos and the 
natural state of war. In this respect Hobbes opposed the state of nature to civil society 
and pointed out that European society was in danger of remaining in the state of 
nature through its continued civil wars. The idea 88 was bom that the state of nature 
had to be given up and a civil society or modem state had to be built in order to refute 
the state of nature which was now considered to be the antithesis of civilised society. 
Hobbes also created the notion of positive law or legal positivism (Henderson, 2000). 
The purpose was not to show what law is in different places and at different times, but 
to show what law is in general. In the man-state, law is the command of the sovereign 
to the sovereign subjects, while in the state of nature there is no proper law making 
precisely because of the absence of a sovereign. The idea of positive law was also 
used to promote the concept of colonialism through the work of the legal scholar John 
Austin (1920) who defined law as the command of a political superior to a political 
inferior. The subjection was a necessary precondition for political society and law to 
exist, according to Austin. In other words, positive law depended on the existence of a 
sovereign. Austin's theory was based on the belief that 'natural society' (based on a 
general state of savagery) was opposed to 'political society' (based on the concept of 
having a sovereign who rules over subjects). Within the tradition of Hobbes and 
Locke, Austin characterised natural society as 'wild' and 'lawless', while the 
sovereign and his commanding laws gave order and structure to the political society. 
According to Henderson (2000) it was precisely this concept of the rise of the political 
society through the artificial creation of the state that accompanied the rise and 
development of colonialism. 
Henderson (2000) argues that wrong assumptions about the lawless and wild state of 
nature lay at the basis for imposing social and political constructs in the form of 
subjugating citizens through sovereign power regulated by a positivist legal 
framework. Henderson states that the Hobbesian view in particular, that the state of 
81 Political philosophers ranging from Spinoza to Locke, Pufendorf to Rousseau to Kant followed this 
idea and continued to theorise about the natural law theory of the modem state. 
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nature characterised by chaos must be replaced by a societal structure that creates 
order and law from above, continues to be the basis of (international) law that 
suppresses indigenous peoples. Other studies (for a legal study, see e. g. Riles, 1993; 
for more generic studies, see e. g. Said, 1993; Wright, 2001) have also suggested that 
there is a close link between the rise of international law as a mechanism of order and 
the cultural construction of European identity. The supremacy of European identity 
in 
the formation of international law can be found in Thomas Lawrence's 
89 treatise on 
international law first published in 1885 (for an analysis of his work, see Riles, 1993). 
Lawrence's work is a good example of such a polemic wherein the creation of an 
essentialised and coherent European community is defined in dichotomous opposition 
to non-European 'savages' and wherein the centrality of statehood is built upon this 
bounded and essentialised conception of culture (Riles, 1993). Henderson (2000) 
argues that the historical and legal legacy of the state of nature will continue to haunt 
indigenous peoples as long as (international) law remains embedded in this 
essentialised thinking of the supremacy of (what can be called) Euro-American 
identity and as long as essentialising assumptions are made about the societal 
organisation and rules of other cultures, particularly indigenous peoples. Niezen 
(2003) has called this the 'Weberian dilemma' of law; for Weber, one of the most 
defining features of modernity is the overwhelming power of bureaucracy and law 
over tradition and custom as a way to legitimise authority. 
Also, Douzinas (2000) doubts whether the principle and promise of emancipation can 
be reached through reason and law. In Eurocentric thought the idea of progress and 
emancipation can only be reached by abandoning myths and replacing these with the 
reason of law. Douzinas argues that reason and myth, the two opposing principles of 
the Enlightenment, have been perceived to be in conflict since the age of modernism. 
This conflict will only come to an end when human rights, which is the principle of 
reason, becomes the realised 'myth' of postmodern societies. Myths belong to 
particular societies legitimised through narratives of belonging and stories of origin, 
while reason and human rights, on the other hand, are universal and are based on the 
promise of progress and emancipation. In law, traditional order and rules have been 
undermined by universal principles that eventually destroy, so argues Douzinas, the 
'9 Thomas Lawrence was a legal theorist and professor in international law at the university of 
Cambridge in the late 19t" Century. 
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pre-modem legal cosmos. Proceduralist and formal concepts of law and order have 
replaced contextualised concepts of law and order (Fitzpatrick, 1992; 2001; Douzinas, 
2000; von Benda-Beckmann et aL, 2006). In this sense, legal rules become very 
positivist and restrict the protection against, what Douzinas calls, the all-devouring 
legislative and administrative power of the state. As a result, rights are framed by 
formal legislation that prioritises power and domination and neglects the pluralism of 
ethical and legal values of different communities. For law to 
become truly 
emancipatory, it has to break with its tradition of being embedded 
in abstract ideals 
and legal semantics. 
Instead, a postmodem approach to law which is based on the belief that law and its 
rules are rooted in daily life and political rhetorics might prove to be a more liberatory 
framework for indigenous peoples (Stark, 2000). Stark's belief that law is framed by 
everyday practices is very similar to the theoretical underpinnings of legal 
anthropologists who, in contrast to the political philosophers briefly mentioned above, 
do not believe in what anthropologists refer to as the hypothetical original condition 
of the philosophers' state of nature. By contrast, they argue, the source of law is not 
hypothetical, but can be found through observing local practices and listening to 
stories and explanations (Falk Moore, 2005). In her article on women and 
globalisation, Stark (2000) has examined how a postmodern approach to law can offer 
a useful framework for economically subordinated women seeking empowerment. In 
the next part it will be examined whether such an approach could also be useful for 
indigenous peoples. 
3 Law Making - the Bottom-Up Approach 
3.1 The Possibilities of Postmodern International Law for the 
Empowerment of Indigenous Peoples 
While classical legal theorists articulate clear legal standards and develop a normative 
legal framework, postmodem legal scholars question this normative legal framework 
by deconstructing it and exposing the (hidden) power relations that drive and 
reinforce a particular legal system. Different strands of postmodernism interrogate 
different power structures. For example, critical legal scholars show how international 
law reinforces existing power structures. Feminists argue then that these power 
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structures are gender-based; e. g. international law reinforces the distinction between 
public and private law wherein the world of public law is perceived to have male 
characteristics and private law is (rather pejoratively) perceived to belong to the world 
of family and custom, two features of law ascribed to women characteristics. Others, 
like critical race scholars, argue that power structures differ according to race and 
describe international law as being 'white' and 'Western'. 
However, Stark argues that not all critical legal scholars' work can be labelled as 
postmodern. What makes some of the work of critical legal scholars postmodern is the 
belief that even the most well-intended reforms of law reinforce existing power 
structures and replicate "the hierarchies of privilege and subordination that infuse 
power structures oflaw " (Stark 2000: 565). In other words, postmodem legal scholars 
challenge the boundaries of law itself. While, within the remit of this thesis, it is 
argued that indeed the boundaries of (international) law must be challenged in order to 
create a (legal) environment that is more supportive towards the protection of 
traditional knowledge from an indigenous peoples' point of view, simultaneously it is 
also argued in this thesis that a postmodern approach to law making is not without its 
own problems; an opinion which is also shared by Stark (2000) and Wicke (199 1). 
In order to address the ambivalence of postmodernism or the misalliance between 
postmodernism and law (Wicke, 1991), Stark suggests differentiating between a legal 
postmodemism of resistance and a legal postmodernism of reaction. While the former 
questions modernism and the Enlightenment and considers modernity to be a lost 
cause, the latter favours a more pragmatic approach. Reactionary postmodemists, 
even though they also challenge to a certain extent the normative framework of law, 
argue that a continuous process of questioning and deconstructing is not good enough 
and other alternative approaches towards law making must be sought. To use the 
example of human rights again, scholars theorising within the reactionary postmodern 
framework - like Nussbaum with her capabilities framework - argue that human 
rights do not exist within a socio-economic, legal and political vacuum, but instead 
they plead that normative and often abstract concepts (such as universal human rights) 
must be linked to concrete experiences that can vary in place and time. 
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Stark's (2000) view on how to empower subordinated women in a globalised world is 
an example of such a reactionary postmodern approach to law making. She rejects the 
abstract notion of a normative approach (e. g. all women are equal to men) in favour of 
concrete and contextualised approaches. For Stark, the main question 
is not "how 
women can realise their human rights within an implied context of 
free market 
democracy, no[r] how the law can help women become market players equal to men, 
but how women can use the law to further their own objectives" (2000: 55 1). 
According to Stark, the shift from perceiving law as something abstract and 
theoretical to perceiving law as something pragmatic and contextualised demands a 
new focus. Stark's suggestion to examine and use stories as a new medium of law 
making chimes with Gewirtz' (1996) finding that storytelling is particularly attractive 
for people outside mainstream society (e. g. racial and religious minorities) as a means 
to question a particular status quo. 
In this sense, according to Gewirtz (1996), storytelling is the methodological tool that 
postmodernist legal scholars use to give a representative voice to perspectives and 
experiences of (legal) subjects (e. g. indigenous peoples) that, traditionally, were either 
left out of legal scholarship or were simply ignored when shaping legal rules. As such, 
postmodernism is not only a theoretical framework that questions the roots of 
international law and its normative values (what Stark calls 'postmodemism of 
resistance'); from a pragmatic perspective a postmodernist approach to law is above 
all concerned in exposing the facts rather than the rules of law. The facts of law are 
revealed through examining law as a narrative and rhetoric. In practice, this means not 
simply looking at the normative foundations of law, but the context in which law is 
made whereby examining the interaction and relationship between speakers (law 
makers) and audience (legal subjects) is crucial. In other words, narratives have, first, 
the ability to expose the concrete and unique experiences of individuals, second, the 
ability to make 'alternative' voices heard and, finally, the ability to contest the 
assumptions behind law making (Brooks, 1996; Minow, 1996). Those who argue that 
stories should be incorporated as a new medium in law making even believe that only 
through stories "can the fundamental racist, sexist and homophobic structures of our 
society be confronted and changed" (Farber and Sherry, 1996: 3 7). However, Farber 
and Sherry also argue that such a strong focus on stories as a factor of change is not 
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without risk. It may distort the legal debate and, furthermore, stories can be 
inaccurate, incomplete or atypical. 
In other words, a postmodem approach to law exposes the limitations of a normative 
and positivist legal framework, such as excluding some groups from the process of 
law making. As discussed in chapter 6, the Peruvian sui generis legislation with 
regards to the protection of traditional knowledge is a good example of such a 
positivist and normative approach to legal processes. When preparing this legislation, 
the Peruvian policy makers focused too much on the objectives, form and technical 
content of the sui generis legislation and ignored, to a large extent, the improvement 
of the human rights position and empowerment of indigenous peoples, the latter two 
being requests from indigenous peoples themselves. However, a postmodem approach 
to law has also its drawbacks. Although including subordinated groups (e. g. 
indigenous peoples) in the process of law making must certainly be applauded, this 
participatory method also opens up a new debate about the interaction or relationship 
between law and social identities. As exemplified throughout this thesis, most of the 
attempts to involve indigenous peoples more closely in the process of developing 
regulations to protect traditional knowledge have resulted in defining indigenous 
peoples (chapter 2), traditional knowledge (chapter 2 and 3), property relations 
(chapter 4 and 5) and protection mechanisms (chapter 6) in an essentialised manner. 
In other words, the search for an appropriate protection mechanism to regulate the use 
and protection of traditional knowledge inevitably draws attention to and reinforces 
the essentialising characteristics of law or, in other words, to the role of law in the 
construction of social identity; this issue is discussed further below. 
3.2 Interaction between Law and Identity 
So far, it has been argued in this chapter that, in order to empower indigenous 
peoples, the process behind regulating the protection of traditional knowledge should 
be more controlled and steered by indigenous peoples themselves. This process of 
empowerment is more likely to be successful when law making is approached from a 
more participatory or 'bottom-up' perspective. It is proposed in this chapter that one 
way of achieving a participatory bottom-up legal framework for the protection of 
traditional knowledge is by giving indigenous peoples a 'voice' and including their 
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narratives and stories in the process of law making. However, as identified within the 
discipline of 'sociolegal' studies (for a good overview of the issues discussed in this 
discipline see e. g. Mertz 1994a, 1994b), this approach comes with its own problems 
and flaws. 
Taking the history of law and law making into consideration, sociolegal scholars 
question whether law as a discipline is capable of unconditionally including new 
groups or communities in the process of law making; will law only open its doors to 
subaltem groups (e. g. indigenous peoples) when these groups represent themselves 
and their needs in a specific, preconditioned manner which is easily recognisable by 
lawmakers? To put it more concretely, when claiming better protection mechanisms 
for traditional knowledge, must indigenous peoples represent themselves in a 
prefigured and traditional way in order to be heard by law makers? 
Based on the findings so far in this thesis, it can be argued that (national and 
international) policy makers and law makers and some scholars have influenced, 
shaped and translated indigenous peoples' identity when debating protection 
mechanisms for traditional knowledge. In other words, even in a postmodern. legal 
framework, it must be acknowledged that law will always play a role in the process of 
identity formation and reformulation and vice versa (Mertz 1994a; Cowan et al., 
2005). In her study on the relation between law and culture, Riles comes to a similar 
conclusion, but her study also supports what has been identified in this thesis as the 
essentialist characteristics of law when she argues that "the project of international 
law rests on an essentialization of culture that privileges the role of international law 
as a mechanismfor bridging the void between cultural boundaries. A challenge to this 
essentialism, [ ... J, may 
demand a radical critique of the rhetorical authority of 
international law " (1993: 723). 
Nevertheless, while it is common knowledge in the domain of sociolegal studies 90 that 
both national and international law influence and shape identity formation and 
reformulation, within the debate about intellectual property rights and traditional 
11 l3esides sOciolegal scholars, some anthropologists (see e. g. the work of the legal anthropologists Falk 
Moore, 2005 and the social anthropologist Geertz, 2005) have also argued that law and legal facts are 
socially constructed. 
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knowledge little attention has been given to this aspect. Much of the debate on how to 
protect traditional knowledge is still based on the assumption that there is such a thing 
as a singular identity in indigenous communities (see e. g. Mgbeoji, 2001; 2006; 
Zerda-Sarmiento and Forero-Pineda, 2002) ignoring the fact that, first, indigenous 
communities often have multiple identities (see Appendix 2 and 5) which are 
susceptible to change and, second, that identity reflects a process of intervention and 
response. For example, Golberg-Ambrose (1994) has argued that the social structure 
and identity of Native Americans is based on a 'co-construction' characterised by 
interventions of the US government that has adapted or even invented tribal 
governance structures in order to fulfil the needs of the US government (e. g. to 
identify the so-called tribal leaders who could sign oil and gas deals in the name of the 
community)91. In other words, US law has encoded categories of indigenous identity 
which, in turn, are now used by indigenous peoples themselves as a point of reference 
in their struggle for empowerment within the legal discursive frameworks even 
though they know that these legal categories and identities are invented. 
Goldberg-Ambrose's (1994) observations reaffirm the central concept of Berger and 
Luckmann's (1966) classical work in sociology (The social construction of reality) 
that persons and groups interact together in a social system and that these interactions 
over time change and come to form (mental) representations of each other's actions. 
Eventually, these interactions become habituated into reciprocal roles played by the 
different actors in relation to each other. As such, the meaning of reality becomes 
embedded in the social construction of society, i. e. the roles played by each group 
conform to the expectations of the other. With regards to the situation of indigenous 
peoples, Berger and Luckmann's theory can be expanded with Gramsci's (1971) idea 
of hegemony as ideological dominance. According to Gramsci, the interests of the 
bourgeoisie are perceived as natural and inevitable, not only in the world of politics 
and ideologies but also in every day life. This reinforces the hegemonic power of the 
9' Arguably, a similar phenomenon can be identified for the I-loodia agreement which has been 
negotiated by a delegation of the South African San community who claims to have consulted the other 
San communities in Namibia and Botswana and to have acted on their behalf However, as appeared 
during the fieldwork and as confirmed by a recent workshop (September 2006) only a handful of the 
community members in Namibia and Botswana knew about the Hoodia negotiations. For more details, 
see chapter 7. 
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ruling class and prevents the revolution of the proletariat that has accepted the 
dominance of the ruling class 92 . 
In short, while it can be argued that a proper sui generis approach to the protection 
and management of traditional knowledge should be based on giving a more 
prominent voice to indigenous peoples, simultaneously it must also be acknowledged 
that any formal recognition of a category (i. e. indigenous peoples) or concept 
(empowerment) is not without its own social and cultural framing or social context. 
Even though including the subaltern (e. g. indigenous communities) in the process of 
law making is done with the best intention of empowering these local and quite often 
powerless groups; in reality, such an act of deference results in essentialising these 
units. In some cases this will result in forms of disempowerment (Mertz, 1994a). One 
way to avoid this powerlessness from happening is, according to Mertz (1994b), 
accepting the concept of a moderate social construction of law, as opposed to legal 
essentialism. Such a stance encourages a more critical view of laW93 which is based on 
empirical observations that do not lead to epistemological or moral nihiliSM94 , but 
lead to an understanding that in many cases: (1) essentialist legal representations of 
social identities are wrongly portrayed as fixed and coherent; (2) local units in legal 
discourse are often created from the top-down through interaction between the 
international, national and local legal discourse, while the former two have the 
capability to display more power; and (3) concepts such as customary law and 
authentic indigenous voices also reflect particular social constructions that are often 
far removed from neutral reflections of reality (Mertz, 1994b). 
Mertz's (1994b) observations concerning the construction of identity in legal contexts 
and the doubtful source of local customary law in the legal discourse are particularly 
poignant with regards to the development of a sui generis approach towards the 
protection and management of traditional knowledge. Gibson's (2005) proposal to 
92 Gramsci's concept of hegemonic power of the dominant class will be further discussed and 
exemplified in chapter 9 when the issuc of the San's lack of land rights is discussed. 
93 This corresponds with Riles' (1993) observation that challenging this essentialism demands a radical 
critique of the rhetorics of international law. 9' The concept of social constructionism is often criticised for being morally nihilistic. flowcver, within 
the Critical Lcgal Studies movement it is believed that law cannot be a-political and objective. Critical 
legal scholars have undermined the traditional idea that legal reasoning is neutral, objective and 
rational (Singer, 1984). Singer (1984) argues that the traditional legal theorists have reacted to the 
critical legal scholars by suggesting that they embrace nihilism. 
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develop a legal framework that vests the authority for management and regulations of 
ownership of traditional resources in the community and according to customary law 
was discussed in chapter 6. In addition to the problems that were identified in section 
4 of chapter 6, the above observations reveal further shortcomings of Gibson's call for 
a community-based approach. Even though Gibson (2005) defines community as a 
concept based on self-identity, building further upon the work of social 
constructionists and sociolegal scholars, it can be argued that even the concept of 
defining community on the basis of self-identity can be problematic since the 
construction of a collective identity in legal contexts is often, as identified by Mertz 
(1994b), provisional, fluid, strategic and contested95. In this sense, it must be 
questioned whether a sui generis approach that favours a (strictly) legally based 
communal protection mechanism will be able to accommodate complex, fluid and 
often constructed identities. Otto (1996) argues that community is largely a European 
construct that is defined as the oppositional to individualism. The result of this 
dualism (community versus individualism) means that both are defined by each other. 
Contrary to what Gibson argues, this actually results in the denial of an alternative 
approach. 
These findings chime with some of the observations in chapter 4 that the actual social 
relationships and social practices that are reflected in property relations are often 
ignored or misinterpreted by categorising them into preconceived or constructed legal 
categories as understood by Western law makers. In other words, a sui generis 
community-based (intellectual) property rights system for the protection of traditional 
knowledge falls within, what was called in chapter 4, a categorical legal framework 
that is, to a large extent, a constructed category in terms of identification of 
community, identity and property objects (i. e. community-based property rights). 
Chapter 4 concluded that a community-based intellectual property rights regime is 
based primarily on a categorical and ideological (see Figure I in chapter 4 for more 
details) understanding of indigenous peoples' property relations that is, at best, a 
distortion and, at worst, naYve. These conclusions are strengthened by the findings of 
this chapter that the central concept of this proposed protection mechanism (i. e. 
95 While Gibson contests the representation of community as something that is bounded in space and 
time, she does not acknowledge that community can be a constructed identity. Consequently, her call 
for an engagement with the question of community 'for once and for all' (2005: 297) seems rather 
naYve. 
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community) is based on a constructed identity that, so it is argued by some sociolegal 
scholars 96 , is unfortunately a central concept 
in much of the current legal discourse 
that focuses on indigenous peoples. Therefore, earlier observations of this chapter 
must be reiterated, viz. that a proper sui generis legal framework for the protection of 
traditional knowledge must rather be sought outside the formal socio-legal juridicial 
institutions. As was argued in chapter 6, any new form of protection mechanism must 
be flexible enough to accommodate what the indigenous peoples of the Four 
Directions Council have called the 'jurisprudential diversity'. In short, a sui generis 
regime should be based on the rights of indigenous peoples to create this regime on 
the basis of their own customary practices and laws. The meaning and strength of a 
sui generis regime should lie in the fact that it allows for revival and reinvigoration of 
the principles and laws that have protected indigenous peoples' patrimony and 
knowledge for thousands of years; this issue will be further discussed in the next 
section. 
4 Customary Law and Legal Pluralism 
4.1 Derinitional Issues 
As mentioned in the introduction, formal state-enforced or institutionalised law is not 
the only source of law. Especially in pluralist societies, sources should also include a 
variety of normative orders: not only the formal body of law but also formal and 
informal legal procedures, customs, symbols and rituals (Nyamu-Musembi, 2002; 
Sheleff, 2000; von Benda-Beckmann et aL, 2005). This multiplicity of formal and 
informal enforceable rules is often referred to as legal pluralism. There is some 
disagreement about the exact meaning of this term. Some use the term in reference to 
the differences between colonial law and indigenous law. Others use the term to argue 
that both official and unofficial rule making are enforceable and as such are both part 
of the body of law (for an overview of different definitions see Falk Moore, 2005). 
Within the remit of this chapter and following the approach of Sheleff (2000) and 
Borrows (2002), the concept of legal pluralism is used in the latter sense, i. e. to allow 
for greater recognition of the customary laws of indigenous groups in formal national 
and international law. 
96 See Mertz 1994a; 1994b for an overview. 
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However, developing a protection mechanism for traditional knowledge based on 
customary law is not without its own problems. Just as it is difficult to define 
community in a non-essentialised way (see section 3.2 of this chapter), it is 
challenging to define customary law in a non-essentialised manner. Since many of 
indigenous (legal) practices have been translated, with the risk of being 
misinterpreted, in official (mostly Western) legal sources, one of the most difficult 
tasks is to determine which of these practices should be seen as a legitimate and 
acceptable source of local customary law. In some cases this has led to local custom 
being reworked or even invented. The translation of local life and daily practices (the 
main sources of customary law) into formal legal categories has to a great extent 
altered the local understandings and meanings of these daily practices. In other words, 
the search for authentic customary law imposes the risk of simplifying and 
homogenising the complexities of social life which lie precisely at the basis of 
customary law. Therefore, any legal discourse that gives the appearance of involving 
'authentic' concerns and rules must be treated with certain precautions because there 
is a danger that it masks indifference towards other legal systems or even rejects the 
local values that it tries to portray. As will be demonstrated in more detail in chapter 
9, this rather deceptive characteristic of customary law is to a great extent a by- 
product of colonialism. In order for local customs to serve the needs of the colonialist 
powers, the latter have, according to Mertz (1994b), translated, tamed and altered the 
local customs (for discussion on colonialism and customary law, see chapter 9, 
section 3). 
Although it is argued in this chapter that a proper sui generis approach towards the 
protection of traditional knowledge should be based on customary law, 
simultaneously it must also be acknowledged that it is going to be very difficult to 
define customary law as a separate legal category not frozen in time and space. 
Instead, the potential of local norms and practices lies in the fact that those local legal 
frameworks are constantly changing. It is important to accept the interrelationship 
between formal and informal law; official state law and unofficial customary law; and 
national and local law in order to fully appreciate the value of the 'local' (Nyamu- 
Musembi, 2002). This approach is based on legal anthropologists' understanding of 
how local norms operate in the field. For example, Falk Moore (2000) argues that any 
6social field' (e. g. a 'local' community) has the capacity to develop its own sphere of 
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local norms and practices that can govem the conduct of the people living in this 
social field, but at the same time the rules and decisions from a surrounding and 
usually larger social field can permeate the norms of the local social field 97 . The 
anthropologists von Benda-Beckmann et al. argue that this process of other legal 
norms (usually more formal and state law) penetrating local law should be recognised 
as "a reciprocal interaction between global and local forces which does not 
essentialise either in terms of the 'other' but rather acknowledges that these 
initiatives may constrain local initiatives, while at the same time acknowledging that 
these initiatives may appropriate and transform the global for its own needs" (2005: 
20). 
In other words, defining customary law as being in contradiction to other more formal 
sources of law would introduce the problem of how to identify authentic customary 
law and would lead to a largely essentialised approach towards customary law. 
Customary or local law should be seen as a symbiotic relationship between local and 
formal legal norms that influence and complement each other, but simultaneously are 
also in tension with each other (Nyamu-Musembi, 2002). Borrows (2002) argues that 
it is precisely this ambivalence between difference and similarity that needs to be 
addressed in a sui generis approach to interpreting indigenous peoples' rights. 
It is particularly pertinent to look for similarities between formal and customary law 
when trying to avoid essentialising customary law. Wastell (2001) argues that the 
debate about legal pluralism and the push for recognising customary law as an 
alternative source of law poses a challenge to the survival of customary law itself 
because the recognition of these alternative sources of law is dependent upon the 
judgement of how 'pure' and 'authentic' these alternative sources are. Determining 
how alternative is customary law, is largely done by measuring "the distance of these 
alternative practices ftom the practices of state law" (Wastell, 2001: 189). This 
distance is presumed on the basis of, first, how these alternative sources pose a 
challenge to state law's monopoly and, second, how informal law itself is under threat 
of assimilation by formal law. Wastell laments the fact that through this process 
97 The contributions in von-Benda Beckmann's et al, (2005) edited volume mobile people, mobile law 
discuss the chains of interaction between transnational, national and local actors in legal processes 
across different societies. 
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custom is not only referred to, but also defined as something that is under constant 
threat of being transformed and dominated by formal law. While legal pluralists argue 
for a greater recognition of alternative sources of law, Wastell points out that they 
portray the relationship between formal and customary law as one of dialectic 
opposition and as such they make the recognition of alternative legalities more 
difficult because formal law remains for them the ultimate measure against which 
alternative systems are evaluated. 
Furthermore, both Riles (1993) and Wastell (2001) argue that essentialism creates 
hierarchies. The whole idea of essentialising units, in the sense of portraying them as 
bounded and discrete entities and in contradiction to other bounded entities, serves the 
purpose of judging which one is better or worse, more or less valuable, dominating or 
victim of domination. It is true that the historical relationship between formal and 
informal law has been skewed to the disadvantage of informal law and its custodians. 
Nevertheless, as is argued by Borrows (2002), any attempt to recover indigenous law 
can only be successful when the sui generis doctrine expresses the confidence that 
there are similarities between the two, at first sight opposing, legal systems. 
4.2 Similarities between Customary Law and Formal Law 
In his book, the future of tradition: customary law, common law and legal pluralism, 
Sheleff (2000) dedicates a chapter to the nature of customary law and in particular to 
the role of custom in any legal system, including - specifically - common law 
systems. Sheleff (2000) argues that custom is an important source of law for all legal 
systems. He illustrates the significance of custom in modem legal systems (mostly 
common law systems98) by, first, pointing out that the historical development of 
98 There is a difference between civil law and common law in terms of sources, concepts and style. In 
the case of sources civil law gives priority to doctrine over jurisprudence while in common law priority 
is given to jurisprudence over doctrine; in civil law jurisprudence is only a secondary source of law 
explanation, while in common law jurisprudence sets out a new specific rule to a new set of facts. In 
the case of concepts the civil law doctrine's function is to provide both the practice and courts with a 
guide to solution of particular cases in the future, while the common law doctrine's encourages to 
distinguish between cases and to extract from these specific rules. In the case of style civil law focuses 
on legal principles - application of these involves some induction from the existing case law, while 
common law focuses on fact patterns. While civil law principles, frozen into codes and often rigorous 
doctrines, are imposed on courts, most common law rules can be changed from time to time, subject to 
the doctrine of stare decids (or 'reason of authority', meaning lower courts must follow the decision of 
the higher courts). Although, at first sight, it seems that common law can address changing customs, in 
reality common law judges are sometimes very reluctant to change a rule. Civil law 
jurisdictions, on 
the other hand, are indeed more rigorous and offer less scope for flexibility. Nevertheless there are 
217 
common law has its roots in custom and, second, by arguing that from a 
jurisprudential perspective the nature of rules can also be found in systems that have 
been neither enacted by statute nor pronounced as precedent by the judiciary. 
4.2.1 Historical Developments 
Sheleff argues that there is a historical tradition of placing custom at the heart of 
common law. Two characteristics of the common law system allow for a comparison 
between common law and customary law. First, in the common law system, the judge 
is an important source in the development of legal norms and his 
judgment is largely 
based on examining and evaluating the customary practices of the realm in which the 
judge presides. Second, in the common law system the judicial precedent is a 
recognised component of the legal system and an essential factor in the decision to 
grant legal recognition to the role of custom. Judges were and still are supposed to act 
in the interest of the people, meaning the judge must consider the sentiments of the 
people when seeking justice. Or in other words, the standards and criteria used by the 
judge must be acceptable to the community. The source of custom in common law can 
be traced back to the King's court that decided on the validity of a custom that was 
common to all the people residing in the territory, in contrast to the local customs of a 
smaller area. 
many examples where civil law jurisdictions have made major legal changes after consultation with 
highly profiled legal scholars. In this sense, civil law is less rigorous and inflexible than it is sometimes 
suggested. Furthermore, French civil law, for example is not only based on the 'revolutionary 
Napoleonic Code', but also reflects pre-existing customary law (which existed prior to the Revolution) 
of France's northern provinces. Finally, some of the mixed jurisdictions (mix of common law and civil 
law) such as South Africa, and also Scotland, received Roman law over a considerable period of time 
without ever adopting a code. Nevertheless, the issues that are addressed in this section will be easier to 
apply in a common law systems (and mixed jurisdictions like Namibia) than in civil law systems. 
However, the principle that law should be more guided by rules and norms that guide people in 
everyday life is part of a wider movement which consists of sociolegal scholars (both from common 
law and civil law systems) who argue for the need for law to be attuned to social reality (see section 3 
and 4.2.2. of this chapter) With regard to the case study of this thesis, South Africa and Namiba are 
both mixed jurisdictions whose legal system reflects elements of civil and common law as well as 
African tribal customary law. The civil law is a heritage of 'Roman-Dutch Law', brought to the Cape 
by the first Dutch settlers in 1652. In the new Republic of South Africa, where South African 
legislation and precedents are lacking, Roman-Dutch and English sources are given approximately 
equal weighting. Customary law must be applied where applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any 
relevant legislation. Roman-Dutch Law was made applicable 
in what is now the republic of Namibia 
when that territory was taken over by South Africa after 
World War I and has, since attaining 
independence in 1990, been part of Namibia's mixed (Roman-Dutch, common and tribal law) 
jurisdiction. 
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However, while it is pertinent that custom lies at the heart of common law, just as it 
does for customary law, common law itself has, in the course of history, started to 
ignore the validity of custom for two reasons. First, common law wanted to distance 
itself from the habits of 'tribal' people who were perceived as 'primitive'. Second, 
common law also started to propagate a positivistic doctrine of jurisprudence (see e. g. 
section 2.2 of this chapter). This resulted not only in disregarding custom as the 
source of common law, but it has also changed the way custom was perceived in 
various parts of the British Commonwealth. The customs of indigenous peoples were 
no longer accepted on their own terms, but defined within a positivistic spectrum. 
Customs of indigenous peoples became associated with habits of immortal usage. 
From then onwards, common law judges only accepted custom as law if its origins 
were unknown. In other words, custom would only be recognised if it had a long- 
standing usage, and once recognised, it could not be changed. This approach ignored 
the fact that 'tribal' societies' customary laws also change. Nevertheless, from the 
moment common law had become firmly embedded in a positivistic jurisprudential 
framework, custom was perceived as static, even though any type of law, including 
customary law, changes. 
4.2.2 Sociolegal Jurisprudence 
According to Sheleff (2000), there are several theoretical perspectives in 
jurisprudence that do not emphasise in law a judicial precedent, but argue that law 
consists of the rules and norms that guide people in their everyday life. As mentioned 
earlier (see section 3), sociolegal scholars have always argued for the need for law to 
be attuned to social reality. People seek to enforce their rights in terms of those 
customary practices and patterns of behaviour that have developed in response to 
similar kinds of problems in the past; Ehrlich (1975 in Sheleff, 2000: 86) calls this 
'living law'. Similarly, theorists of the Scandinavian school of legal realism have 
suggested that legal rules are not markedly different from general social norms. They 
argue that law should give formal recognition to such general social norms, as these 
are in fact the customs of the people. 
In this context, Sheleff argues, customary law becomes one aspect of a larger 
movement that seeks flexibility in both the procedural and substantive aspects of law. 
Customary law, then, should be seen as part of a larger jurisprudential reality, viz. as 
219 
an expression of law making that seeks to retain a close link between obligatory 
norms and popular sentiments attuned to changing circumstances. Customary law, 
defined as a fluid system that allows particular circumstances or norms to be taken 
into consideration, then becomes very similar to past definitions of common law. The 
perception of custom can then change from being a problematic aspect of 'tribal' life 
into being an integral aspect of a legal system that is accepted by its citizenry, because 
it is embedded as a living part of their culture. 
In this sense, custom emerges from the people, while the task of the judge, chief or 
headman is to respect the feelings and wishes of the community. These wishes of the 
community will then determine the norms that the judge or chief will apply in the 
future when similar situations occur. In this sense, applying custom or judicial 
precedent is not that different. However, so argues Sheleff, only a few writers have 
drawn attention to this overlap in approach of common law and the structure of 
customary law". Zion (1988), for example, has explicitly highlighted the similarities 
between common law and customary law when examining North American Indian 
law'00. Bennett (1985 in Sheleff, 1999) has also written persuasively of the 
commonalities of custom and law in Southern Africa. Bennett (1985) stresses the 
interconnection between law and custom and argues that the so-called conflict 
between custom and law is very similar to the conflict between, for example, national 
and international law. 
99 Wright goes even one step further and argues that indigenous cultures played an influential role in 
the constitutional development of the United States: "[i]t can be argued, based on a serious 
reappraisal of the historical evidence, that the original Euro-American ideals of democracy, equality, 
liberty, civil rights, local autonomy andjederalforms of government were at least partially borrowed 
ftom indigenous peoples in the Americas" (2001: 3 8). 
100 Zion writes: "The discussion is concerned with the Indians offorth America and the common 
law systems of the United States and Canada. Since these two nations largelyfollow the common law 
tradition, it makes sense to speak ofIndian law in terms of that method This method of analysis is also 
useful in the international law context because many of its principles are based upon an international 
common law. This is not a matter of yet another imposition of alien forms of analysis on Indian 
cultures because the analysis is aimed at the non-Indian who needs to be convinced that Indians indeed 
have their own laws. The comparison between Anglo-American common law and Indian common law 
demonstrates that Indian law has foundations which are understandable to the non-Indian. For the 
purpose of a rational discussion of Indian customary law, it is best to use the term Indian Common 
Law. Indian government, law and daily life are founded upon long-standing and strong customs, and 
since the stated rationalefor the English Common Law is that it is a product of custom, that approach 
may be usedfor Indian law as well. Indians 
have every right to assert that their law stands on the same 
footing as the laws of the United States and Canada. It is unfortunate that the term 'custom' 
implies 
something that is somehow less or of a lower degree than 'law'. There are connotations that a 'custom' 
is somehow outside the 'law' of government, which is powerful and 
binding. This is an ethnocentric 
view" (Zion, 1988: 123-124 in Sheleff, 1999: 14-15). 
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Borrows (2002), in his book on the resurgence of indigenous law in Canada, 
demonstrates that some Canadian courts have recognised that Canadian law when 
applied to First Nations may use both Aboriginal and common law sources. For 
example, in the first year of Canada's Confederation, the Quebec Superior Court 
affirmed the existence of the Cree law on the Prairies and recognised it as being part 
of the common law'01. Even though, at times, indigenous customs and conventions 
have been incorporated into Canadian law, in the majority of the cases the Canadian 
Courts have favoured non-Aboriginal law over Aboriginal law. Borrows (2002) gives 
the example of the case Sheldon v. Ramsay in 1852, famous for its obiter dicta that 
common law is not part savage and part civilised. This case portrays that, in general, 
Aboriginal or customary law is not applied because it is perceived as being inferior to 
and incompatible with common law as the former is labelled as 'personal', 
'usufructuary' and 'dependent' on the goodwill of a sovereign. Nevertheless, there are 
examples wherein the Canadian courts have argued that the pre-existing rights of First 
Nations can co-exist alongside Western legal principles 102 ; in other words, the task for 
the courts is to find more appropriate terminology to describe indigenous laws so that 
they are no longer dismissed as being primitive and bounded in time and space 
(Borrows, 2002). 
101 Justice Monk wrote the following about his decision: "Will it be contended that the territorial 
rights, political organisation such as it was, or the laws and usages of Indian tribes were abrogated - 
that they ceased to exist when these two European nations began to trade with aboriginal occupants? 
In my opinion it is beyond controversy that they did not - that so far from being abolished, they were 
left infullforce, and were not even modified in the slightest degree [ ... ]" (quoted in Borrows, 2002: 6). 102 Borrows (2002) gives an example of another important case; the Stellaquo adoption laws were 
recognised by the common law and by the constitution of Canada in Casimel v. Insurance Corporation 
of British Columbia (B. C. C. A. ), in 1994. The Court held "that the status conferred by Aboriginal 
customary adoption will be recognised by the courts for the purposes of application of the principle of 
the common law and the provisions of statute law to the persons whose status is established by 
customary adoption" (quoted in Borrows, 2002: 6-7). Borrows also mentions a parallel line of cases 
that have incorporated Aboriginal law into Canadian law, for example: Delgamuukw v. British 
Colombia in 1997 concerning land; R. v. Sioui in 1990 concerning governance; R. v. Gladstone in 1996 
concerning trade; and R. v. Bear's Shin Bone in 1899 concerning marriage. 
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4.2.3 Challen es 
To recapitulate, even though it has been proposed by some scholars that the best way 
forward for protecting traditional knowledge is by developing a sui generis legal 
framework that is largely based on customary law, it has been argued in this chapter 
that defining the body of customary laws is no simple matter. Most scholars in the 
current debate about traditional knowledge and intellectual property rights have barely 
engaged with the nature of customary law, let alone analysed customary law within a 
historical context. Yet it is obvious from the above analysis that the manner in which 
customary law is perceived is crucial for the possibility of creating a framework that 
recognises indigenous peoples' participation rights when making decisions on 
protecting and managing traditional knowledge. While it may sound good in principle 
to propose a protective framework based on legal pluralism, in reality the 
development of such a framework will be highly challenging because of the problems 
and complexities in defining and describing customs. Custom and customary law are 
perceived as some sort of relic of backward people, or as a habit with a long-standing 
usage that is static and therefore difficult to change, or as something that is completely 
the opposite of formal law and as such may not be acceptable by the legal and societal 
standards as set out by the dominant culture. 
However, these challenges do not undermine the importance of drawing upon 
indigenous legal sources - more often and more explicitly - when deciding upon 
indigenous issues, including the future of traditional knowledge. Mechanisms need to 
be identified that would allow for a greater recognition of indigenous peoples' rights 
and legal systems. So far, it has been argued in this chapter that portraying customary 
law as the opposite of common law only aggravates the tension between the two. 
Instead, attention should shift to identifying a concept that would allow indigenous 
law to function alongside common law. As mentioned before in this chapter and as 
confirmed by Borrows (2002), the concept of sui generis can only work when equal 
weight is given to each perspective; this equity is the prerequisite to achieve true 
conciliation between two cultures. A sui generis approach should be based on 
recognising the difference of indigenous peoples without essentialising indigenous 
peoples' identity, whilst simultaneously promoting cooperation and unity between 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. The ultimate question that then needs to be 
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addressed is twofold: where/how to discover non-essentialised indigenous law and 
how to incorporate indigenous law into common law? These two questions will be 
addressed in the next section. 
5 Discovering Indigenous Law 
The work of Borrows (2002) and his attempt to rediscover cases in which indigenous 
law was recognised by and incorporated in common law is inspirational and presents a 
vision of a new political and legal order for indigenous peoples. While Borrows 
focuses specifically on incorporating indigenous law and legal knowledges into 
existing legal structures in Canada, some of the concepts that he introduces are 
valuable and insightful for the central debate in this chapter, viz. what is customary 
law, where and how can it be found and how can it be incorporated in a sui generis 
framework. Borrows' ideas are used here as a focal point for discussing an alternative 
approach towards the development of a sui generis protection mechanism for 
traditional knowledge. Although the main focus of Borrows' work is on Canada, some 
of the concepts he has introduced are certainly valuable and recognisable within a 
wider context. 
Borrows presents an epistemological and ontological paradigm about indigenous law 
that is very similar to the approach of sociolegal scholars and legal anthropologists 
(see section 3.1 of this chapter). According to Borrows, indigenous law originates in 
the political, economic, spiritual and social values of indigenous communities, which 
are expressed through the teachings and behaviour of knowledgeable and respected 
elders and individuals. These principles can be found in the stories, ceremonies and 
traditions of indigenous peoples. Or in short, stories express the law in indigenous 
communities, reveal the principles of order and disorder, and serve as a source of 
normative authority. This principle corresponds with the approach of some of the 
postmodern legal scholars who argue that the source of law can be found through 
observing local practices and listening to stories and explanations. When stories are 
used in the sense that they reveal the normative legal structure of a society or 
community, they are very similar to legal precedent in common law. Both common 
law precedents and indigenous stories record the patterns of past disputes and 
resolutions, which can then be used and analysed by people of wisdom as 
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authoritative sources of knowledge that reveal the underlying principles and values of 
the community. 
However, stories and common law precedents differ in form and content in the way 
they are recorded and applied. This difference has obscured their similarities and is 
one of the main reasons why customary law is perceived as different and often 
inferior to common law. Indigenous peoples do not record their stories in a written 
form like the recording of cases in common law. Norms and values are passed on 
through oral transmission that is, contrary perhaps to popular thought, not dependent 
on an authentic first telling and uncorrupted by subsequent development. An oral 
system of law is based on reinterpretations of traditions in order to meet new and 
contemporary needs. Borrows comments that the fluidity of indigenous peoples' oral 
cultures is arguably greater than the fluidity of common law. 
It could be argued that norms and values could get lost when stories change from one 
telling to the other. However, more importantly, the different versions of the stories 
show that indigenous peoples' legal systems recognise the principle that context is 
always changing, and therefore requires a constant reinterpretation of many of the 
underlying values and norms. In other words, contrary to the portrayal of customary 
law in the literature and in jurisprudence as static, the fluidity of indigenous peoples' 
stories reveals that indigenous communities value contextual meanings and are 
capable of adapting these according to the needs of community members which can 
change over time. 
However, the tendency persists to characterise customary law as rigid, static and 
traditional in contrast to common law which is seen as fluid, changing and adaptable. 
The perseverance of this dichotomised thinking can be attributed, according to 
Borrows, to the fact that the social function of law is still largely underestimated or 
even overlooked in the common law tradition which remains embedded in a 
positivistic framework. Formal law has become too detached from its cultural context 
and it is argued in this chapter that there is a potential danger that something similar 
will happen to customary law if it is defined in opposition to 
formal law. While it is 
not hard to acknowledge that there are indeed, to use the words of Borrows, 
irreconcilable distinctions between customary law and common law given their 
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different history and social organisation, it can be argued that a bridge can be built 
between the two legal systems by paying more attention to the cultural aspects and 
context of law. 
The concept that law has to go back to its original roots is a logical continuation of 
one of the core messages of this thesis, viz. that the solution to the problem of 
appropriating traditional knowledge should be more contextualised and localised. 
Based on the author's own fieldwork observations (see chapter 7 and intermezzo I 
and Appendix 2), and similar findings reported by Greene (2002; 2004) from his 
research in Peru, protecting traditional knowledge is more of a local problem - and 
specifically one that is linked to territorial and tenure rights (see chapter 9) - than is 
currently portrayed in some the literature on traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property rights. Some leaders of indigenous peoples (often the new elites) have 
learned how to present their claims to a global audience in a discourse that is 
recognisable by that audience, i. e. centring on human rights, self-determination rights 
and cultural rights. However, a more contextualised approach, through engaging with 
indigenous peoples in their own settings, can reveal that, contrary to the legal 
literature and policy documents on the protection of traditional knowledge, an 
internationally framed formal legal solution is unlikely to solve the problems on the 
ground. Deconstructing the persistent prejudices about indigenous peoples' identity, 
knowledge, property and legal system, leads to the conclusion a local solution must be 
sought. In this respect, a sui generis approach means acknowledging that law must be 
sought in its local and cultural context. 
Law making or setting legal boundaries also occur on the ground outside court 
settings or the UN. As argued by Borrows, communities, politicians, bureaucrats, 
development workers, NGOs and so forth, all interact with each other on an almost 
daily basis. Together they draw, erase and redraw legal boundaries to include and/or 
exclude certain peoples, institutions, ideas and concepts. These engagements are part 
of the living law and they produce their own forms of customary law and legal 
geography that are contextualised and grounded in reality, but that have so far been 
kept hidden or unexplored in the formal system of law. It is precisely these localised 
practices of law that need to become the focus of attention. It remains a challenge to 
find an appropriate methodology that allows access to oral traditions and community 
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knowledge, but this should not prevent the attempt to look for contemporary 
customary law. As will be explained in more detail in chapter 9, many indigenous 
peoples are getting more organised. Taking the Narnibian context as an example, 
through conservancy boards, national park management boards, traditional authorities, 
tourist projects and other cooperation projects with other members of society, 
indigenous peoples can reveal some of their norms, values and customs with regards 
to resource and land use 103 . 
An interesting case in point is Suzman's (2000) account of the San in Omaheke 104 , 
who he describes as 'impure' San in the sense that they have lost most of their 
hunting-gathering traditions because for generations they have eked out a living as 
farm or domestic workers for either white or Herero farmers. In his search for the 
identity of the Omaheke San, Suzman has collected stories of the JuPhoansi in the 
Omaheke region and has compared these stories with some of the findings of Biesele 
(1993) who has done research amongst the 'pure' (and more autonomous) JuPhoansi 
San in the Dobe/Nyae-Nyae areas. Biesele (1993) reaffirms the view that stories 
provide one the of the principal means for expressing key issues that affects the San's 
lives and that although these folk-stories were passed on from one generation to 
another, the stories deal with the actualities and realities of social experience by 
constantly making sense of new things. Biesele argues that stories provided the means 
for the San to reflect upon new situations because narratives allowed some space or 
freedom to suspend or invert social norms which then allow for action to take place 
which would otherwise be unacceptable. Suzman's (2000) findings are particularly 
interesting; he comes to the conclusion that even though the San in the Omaheke have 
lost most of their traditions, stories and storytelling continue to provide the alternative 
paradigm through which the JuPhoansi express themselves about their social universe, 
albeit in a less prominent manner than for the JuPhoansi in the Dobe/Nyae Nyae area. 
Furthermore, Suzman notes that although the stories told by the Omaheke San retain 
most of the narrative and metaphoric devices of the stories told by the Dobe and Nyae 
10' This is not to argue that there are no problems with institutions like traditional authorities. These 
problems are discussed in chapter 9. Suffice it is to say in this context that, while these structures may 
be flawed, they still offer some glimpses of hope. 
104 In the Omaheke region in Namibia live mostly JuPhoansi San who for several generations have 
been living on white-owned commercial farms and former native reserves. For more details on this 
region, see Appendix 1. 
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Nyae San, the stories of the Ornaheke San are, nevertheless, "strongly oriented to the 
present circumstances ofJuPhoansi life in the Omaheke " (Suzman, 2000: 142). 
It is interesting to note that Borrows (2002) claims, and this is also confirmed by 
Guenther (1999) for the San, that indigenous peoples' legal tradition can be best 
found in the stories of a character known as the 'trickster'. The trickster offers 
valuable insights into the norms and values of a particular community through his/her 
encounters and adventures. The trickster takes on different personae and in some 
cases even becomes an animal which makes it easier for him/her to escape the 
structures and cultural order of society. This allows the trickster to explore expanding 
legal boundaries when confronted with a new situation. According to Borrows, it is 
precisely "the [t]rickster's unique position [that] generates a language bridging 
Western and Aboriginal accounts of law and incorporating intersecting and 
oppositional cultural perspectives. [ ... ] The [tjrickster's incongruous entry into legal 
discourse permits us to view lawfrom a perspective thatfalls outside the conventional 
structure of legal argument and exposes its hidden cultural (dis)order " (2002: 57). 
Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that defining customary law as being in opposition 
to other more formal sources of law results in the essentialisation of customary law. 
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it creates a hierarchy in which 
customary law is defined by being different from and inferior to modem or 'Western' 
law. Second, it makes customary law difficult to identify as it has somehow to be 
certified as 'authentic'. Third, it potentially makes customary law less relevant 
because essentialised customary law reflects the issues of yesterday's society and may 
not be able to address current and emerging issues facing indigenous groups, such as 
the commodification of knowledge. 
These problems are not the only reason why this essentialised approach to customary 
law should be abandoned. The historical observation that prior to colonialism 
common law in the West was a 'living law' very much like customary law, highlights 
both the shortcomings and the moral flaws of the process of codification which has 
produced our view of national and international law as immutable. Any effort to write 
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down customary law can and should be informed by the evolving oral literary 
traditions of local communities, i. e. by story telling. However this effort should 
equally be informed by observations of the practice of national and international law 
as a living process. Customary law should be viewed as the relationship between local 
and formal legal norms that influence and complement each other, but simultaneously 
are, or can be, in tension with each other. As Sheleff s (2000) work has demonstrated, 
it seems that formal law has particular difficulties in dealing with the local and 
changeable because formal law will always try to translate complexities into 
understandable and manageable units. 
To surnmarise, it has been argued in this chapter that a sui generis approach to 
protecting traditional knowledge must focus on discovering, precisely, the discourses 
that exist outside the legal settings such as courts and institutions of the United 
Nations. In order to find a 'solution' to the problem of protecting traditional 
knowledge that works in the local context it is important that scholars, development 
workers, NGOs and institutions like the U`N come to terms with the fact that 
indigenous peoples can be at once traditional, modem and postmodern. Engaging with 
these multiple 'identities' of indigenous peoples through a formal (i. e. Western) legal 
framework seems like an impossible task because, ultimately, it is less flexible and 
fluid than informal law. For customary law to work it has to be living law, and in 
order for it to find the space to 'live', Western law will have to find more flexibility in 
its practice. This highlights the importance of local scale, an issue that will be further 
explored in the next chapter when discussing territorial rights and native title claims. 
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Intermezzo 3- Law and Leadership 
105 
"We want our representatives, we need somebody that can speak on our behatf, we 
need contact with the government" (San people in Tjaka, II August 2005) 
To practice our culture we need a chief that is recognised by the government. Our 
culture is dying out while other tribes' culture is still very much alive because their 
chiefs have been recognised by the government" (A San elder in Skoonheid, 8 August 
2005). 
Our community has some problems because our leaders are not recognised and it is 
the leaders who know the traditional rules and laws to [govern] the community. 
According to the Constitution all Namibians are equal so why not the San, we need 
freedom ofspeech, we need to be able to give out opinion ... Other tribes'chiefs cannot 
help the San because they do not know our rules and laws (Chief Langman, 
Skoonheid area, 8 August 2005). 
The traditional laws as recognized or promoted by the Traditional Authority laws are 
different from the laws of the San; these laws fight with each other (Chief Sofia, 
Aminuis Korridor, 12 August 2005). 
In the past the Traditional Authority did not exist, but I was already a chief; I was 
always called for a meeting if San people called me to assist with their life. My 
grandfather was already a chief 'royal house blood'. My father he was German, 
Herero, Kung. Mother's blood, San people call it 'royal house'. Councilors are 
elected but the chief, although he is elected, he must have royal blood. The elections 
were paldfor by WIMSA, 6 senior and 6junior councilors were elected and the chief 
and secretary. 
If people don't come to you, then you cannot interfere with them as a traditional 
authority. How do you know, for example, how to punish someone who has stolen a 
Extracts from interviews. 
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chicken? Sometimes you have to look it up; Rules for Traditional Authority are 
written by the Department ofLand and Resettlement. 
I am not happy with the rules in that book. My rules (the San rules) and the rules in 
the book are not the same. For example traditional marriage is not recognized - you 
must get married in church or in the magistrate court. (Chief Amold, Omatako, 28 
August 2004) 
In the old days the San had different sort of leadership structure, besides a leader was 
a leader it was somebody with respect, now everybody talks about rights and that is 
where we run into problems. Talking about rights does not give you respect and that 
is what is neededfor a good leader (Chief Sofia, Aminuis Korridor, 12 August). 
My desire, as a leader of the San communities, is to understand what is going on at 
government level. Ifyou don't understand that, how can you serve you community? It 
doesn't help if we send people who are not capable to represent us. The government 
has sent people, like commissar [ ... J, who speaks Tswana and English. Our people 
don't speak these languages. He is trying to clarify what he can't clarify. We need 
someone here in our San community who can translate, who has a direct link to the 
office of the prime minister and the government. If we have to unite as a nation, which 
the government recognizes as the oldest nation, then we need to be connected (Petrus 
Vaalbooi, Andriesvale, 3 October 2004) 
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Chapter 9- Knowledge in Context 106 
The Question of Territorial Rights 
I Introduction 
So far, it has been argued in this thesis, and specifically in chapter 5, that indigenous 
peoples must seek protection over their knowledge and culture so that they can assert 
their own cultural views and self-determination, free from dominating influences from 
outside. In this sense, claiming rights over culture and knowledge is a socio-economic 
and political act for indigenous peoples. This act includes, amongst others, 
questioning the invasion of their territories, the disintegration of their identities, and 
the historical process of subordination and their current position as an underclass. In 
chapter 5, it was concluded that it is very doubtful whether intellectual property rights 
can be a flexible enough instrument to be of much use in supporting indigenous 
peoples with these claims. The existing intellectual property rights regime is not, and 
is unlikely to become, an institution that is sympathetic towards the claims and needs 
of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples need a more flexible framework for 
protecting their knowledge. This chapter focuses on the role of the state as a key actor 
in the indigenous peoples' struggle to restore their rights over land, resources and 
knowledge. Ultimately, it is the nation state that needs to sign and implement the 
international conventions and declarations that recognise indigenous peoples' rights. 
When examining whether traditional knowledge can be protected with intellectual 
property rights, it is not uncommon in the literature to make an explicit link between 
rights over land and natural resources and rights over knowledge (Posey and Dutfield, 
1996; Simpson, 1997; Greene, 2002; 2004; Tucker, 2004; Berman, 2004; Riley, 
2004b; Solomon, 2004; Gibson, 2005). Indigenous peoples regard knowledge as 
something that is closely tied to land; traditional knowledge is not just part of the 
body of knowledge, it also encapsulates spiritual experience and relationship with 
106 The main focus in this chapter is on the San in Namibia, Given the fact that the fieldwork was 
limited by time and budget constraints, only 6 months were spent in the field of which 5 months were 
spent in Namibia. At the time of the fieldwork the San in Botswana were still heavily involved in the 
eviction trial (San have been evicted from their ancestral land in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, 
only recently they have won this court case and a few hundred have returned to the park) which was a 
highly politicised court case and therefore (mainly for ethical reasons) inappropriate to include in the 
research. The research in South Africa with the : Khomani San was focused solely on the Hoodia 
benefit sharing. The ++Khomani San represented all the other 
San in the negotiations. 
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land (Barsh, 1999; McGregor, 2004). Agreements 107 drawn up by indigenous peoples 
themselves highlight that rights to land, traditional institutions, cultural practices and 
intellectual property rights are inseparable and interrelated, a statement that has also 
been recognised by some of the UN institutions' 
08. Not only are indigenous peoples 
struggling to get their legal rights over land and resources recognised, they also want 
to have the freedom to make their own decisions about how to use and manage natural 
and cultural resources (Tucker, 2004). One of the major stumbling blocks in 
indigenous peoples' quest for recognition of their user and ownership rights over land, 
resources and knowledge is the fact that throughout colonial history their territory and 
organisational structure has been perceived as, respectively, terra nullius and res 
nufflus. 
Without a definable and defendable territory, the concepts of indigeneity, the 
enactment of culture and the maintenance of traditional knowledge can easily be 
undermined or eroded (Greene, 2002). As a result of colonial and post-colonial 
expropriation and displacement, indigenous peoples' knowledge systems and cultures 
are in danger of becoming extinct. The fact is that many forms of indigenous practice, 
such as harvesting medicinal plants, are intrinsically linked not only to a specific land 
area but also to a traditional land tenure 109 system of open access (Tucker, 2004). 
Changes in land tenure systems, like imposing private ownership, will limit access to 
resources that are not only intrinsically part of indigenous peoples' knowledge base 
and culture but are often also part of their livelihood strategy and survival skills (i. e. 
gathering food, medicine, and natural resources that underpin their material culture). 
Having access to land and being able to exercise rights over it are essential elements 
in restoring and maintaining indigenous peoples' identity (Keal, 2003). 
107 For example: The Charter of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, The Indigenous 
Peoples' Earth Charter, The Declaration of Principles of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. 
More details of these accords can be found in Tucker (2004): 130-131 and Posey and Dutfield (1996): 
190-198 and Appendix 6. 
10' For example: Declaration on the Rights of Tndigenous Peoples, the COICA-UNDP Regional 
Meeting on Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, the UNDP Consultation on the Protection 
and Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge and the International Labour Organisation's Convention 
169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. More details of these agreements can be found in Venne, 1998; 
Swepston, 2003; Posey, 2004). 
109 "Land tenure systems are definitions about rights to land and resources; they encompass concepts 
and rules (formal and informal) about rights and duties related to land use and access " (Tucker, 2004: 
127). 
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The importance of territorial rights draws attention to the role of the state as the most 
powerful actor and the ultimate arbitrator of local territorial disputes. By looking at 
territorial rights as a proxy for the wider struggle to recover from colonial 
subordination, the debate on the protection of indigenous knowledge can be seen (a) 
in a wider context of indigenous peoples' needs and (b) in a more relevant setting in 
terms of their day to day struggle for their livelihoods and cultural survival. 
At the end of the day, many indigenous peoples face a more acute threat of 
encroachment on their territories and livelihoods from more powerful groups in 
society than from the unauthorised use of their knowledge for corporate 
pharmaceutical research. The problems of bioprospecting are important but in terms 
of their overall impacts on the ground, they should not be seen in isolation from other 
and perhaps more pressing threats to indigenous peoples. 
It is argued in this chapter that the protection mechanisms that are currently proposed 
both internationally (e. g. WIPO, CBD, TRIPS, UNESCO) and nationally (e. g. 
national protection laws) are not unimportant, but these rather abstract and formal 
legal mechanisms lack the flexibility and fluidity to deal with the complex history and 
social realities that some indigenous peoples face on the ground. As will be discussed 
towards the end of this chapter, this argument encourages a review of the current 
campaigns of indigenous peoples for recognition which are increasingly based on 
making use of an international political platform to influence national as well as 
international decision makers. However, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, the 
international platform forces some groups of indigenous peoples to engage with a 
discourse that does not necessarily reflect the 'social realities' as they are experienced 
by indigenous peoples on the ground. Therefore, it is suggested that for some 
indigenous peoples a closer attention to local campaigns and local strategies for 
recognition of their rights over land, resources and knowledge might be more 
appropriate. 
In order to address all these issues this chapter will be structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the colonial history of land enclosure. It details how the colonial legacy of 
the institutions of the Namibian state has limited the state's effectiveness in dealing 
with post-colonial land reform. Specific attention is drawn to the consequences this 
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has had for the San. The San were more dispossessed through colonial enclosure than 
any other African group, yet post-colonial land reform (well-meaning though it was) 
has largely failed to support them in their quest for restoration of their rights and 
livelihoods. Section 3 looks more closely at the reasons behind this failure of the state. 
It investigates the construction of customary law and traditional authority in the 
colonial and post-colonial era and demonstrates how this evolving institution reflects 
the dynamics of power relations on the ground. Section 4 examines on what basis the 
San can attempt to claim back their land, and explores three different strategies; native 
title claims, generalist rights claims and grass-roots mobilisations. 
2 The Territorial Rights of the San in Post-Independence Namibia 
2.1 The Colonial Legacy of Namibia's Land Reform Policies 
2.1.1 Colonial Land Enclosure 
As illustrated in chapter 5 (section 4) and chapter 8 (section 2.2), political thinkers 
such as Locke provided intellectual and ideological justification for colonialising 
indigenous peoples and expropriating their territories (Keal, 2003; Scott, 1997). 
However this expropriation also had a European precedent. The plight of black 
Africans in colonial times and the contemporary plight of indigenous peoples can be 
traced back to the land enclosure movement beginning in Western Europe about half a 
millennium ago. During this period, vast areas of common grazing land were enclosed 
by landlords and made into private property. Land previously used by villagers on a 
shared basis became private when landlords erected fences and secured title deeds 
through the courts. During the second enclosure movement in England, between 1700 
and 1845, about 7 million acres of land were enclosed, followed shortly by the 
General Enclosure Act (Olson, 1990). The new system of free proprietorship released 
landlords from their traditional duties of stewardship and manorial obligation. Access 
to land was no longer an entitlement based on usufruct rights. By 1850 agriculture in 
England had become a capitalist enterprise, mediated through the market. People 
needing to use land had to rent or buy it from a landowner. 
A somewhat similar type of enclosure took place during the colonial period when 
large parts of Namibia and other African countries with a significant European settler 
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population were transferred into the hands of individual white settlers. This enforced 
appropriation of what was typically the best quality land, resulted in many evictions 
and caused massive social, economic and cultural disruptions for the local African 
population. Ownership of land and resources by black people was severely restricted; 
they were allowed access only to communal areas. Through a system of communal 
land tenure ('native reserves') every household had access to land, but the land 
allotted was (often deliberately) so small that at least one member of the household 
had to engage in wage labour. At the same time colonial employers argued that they 
could pay a wage below the value of labour because the workers and their dependents 
lived off the land (Werner, 1993). The colonialists regarded the land under the control 
of Africans as res nullius because, so they argued, Africans were incapable of 
managing it under private ownership. 
Just as elsewhere in Southern Africa, land reform in Namibia calls for a redistribution 
of land. Land redistribution is crucial for making a living in developing economies, 
for commercial or subsistence farming and grazing. Access to rural land is a major 
source of affluence. In Namibia a major cause of poverty is the continuing unequal 
access to land (Smit, 2002). The appropriation of land in the colonial period remains 
the basis for this inequitable access to land" 0 (Widlok, 2002). 
After independence in 1989, Namibia's state formation was characterised by a 
constitutional framework based on liberal democratic thinking that embraced concepts 
of human rights and the rule of law (Erasmus, 2002). The Namibian approach, 
contrary to the 'truth and reconciliation' policy in South Affical 11, assumed that the 
atrocities of colonialism (and apartheid) could best be dealt with by building a unified 
nation. In Namibia, it was hoped that the Constitution would prevent another 'African 
110 While Adolf Luderitz purchased land from the Nama for the first German settlement, the vast 
majority of the native land in Namibia was acquired through lease, treaties, war and genocide; the 
German colonial forces exterminated between 70 and 80 per cent of the Herero and about 50 per cent 
of the Nama during the Herero and Nama war of resistance in 1904 (Werner, 1993: 138). Especially, 
the records of the agreements and the wars give evidence that the lands in Namibia were not terra 
nullius, i. e. vacant lands that automatically became property of their discoverers. The acquisition of the 
Namibian land was in all likelihood legal under German, British and South African law of that time. 
But no modern authority would now perceive these seizures as justified (Harring, 1996). For an 
overview of the history of land dispossession in Namibia, see Wemer (1993); for the specific story of 
land dispossession of the San, see Gordon and Douglas (2000). 
111 South Africa adopted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the belief that concentrating on 
'truth', 'forgiveness', and reconciliation' could counter the danger of new inter-ethnic conflicts 
breaking out after the abolition of the apartheid regime (Erasmus, 2002). 
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disaster' and instead bring stability and progress. In this respect it could be judged to 
have been somewhat successful. However, with regard to land reform, the literature is 
agreed that the Constitution was less successful (Daniels, 2003; Harring, 1996,2002; 
Suzman, 2002). The main difficulties were related to the fate of communal land, the 
taboo of ethnic identity in the land rights debate and the dominant role of the Western 
model of private ownership in land reform. These are all aspects that are of particular 
relevance to the San, as will be discussed below. 
2.1.2 Land Reform in Communal Areas 
One of the key objectives of the Namibian independence struggle was to return the 
land to the people who had been dispossessed during colonialism. However, 
according to Daniels (2003), the Constitution perpetuated colonialist policy by 
explicitly stating that land, water, and natural resources belong to the state if they are 
not otherwise lawfully (privately) owned (Articles 100 and 124). In other words, 
communal land became state property. This was underscored by Prime Minister Hage 
Geingob's statement that "people in the communal lands have no acknowledged right, 
independent of the will of the State, to live andfarm in the Communal Areas " (cited in 
Harring, 1996: 467). This means that the vast majority of Namibians have neither 
ownership nor tenure security of land, even if they have been living on it for 
generations. 
According to Harring (2002), the Constitution facilitates the continuation of German 
and South African racist colonial practices. While 70 percent of blacks live in 
communal areas, hardly any whites do. It is impossible for most blacks to acquire land 
from whites because they lack the means to buy it. The effect is that poor blacks 
living on communal lands can move only to other communal lands. This has 
particular repercussions for San communities living in communal areas. Because of 
their vulnerable social structure and poverty, communal areas used by San 
communities are under the threat of land grabbing by stronger and better organized 
groups (Daniels, 2003). When San complain to the Ministry of Land Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation about the fencing of communal land by other groups, the official reply 
is that Namibia needs to prioritise the productive use of land so that it not only feeds 
small groups of rural dwellers such as San (former) hunter-gatherers, but also the 
nation at large (Widlok, 2001). Thus, the Namibian government is responsive to 
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stronger ethnic groups, an ironic continuation of colonial rule through powerful tribal 
chieftains. 
Even in areas where San are allocated communal land, such as resettlement farms, 
they are still frequently dispossessed because the state does not provide them adequate 
protection against subsequent encroachment by more powerful groups. As a result, 
San have argued that land allocated to them should be firmly under their control. The 
San's desire for a stronger formal protection of their land is motivated in part by the 
San's awareness that others perceive land that the San use to be open and 
gunproductive'. This echoes the colonial practices of terra nullius and res nullius. 112 
2.1.3 Land Reform and Historic Land Claims Linked to Ethnic Identity 
The situation for the San is particularly difficult because they have lost more ancestral 
land than any other group yet the post-colonial government refutes the return of any 
ancestral land on moral grounds (Widlok, 2002). The government argues that nation 
building is important to counter ethnic segregation and that it has a moral 
responsibility to cater for all the members of the population without consideration of 
ethnic identity. The Namibian government's stance reflects Africa's 'obsession' with 
nation building which is fed by a well-intended drive to homogenise socio-cultural 
differences among ethnic groups (Okafar, 2000: 513). The slogan, 'kill the tribe to 
build the nation', exemplifies the policy of banning ethnicity and was used by 
FRELIMO, the ruling party in Mozambique in the 1970s. The attempts by African 
leaders to form cohesive nations out of culturally heterogeneous populations has been 
inspired by the apparent shape of European-style nation states which combine a tight 
territorial demarcation with a more monocultural sense of nationhood' 13 . 
Indeed there are no specific provisions in the Constitution that protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples or minorities, and Namibia is not a signatory to international 
conventions recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples (Daniels, 2003). Both the 
Constitution and the urban elite are biased against conceding group rights on the basis 
of ethnicity. As a result the San are not recognized and there are no government-led 
112 See Martin and Vermeylen (2005) for a historical analysis of these practices. 
"' As discussed in chapter 8 section 2.2, this popular, but not necessarily accurate, view of the nation 
state is also reflected in international law. 
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affirmative action plans on their behalf (Widlok, 2001)1 
14 
. The government defines 
indigeneity by reference to historic European colonialism. Accordingly, almost 
everyone born in Africa of an African bloodline is indigenous. Furthermore, the 
Traditional Authorities Act defines all Namibian traditional communities as 
indigenous. This definition of indigeneity is consistent with the global practice for 
defining it largely as a product of Western colonialism (see chapter 2, section 4.2 for 
more details). While colonisation is a necessary factor in understanding the current 
conditions of indigenous peoples, it is not a sufficient one (see Coates, 2004). For 
example, it allows the South African Boers to seek indigenous status by virtue of 
having been colonised by the British. In addition to the San's inability to pursue land 
claims on the basis of indigeneity, their scope for pursuing such claims on the basis of 
ancestral inhabitation is equally limited. The 1991 National Land Conference reported 
unequivocally that the restitution of ancestral land claims by any group or individual 
would not be entertained in Namibia. This decision was later incorporated in the 
National Land Policy of 1998. For most San, existing rights to land are therefore de 
facto rights, not guaranteed by customary law. This is most evident on commercial 
farms, where rights of San workers to residence are contingent on their employment 
by a farm owner, or by a farmer granting squatting rights. Whereas the majority of 
rural Namibians can claim at least partial tenure rights in terms of state or customary 
law, most San (outside the Tsumkwe district) cannot claim such rights. 
2.1.4 Limits of the Individual Land Rights Model 
The rules and norms of Western law not only influenced African statecraft, they 
became fundamental building blocks of African nations. Namibia's failure to 
adequately address the degraded position of the San is clearly not attributable solely to 
unwillingness on the part of its government. It represents a continuation of norms that 
have formed an essential part of international law making since the 18 th Century. 
Accordingly, only those people with a similar level of social organisation and 
agricultural or pastoral practices as those found in European states are entitled to have 
114 When the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation came into existence in 1990 with the 
aim to alleviate poverty and improve access to scarce resources (including land), the San were 
prioritised as one of the key beneficiaries of land reform. on the basis of their poverty (not ethnic 
identity). However, pro-poor resettlement schemes have failed for a number of reasons. The lack of 
participation of the San in the implementation policy has been identified as one of the main reasons 
(Harring and Odendaal, 2002). 
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rights over land. Other people, e. g. hunter-gatherers, who are not 'modern, ' have their 
occupation and use of land nullified. This view states that people like the San do not 
use land as prescribed in international law, an argument which was used as a 
justification for colonial powers to take control of their territory (Dodds, 1998). 
Namibia's post-colonial government has effectively continued this practice. 
During colonialism, land tenure security could only be achieved through individual 
ownership rights. Allocating private rights attached a market value to land, which 
facilitated its 'development'. In the post-independence period it is still believed that 
property individualisation contributes to the development process (Bruce, 2000). 
However, strong doubts have been registered about enforced individualisation in the 
African context because it is based on Euro-American economic and technocratic 
views of land (Smit, 2002). The assumption that narrowly defined individual property 
rights guarantee more secure land rights and more development' 15 has been criticised 
(Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999; Platteau, 1996; Bruce, 2000). Economists have 
argued that a market for land does not exist and anthropologists have criticised 
individualisation for ignoring the complexities of customary tenure, including that it 
provides for multiple users to hold rights to a single plot. 
Based on the above it is apparent that there is a need for a different approach to land 
reform. It is unlikely that simply redistributing property (similar to the model used in 
Zimbabwe) will result in an equitable allocation of land. Dividing the land into small 
parcels of fee simple land is not economically viable for people like the San and it 
builds upon the existing system of land ownership, i. e. "using the model of white 
agriculture as the implicit modelfor land reform " (Harring, 2002: 276). 
Chanock (1991 a) argues that colonial regimes simplified tenure systems in order to 
undermine indigenous use of land. They emphasised their communal elements and 
ignored their more subtle gradations such as various tenure arrangements for land put 
to individual uses 116 . However, numerous studies confirm that prior to the colonial 
115 Proponents of private (and also government-owned) property argue that private property results in 
optimal tenure security, improves access to credit and allows owners to capture the benefits from land 
improvements which eventually will encourage more profitable and sustainable use of land (Tucker, 
2004). 
116 This issue has also been discussed in chapter 4, section 4. 
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period native land was not solely communal (Harring, 1996; Mann and Roberts, 
1991). Colonial authorities selectively used rules in support of their position that 
traditional land tenure consisted solely of communal land tenure, including customary 
law (Chanock, 199 1 a; 199 1 b). 
The reality is that in indigenous land tenure systems each category of tenure meets the 
needs of specific community members. Chanock (1991a) describes a community's 
territory as a landscape divided into areas of land used for various purposes and 
managed under different tenures. Each area represents a particular tenure niche, a 
space in which use is governed by a common set of rules. Different niches can be 
identified within a single area, ranging from open access (grazing areas), through 
common property (medicinal field plants), to individual property (small agricultural 
Plots). 117 To phrase it differently, "each person in a community had rights of access to 
the land depending on the specific needs of the person at the time; for example, in any 
given community, a number of persons could each hold a right or bundle of rights 
expressing a specific range offunctions; a village could claim grazing rights over a 
parcel, subject to the hunting rights of another, the transit rights of a third and 
cultivation rights of thefourth " (Nzioki, 2002: 229). 
In order to identify different tenure niches it is crucial to ask who uses the resource 
and on what terms (Bruce, 2000). The legacy of colonialism has made it difficult for 
the San to answer this question for several reasons. First, the traditional rules of land 
allocation have eroded, making it difficult to identify who uses what part of the land 
and for what purpose. The San struggle just to understand what kind of rights they 
have as occupants of communal lands. Secondly, there is evidence of prejudices 
against the San. 118 Other ethnic groups regard the San's traditional use of land 
(hunting and gathering) as backward, a view supported by the Namibian 
government-119 Thirdly, the government is reluctant to recognise alternative forms of 
117 For a more detailed overview of various tenure systems among ethnic groups in Southern Africa, see 
Silitshena (1990). 
118 The forms of discrimination against hunter-gatherers like the San include negative stereotyping of 
their subsistence strategies, denying their basic rights, and segregation. The reasons underlying this 
discrimination are diverse and have been identified by Woodburn (1997) as the political weakness of 
hunter-gatherers, as well as the distorted notions that they are impoverished, backward, uncivilized, 
eaters of revolting food, animal-like, and child-like in their behaviour. 
'19 For a detailed analysis of the San's socio-political and economic status in Namibia, see Suzman 
(2001). 
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social organisation and land holding, and it actively supports modes of subsistence 
that exploit land through 'labour', which is defined as agricultural or pastoral 
(Widlok, 2001). Together with the practice of enclosure, Europe's Enlightenment 
individualism and the idea of independent, self-sufficient farmers were exported to the 
colonies 120 (Lemert, 2002). Namibia's post-colonial government has adopted this 
ideal. Finally, it is common practice in rural Africa that access to land in communal 
areas is dependent on an applicant's location, culture, social status, and use purpose 
(Nelson, 2004), eligibility factors which put the San in a strongly disadvantageous 
position. Both colonial and post-colonial regimes have ignored the rights of former 
hunter-gatherer groups because they do not 'invest' in the land (e. g. by tilling or 
grazing) and because they are politically weak. 
2.1.5 Applying for Individual Land Rights in Communal Areas 
Taking the above criticisms on board could produce a land policy that recognises 
existing customary tenure rather than one which copies Western private property 
rights (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999). Namibia has a policy in place that allows 
people in rural communal areas to register their customary rights for farming, 
residential, or other purposes 121. People can exercise these rights for a limited time -a 
human lifespan. 122 A Chief or the Traditional Authority allocates or cancels 
customary land rights, a decision which has to be approved by the Communal Land 
Board. 123 Apart from these land rights based in customary law, people in communal 
areas can apply for grazing rights and leasehold. The former can be part of customary 
tenure and are allocated by a Chief or the Traditional Authority, while the latter is for 
agricultural or tourism projects and must be approved by the Traditional Authority 
and the Communal Land Board 124 
. The following section (notably 3.1 and 3.2) will 
look more closely at the evolution of traditional authorities and customary law during 
the colonial and post-colonial period, but in this section the focus is on the 
120 In the American colonial context, this became the Jeffersonian ideal of a democracy of yeoman 
farmers. 
12 ' Namibia has also drafted a bill that regulates Flexible Land Tenure in the urban areas. As far as the 
author is aware, this bill still needs approval by the Cabinet (LEAD, 2005). 
122 Joint registration (usually by spouses) is allowed. After the title is expired the land reverts back to 
the Traditional Authority. 
123 For the establishment, functions, and composition of Communal Land Boards, see LAC (2003). 
124 For more details on establishment, functions and compositions of the Communal Land Boards, see 
LAC's (2003) Guide to the Communal Land Reform Act No 5 of2002. 
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effectiveness of existing regulations for the registration of customary land rights in 
order to improve the position of the San. 
So far very few of the San have embraced registration of customary land rights. For 
one thing, the application needs to be done in writing, a task which is problematic for 
the largely illiterate San. Secondly, the application has to go through a Chief which 
puts the San in an awkward position because not all their leaders are recognized as 
Chiefs and in many areas they would have to ask permission of chiefs of other ethnic 
groups who are already dominating them. Finally, some San have argued that the 
maximum size of land right is too small for their needs. Unlike other occupants of 
communal land, the San want to use it for preserving or reintroducing their traditional 
lifestyle and 20 hectares is not sufficient for that purpose. Furthermore, by granting 
customary land rights, more plots will be fenced off in the communal land area which 
will make it even more difficult for the San to gather field foods (occasionally the 
only food available) and medicines. In summary, granting property rights modelled on 
the Western style private property model in the rural communal areas will have a 
disastrous effect on the San's livelihood strategy. Not only is there a risk that they will 
be excluded from the process, other peoples' registration will prevent the San from 
engaging with their way of life (which is usually a mixture of subsistence farming and 
foraging for food and medicines). 
2.1.6 Conclusions 
The Namibian government's ownership and management of communal lands 
represents to some extent a continuation of colonial land policy. As with some other 
Southern African countries, the Namibian government's efforts to address the colonial 
land issue is clearly limited by an institutional legacy of colonial rule (Mamdani, 
2005). By claiming ownership rights over communal land previously seized by 
colonial regimes, the government missed an opportunity to rectify an unlawful land 
seizure. According to Harring: "no modern authority would cite these seizures of 
native land as either legal, or justifying modern Namibian land law; the fact is that 
these land seizures are the modern basis of the idea. that the state 'owns'Crown land, 
and the derivative idea that communally held land is a form of Crown land" (1996: 
469). 
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While the Constitution states in its preamble that it will deal with the injustices of 
colonialism, it does not adequately address the legacy of enclosure. As a result, the 
government's efforts have been of limited benefit, particularly to those who lost most 
in the colonial enclosure, i. e. the San. The San's current weak socio-economic and 
political situation is in many respects the product of the process of enclosure. The 
government's insistence on implementing the post-colonial process of land reform on 
the basis of a Westem-style individual land ownership model or through traditional 
authorities shaped by colonialism (see next section) have both been detrimental for 
the San's prospects for restoration of their rights. While in some of its policies the 
government has attempted to prioritise the landless rural poor as the key beneficiaries 
of land reform, its deliberate blindness with regards to ethnicity has meant that the 
plight of a particularly marginalised minority (the San) has been effectively ignored. 
3 The Transformation of Customary Rights and Traditional 
Decision Making Structures 
3.1 The Emergence of Customary Law in British Colonial Africa 
Customary law is regarded by many as the embodiment of indigenous African legal 
tradition. However it is, as aptly illustrated and researched by Roberts and Mann 
(1991), an institution that epitomises the encounter between colonial authorities and 
African societies. 'European understanding of pre-colonial African systems of law 
and authority and African collaboration with colonial systems of law and government 
led to the invention of tradition in Africa and its foundation in customary law and 
local institutions such as chieftaincy and courts' (Roberts and Mann, 1991: 4). As 
discussed in detail in chapter 8, law as a concept reflects changing economic, social 
and political environments. Consequently, colonialism changed the rules, institutions, 
procedures and meanings of African law (ibid. ). Therefore, the meaning of 
contemporary African law can only be fully understood when examined against the 
background of its history - how did it change, how was it perceived and understood 
by both Africans and colonial powers? Tracing back how rituals, symbols and rules 
were invented will help to understand how Europeans and Africans used law in their 
struggle for control over resources, land, power and authority. Roberts and Mann 
(199 1) have examined this generic process in detail 
125 
, as will 
be summarised below 
125 Other sources of information will be referenced explicitly. 
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as it applied to British colonial Africa 126 . Considering the strong variations in colonial 
history in different parts of Namibia, a more detailed overview of this historic process 
in Namibia is not attempted here 127 . While many 
local variations in colonial rule 
existed at the time, subsequent sections of this chapter will show how this generic 
process in the British colonies in Africa has been of clear relevance to post- 
independence Namibia. 
Prior to colonialism, Europeans and Africans had already established a legal 
relationship through the practice of slave trade. Initially the dealings were limited to 
commercial interaction, but they expanded into areas such as kinship, marriage, 
labour and inheritance. Initially, the Europeans tolerated the African legal system but 
from the moment trade became more intense and prolonged, the balance of power 
between the two parties changed in favour of the Europeans. Industrialisation and 
evangelical beliefs convinced most Europeans not only of the moral superiority of 
their own civilisation, but also that exporting their culture to Africa would be 
beneficial for the Africans. This thinking affected the legal relationship between the 
Africans and Europeans. 
Local legal practices were not further accepted and it was believed that only Western 
legal arrangements could stimulate the growth of trade and civilisation in Africa. 
Local practices had to be replaced with new institutions and authorities to regulate 
dealings with the locals. During the I 9th Century, informal commercial imperialism 
was replaced with formal colonial rule and, eventually, the British Empire introduced 
common law and statutes to its colonies. 
126 While there are obvious differences in the British and French legal system (this also counts for the 
German and Portuguese legal system), in general terms, the construction of customary law is a 
phenomenon that can be found in most of the African colonies regardless whether they were ruled by 
the French, British or Portuguese (Roberts and Mann, 1991; Chanock, 1991a). However, there have 
been differences in the implementation of legal rules. For example, while the indigenous peoples of the 
Portuguese and French colonies could not take their case to a Portuguese or French court, the local 
peoples in the British Crown Colonies could take their disputes to the British courts. In other words, 
while the French and Portuguese operated with different codes and separate courts for French and 
Portuguese nationals, the British Crown applied indigenous law in British courts. 
127 German colonial history brought the complete eradication of local laws in some areas (e. g. through 
genocidal wars against the Herero and the Nama) and left other areas virtually undisturbed; areas north 
of the 'police line' were not colonised or administered by the Germans and this line is still today the 
separation between privately (mainly white) owned commercial farms and communal land. North of 
that police line, where the vast majority of Namibians still live today, colonial rule began in earnest 
under British South African and subsequent Apartheid rule. In addition several areas south of the police 
line were later demarcated as ethnic homelands (for Herero, Damara) under the Apartheid Regime. 
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Partly as the result of colonisation, internal disputes erupted frequently amongst 
indigenous Africans. Indigenous peoples in the British Crown Colonies could go to 
the British Courts to settle their disputes. As a result, the authority of the local rulers 
crumbled. Furthermore, the fact that magistrates and judges in the British Courts were 
supposed to apply indigenous law in their ruling (as long as it was not repugnant to 
justice, equity and good conscience) often led to a situation wherein indigenous law 
was misunderstood by the magistrates and judges of the British Courts. The British 
officials were unfamiliar with local customs. This created an opportunity for litigants 
to present their local customs as they saw fit. Often, these 'constructed' local customs 
were then recorded and published by the British Courts as official customs. 
In the early days of British colonialism, the authorities made great use of the local 
authorities. Simultaneously the authorities were also convinced that they had to 
reform these barbaric institutions until a civilised level was achieved' 
28 
. This 
belief in 
the need for reform was influenced by Maine's (1861) ideology of evolution in 
Ancient Law. Maine developed a theory of the development of law based on an 
evolutionary model that placed all human societies on a scale of development, 
distinguishing between those societies in which legal rights and responsibilities were 
based upon social status and those in which they rested on contractual agreements 
between individuals 129 . 
128 European powers' concern with local laws predates colonial history. From the time of the Roman 
Empire to medieval times, governments and the church were occupied with the great diversity of 
European ethnic communities and regions and subsequently with the diversity of their local laws. 
During those pcriods the ruling powers were already facing the challenge of dealing with local and 
standardised laws. In colonial as well as medieval times, law was ultimately the rules of the dominant 
regime, while customs were the practices of localised subordinate people. The colonial powers argued 
that in modem states ruleg of law were deliberate, reflective and rational. By contrast, in traditional 
societies custom arose firom the opinions and practices of the people like mists from a marsh' (Falk 
Moore, 2000: 14). 
129 This view was shared by other people. For example, Vinogradoff (1925) states that In 
rudimentary unions, in so-called barbaric tribes, even infeudal societies, rules of conduct are usually 
established, not by direct and general commends, but by the gradual consolidation of opinion and 
habits. The historical development of law starts with custom. Rules are not imposedfrom above by 
legislative authorities but rise from below, from the society which comes to recognise them. 
The best 
opportunities for observing the formation and application of custom are presented when primitive 
societies are living their life before the eyes and under the control of more advanced nations 
" (cited in: 
Falk Moore, 2000: 14-15). 
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Pound (1921) developed a similar idea in The Spirit of Common Law. He identified 
four stages in the process of legal evolution, each characterised by a different basis for 
the allocation of liability. The starting point was the idea that primitive societies were 
based on reprisals, private war and blood feud. As a result, the first stage of legal 
evolution was controlling the desire to be avenged. The second stage of law was 
characterised by 'strict law', meaning an inelastic and inflexible formal system of 
rules. The third one was the stage of natural law or the stage wherein rules of equity, 
morality and good conscience became legal duties, while the fourth stage evolved 
around security (Pound, 1921 in Falk Moore, 2000). 
Ideally, the colonial authorities would have liked to reform these primitive blood feud 
institutions. Budgetary constraints made this reform difficult and, consequently, 
colonial authorities had to rule through the 'original' indigenous institutions and 
authorities. However, these so-called indigenous institutions did not resemble the 
indigenous political system. For example, the chiefs that were appointed were not the 
locally recognised chiefs and, furthermore, the chiefs were given more power than 
they ever had under the authentic indigenous system. In places where there were no 
chiefs, they were invented. 
Incorporating indigenous law demanded assistance of liberal anthropologists. The 
locals could be persuaded to contribute by promising them a place or job in the 
administration. This contributed further to the instability on the ground because 
different (ethnic) groups were now more than ever involved in power struggles. As a 
result, more civil conflicts erupted and when they were fought out in Court each 
litigant usually professed a different custom. This led to major difficulties in defining 
what wa s customary law. Although indigenous law may have influenced customary 
law, it was not the same thing. Europeans came to Africa with their own beliefs about 
the Africans and these views have influenced their (legal) policy. However, Africans 
themselves have also contributed to the process of changing their own legal customs. 
The fact that the colonial authorities were governing through indigenous institutions 
gave them the opportunity to reshape customs often influenced by local struggles over 
power and resources. Not all native voices carried the same weight in the discourse 
about custom. Inequalities in power existed and had an impact on the outcome of local 
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conflicts over rules, regulations, procedures and institutions. The official authorities 
had to rely on particular individuals, mainly chiefs, to determine custom. There are 
examples that show that chiefs who cooperated with the colonial powers manipulated 
customary rules to augment the power of the chief. However, pre-colonial Africa did 
not have a single customary authority like the chief, usually it had several authorities 
like age groups, women groups, chiefs, elders etc. (Mamdani, 2005). The colonialist 
regime recognised only one of these authorities, viz. the chiefs. By only 
acknowledging the chiefs as the genuine representation of custom, the colonial 
authorities depicted native custom as something that was unchanging and singular and 
created an authoritarian version of custom (ibid. ). Eventually, in some cases the 
chief s power was characterised by despotic behaviour. 
To summarise "customary law was born of the collaboration of Africans seeking to 
establish new forms of access to resources and labour and Europeans looking for 
local authorities to fill positions generated by their concepts of African societies" 
(Roberts and Mann, 1991: 23). Under this system conflicts over land and resources 
intensified because the conflict was now also about who (amongst the natives) had the 
authority to allocate these resources. While the colonialist regime identified the chiefs 
as the owners or trustees of land who had the capacity and authority to allocate land 
on behalf of the community, in reality tenure arrangements were usually governed 
through a system of kinship (e. g. a family head who was highly respected in the 
community) that was recognised as the primary organising body that governed access 
and use of land (Nzioki, 2002). 
While the system of indirect rule matured, colonial administrators and anthropologists 
began to develop models of African societies that linked the importance of family, 
community and tribe to the collective control of land. Furthermore, these models also 
gave chiefs and elders the power to allocate land. Under stress of potential spread of 
individual ownership amongst the locals, the colonial authorities were worried that 
this trend would undermine the power of the chiefs and started to prohibit land sales 
and restricted individual ownership amongst the local peoples. Instead a tenure form 
of communal ownership was promoted that was allocated by the chiefs and could be 
used individually (usufruct system). Due to agricultural commercial isation, land 
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became increasingly scarce and debates over ownership became linked to debates 
over identity and ethnicity. 
The colonial state made a distinction between race and ethnicity (Mamdani, 2005). 
Non-natives were identified according to their race, while natives belonged to certain 
ethnic groups. Each was ruled by their own legal system. Races were governed 
through 'civilised' law (i. e. common or civil law) because non-natives were civilised. 
Ethnicities were governed through customary law; they did not belong to a civilised 
society and therefore could not be ruled through 'civilised' law. While 'civilised' law 
spoke the language of rights, customary law was based on tradition. The language of 
rights prevented uncontrolled expansion of power; it drew boundaries to control 
power. Customary law, on the other hand, strengthened power. 
After independence this duality of the legal system was reproduced in many African 
countries (Mamdani, 2005). In Namibia, Article 66(l) of the Constitution stipulates 
that both: 'the customary law and the common law ofNamibia inforce on the date of 
Independence shall remain valid to the extent that such customary or common law 
does not conflict with this Constitution or any other statutory law'. Article 66(2) 
articulates that customary, common and statutory law remain concurrently valid 
unless statutory law explicitly stipulates that the equivalent common and customary 
law is repealed. The acceptance of customary law in the Constitution is another 
example where the Constitution is contradicting itself130. Despite Namibia's quest to 
promote the unification and harmonisation of various legal systems, legal pluralism 
remains accepted in the Constitution (Hinz, 2003). 
3.2 Traditional Authorities and Chiefs in Independent Namibia 
The recognition of customary law in the Namibian Constitution also encompasses the 
recognition of Traditional Authorities, although the Constitution does not pay 
attention to the role and function of Traditional Authorities and their relationship with 
130 A similar situation has occurred in South Africa. During the apartheid era, the ANC had declared 
customary authorities as undemocratic. Now that ANC is the ruling party, it has embraced customary 
rules as being part of the tradition (Mamdani, 2005). As a result, post-apartheid South Africa has a dual 
legal structure in the same way as it had during the colonial and apartheid period. 'While the new 
government has de-racialised civil law, civil society and civil rights; it still works with an ethnicized 
'Customary' law enforced hy an ethnicized native authority' (Mamdani, 2005: 275). For a detailed 
overview of the comeback of chieftaincy, custom and culture in South Africa see Oomen (2005) 
248 
other governmental structures (Hinz, 2002). Traditional Authorities are, just like 
customary law, a highly ethnicised institution, while the Namibian government 
pledges to de-ethnicise the nation. 
The importance of the Traditional Authorities 131 in Namibia cannot be 
underestimated. It has been argued (see for example Suzman, 2002) that in Namibia 
the functions and duties of traditional leaders far exceed those of similar bodies in 
many other liberal democracies. This highlights the vital importance for the San to 
have their traditional authorities formally recognised by the state. While some 
anthropologists who have studied the San extensively over many years have 
concluded that San communities '[ ... I make group and individual decisions [ ... ] in a 
society without formal political and juridical institutions [ .. J' (Lee, 1979 cited in 
Hinz, 2003: 75), a member of the Hai//om San community has argued that the San 
have their own distinct forms of leadership and organisation (/Useb, 2000). 
/Useb's description of the history of the Hai//om's leadership structures is to some 
extent similar to the situation as described by Roberts and Mann (1991) i. e. that prior 
to colonisation the role of chiefs was less formal and institutionalised. According to 
the elders of the Hai//om community in the late 1800s each community, which 
consisted of 20 to 30 families staying at the same waterhole, had their own leader 
whom they called ! Ari-aub. He was the hero of the community and did some valuable 
work for the community like lighting the first fire when the community had to move 
to another place within their traditional resource area (koros), usually as a result of the 
changing of seasons (/Useb, 2000). It became necessary to appoint strong leaders 
when other people invaded the land of the Haiflom people. All the married people of 
the community came together and chose the man with the best skills to defend the 
land. It was important that the newly appointed leader knew well the quality, 
boundaries and natural resources of the koros. Whether leadership was based on 
inheritance or appointment, nothing much changed in the decisions making process; it 
13 1 Traditional Authorities and traditional communities are ultimately subject to constitutional and 
statutory law. The two most important Acts detailing the role and functions of Traditional Authorities, 
and by extension the status of traditional communities, are the Traditional Authorities Act (2000), 
which superseded the previous Traditional Authorities Act (1995) in its entirety, and the Council of 
Traditional Leaders Act (1997). Whereas the former outlines the principles for the formation and 
recognition of a traditional authority - and hence a traditional community - the latter sets out the role 
of traditional authorities in state governance (Suzman, 2002) 
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continued to be done by consensus and information was passed on in a very informal 
way, while leaders continued to be treated in the same way as any other person in the 
community. 
Although Lee and [Useb reach a different conclusion, Lee describes a similar 
leadership structure for the Mung community as /Useb has done for the Hai//om. 
Initially the Mung called their leader headman. Lee has enquired to what extent the 
concept of headman was part of the political structure of the Mung and came to the 
conclusion that the concept of headman only entered the view of the Mung when they 
made contact with non-! Kung groups. Lee concludes: 'The changing pattern of 
leadership reveals the existence of two contradictory systems of politics among the 
p 32 San. The old system based on genealogy and Wore ownershi 1 javoured a leader 
who was modest in demeanour, generous to a fault, and egalitarian, and whose 
legitimacy arosefrom long-standing Wore ownership. The new system required a man 
who had to den most of the old virtues. The political arena of district councils, land Y 
boards, and nationalist politics required someone who was male, aggressive, 
articulate, and wise in the ways of the wider world'(cited in (Hinz, 2003: 76). 
Although it is not entirely clear for each of the different San communities in Namibia 
to what extent the leadership structure has changed from being hereditary to one of 
appointment and to what extent this has changed under pressure of non-San peoples, 
one thing is clear: throughout the years the role of San leaders has become 
increasingly formal and has gained in significance and political importance. As a 
result, a leader who was previously seen as equal amongst the others in the social 
organisation of the community is now expected to represent his or her people in 
dealings with the central government. The whole issue of leadership has become 
"' Moresi (plurial for Wore) are named territories without fixed boundaries. Usually important 
resources can be found on Moresi, such as permanent and semi-permanent waterholes or highly valued 
food or medicines. Individual rights to residence within a Wore, and to use its resources, are inherited 
directly from both parents and ownership of a Wore is only recognised if kinship can be demonstrated. 
As such, ownership of a Wore is exclusive to a group related through kinship who manage the 
resources communally. Ownership cannot be transferred to non-kin or outsiders, although outsiders are 
allowed to reside within a Wore for a prolonged period of time with permission of the recognised 
owners (for example, this happens in periods of drought). An individual chooses in adulthood which of 
their parents' Wore they wish to claim as their own. When that person gets married to someone from 
outside the Wore, that person gains rights of access and resource use to a second Wore. In this sense, 
kinship networks underpin an individual's rights to land and resources (source: Sullivan and 
Homewood, 2004). 
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increasingly politicised 133 for two reasons. First, the San who are poorly represented 
in the forinal bodies of government see in the recognition of the traditional leaders a 
possibility to gain basic participatory rights in important decisions such as securing 
land rights (Suzman, 2002). Second, in recent years the power of the chiefs has not 
only gained in importance, but has also extended to new areas such as land and 
natural resource management (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and Van Dijk, 1999). 
Especially, NGOs have turned chieftainship into a new almost entrepreneurial 
domain. Previously, chieftaincy was associated with nostalgic claims to authentic 
ritual power. Under the influence of the NGOs' agenda of promoting sustainability, 
resource management and environmental awareness, chieftaincy is now much more 
defined in terms of real political power and brokerage. 
3.3 Discussion 
In short, there are many reasons why the demands for land rights of the San are not 
fulfilled. Although after independence the Namibian state promised civil and equal 
rights to all Namibian citizens, the San are still struggling to gain recognition as equal 
Namibian citizens. Both local and state led prejudices continue to label the San as a 
people who are not making appropriate use of the land, a vision that is similar to early 
colonialist thinking. There is widespread bias against the San modes of subsistence; 
the only acceptable way of exploiting land is through pastoralism or agriculture and 
alternative forms of social organisation and land holding are not recognised. The new 
Namibia's land policy bears some resemblance to the legacy of colonial (ethnic- 
based) land distribution, i. e. linking access to land to power relations. These power 
relations existed, and continue to exist, on different levels, viz. between the colonised 
and colonisers, between common law and customary law, and between local chiefs 
amongst themselves. Any successful land reform policy has to unravel these 
relationships. 
It remains to be seen whether in the longer run customary law will pose a real threat 
or provide a tool to support rural democratisation (Ribot and Oyono, 2005) and 
"' Local Informants argue that in all likelihood chief Sofia will be recognised because she supports 
SWAPO, while chief Langman's recognition will be very problematic because he is a supporter of 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). At the moment, only the San chiefs that arc member of 
SWAPO, the ruling party, have been officially recognised by the government as chief (for more 
details 
see Harring and Odendaal, 2006). 
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emancipation of subjugated peoples like the San. As discussed in chapter 8, this will 
mainly depend on, first, rediscovering customary law in the daily social practice of 
indigenous peoples and, second, integrating customary law or informal law in 
common law or formal law. 
Whether customary law can be used for law reform processes such as land reform or 
as a means to protect indigenous culture, is another open question. As explained in 
chapter 8, one step in the right direction is to define both Western and customary law 
as 'fluid', 'relational' and 'negotiable' systems that are linked to ever changing social 
and political relations. It would be wrong to perceive customary law as a form of law 
that is fixed in time and location. Instead, just like Western law, customary law shapes 
and has been shaped by economic, political and social processes. Therefore law can 
be used as a mirror for looking into society's power relations. As Oomen (2005) 
argues, law can give us Foucauldian insights: Power emanates in many places, and it 
is in discourse thatpower and knowledge arejoined together to create - in this case - 
legal - subjects, categories, divisions. As such, law not only mirrors and creates 
power relations but also makesfor meanings and understandings of identity' (Oomen, 
2005: 22). 
The theoretical insight that law is an institution that gives meaning to identity has 
been discussed in detail in chapter 8 (section 3.2), but this issue will be further 
examined from a practical angle when the next questions of this chapter will be 
further explored, viz. what can indigenous peoples do to regain their rights over land? 
on what basis can indigenous peoples claim entitlements to land, resources and 
knowledge? should they use a strategy that is based on native title claims, moral or 
rights claims? 
4 Validating Land Claims 
4.1 Native Title Claims 
Native title is a sui generis proprietary interest in land recognised in common law 
134 135 
jurisdictions such as Australia , Canada , the United States and New Zealand. The 
134 For Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders an important step towards rights over land was 
taken with the Australian High Court's decision in the Mabo case of 1992, which overturned the terra 
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Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor and Another 136 was the first case to 
consider whether aboriginal title is part of South African law (01gen, 2002). In 
Richtersveld native title claim was dismissed on the basis that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to award restitution of a right to land not recognized under the Restitution 
Act. 137 The doctrine of native title is appealing to indigenous people in Southern 
Africa because it would legitimise their rights over land they occupied prior to 
colonisation. However, the arguments that have been used in Australia and Canada for 
claiming back ancestral land cannot easily be made in Southern Africa. Native title 
claims are based on a historical membership in a particular tribe or kingdom. In a 
country still recovering from apartheid and where tribal groups have been uprooted 
many times, it is argued that native title claims will unnecessarily awaken or worsen 
nullius principle. Although in the decision it was declared that the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty 
could not be challenged in a court, the decision established that native title could be claimed over 
unappropriated Crown lands. As a result of the Mabo judgment - which, some have argued, was far 
more conservative than both the debate over its implications and subsequent development have 
suggested - native title exists only where there is an Aboriginal group that has maintained its 
connection with traditional lands. The group has to be able to prove that it is looking after its land, 
discharging obligations under traditional law, and enjoying as far as is practicable the traditional rights 
of use and occupation (Brennan, 1995 in Keal, 2003: 124). In spite of being limited in this way, the 
recognition of native title in the Mabo judgment was, for Australian indigenous peoples, a milestone in 
the recovery of identity and rights. Following Mabo the Federal Government enacted the Native Title 
Act in 1993, which was intended to be the judicial framework for claims to native title. For Aborigines 
and Torres Strait Islanders it was a bitter disappointment. It legitimised past dispossession without 
compensation and placed tight restrictions on what could be claimed (Keal, 2003). In 1996 a new 
conservative Coalition government came to power. A few months later, in the Wik case, the High Court 
ruled that pastoral leases do not necessarily extinguish native title. The Native Title Amendment Act 
that followed further weakened native title (ibid. ). For more information on Mabo, Wik and native title 
see for example Butt et al. (2001); Mantziaris and Martin (2000) and Glaskin (2003). "' In Canada the case comparative to Mabo was the Calder case (1973) concerning the claim of the 
Nisga'a First Nation to traditional lands in the Nass Valley in North-westem British Columbia. The 
Supreme Court recognised native title, but it was not until April 2000 that an agreement between the 
Nisga'a and the governments of Canada and British Columbia finally came into force. The outcome of 
this agreement was that though the Nisga'a agreed to give up native title to ninety percent of their 
traditional lands, the Court recognised the supreme power of the Nisga'a legislature to make laws 
concerning the constitution, citizenship, culture, language and the management of the lands of the 
Nisga's First Nations (Kea], 2003). Further important Canadian cases were Sparrow vs. the Queen 
(1990) and Delgamuukw vs. British Columbia (1997). The latter case is of particular importance 
because it gave, as no other court has done previously, the meaning of native title, i. e. full proprietorial 
rights including ownership of sub-surface minerals and the right of native owners to develop traditional 
lands in non-traditional ways (ibid. ) 
136 In Richtersveld the Richtersveld people, comprising the inhabitants of four villages in the Northern C, 
Cape Province, claimed aboriginal title to land that is the site of diamond mining operations by Alexkor 
Limited, a public company that owns the land and holds surface and sub-surface mineral rights. The 
Richtersveld people alleged dispossession of a portion of the land after 19 June 1913 by a series of 
racially discriminatory legislative and executive acts. They sought restitution of three alternative rights 
in land based on the doctrine of native title: ownership, exclusive beneficial occupation and use for 
specified purposes, and beneficial occupation of the land for a longer period than 10 years prior to 
dispossession (Olgen, 2002). 
137 Olgen (2002), on the other hand, argues that the conceptual framework of the Restitution Act does 
recognize the principle of native title. 
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destructive ethnic and racial politics- an argument eagerly put forward by Southern 
Africa's governments. 138 
However, international law does recognize native title. The 1994 UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that there is opinio iuris (conviction that the 
practice is obligatory) to recognize aboriginal title. Considering the fact that South 
Africa and Namibia accept in their Constitutions the application of international law, 
it can be argued that they should recognise native title claims, a vision shared by legal 
commentators in both nations (Tjombe, 2001). Bennett and Powell (1999) have 
argued that in the context of Southern Africa it might be better for indigenous peoples 
to invoke native title in international law rather than in national common law because 
the latter was responsible for their land dispossession. In order for the doctrine of 
native title to be applicable, according to international law, the concept of native title 
claims has to be recognised in at least one of the three accepted sources of 
international law which are treaty, custom and the general principles of law as 
recognised by 'civilised' nations (Bennett and Powell, 1999) 139 . 
In terms of treaty, in addition to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (1994) (see above), the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Populations Conventions 
107 140 (1957) and 169 141 (1989) recognise the principle of native title 
142 
. Even though 
Namibia is not a signatory party of the conventions, they highlight an emerging 
consensus on the doctrine as an indication of state practice and opinio iuris 
(conviction that the practice is obligatory). 
With regards to custom, international legal theory splits the requirement of custom 
into two elements, viz. a state practice and opinio iuris. Legislation, court decisions 
138 For example, large parts of South Africa could be subject to overlapping and competing claims 
where pieces of land have been occupied in succession by San, Khoi, Xhosa, Mfengu, Trekkers, and 
British people (Olgen, 2002). 
139 In order to avoid repetitive referencing, the description of what entails treaty, custom and the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations is based on the writings of (Bennett and 
Powell, 1999). 
140 ILO Convention 107 has been ratified, as per January 2006, by 18 member states. 
141 1 LO Convention 169 has been ratified, as per January 2006, by 17 member states. 
142 For example, ILO Convention 169 states in Article 14.2: Governments shall take steps as necessary 
to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupied, and to guarantee effective 
protection of their rights of ownership and possession and 
in Article 14.3: Adequate procedures shall be 
established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned. 
254 
and the writings of the most highly qualified legal publicists provide evidence for 
state practice and opinio iuris. The state practice of executive or legislative 
recognition of aboriginal title can be explicit (for example, the Constitution can 
protect the land rights of indigenous peoples - which is the case in Canada, Brazil, 
Panama, Guatemala, Peru and the Philippines) or the rights might be guaranteed by a 
treaty (for example, in the United States and Norway) or by local legislation (for 
example, Ecuador, New Zealand and Venezuela). Further evidence of state practice 
can also be found in the decisions of municipal courts (for example, Mabo v 
Queensland). On their own, the above activities are not sufficient to constitute 
international custom. However, when taken in combination with opinio iuris and the 
ILO Conventions on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, altogether they demonstrate a 
consensus that native title is a rule of customary international law. 
With regards to the last category, the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations, native title has been perceived as a principle recognised by the world's main 
legal systems (which are the legal systems of the former colonial states with surviving 
indigenous peoples), and therefore forms part of international law. Especially, the 
writings of legal theorists can shed more light on this. Contemporary legal scholars 
trace native title back to the writings of 16'h Century legal scholars and in particular 
the terra nufflus principle which dates from ancient Roman law. 
To recapitulate, terra nullius allowed occupation of new territory only when it was 
uninhabited. The crucial question was whether territory occupied by tribal peoples 
was uninhabited. According to Victoria, and later Grotius, whenever people had a 
social organisation their territory could not be considered terra nullius. Whether 
indigenous peoples' society fulfilled this criterion remained an open question until the 
143 Western Sahara case , some three hundred years later. In the second half of the 18th 
113 The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the Government of 
Morocco and the Polisario Front, an organisation seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan 
Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the Western Sahara after Spain 
withdrew from the area in 1975, and extended its administration over the southern province of Oued 
Ed-Dahab after Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has undertaken a 
sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara as part of its long-term efforts to 
strengthen Moroccan claims to the territory. Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims 
of Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently 
from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment to the area of a U. N. peacekeeping contingent, 
known by its French initials, MINURSO. In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory 
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Century the legal scholar, Wollf, was more precise about the requirements of social 
organisation and argued that single families and nomadic tribes had rights in the land 
they inhabited. These rights could not be seized, not even by a just war. Vattel, on the 
other hand, argued that, nature obliged all humans to cultivate the soil; therefore 
seizing the land from peoples who lived by hunting or gathering was perfectly 
acceptable. Today the relevance of this earlier writings about terra nullius is 
embedded in the Western Sahara case which supports the earlier interpretations of the 
concept of terra nullius, and more specifically those of Victoria, Grotius and Wolff, 
i. e. whenever territory is inhabited by a people it cannot be terra nullius. Furthermore, 
the Western Sahara case acknowledged that indigenous peoples were bearers of 
certain rights, including property rights. 
4.1.1 Native Title and the San: From Civilized to Sociall Or anised .Yg 
At first sight it would appear that the San fulfil at least some of the requirements for 
native title claims. Although, as mentioned, the validity of indigenous land rights 
remains an open question in Namibian law, Judge Mahomed indicated in the 
Rehoboth Baster 144 appeal that the principles set out in Mabo might hold in Namibia 
on the basis that the decision did not focus on Australian law, but instead discussed 
indigenous rights under the pretext of common law principles. Since common law 
recognizes native title (common law is operant in Namibia [see section 4.2 of chapter 
8] as the result of the British occupation in 1915) and indigenous land title is 
inextinguishable by colonial powers (Western Sahara case), it is likely that the San 
can dispute South Africa's original title which was transferred to the Namibian 
government (Harring, 2002). However, presenting a case of native title will require 
extensive anthropological and historical evidence to Prove that neither Germany nor 
South Africa ever held title to the communal land. 
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while some of the region's tribes had 
historical ties to Morocco, the ties were insufficient to establish "any tie of territorial sovereignty" 
between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added that it had not found 
'legal ties' that might affect the applicable U. N. General Assembly resolution regarding the 
decolonisation of the territory, and, in particular, the principle of self-determination for its people. 
144 The members of the Rehoboth Baster community are descendants of indigenous Khoi and Afrikaans 
settlers who originally lived in the Cape, but moved to their recent territory in 1872. In the Rehoboth 
Baster Case the Court recognised the Rehoboth Basters as a people in their own right, but the High 
Court rejected the Community's claim to communal property. The Supreme Court rejected the 
Rehoboth Basters' appeal. 
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The requirements for native title which indigenous peoples have to meet have evolved 
from a civilization to a social organisation requirement (Chan, 1997). Until the 20 th 
Century, indigenous peoples had to give evidence of having a civilized legal system in 
place so courts could establish that the claimants were capable of holding title. 
Indigenous peoples who failed the civilization test simply did not exist before the law. 
For example, in Re Southern Rhodesia, the Privy Council dismissed land claims of the 
Ndebele as irreconcilable with the legal ideas of a civilized society. In recent common 
law jurisprudence (the Mabo and Western Sahara cases), the legally recognized 
identity of an indigenous group is no longer linked with the civilization requirement. 
A proof of social organisation is now put forward as the decisive factor for native title 
claims. 
As illustrated by Chan (1997), today, the first step in a native title claim is to show 
that the indigenous group has its own socio-political structure. In practice this means 
that it meets the following criteria: community identity, permanence, exclusivity, and 
a pronounced relationship to the land. Some legal scholars have argued that the new 
requirement, although an improvement, still uses a Western legal yardstick of social 
structure. However, there has been a shift. For example, it is no longer acceptable that 
only Western scholars or judges decide whether or not indigenous peoples conform to 
the ideas of social organisation. Instead, that decision is now left to indigenous 
peoples themselves: the group itself must believe that they have a social structure and 
a relationship with the land, that they adhere to it, and most importantly, that others 
recognise the group's coherence. 
Based on the above, it can be argued that in order to secure a native land claim, the 
San have to provide evidence of their relationship to a particular piece of land and 
their position as an autonomous group with their own identity vis-A-vis other groups. 
Bishop (1998) has already done this exercise for the San in Botswana and came to the 
conclusion that the San can provide sufficient evidence of their continued use and 
occupation of the Kalahari in order to comply with the requirements of native title. 
However, she suggests that the common law terminology of 'land tenure' might 
unnecessarily cause further complications for the claim because it cannot be assumed 
that San use conforms to the common law concept of tenure. Instead, she suggests 
using evidence of the San's territoriality; it captures the holistic system of land use 
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and occupancy by the San. The term is not frozen, i. e. it does not refer to a specific 
era of occupation; instead it is inclusive of adaptations to modem circumstances. 
Furthermore, territoriality captures the identification of various San Woresi and 
includes the rules associated with their use and tenancy. 
Territoriality opens a new domain of research questions. On what basis can 
indigenous peoples claim entitlements to land: moral claims or historical connections 
and customary practices? A case study of the Khwe San in the West Caprivi will be 
used to answer this question (for more details on the Khwe see Appendix 1). 
4.1.2 Khwe San Land Claims 
The Khwe San of the West Caprivi use a multi-layered strategy in their quest for 
economic and political autonomy. Rights over land in the West Caprivi are linked to 
settlement history, colonial influences, neighbourly relationships, ethnic identity, 
recognition of traditional leaders, and economic survival. The main tool the Khwe are 
using in order to secure access to land is identity. They represent themselves as a 
cohesive and distinct ethnic group in anticipation that this will give them a legitimate 
identity in national, regional, and global venues. 
Besides claiming a special relationship to the land, the Khwe use their language, 
hunting with bow and arrow, and food gathering as evidence of an authentic tradition. 
Orth noted that for the Khwe "the importance of tradition was not to befound in their 
content, but rather in the difference between the Khwe [way] of doing things and 
those of other peoples, especially the Mbukushu " (2003: 145). She has interpreted this 
expression of difference by the Khwe as a sign of the need to express their own 
identity in order to survive the threat of subordination posed by the Mbukushu, who 
perceive them as a sub-group of their tribe. The government does not recognise the 
Khwe's authority structure and as a result the Khwe fall under the leadership of the 
Mbukushu king who denies the Khwe access to their ancestral land. 
An example of re-traditionalisation as a cultural survival strategy is exemplified in the 
Khwe revival of hunting. Even though hunting is forbidden because of the game park 
status of the West Caprivi, the Khwe emphasise hunting with bow and arrow as a 
main feature of their heritage. As one Khwe (based in the Omega camp) testified: "Ihe 
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wild animals are our cattle, the cattle of Albukushu are destroying the natural 
resources, they are killing the wild animals, these Bantus create problems for us 
Khwe " (31 August 2005). Orth concludes that the Khwe are using a strategy that 
promotes their identity as Khwe at the local level, as San at the regional level, and as 
indigenous at the global level. 
Khwe land claims focus on a connection to their use of land. However, this discourse 
is often based on an unrealistic expectation of indigeneity. Native title claim is a 
process that remains embedded in a colonial frame of reference. For example, non- 
indigenous peoples often define tradition in a narrow and restricted way (for more 
details see chapter 2). Indigenous culture, according to them, is expressed through the 
use of traditional language, stories, places, ritual practices, and kinship ties. Thus, 
native title claims are driven to represent the past as frozen, while ignoring that they 
are part of a complex process of transformation and continuity. As a result, indigenous 
peoples are required to internalise the non-indigenous (i. e. colonialist) understanding 
of tradition and authenticity in their strategy to gain land rights. 
There are problems with defining indigeneity in this narrow sense, as exemplified by 
Chennells' reflection on the success of the JKhomani San land claim that he 
represented in 1999: "The San are now landowners. They'll have to train people to do 
the tracking and all those things to fill that space. But probably the most major 
challenge is trying to make the myth that we've actually created in order to win the 
land claim now become a reality. It is the myth that there is a community of 
JKhomani San. At the moment there is no such thing (emphasis by author). We have 
to try and find a way of helping the JKhomani understand what is means to be 
JKhomani" (cited in Robins, 2001: 840; 2003: 277-78). 
In order to win this land claim, the San in South Africa conformed to the expectations 
of donors and governments and engaged with a strategic narrative of community 
solidarity, social cohesion, and cultural continuity. However, after winning the land 
claim, the community fell into social fragmentation and intra-community conflict 14S . 
145 Some of the tKhomani community members complained to the South African Human Rights 
Commission when one of the community members was murdered (it was claimed by the community 
that this person was murdered by the police, the Human Rights Commission has not denied this claim 
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4.1.3 Idealisation of Indigenei 
The criteria for indigenous status in native title claims enforce an engagement with 
'primordialist' and 'essentialist' concepts of culture. Indigeneity is fixed in time and 
place and is not socio-economically and historically contextualised. This strategy can 
lead to the exclusion of indigenous peoples who have lost connections with their 
ancestral lands. For example, Canadian and US courts "have rendered land claims 
invalid when plaintiffs do not appear Native enough" (Thorpe, 2005: 7). Sylvain 
(2002) gives the example of the Omaheke San 
146 who have been a landless underclass 
of farm workers for generations and as a result have been incorporated into an 
ethnically hierarchical class system. For the non-San in Namibia there are no 
authentic San in the Omaheke anymore; they no longer hunt and gather and therefore 
have lost their cultural identity. The Omaheke San, on the other hand, do not consider 
themselves to be non-authentic. To them, being San means being able to cope with 
continuing experiences of exploitation. The Omaheke San express a class-shaped 
conception of territorial identity. However, global discourse expects indigenous 
peoples to represent themselves as being internally undivided and untouched by 
history. While indigenous peoples are expected to represent land struggles in terms of 
this idealised traditional cultural identity, in reality, as Sylvain argues, land rights are 
tools to obtain contemporary social and economic justice: "the Omaheke San are also 
seeking land rights, but they are not trying to restore a hunting and gathering lifestyle 
or regain an evolutionar heritage; rather, they are struggling for access to y 
development, resources for better work conditions, andfor political representation 
(2002: 1080). 
in its fact finding report). The Human Rights Commission started an inquiry in 2004 and addressed a 
complex and intertwined set of challenges around relationships, cooperative governance, just 
administrative action, capacity-building and sustainable development. One of the key issues that 
emerged during the inquiry was that 1) there is a serious division within the community, particularly 
between the original claimants and those that joined the land claim; 2) the community is very close to 
splitting up and 3) that the problems in the community are exacerbated by the involvement of other 
players (for more details see South African Human Rights Commission report on the Inquiry into 
Human Rights Violations in the JKhomani San Community, 2004). 
146 Beginning in 1914, large tracts of the Omaheke region were set aside as reserve lands for the 
Hereros and Tswanas. The reserves became apartheid homelands in the 1970s, and after Namibian 
independence they became communal areas. These areas comprise about 35 per cent of land area in the 
Omaheke. The remaining 65 per cent is a 'commercial farming block' dominated by Afrikaner and 
German cattle ranchers 
0 
who occupy 900 farms averaging about 7,000 hectares. No land in the 
Omaheke was set aside for the San (Sylvain, 2002). 
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Although the San have a strong case to claim native title over their ancestral land, 
Suzman has argued that the fate of the Hai//om with regard to their claims over Etosha 
"ultimately rests on the government's appreciation of their particular predicament of 
landless underclass and willingness to prioritise them and other San in the land 
reform process" (2004: 222). Questions can be raised about the continued use of the 
native title claim as an 'enforced' strategy. Instead, approaches that are infused with 
current socio-economic realities might better reflect the needs of present indigenous 
peoples. For example, a land rights strategy based on compensation for past injustices 
and discrimination could be a valid alternative. However, while native title claims are 
clearly embedded in a legal framework, gaining land rights as compensation for past 
injustices and discrimination is still only theoretical. However, van MeijI argues in his 
case study on the redistribution of property rights to the Maori that the main issue at 
stake in any debate about redistributing property rights to indigenous peoples is the 
point of departure for the negotiations: is it "historicaliustice based in the restitution 
of property rights that were dispossessed in the nineteenth century or [is it] social 
justice on the basis ofcontemporary concerns about [ ... ]poverty" (2006: 171)? 
Normative arguments such as the concept of terra nullius that justified colonial 
acquisition of territory, are biased against the political and social organisation of 
indigenous peoples. These biases, according to Tully (1994), influence the current 
debate about native title claims and form the basis against which native title claims 
are judged. Contemporary property theory does not recognize the sovereignty of 
indigenous peoples; neither does it approve of indigenous tenure systems (see chapter 
4). Both Dodds (1998) and Tully (1994) argue that it will be difficult to respond 
appropriately to compensatory demands for justice with regard to indigenous land 
claims as long as Western-based property theory is used to judge them. Tully suggests 
that it is important to assess land claims on the basis of historical practices of 
injustice, and whether or not these practices continue to exist. As such, an alternative 
framework for claiming property rights needs to be explored. In the next part, it will 
be examined whether a broader rights-based approach could offer a better alternative 
to the strategy of native title claims. 
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4.2 Human Rights Framework 
While native title claims are clearly linked to an 'essentialised' indigenous identity, 
not only anthropologists (see for example Sylvain, 2002; Robins, 2001; 2003) but the 
San themselves (see Appendix 2) have repeatedly argued that they want to become 
equal citizens. Under the post-apartheid Constitution, all Narnibians should be equal. 
However, native title claims that require the projection of an essentialist and 
primordial identity and relationship to land might prevent the aspiration of the San to 
become equal citizens in Namibia. Therefore a more generalist rights discourse might 
be a better tool for the San to advance their land claims on the political agenda. A 
broader rights discourse that includes social and economic rights would lead to new 
and different claims relating to land (Hellum and Derman, 2004). For one thing the 
claims would be more contextualised and embedded in the daily socio-economic 
reality of the San. 
A widened vision of rights (i. e. more widely defined as going back to a traditional 
way of life) would open up the debate and could easily include demands of rights to 
livelihood, equal protection of tenure and access to resettlement land for the San. 
Hellum and Derman (2004) show in their paper that property rights are part of a 
general right to a decent standard of living, life and dignity. As such, human rights are 
more defined as a holistic concept, wherein property rights are linked to the 
realisation of broader social and economic rights. 
According to Hellum. and Derman (2004), any land reform programme should be both 
equitable and economically sustainable. In practice this means that any land reform 
programme should include the three pillars of human rights, namely, civil and 
political rights (for example, the right to participate, the right to protect bodily 
integrity and property and the right to equality and non-discrimination); social, 
cultural and economic rights (for example, right to health, food, water and livelihood) 
and solidarity rights (for example, right to development and to live in a healthy 
environment). Some of these requirements are already embedded in the most 
important human rights instruments (see Appendix 4). 
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At first sight, it seems that the San could potentially use a whole area of international 
and regional African human rights instruments in their battle for land rights. 
According to Hellurn and Derman (2004), these human rights instruments are 
particularly appropriate because they are designed to protect social justice and go 
beyond the sole protection of individual property. These instruments acknowledge 
that property rights are far broader than exclusive private ownership; they include a 
bundle of rights to use land and its resources in a way that can support the livelihood 
strategies of indigenous peoples. However, as already mentioned in the introduction, 
these instruments need to be implemented by the state and, as the case study of the 
San indicates, this has not yet happened in Namibia. 
In their campaigns for recognition, indigenous peoples are increasingly making use of 
an international political platform, such as a human rights framework, to influence 
national decision-makers. Keck and Sikkink (1998) call this the 'boomerang strategy'. 
It can be helpful in states where the input of indigenous peoples in the political and 
judiciary process is very limited and where governments are dependent on 
international support to advance development projects. In this scenario, indigenous 
groups make appeals to other nations and to NGOs which then put pressure on their 
recalcitrant national governments. However, this strategy underscores a dilemma that 
many indigenous peoples face; in order to gain access to an effective platform to 
voice their concerns, they have to engage in a discourse that is not embedded in their 
daily reality. In addition to appeals to the international platform and use of the 
boomerang strategy, there is a third way for indigenous peoples to achieve recognition 
for their land claims, viz. social movement action in the form of local grass-root 
mobilisation; an issue that will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
4.3 Local Grass-Root Mobilisation 
In recent years, social movement action in the form of an international grass-roots 
mobilisation has been a popular strategy for indigenous peoples. Scholars like Brysk 
(1996; 2000) have argued that the fate of social movements in general, and indigenous 
peoples in particular, now depends on the establishment of a transnational civil 
society that is capable of encouraging international solidarity. However, as illustrated 
in this chapter, against this background of globalism, internationalism and 
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cosmopolitanism, the nation-state continues to be a critical player in the process of 
modifying the economic, political and socio-cultural position of subordinated groups. 
This is not to argue that indigenous peoples should be discouraged from pursuing an 
international strategy, but as Otero (2004a; 2004b) argues, subordinated groups (like 
indigenous peoples) will only be able to influence domestic state politics and 
interventions in their favour when these groups organise themselves politically at the 
local level. Castree (2004) calls this approach 'situational pragmatism' and he argues 
that contemporary efforts to defend territories, resources, knowledges and cultural 
artefacts can be perfectly embedded in the local without sliding into a 'xenophobic 
particularism'; the latter is often used as an argument by some for rejecting a local 
approach. 
Based on observations of indigenous peoples' struggles in Latin America, Otero and 
Jugenitz (2003) and Otero (2004a; 2004b) argue that a political theory of class 
formation with a bottom-up linkage approach, offers a better strategy for indigenous 
peoples than a globalist strategy. Indigenous peoples must be able to mobilise 
themselves from below, hence the need for a theoretical and practical bottom-up 
approach. In terms of indigenous mobilisation in Latin America, Otero (2004a) has 
observed two approaches. The first is based on the attempt to reassert class as a 
political determinant; the other, in contrast, is part of a new social movement and uses 
identity, rather than class, as the prime factor for mobilisation. However, Otero 
(2004a) argues that there are problems with both concepts. While the first approach is 
(too much of) a continuation of traditional Marxism, the second approach does not 
sufficiently target local politics. Otero (2004a) claims that a theory of political-class 
formation would provide a better understanding of how subordinated groups should 
organise themselves because, first, both class and identity would serve as constitutive 
parts and, second, inspired by Gramsci's (1971) insights about civil society, political- 
class formation would create the optimal framework for understanding the dynamics 
between civil society and the state. 
In this respect, political-class formation becomes a particular attractive option for 
indigenous peoples in their struggle for recognition. Especially, the link with 
Grarnsci's theory that civil society is the arena between the state and the market 
wherein ideological hegemony can be contested, offers some scope for better targeted 
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campaigns by indigenous peoples. Although Gramsci's ideas about civil society have 
long been used to organise resistance to colonialism and post-colonialism, as Lewis 
(2002) illustrates, some scholars still question the relevance of the transfer of civil 
society - which historically was mainly a Western concept - to other (non-Western) 
political and cultural settings. As a counter argument, some have suggested that the 
concept of civil society can - when transferred to other cultural settings - take on 
local and different meanings, while others have implied that the idea of civil society 
has for a long time been implicated in Africa's colonial histories of domination and 
resistance. 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1999 in Lewis, 2002) offer a useful insight when they argue 
that while a Eurocentric approach to civil society is rather narrowly defined in the 
institutional arena, recognising a local counterpart of civil society opens up a new 
terrain of action that highlights the potential of kin-based and ethnic organisations in 
helping to form public opinions and political pressure groups. Widening the concept 
of civil society to include kinship, will be problematic for those scholars (see e. g. 
Gellner, 1995 in Lewis, 2002) who still define civil society according to Hegel's 
conception in which the domestic sphere of family and household is explicitly 
excluded from civil society. However, within the context of this chapter, it is argued 
that a culturally varied type of civil society that organises social activities and 
mobilisation at a micro-level will be more useful for some indigenous peoples, like 
the San, than the current strategy of focusing on high levels of international rhetoric, 
abstraction and a-historical generalisation. For one thing, social mobilisation 
organised at the micro level is a natural continuation of their kinship-based social 
organisation. 
Hearn (2001) argues that concentrating on the lowest possible level of social 
mobilisation (which could be kinship) allows the possibility of operating outside the 
formal realms of law. As demonstrated in this chapter, this strategy might be 
particularly useful given the fact that the current legal regime in Namibia (a) does not 
recognise the San as equal citizens with the same rights and duties as other Namibians 
even though they are equal before the law and (b) does very little to alleviate the 
poverty of the San which was, in the first place, created by outsiders. In this sense, the 
concept of civil society at the micro level becomes not only a theoretical concept, but 
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above all a pragmatic act that indigenous peoples like the San can use to create a more 
supportive and socio-economically sound environment at the local and national level. 
While the debate about how to protect indigenous peoples' resources, land and 
knowledge has so far been heavily influenced by concepts of 'belonging' and 
'identity', it is argued in this chapter that this approach has led to essentialised policy 
prescriptions. Therefore, it is suggested that the central focus of this debate should 
shift to issues of 'scale' which links targeted micro-level actions with more national 
and international approaches. When von Benda-Beckman's et al. (2006) make a 
distinction between categorical fformal') and concretised (InformalVdaily reality) 
property relations (see chapter 5) this is mainly a distinction of scale. The prime 
example in this chapter is that of the state's (formal and top-down) approach to 
communal and individual land ownership, which has been demonstrated to be clearly 
at odds with the daily needs and enacted livelihood strategies of the San family groups 
and communities. 
Highlighting the importance of the local scale is also consistent with the starting point 
of this chapter, that territoriality may in fact be a more useful concept to guide the 
debate about traditional knowledge and how to protect it than intellectual property 
rights. To quote Greene, territoriality encourages "a stronger sense of political 
integrity and consistency for indigenous peoples, challenging them to (setf-) 
determine what should and should not be considered a resource and what should or 
should not become accessible to market concepts ofproperty and commercialisation, 
hence also a methodfor preserving the values associated with local cultures " (2002: 
245). 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored continuities between the enclosure of the land of indigenous 
peoples under colonial and post-colonial regimes. Taking the Namibian San as an 
example, it can be argued that current indigenous concepts of land tenure represent 
centuries of assimilation, subordination, and cultural loss, rather than pristine cultural 
and socio-economic practices of pre-colonial eras. Just like other indigenous peoples, 
the San have started to wield their indigeneity as a basis for claiming restitution of 
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alienated property. Emphasising a special relationship to land has become their main 
weapon. 
The argument that indigenous peoples should claim property rights over land on the 
basis of their culture is based on the erroneous assumption that traditional 
communities are homogenous (see e. g. Appendix 5) and can be represented with one 
voice. Where society once enforced assimilation on indigenous peoples, it now 
enforces re-traditionalisation. With regard to native title claims, it is a continuation of 
a trend that requires indigenous peoples to link their relationship with land to concepts 
of identity, culture, and personhood. However, underlying power relations continue to 
derail land reform processes. 
The tradition of cultural exchanges of indigenous peoples with neighbouring groups 
was severely distorted by the particular power asymmetry that developed under 
colonialism, an imbalance that continued in the post-colonial period and has been 
intensified by the forces of globalisation at work today. In order for land reform to 
succeed, land reform and reconfiguration of the received legal model of individualised 
property rights need to come to terms with the historic subordination and domination 
of indigenous peoples. 
The colonial enclosures continue to bear on the living conditions of indigenous 
peoples today. Even after decolonialisation, some new national governments ratified 
the colonial appropriations of land and in some cases extended them. The 
maintenance of indigenous land-tenure systems is a fundamental component of 
indigenous peoples' livelihood strategy and cultural survival. Nevertheless, despite 
the growing international recognition of indigenous rights, national states and other 
ethnic groups continue to enclose indigenous peoples' land. 
So far, to put it bluntly, law has been used to create an underclass, i. e. legal subjects 
subordinated by more powerful groups. The fate of the San, and other indigenous 
peoples for that matter, provides an example of this process. Law is an institution that 
has legalised to a certain degree the persistence of inequality between indigenous 
peoples and non-indigenous peoples. For indigenous peoples to use law to their own 
advantage will require a change of strategy. A first step in the right direction is to 
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reframe the debate over traditional knowledge to a language that is less embedded in 
an international rhetoric that is rather abstract and often meaningless at the local level. 
In order to survive, indigenous peoples have to secure access to land and while it may 
be useful and feasible for some indigenous peoples to influence their local and 
national government through the international arena of the UN, within the remit of 
this research doubts are raised whether this is going to be the most appropriate 
strategy. Although indigenous peoples are familiar with the concepts of globalism and 
cosmopolitanism, it is argued in this chapter that in order to grasp the real fate of the 
tragedy of traditional knowledge, academics, policyrnakers and NGOs should shift 
their attention from the global to the local. This is not to argue that the local should be 
firmly placed as the opposite of the global; throughout this thesis it has been argued 
that bifurcated views will only reinforce so-called differences. By drawing attention 
back to the local, the debate becomes more contextualised. The local and the global 
are not two opposing worldviews, they are related conflicts at different scales. A 
better understanding of socio-cultural, economic and political settings at the local 
level will help to inform the relevance of the debate at the international level; as has 
been demonstrated repeatedly in this thesis, the opposite approach has often resulted 
in essentialising indigeneity. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to unpack and contextualise some of the assumptions that have 
been made in the literature about traditional knowledge, commodification, property 
and indigeneity. This has resulted in the emergence of several themes that constitute 
key challenges that must be dealt with in order to further the debate about traditional 
knowledge and the policies designed to use and protect it. 
I Dichotomies 
There is a continuing belief in the validity of depicting different knowledge systems, 
commodities and property systems as complete opposites. The persistent portrayal of 
traditional knowledge as the mirror image of other knowledge systems is the result of 
the impulse to divide the world into two meta categories. The origins of this belief 
must be sought in the Enlightenment philosophy that universalised European society 
and its socio-economic and political infrastructure. By separating European society 
from non-European societies, an opposing classification of 'us' versus 'them' has 
been created. The strong emphasis on differences continues to guide the debate about 
traditional knowledge and how to use it and protect it. 
It is argued, for example, that indigenous peoples' economic systems differ from the 
Western economic system. This dichotomised portrayal has led to a one-sided 
portrayal of commodification processes and has provoked strong opinions about the 
commodification of traditional knowledge that does not always represent the views of 
indigenous peoples themselves. Property relations in indigenous societies have been 
oversimplified and reduced to being community-based, as opposed to Western 
individualised property rights. Another example of a bifurcated view is the portrayal 
of indigenous 'legal systems as different from Western legal systems. Such 
polarisation may lead to policy prescriptions of little value once they are applied in a 
particular case. 
The strong emphasis on differences, which has been artificially created as a result of 
this philosophical perspective, inhibits the recognition of substantial similarities in 
knowledge, economic, property and legal systems. The false polarities promote 
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hierarchies and there is a danger that continuously emphasising the dichotomy 
between the so-called opposing knowledge, property, economic and legal systems 
leads to misinterpreting the foundation of these. This approach has introduced the 
problem of how to identify authentic traditional knowledge and objects, indigenous 
property rights and indigenous (customary) law and leads to essentialising these 
aspects. The effect of portraying these aspects as bounded and discrete entities and 
opposing them to other bounded entities is that these concepts are going to be judged: 
which one is better or worse; more or less valuable; dominating or victim of 
domination. 
It is important to move away from this homogenised and polarised thinking. In order 
to protect traditional knowledge from fin-ther exploitation by other parties, it is 
necessary that concepts of indigenous peoples' rights over knowledge, resources and 
culture can bridge the gap between Western and non-Western cultures. Recovering, 
protecting and cornmercialising traditional knowledge in a more equitable way means 
looking for similarities between the two, at first sight opposing, systems. A 'true' sui 
generis approach should be based on recognising the difference of indigenous peoples 
without essentialising their identity, knowledge, property and legal systems, while 
simultaneously promoting cooperation and unity between indigenous and non- 
indigenous peoples. Building bridges between the two diverging systems depends on 
paying more attention to the cultural aspects and contexts of knowledge systems, 
commodification, property rights and law. 
2 Social Relationships 
Emphasising simplified dichotomies in this debate about traditional knowledge is a 
defining characteristic of a positivist approach. In contrast to indigenous peoples' 
systems, Western concepts of knowledge, commodities, property and law are 
portrayed as being devoid of any real social embeddedness. However, Western 
knowledge creation, commodities, property rights and legal systems are just like their 
indigenous counterparts reflecting political and social practices and expressing 
relationships between people and environments. Although the format and output may 
be different between different knowledge, property, economic and legal systems, the 
concept that these units emerge and develop as political constructs and represent 
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particular social and institutional relations is just as relevant for Western as it is for 
indigenous systems. 
For example, acceptance of the idea that all knowledge is socially produced dissolves 
the theoretical dichotomy between indigenous and scientific knowledge and reveals 
particular social and historical relations and practices which might better explain the 
contestation between different knowledge systems than highly simplified 
dichotomised epistemologies of knowledges. A similar approach is also relevant for 
the concepts of property relations, commodification and legal systems. It is important 
to consider property relations and regimes as being embedded in larger social, 
economic, political and legal constructs rather than to focus narrowly on the 
proprietary terms of individual versus communal property rights, which is in any case 
largely a Euro-American construct that was exported to non-Western cultural settings 
during the colonialist era. 
Furthermore, this approach also highlights the responsiveness of these frameworks to 
context-specific challenges. Especially, the concept of traditional knowledge and 
indigenous peoples' identity as bounded in time and space must be criticised. 
Knowledge systems are syncretic, in a constant process of change and continuously 
influenced by outside ideas. Any sort of knowledge system, commodity, property 
relation or legal system embodies a history of social practices and is an answer to the 
local cultural context. 
Studying knowledge, commodity, property and legal systems in a more contextualised 
manner requires mapping and analysing the power structures between different 
networks, the influence of formal and informal law and procedures, the role of formal 
and informal organisational structures with regard to property and different positions 
of power on the ground between institutions and different groups of people. In other 
words, the difference between 'us' and 'them' does not lie in opposing systems; the 
difference lies in power relations. 
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Power 
In order to further the debate about the commodification of knowledge, it is important 
to acknowledge that indigenous peoples are not just helpless victims who submit to 
globalisation and commodification, but are capable and often participating actors who 
can make commodification work to their advantage. The focus on commodification as 
a tool to achieve social and economic equality is a very contested approach. 
Commodification can only become an act of emancipation and liberation when poor 
and subordinated people are sufficiently involved in setting out the rules and meaning 
of the exchange or commodification. This means that in order for commodification to 
work in the best interest of indigenous peoples, it is important that local settings are 
questioned. There is a need to have a critical understanding of historical trajectories 
and to identify underlying power structures that dominate local settings. In practice 
this means that the focus of attention should shift from the yes-no question on 
commodification towards the empowerment of those who want to use their traditional 
knowledge and sources in order to improve their livelihood. Indigenous peoples' 
acceptance of commodification in principle does not equate to the acceptance of a 
commodification practice that is shaped by and driven by more powerful external 
actors. On the contrary, it is important to empower indigenous peoples who want to 
use their rights to prevent the commodification of their knowledge. Regardless of 
whether the issue is the protection of traditional knowledge as an economic resource 
or the protection of traditional knowledge as an expression of cultural identity or 
heritage, both forms of protection require the possession of power. 
Many indigenous peoples are turning to intellectual property rights in the hope that 
these can help them with redressing a historical situation of social, economic and 
political oppression and subordination. However, it is difficult to see how intellectual 
property rights can be an appropriate tool to help indigenous peoples to achieve 
equality. This is certainly going to be problematic as long as indigenous peoples are 
not sufficiently empowered to seek the commodification of their knowledge on their 
own terms. In their struggle for empowerment and control over their knowledge, 
resources, culture and land, indigenous peoples are increasingly enforced to rely on 
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claims of ethnic and cultural authenticity, even when and where these images bear 
little resemblance to the current identity of indigenous peoples on the ground. 
4 Politics of Identity 
By turning knowledge and culture into property, their uses and meaning are defined 
and directed by law, a process that is steered by more powerful actors and which often 
excludes indigenous peoples from participation. The result may be that the rules and 
norms that govem culture, knowledge, commodities and properties become 
standardised and subject to strict legal conditions set out by the more powerful actors. 
This will restrict the possibility to create and recreate knowledge and culture, which 
can be highly problematic since knowledge and culture are negotiated, defined and 
produced through social interactions within and outside communities. 
The argument that indigenous peoples should claim property rights over culture on the 
basis of their identity, assumes that indigenous communities are homogenous and can 
be represented with one voice. Where society once enforced assimilation on 
indigenous peoples, it now reinforces re-traditionalisation. With regard to intellectual 
property claims, this is an example of how indigenous peoples are required to link 
their relationship with culture and knowledge to concepts of homogenous identity, 
ethnicity and personhood. 
In other words, law continues to influence and shape identity formation and 
reformulation. Much of the debate on how to protect traditional knowledge is still 
based on the assumption that there is such a thing as a singular identity in indigenous 
communities, thus ignoring the facts that, first, indigenous communities often have 
multiple identities which are susceptible to change and, second, that identity is shaped 
in a process of intervention and response. If cultural property is considered as a kind 
of communal right, a bounded body that can claim communal rights must be invented. 
A new social identity has to be created, defined by its own perceptions of community 
and based on the rights that it perceives as being part of its common heritage. As such, 
declaring collective rights over knowledge on the basis that it is part of a distinct 
culture has become a powerful construct in the politics of identity creation. 
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The criteria for indigenous status also guide native title claims and enforce an 
engagement with 'primordialist' and 'essentialist' concepts of culture. Indigeneity is 
fixed in time and place and lacks socio-economic and historical contextualisation. 
This strategy can lead to the exclusion of indigenous peoples who have lost 
connections with their ancestral lands. 
Allocating property rights over culture on the basis of ethnicity needs to be questioned 
for all but the most isolated indigenous groups. The Sentinelese are probably the only 
remaining group for whom this approach might be valid. In the context of traditional 
knowledge, claiming property rights over knowledge and culture on the basis of 
ethnicity means highlighting the otherness and pristine uniqueness of one's own 
identity. In order to achieve control over resources and knowledge, indigenous 
peoples require social mobility and emancipation. In most societies it is highly 
contestable that indigenous peoples will be able to achieve this improved social status 
by highlighting their ethnicity, and thus further distancing themselves from other 
groups in that society. In short, (property) law reinforces an essentialised view of 
culture and identity and fails to accommodate alternative and more diverse notions of 
culture which may be experienced by indigenous peoples. Therefore indigenous 
peoples need a more flexible framework that is based on quotidian social practices for 
protecting their traditional knowledge. 
5 Issues of Scale and Locality 
The translation of local life and daily practices into formal (legal) categories has led to 
policies that dichotomise, simplify and homogenise the complexities of social life as 
lived by indigenous peoples. A sui generis approach to protecting traditional 
knowledge must focus on discovering the localised practices of law that are, so far, 
barely explored in the formal system of law making. In order to find a 'solution' to the 
problem of protecting traditional knowledge that works in the local context, it is 
important that scholars, development workers, NGOs and institutions like the UN 
come to terms with the fact that indigenous peoples can be at once traditional, modem 
and postmodern. Engaging with these multiple 'identities' of indigenous peoples 
seems an impossible task in a formal (i. e. Western) legal framework because, 
ultimately, it is less flexible and fluid than informal law. For law to work it has to be 
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living law, and in order for it to find the space to 'live', it will have to find more 
flexibility in its practice. This highlights the importance of the local scale. 
While the debate about how to protect indigenous peoples' resources, land and 
knowledge has so far been heavily influenced by concepts of 'space' and 'identity', 
this approach has led to essentialised policy prescriptions. Therefore, in this debate 
more emphasis should be placed on issues of 'scale' which link targeted micro-level 
actions with more national and international approaches. 
Fortnal-institutionalised law has created an underclass, i. e. legal subjects subordinated 
by more powerful groups. Law is an institution that has legalised to a certain degree 
the persistence of inequality between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous peoples. 
For indigenous peoples to use law to their own advantage will require a change of 
strategy. A first step in the right direction is refraining the debate over traditional 
knowledge to a language that is less embedded in an international rhetoric that is 
abstract and therefore often of little relevance at the local level. Therefore indigenous 
peoples' strategy to gain more rights over their knowledge, resources and land should 
shift from the global to the local. This is not to argue that the local should be firmly 
placed as the opposite of the global; such a polarised view will only reinforce so- 
called differences. The purpose of drawing attention back to the local is to 
contextualise the debate. The local and the global are not two opposing worldviews, 
they are related conflicts at different scales. The fieldwork in this research and the 
stories interspersed as intermezzi in this dissertation have emphasised the importance 
of understanding local concerns and illustrated the relationships between global and 
local conflicts. A better understanding of socio-cultural, economic and political 
settings at the local level will help to inform the debate at the international level and 
end the practice of essentialising indigeneity. 
Furthermore, focusing on the local will also facilitate the (re)discovery of law and its 
rules in daily life. The sources of law that regulate intellectual property rights are not 
only to be found in the WIPO, CBD, UNESCO or WTO, they can also be found 
through observing local practices and listening to local stories. Incorporating these 
local practices into the global is going to be the challenge. However, as argued 
throughout this thesis, by unpacking some of the assumptions that have been made 
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about commodities, properties, knowledge systems and legal systems, it appears that 
the gap between the global and the local or 'us' and 'them' does not have to be 
unbridgeable. The 'noble savage' has always been a myth; creating a system of 
goodwill and equality is perhaps the most important prerequisite to demystify and 
decolonise this myth, and it opens the way for a property system that is less exclusive 
and more balanced in the way in which it allocates both rights and obligations over 
knowledge. 
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Appendix I- Fieldwork Methodology and San Communities 
Visited 
Given the fact that the fieldwork observations and data have not been used in a very 
prominent manner in this thesis, it is decided that, following the same logic, the 
description of the methodology that was used during the fieldwork should not be part 
of the main body of the thesis. This appendix describes the social science research 
methods used during the fieldwork (section 1-3) and the San communities visited 
during the fieldwork in Namibia and South Africa (section 4). 
The main research methods that have been used for the fieldwork (see further down) 
have their roots in ethnographic research. Although this research is not a priori an 
anthropological study of the San, it is not unusual to use ethnographic research 
outside its classical domain of anthropology (Flick, 2002). It is not uncommon that 
researchers from a variety of disciplines (e. g. human geographers, sociologists) 
conduct on-site participant observations, although typically shorter periods of time are 
spent in the field in comparison to fieldwork by anthropologists, mostly because of 
resource and time constraints (Sherman Heyl, 2002). For this study, fieldwork was 
carried out from August - November 2004 and July - September 2005. 
Linking different qualitative data gathering methods (triangulation) has become an 
essential part in empirical studies (Flick, 2002). The main purpose of triangulation is 
to enhance confidence in the research findings by combining different methods in 
order to seek validity of the results by cross-checking one method with another 
method (ibid. ). In other words "once a proposition has been confirmed by two or 
more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is 
greatly reduced. The most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of 
measurement processes" (Webb et all, 1966: 3). Furthermore, ethnography is not a 
single method; many methodologies can be used such as direct observation, 
interviewing, discourse analysis, diary techniques and even questionnaire surveys 
(Uzzell, 2000). With regard to this study, the San's point of view towards intellectual 
property rights in general and in particular the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement has 
been collected by making use of mainly three techniques: participant observation, 
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informal and semi-structured interviews and scenario survey testing (for more details 
on the scenario survey testing see Appendix 2). 
Following Denzin's (1970) categorisation, the following two triangulation methods 
have been used in this research. First, through data triangulation data is gathered by 
making use of different sampling strategies, for example by focusing on different 
communities in different countries, across gender, age categories and different social 
positions within the community (for more details on the communities that have been 
visited see section 4 of this Appendix). In addition to the collection of data by 
engaging directly with the San, interviews with non-San people (e. g. people from the 
government and NGOs) were added to the data collection to verify and cross-check 
the data collected by interviewing and observing the San. Second, between-method 
triangulation has been used to contrast the findings generated through different 
qualitative research methods like participant observation, informal, semi-structured 
and elite interviews, scenario survey testing, transect walks, recording of life stories 
and other narratives. The main research methods that were used during he fieldwork 
are described below. 
I Participant Observation 
Participant observation has been one of the main research tools to gather data in the 
field. The main aim of participant observation is to get close contact with the people 
that are being researched by making them feel comfortable enough with the presence 
of the researcher so that the study group can be observed and information recorded 
about their lives without interrupting the daily practice or life of the community 
members that are being studied (Bernard, 1988). The purpose of participant 
observation is twofold: first, to engage with the activities identified as appropriate for 
the field of study and second, to observe the activities of the people under study and 
the physical aspects of their situation (Spradley, 1980). The style of participant 
observation that has been used for this fieldwork - i. e. the degree of involvement both 
with the people and in the activities that were observed (Spradley, 1980) - varied 
between passive participation (Le. being present at the scene of action but not 
participating or interacting with other people to any great extent), moderate 
participation (i. e. maintain a balance between being an insider and an outsider, 
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between participation and observation) and a few cases of active participation (i. e. do 
what other people are doing to fully learn the cultural rites for behaviour, e. g. transect 
walks to gather food and medicines). 
The crucial part of this research technique is the impression the researcher makes 
when he/she enters the field (Bernard, 1988; Jorgenson, 1989). For this study, the 
Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA) has facilitated 
the entry in the field. Establishing contact and building up a relationship with WIMSA 
was in any case a prerequisite since every researcher has to sign a research and media 
contract with the San, through WIMSA, which aims to protect the intellectual 
property rights of the San and guard that correct information of the San reaches the 
public. In the past, numerous researchers and journalists have exploited the San by 
depicting them wrongly and not sharing the benefits accrued from the research, such 
as the revenues generated through the sale of books or documentary films about the 
San (/Useb, 2003). When the San communities were visited, the signed research 
contract had to be shown to the elders and chiefs of the respective communities. The 
research and media contract is also seen as a tool to combat knowledge ownership 
disputes that can arise as a result of using San images by artists, advertisers 
researchers and media without the consent of the San. 
In all the communities visited during the fieldtrip, but especially during the first three 
weeks in the field, participant observation has been the main source of data gathering 
for the following reason. Although prior to the fieldtrip, numerous anthropological 
works have been analysed in order to become familiar with the San's culture, realities 
of the field demanded that before any attempt could be undertaken to conduct 
interviews and exercise the scenario surveys, more information needed to be gathered 
to adapt both the interview topic guide and the scenario surveys to the realities as 
experienced in the field. Especially, attending meetings organised by the elders and 
elected representatives of the community proved to be extremely useful for 
understanding the context of the San's social, political and economic situation, but 
above all their marginalised situation in mainstream society. It also gave invaluable 
insights in how the San perceive the relationship between themselves and other 
parties; like government, NGOs (mainly WIMSA), researchers and funding bodies. 
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This initial approach of mixing and mingling with everyone possible is an example of 
what Fetterman (1998) calls the big-net approach. It allows for a wide-angle view 
before zooming into the microscopic analysis of the population. As the study 
progresses, the focus of the observation narrows to specific groups of people. It is 
common practice to use the first stage of the fieldwork as a tool to help refine the 
focus of the research and to aid the fieldworker in understanding the finer details that 
he or she will capture in notes for further analysis. To assist in this achievement it is 
believed that using this more informal strategy at the onset of the fieldwork can be 
most beneficial (Fetterman, 1998). 
It was obvious from the way the members of the community acted that they saw this 
research as some sort of facilitating body through which they could 'air' their 
grievances. The San made great attempts to make sure that meetings were translated 
even though there was no direct link between the agenda of the meeting and the focus 
of this research. However the privilege given by the San to attend their meetings 
allowed for a better understanding of the power relationships at play amongst the San 
themselves and between the San and the so-called outside world. This information has 
been quite useful in reshaping the research strategy and reviewing interview topic 
guide and shaping the approach to the scenario surveys. Facilitating these San 
meetings (mainly in the sense of Providing transport logistics) helped to establish a 
good rapport with the community. Also the decision to pitch a tent amongst the San 
during the fieldwork was helpful in establishing a good and trustworthy relationships 
with the San. It provided more time and opportunities for conversations and 
observations, which could take place on a more equitable basis as community 
members could and did pay visits to the researcher's campsite when they felt like it. 
The data that has been collected through participant observation has been recorded in 
fieldnotes. Writing fieldnotes provides the basis and is even the foundation of 
ethnographic representation of the findings of participant observation (Emerson et al, 
2002; Spradley, 1980). As explained by Emerson et al (2002), "the primary purpose 
of writing fieldnotes is to describe situations and events, as well as people's 
understandings of and subjective reactions to these matters, fieldnotes also provide a 
critical, first opportunity to write down and hence to develop initial interpretations 
and analyses. In writing the day's events, [the researcher] tends to assimilate and to 
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understand [ ... J observations and experiences, seeing previously unappreciated 
meanings in particular happenings, making new linkages with or contrast to 
previously observed and written-about experiences" (Emerson et al, 2002: 361). 
Geertz (1973) has called this practice 'writing down the social discourse'. 
Following Van Maanen's (1988) and Jorgensen's (1989) recommendations about 
keeping and writing fieldwork diaries during the fieldwork, whenever the opportunity 
occurred, field observations were recorded in the fieldbook with the greatest possible 
detail in order to represent and recount just-observed events, persons and places to 
written accounts. Fieldnotes describe events, people, things heard and overheard, 
conversations among people, conversations with people, etc. (Emerson et aL, 2002). 
Three types of fieldnotes were taken during the fieldwork. First, in the descriptive 
fieldnotes (Bernard, 1988) everything that was observed was captured in the fieldbook 
with a particular focus on the behaviour of people and the environment. Second, 
analytical fieldnotes (ibid. ) described the evolvement of ideas about how the research 
was developing, including analyses of how the communities that were examined 
responded to the research, how they were organised, what sort of problems the 
communities were facing, etc. Third, personal and emotional reactions (Emerson et 
aL, 2002; Bernard, 1988) were also recorded in a diary. 
Fieldnote extracts have been included in the intermezzi and are presented as 
'impressionist tales' (Van Maanen, 1988; Emerson et aL, 2002) in the sense that the 
stories are striking but are not intended to tell readers what to think of an experience. 
impressionist tales draw the reader into the story and let the reader work out the 
problems and puzzles of the story (Emerson et aL, 2002). 
A similar approach has also been used for the incorporation of narratives and life 
stories in the intermezzi. Narratives are, just like participant observation, used to 
represent experiences of particular persons or groups so that others may know life as 
they know it through 'expressions of voice' (Emerson et al, 2002). Emerson et aL 
(2002) argue that this concept of voice can be linked to the need for certain groups to 
be heard. The life stories and narratives that have been collected during the fieldwork 
have been presented in the intermezzi through the voice of those whose life story has 
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been collected without any undue interference from the researcher; a technique 
recommended by Van Maanen (1988). 
In the context of this particular research special interest was shown in collecting life 
stories to have a better understanding of the political, social and economic situation of 
the San in recent history. Collecting life stories has become a crucial part of this 
research to map the San's human rights and socio economic position in which they 
find themselves within the national context throughout different stages of their life. 
By listening and incorporating the life stories of the San into the research, a better 
understanding can be gained of their struggles embedded in a specific context shaped 
by specific conventions of time and place. The life stories of the San do not appear out 
of nowhere; they are embedded in their traditions and culture. 
Life stories are also an important pillar for understanding identities - of who one is 
and who one is not: "[Life stories] make links across life phases and cohort 
generations revealing historical shifts in a culture. They help establish collective 
memories and imagined communities; and they tell of the concerns of their time and 
place. They bridge cultural history with personal biography. And they become moral 
constructions, tales of virtue and non-virtue, which may act to guide us in our ethical 
lives. Indeed, the stories we construct of our lives may well become the stories we live 
by. What matters to people keeps getting told in their stories of their life. Listening 
carefully to these stories may well be one of the cornerstones ofethnographic enquiry. 
To describe and analyse the ways of life which is a culture must mean describing and 
analysing the stories of its lived lives ". (Plummer, 2002: 3 95 ). 
Interviews 
During the fieldwork mainly two different interviewing techniques have been uscd. 
First, unstructured interviewing has been used to interview people informally during 
the course of an ordinary day of participant observation (Bernard, 1988), e. g. during 
long rides through the Kalahari, when sharing meals, etc.. These informal 
conversations were included in the fieldnotes on the basis of 'remembering' the 
conversations. Any conversation between an ethnographer and a member of the 
culture being studied can be considered as an interview (Werner and Schocpfle, 
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1987). For example, any verbal confirmation or disconfirmation of an observation, or 
any formal, informal, or casual answer to a question, constitutes an interview (ibid). 
Second, semi-structured interviews were used whereby an interview guide was used 
to gain insights in the San's perception of their socio-economic and political position; 
the importance of the preservation of their cultural identity; what it meant to be San 
and their stance towards protecting their traditional knowledge of plants. The 
interview guide was set up after close observations in the field. Where permission was 
given, the interviews were recorded on tape. However, Kvale's (1996: 3-5 in Sherman 
Heyl, 2002: 371) reference to the metaphor of 'the researcher as traveller' means that 
even semi-structured interviews can lead to unexpected twists and turns as 
interviewers sometimes have to adjust their paths according to how interviewees 'met 
along the way' choose to share their stories. 
Elite interviews were organised with government officials in Namibia, representatives 
of NGOs (e. g. WIMSA, WWF, Omaheke San Trust) and people who have been 
involved in the negotiations of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement (e. g. the human 
rights lawyer Roger Chennells, members of the Hoodia working group in Namibia; 
Martinus Horak from the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
[CSIR] - the patent holder). 
Group discussions were included in the research. Some of these discussions were 
casual (e. g. the problems the community faced), while other group discussions were 
more focused and deliberately structured on a variety of topics directly related to the 
research (e. g. rights over knowledge and land). 
In some communities discussions and semi-structured interviews were also organised 
with elite informants such as schoolteachers, health workers, farmers, non-San 
community members, shop owners, etc. 
The process of sampling was mainly led by relying on personal judgment and 
recommendations of the translators and guides in order to select the most appropriate 
members of the subculture. This very common technique is called judgmental 
sampling. Where ever possible, a good spread of gender and age of interviewees was 
attempted. The majority of the interviews in Namibia were conducted in Khoisan 
283 
(general term for the family of San language) through an interpreter, whilst the 
interviews in South Africa were in Afrikaans were the interpreter functioned mainly 
as a guide to the community. The informal interviews and conversations were 
conducted in Afrikaans or English. 
Scenario Surveys 
The scenarios used by Soleri and Cleveland (1994) for their study on intellectual 
property rights and protection of folk crop varieties of the Zunis (a Native American 
community) were adapted to fit the local context of the San. Two scenarios surveys 
were drafted. The first one deals with the question whether the San want to share their 
knowledge with the outside world and under what sort of circumstances. The second 
scenario survey examines what sort of benefit sharing agreements the San would 
prefer and why (for more details on the scenarios see Appendix 2). Although the 
scenarios presented were fictitious, they described a situation that could easily happen 
to the San and some of the proposed scenarios were very similar to what happened 
with the Hoodia. 
The sampling for the scenario surveys was based on judgmental sampling. All the 
people that were interviewed have participated in the scenario surveys. Sometimes 
people who were not interviewed participated in the scenario survey because they 
came to listen to the interview. Consequently, the sample does not pretend to reflect 
the opinion of the San across different communities and countries. At best, the sample 
is a reflection of the ideas that live in that particular community. 
Communities 
147 
4.1 Ornatako Community (Namibia) 
Omatako is the largest settlement in West Tsumkwe District, east of the city of 
Grootfontein. This is one of the few areas in Namibia where the San are in the 
majority and it is still often referred to as 'Bushman Land', as it was called prior to 
Namibia's independence (under the Apartheid system it was designated as a homeland 
for the 'Bushmen'). East Tsumkwe is inhabited by the JuVhoansi, probably tile most 
147 Description of the communities is based on the author's own observation, complemented by 
Suzman's (2001) and Harring and Odendaal's (2002; 2006) description of the communities. 
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extensively studied San group, characterized by a relatively strong sense of cultural 
heritage and uniquely protected against land hungry pastoralists. The San in Omatako 
and in West Tsumkwe in general are much more diverse in origin and include 
JuPhoansi and Rung who have always lived in that wider area, Vasekele from 
Angola who were resettled there by the South African army from the 1970s onwards, 
San from the Kavango region and some Hai//om whose ancestral lands are to the west 
of Grootfontein. Post independence, the area has also experienced an important influx 
of Herero and Damara pastoralists who brought large herds of cattle with them. The 
different San groups interact extensively and intermarry but there are some visible 
divisions in culture and level of empowerment. For example, the Vasekele and 
Kavango grow millet and live in huts that are similar to those of their Bantu-speaking 
neighbours in the areas where they originated. The Hai//orn are only a small group but 
appear to be relatively well-off with one family having 30 head of cattle and about 
150 goats. The JuPhoansi can be recognized by their traditional jewellery. The Mung 
appear to be the most materially impoverished (some living in open-sided shelters that 
can hardly be called huts) and least interested in growing crops; however they are the 
most powerful group in the local authority (the traditional Mung authority) and there 
are rumours that some of them have accumulated cattle that are kept by the non-San 
pastoralist newcomers (possibly received as payment from these newcomers to be 
allowed to settle). A few of the San settlers are of more entrepreneurial spirit and have 
clearly been attracted to the area because of the economic opportunities provided by 
the abundance of land. The Chief of the Mung Traditional Authority, whose father 
was a relatively wealthy Herero fanner, had his formal ethnicity (as stated on his 
identity card) changed from Herero to San in order to be allowed to settle in the area 
in the time of South Africa's occupation 148 . One ambitious family that arrived only 
recently has been planting such large fields that they had to hire other members of the 
Omatako community to help them with the harvest. There is much resentment towards 
some of the powerful pastoralist newcomers who have been accused of acts of 
violence, damage to the land due to overgrazing, damage to San crops and illegal 
fencing. Despite the damage caused by the cattle in the areas around the settlements, 
bushfood is relatively abundant and widely collected. Beyond the immediate vicinity 
of the settlements there is still a fair amount of game to hunt, which the San are 
148 Other members of the Omatako community provided this information. 
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entitled to do provided they use traditional methods (bow and arrow). However, very 
few people (all Mung San) have retained their hunting skills. 
4.2 Vergenoeg and Blouberg Communities (Namibia) 
Vergenoeg and Blouberg communities lie in the Omaheke Region, close to the 
Botswana border crossing of Buitepos, due east of Windhoek. Vergenoeg is a San 
community of ! Xoo and some Nharo while Blouberg is exclusively a ! Xoo 
community. These two communities are based on resettlement farms. These are cattle 
farms that were previously owned by white farmers and that were obtained by the 
government for the purpose of resettling landless people. These resettlement farms are 
not exclusively for the San and in both cases the San are the most marginalized group 
on the farm, with Herero and Damara settlers making the most of the opportunity to 
engage in cattle and goat raising. In comparison to Omatako, the land resources are 
heavily used and rainfall is sparser than in the Tsumkwe district so that the options of 
growing millet or other crops are more limited. Bushfood is less plentiful and hunting 
is nonexistent. Both communities are noticeably poorer than Omatako with little 
differentiation in socio-economic status of the community members and a very low 
level of ownership of husbandry. Most, if not all of the older members of these 
communities have been working on white-owned farms for much of their lives. 
However there has been a decline in the number of white-owned farms and the 
increase in minimum wage has made labour more expensive so that this potential 
source of income is becoming scarcer. In Vergenoeg, the only other regular option for 
generating cash lies in the collection of the Devil's Claw, a medicinal plant that is 
used in the west for treating arthritis. This plant is harvested across rural Namibia. In 
Vergenoeg the harvest is regulated by the Centre for Research Information Action in 
Africa and Southern African Development and Consulting (CRIAA SA-DC) 149. This 
149 The Devil's Claw is traditionally used by the San as a digestive tonic, for headaches, fever ad 
allergies, and as an ointment to relieve pain during childbirth. Its 'medicinal' properties were 
'discovered' by Mehnert in 1907. More recent clinical trials have established that the Devil's Claw has 
anti-inflammatory and anti-arthritic properties for patients with degenerative joint disease. The Devil's 
Claw has become an increasingly popular herbal rernedy (e. g. in 2000,400 tons were exported from 
Namibia). The great majority of harvesting is believed to be undertaken in an unsustainable manner. 
Furthermore, the low prices generally paid to the collectors - mainly San - (e. g. N$ 1 -8 per kg of dried 
roots) are a poor reflection of the final value of the medicinal product. The Sustainable Harvested 
Devil's Claw Project (SHDC), run by CRIAA SA-DC is attempting to address these issues of over- 
harvesting and unfair prices by paying collectors a reasonable price for sustainable harvested dried 
roots. For more detailed information about this project see CRIAA SA-DC (2003). 
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NGO aims to cut out the middleman and give the harvesters a fair share of the profit. 
CRIAA SA-DC agrees contracts with individual harvesters for set quantities, pays a 
guaranteed price for the harvest and promotes sustainable harvesting methods; in the 
case of the Devil's Claw, the main vertical root of the plant must remain undisturbed 
and only the regenerative side-shoots must be harvested. 
In Blouberg CRIAA SA-DC is not active and collection of the Devil's Claw is not a 
relevant activity. Blouberg lies only l8km from Buitepos where the shop, petrol 
station and camping site provide some limited job opportunities for this community. 
4.3 Andriesvale Community (South Africa) 
Andriesvale is located in South Africa's Northern Cape Province, just south of the 
Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (the South African part of the more recently created 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park) and close to the southernmost comer of Botswana. This 
is the only remaining San community native to South Africa. The JKhomani San who 
live around Andriesvale are in many ways a unique community. First of all, they had 
been dispersed by the South African authorities, the last group being evicted from the 
Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in the early 1970s. They were branded as 
6coloureds' under Apartheid. As this new label was at the time more socially 
acceptable than the stigmatising 'Bushman', most of the community accepted this 
chance to assimilate and buried their identity, even hiding it from their own children. 
In the early 1990s the language was thought to be extinct. Only a small group still 
portrayed themselves as 'bushmen' and lived from selling crafts to tourists on a farm 
not far from Cape Town (and hundreds of miles from their native land). However the 
abolition of Apartheid brought new opportunities. This group of 'Bushmen', led by 
Regopstaan Kruiper and his son David Kruiper, met with Roger Chennells, a human 
rights lawyer who presented their case to the new ANC government. The ANC in turn 
were interested in restituting land to this small but highly symbolic group of people 
(the San being the ethnic group that was worst affected by European colonial isation) 
in an act that was relatively free of controversy in a time of elections. The government 
has bought up and handed over to the JKhomani San a number of farms around 
Andriesvale and gave the JKhomani certain user rights within the South African part 
of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. The government did demand that all JKhomani 
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San descendants should share the rights to this land and this initiated a search for 
jKhomani descendants across the farms and townships of the Northern Cape. This 
search resulted in the discovery of a handftil of octogenarians who could still speak 
Nju (the original language of the jKhomani - see also Appendix 5), although they had 
not used the language in decades. These survivors - less than a dozen were still alive 
in 2004 - hold the key in the struggle to revive the jKhomani culture and identity. 
On the back of the successful land claim, Roger Chennells was also able to persuade 
CSIR, a research institute owned by the South African government, to sign a benefit 
sharing agreement with regards to the exploitation of the Hoodia, a plant traditionally 
used in San medicine 150 . CSIR owns the patent on the active ingredient in the Hoodia 
which can act as an appetite suppressant. Once commercialised (it is now under 
research by Unilever), its economic value in the fight against 'globesity' could be 
astronomical, especially from the perspective of the San. 
The successful land claim had brought together a group of people who shared a 
related ancestry, though many of them were not aware of it and did not know one- 
another. They have been brought together in order to win this land claim and as a 
result it remains to some extent a virtual community. Many have moved to the area 
around Andriesvale in expectation of economic gains resulting from the land claim 
and, more recently, the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement. However any gains have 
been slow to materialise and this has added to the tension within the community, 
where a handful of unresolved murders have taken place. Despite the limited delivery 
of economic benefits, the economic* conditions of the community are significantly 
better than in Omatako, and there is clearly a world of difference from the hardship 
and malnourishment that are evident in Vergenoeg and Blouberg. 
4.4 Other San Communities in Namibia 
While between two to three weeks each were spent in Omatako, Blouberg, Vergenoeg 
and Andriesvale. Shorter periods of time (between one week and 10 days) were spent 
in the following communities. 
150 For a detailed chronology of the commercial development of the San, see Stephenson (2003); 
Wynberg (2004b) and chapter 7, section 4, Table 5. 
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4.4.1 Communities in West Cqprivi 
The Caprivi region is home to approximately 4 000 San, most of whom speak 
Kxoedam and are better known as the Khwe, Barakwena or Barakwengo. At the time 
of Namibia's independence West Caprivi was also home to the Vasekele Mung 
population but half of them have now moved to other places (including Omatako). 
The Kwe, most of whom live between the Kavango and Kwando rivers in West 
Caprivi, have had possibly the most tumultuous and complex recent history of all 
Namibian San. Their traditional authority has not yet been recognised and their tenure 
status remains insecure. After independence, 600 Khwe fled to Botswana fearing 
intimidation and harassment from the Namibian Defence Force and Special Field 
Force. The South African Defence Force employed the Khwe as trackers during the 
independence struggle. 
While the lands of the Khwe are ancestral, the land is now communal but the legal 
status of the land remains uncertain and contested on two fronts. First, the Mbukushu 
(a Kavango people) have migrated into Khwe lands in large numbers and are now 
claiming ownership over the land. Second, the Namibian government has gazetted 
most of these lands as part of the Bwabwata National Park, thereby claiming 
ownership of Khwe communal land. Furthermore, in Divundu the government has 
also opened a resettlement project and prison. 
The communities that were visited in West Caprivi were Divundu, Mutciko and 
Omega. 
4.4.2 1 Community 
Mangetti West is one of the large blocks of government farms run by the recently 
defunct Namibian Development Corporation (NDC). These NDC farms were 
originally quarantine farms set up and run by the South African Government for the 
purpose of moving cattle from north of the Red Line (which is a communal farming 
area) into the white economy (commercial farms). Approximately 130 HaiHom live in 
an informal settlement in Farm 6 at Mangetti West. The majority of them are 
displaced farm workers with nowhere else to go. 
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Mangetti West's location at the edge of the communal areas permits some access to 
hunting and gathering activities but only a few Hai//om can still engage with these 
activities. There is little work in the area other than some casual work for the NDC. 
The area in Mangetti West was formerly the traditional land of the Hai//om. While the 
130 HaiHom could be given the land back since the land has become vacant as a result 
of the closure of the NDC, in all likelihood other ethnic groups will be resettled on 
that land by the government and the Hai//om will once more be expelled from their 
land (there are rumours that it will go to Ovambo individuals who are well connected 
to the ruling party, SWAPO). 
4.4.3 Nyae Nyae Conservancy 
The JuPhoansi have lived in the East Bushmanland for hundreds of years, carrying on 
traditional hunting and gathering activities in this remote region of the Kalahari 
desert. At the time of the Odendaal Commission, this area was set aside as the 
communal lands of the Bushmen. 
The original inhabitants of Nyae Nyae are among the most traditional of the San 
peoples, but anthropologists report that by 1960s most of their traditional hunting and 
gathering activities has ceased. Small-scale subsistence activities persist, but most 
people of the JuPhoansi have settled in the new administrative centre in Tsumkwe 
although some JuPhoansi have recently moved back to the more remote parts in the 
area. Because the land was remote and these communal lands were set aside for the 
San, the JuPhoansi are the only San in Namibia living uncontested on their own lands. 
In 1998 the JuPhoansi communal land was turned into the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, 
the first conservancy in Namibia, hence the conservancy has become a major 
economic and social force for the JuPhoansi. 
4.4.4 aheke and Aminuis) 
In the Omaheke region the San are living both on commercial farms and communal 
areas. Commercial farming in the Omaheke region began early in the 20th Century and 
settlement continued until the 1930s, by which time the commercial farming block 
had taken on more or less the shape that it has today. Like most Namibian farms, the 
Omaheke farms are very large (averaging around 6000 ha. ) and their creation resulted 
in the majority of the Omaheke San being transformed into a farm labour force. The 
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minority of the San that did not became farm workers in the Omaheke commercial 
farm region moved into Hereroland or Botswana. Within the commercial fanning 
block, one farm was visited, Zelda, where the majority of the workforce were San. 
The communal area in former Hereroland is now divided in Omaheke (Hereroland 
East, mainly JuPhoansi, Nharo and Mung speakers), Otjozondjupa (Hereroland West, 
mainly Mung speakers) and Aminuis and adjacent Korridor (Hereroland East Area 2, 
mainly ! Xo and Nharo speakers). The San constitute more than 5% of the population 
in these communal areas and usually live in the vicinity of larger towns and villages 
or on the peripheries of larger settlements. The living conditions of the San in the 
communal areas are often squalid. In the larger settlements alcohol abuse is 
widespread and food security is a real concern. The levels of tuberculoses and other 
poverty-related diseases are high among the San in these areas. 
The communities that were visited in the communal areas in former Hereroland were: 
Skoonheid, Eiseb, Tsjaka and a few small communities/settlements in the Korridor. 
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Map 1: Distribution of the San communities visited (see Map 2 for details of West 
Tsumkwe District -i. e. the area around Omatako) 
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Map 2: Settlements in West Tsumkwe District (western part of fon-ner 
'Bushmanland'). All settlements were visited during the fieldwork except those 
indicated with #. 
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Map 3: San and other ethnic groups in Namibia: A very rough indication of historic 
distribution before the arrival of Europeans (non-san groups in italics). 
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Appendix 2- Trade in Tradition? 
Exploring Views on the Commodification of Traditional 
Medicinal Knowledge Within and Between Four San 
Communities 
Fieldwork in four San Communities 
The San are former hunter-gatherers and the oldest surviving ethnic group of 
Southern Africa. Despite severe pressure -including persecution- from more recent 
arrivals (pastoralists and agriculturalists of the Bantu-language group arrived in the 
last 2500-500 years, white settlers arrived mainly in the 1800s), it is estimated that 
about 100.000 San survive today in the Kalahari basin. While local and regional 
variation exists, the vast majority of the San have lost the title to their land and with 
that, the opportunity and skills to hunt. They are almost invariably poor by local 
standards and few can survive on subsistence fanning, as this requires access to 
land, a suitable soil and climate and some capital in the form of livestock or fences 
to protect their crops. Many depend for their livelihoods on seasonal farm work 
(often paid in kind) and the collection of bush food. In countries like Namibia and 
Botswana food aid from the government is also important. 
The case study communities were selected to capture some of the diversity of 
circumstances in which the San may find themselves, including culture, geography, 
the situation with regards to land rights and general socio-economic conditions. 
Below is a brief description of the communities (for more details, see Vermeylen, 
2005 or Appendix 1). 
Ornatako, West Tsumkwe District. This community is located in former Bushman 
land, inhabited by only 5% of the Namibian San and the only ones that have dejue 
rights to the land. The San community is rather diverse, with some 'local' ! Kung 
San and many relative newcomers from other areas of Namibia and Angola. The 
San are the majority group in the area, which is a community-based conservancy 
with significant natural resources for hunting and the collection of bush food. Many 
san families also grow some millet or maize, but even in years with good rainfall 
this is insufficient to feed them for the whole year. 
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Blouberg and Vergenoeg. These formerly white-owned farms are also resettled by 
other black groups who have been more successful in fanning. The San here do not 
have de jure land rights and are much poorer than in Omatako. They do not own 
any livestock and the opportunities for the collection of bush food and for growing 
crops are much more limited, both because of land ownership issues and because of 
the physical environment (drier than Omatako). Some of the San in Vergenoeg are 
harvesting the Devils Claw in a scheme run by the Centre for Research Information 
Action in Africa and Southern African Development and Consulting (CRIAA SA- 
DC, 2003). While the Devils Claw is harvested across rural Namibia, this scheme is 
characterised by price guarantees for contract harvesters and the promotion of 
sustainable harvesting methods. CRIAA is not active in Blouberg. 
Andricsvale, South Africa. The San were labelled as 'coloured' under Apartheid 
and widely scattered. They were thought to be culturally extinct in the early 1990s 
when a search across the Northern Cape Province found a handful of elderly 
individuals who could still speak the language. A community of their descendants 
has been more or less 'reconstructed' to claim back their land rights in and around 
the South African part of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. On the back of this 
successful case, their lawyers also managed to persuade CSIR to sign a benefit 
sharing agreement for the commercialisation of the Hoodia. 
Mcthods 
The following ethnographic research methods were used; focus group discussions 
with a facilitator from within the local community, participant observation, informal 
conversations (e. g. see Binns et al., 1997) and a scenario survey (e. g. see Soleri and 
Cleveland, 1994). A guide and other community members who were keen to 
communicate in English or Afrikaans acted as translators for others. 
The scenario survey was conducted to assess and clarify community attitudes 
toward proper use of traditional knowledge in view of demands from the outside 
world. It consisted of a hypothetical story about a businessman coming to a 
community because he had heard about a medicinal plant, which he would like to 
sell in the outside world. He meets three fictitious San individuals who respond in 
different ways: 
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1. Refusal to share knowledge over the plants. 
2. Agreement to share knowledge in exchange for a share of the benefits 
(profits) when the company starts selling the plant based medicines. 
However, when the company patents its new pills they will not acknowledge 
the San in the patent, neither will the patent be jointly owned. (similar 
situation to the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement). 
3. Willingness to share knowledge, provided the san will get legal protection 
over their knowledge so that they can control it's use by others (similar to 
the concept of intellectual property rights). 
The participants were asked to choose the response they liked best and comment on 
it or give their own response. The survey was developed on the basis of the findings 
in the first community (Omatako) and was subsequently replicated in Vergenoeg, 
Blouberg and Andriesvale. Vergenoeg and Blouberg communities were so small 
that the sample included the majority of adults present in these communities at the 
time of the research. Most people were keen to participate; upon approaching an 
adult member of a household, relatives and neighbours would join in a circle. The 
scenario story provoked an animated discussion as people gave their (frequently 
differing) views one by one. Only a few elderly individuals were reticent. 
According to other community members this was due to traumatic experiences of 
cruelty and beatings at the hands of white farmers (Blouberg) or teachings of the 
church against traditional practices (Omatako). 
Results 
In all the communities that were visited, people spoke about their knowledge of 
medicinal plants and their uses. In addition to widely shared knowledge, people 
referred to medicine men who have specialist knowledge of medicinal plants. The 
specialist knowledge of these individuals goes beyond plant knowledge; it also 
involves diagnosis, knowledge over healing rituals and spiritual aspects. This 
knowledge is guarded much more preciously by the traditional healer who decides 
himself to whom this knowledge should be passed on. 
In addition to medicinal plants, most people in the community also referred to the 
tradition of collecting of food plants. They indicated that in the absence of the need 
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for these plants to support their livelihoods, they would still be keen to collect and 
cat them as it was part of their culture. Although most people that were interviewed 
confirmed that their knowledge was eroding and that their parents and grandparents 
knew much more, they also confirmed their intention to pass on the knowledge they 
still possess to the next generation. 
Are the San willing to share traditional medicinal knowledge? 
When people were asked whether they considered themselves as owners of the 
medicinal plants, they automatically made a distinction between the plants (tangible 
property) and the knowledge over this plant (what it treats and how to prepare it - 
intangible property). People linked ownership of the plant to territorial rights; the 
plant belongs to those who own the land. They realised that forest plants, timber, etc 
could be used as commodities because of their economic value. In most cases, they 
showed no signs of reluctance to use their natural resources as an economic 
resource. They argued that they were in desperate need to improve their economic 
situation and were convinced that full control over their natural resources (as 
opposed to current restrictions imposed by government) could be helpful in their 
struggle to alleviate their poverty. Especially, the San in the Na Jaqna Conservancy 
(Omatako) were hopeful that the government would eventually recognise them as 
owners over their natural resources. This would allow them to start trading timber, 
medicinal plants, food plants, etc. The San were however also concerned about the 
depletion of natural resources. Residents of Omatako voiced concern over 
unexplained bush fires and the damage of livestock (overwhelmingly belonging to 
recently arrived, wealthy non-San settlers) to the natural environment which also 
resulted in a depletion of bush food. Around the settlements the ground was bare 
from livestock grazing, but a trip beyond the range of the cattle posts around 
Omatako, showed a very different landscape; tall grasses were abundant and there 
was much evidence of digging by wildlife for tubers. The community at Omatako 
had decided to stop the exploitation of Devils Claw out of concern for over- 
exploitation. However this decision may also have been influenced by the bad 
experience they have had with middlemen 
from outside the community who paid 
less than promised or nothing at all after collecting bags of dried Devils Claw roots. 
Some Omatako community members described the 'right' technique for harvesting 
of Devils Claw which involved removing just the regenerative side-shoots, leaving 
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the main root in tact and covering the hole again'51. This method of sustainable 
harvesting has also been promoted in Vergenoeg by CRIAA SA-DC. 
With regards to the ownership of the knowledge over medicinal plants, especially 
the San in Omatako were more protective. They were aware that they were the 
original inhabitants of these areas and although the neighbouring Herero 
(pastoralists of the Bantu-language group) and even other Khoisan speakers (Nama 
or Damara) might now have the same knowledge, they felt that ultimately the 
knowledge belongs to the San. The San might have shared their knowledge with 
other people, but the knowledge originated from the San and in the case of 
commercialisation, they felt they had the primary right to share in the benefits. This 
suggests that in Omatako at least, the San have an a priori understanding of 
intellectual property rights. 
It also became clear that the San have some rules governing how knowledge is 
shared. When other people ask the San for help to cure, for example, stomach 
cramps, the San will help the person and give them the plant and explain how to 
prepare the plant. Most San did expect something in return. In the past it could be 
anything, a piece of cloth, beads, food, iron, etc. For some people the principle of 
reciprocity is still more important that the question what is given back in exchange, 
but others mentioned that they now live in a money economy and expect money in 
return. Especially, women made the connection that when they get tablets in the 
clinic they have to pay, so why should they give away medicinal plants for free. 
When nothing is given back in exchange, the medicine will either stop working or 
worse become poisonous. Not paying for knowledge was seen as not showing 
respect for the San's culture. 
People with more specialist knowledge, like traditional healers, seemed more 
protective about their knowledge. Even when money was offered they were 
reluctant to share their knowledge. Although, they saw the benefits for the 
community of generating money by selling their knowledge, they were worried that 
people would either stop paying them, or the San would not use the money in their 
151 Phuthego and Chanda (2004) report the same harvesting technique amongst a San community in 
Botswana. 
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best interest. In both cases the money would disappear and the San would have lost 
control of their knowledge without gaining any benefits. They argued it would be 
better to offer treatment but keep the knowledge to themselves so people would 
have to come back and a continuous benefit stream was guaranteed. 
Sharing knowledge with companies was seen as more problematic than sharing 
knowledge with individual people. As long as individuals fulfilled the traditional 
rules, viz. give the San something back in return, the San were quite willing to share 
their knowledge. Individuals are also allowed to help their friends and family, as 
long it is on the scale of reciprocal social relations. Most San expected that if the 
person who acquires the knowledge from the San has paid for it, he or she will also 
charge the person he or she is going to help. But if that person would have obtained 
the medicine for free or as a gift and is then trying to sell the medicine to more 
people and tries to make a profit, the San do not agree. Passing on the plants and the 
knowledge to use them was seen by most as a social contract which creates 
obligations for reciprocity. Most San were not categorically opposed to the idea of 
(re)sale and profit, but these options had to be discussed and agreed upfront with the 
community; trust in the business partner, fairness regarding the benefit distribution 
between the san and the business partner and retaining community ownership of the 
knowledge (including the right to stop the contract) were seen as key criteria for 
such a venture. Some people also expressed concerns that the knowledge could be 
misused and something might go wrong with the preparation of the medicine 
because of lack of appropriate information and knowledge. 
Taking plants without pen-nission was also considered as a very bad practice. Some 
are less worried about this practice, because they believe in the powers of the 
medicine and 'robbing' medicines would undermine their healing powers. 
Especially with regards to the devil's claw, many San thought that they were being 
exploited. People repeatedly suggested that legislation should be in place to prevent 
the theft or that the San should have rights over land and resources so they would be 
more in control over what happened to their knowledge. Alternatively, if they 
would decide to use their natural resources for trading, solid contracts must regulate 
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the transactions and guarantee that the San continue to receive money or other 
benefits, depending on what was agreed in the contract. 
San expressed objections to selling the devil's claw seeds to conunercial farmers 
who could then start cultivating the devil's claw on a large scale. They argued that 
the San are at the bottom of the economic ladder and allowing commercial (Le 
wealthy) farmers to make money with the San's knowledge was perceived as unfair. 
Preferred optionsfor knowledge sharing 
Table 6: Number of individuals who expressed preferences for particular knowledge 
sharing options; a breakdown by gender, income and community. 
Breakdown Option Option Option No 
by 123 idea Sum 
Gender Men 85 25 1 39 
Women 14 20 10 6 50 
Income Pension 734 N/A 14 
Devils claw (only in 
Vergenoeg) 004 N/A 4 
Nothing 262 N/A 10 
Child care (only in 
Andriesvale) 305 N/A 8 
occasional 12 10 N/A 13 
Community Vergenoeg (Nam) 03 15 6 24 
Blouberg (Nam) 9 19 10 29 
Andriesvale (SA) 13 3 19 1 36 
Fo-untry Namibia 9 22 16 6 53 
SA 13 3 19 1 36 
Table 6 summarises the results of the scenario survey, dividing the participants into 
categories that are distinct in their responses. Clear differences were found in the 
preferences expressed by men and women. Men had a very strong preference for 
option 3, which was three times more popular than option I and five times more 
popular than option 2. The opinions of women were more spread out, with option 2 
being twice as popular as option 3, with option I lying somewhere in between. 
Women are also much more likely to say they don't know. 
Option 2, which is the equivalent of the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, was the 
most popular option for the women interviewed in this survey. When asked why 
they opted for benefit sharing, their view was very utilitarian. Generating money 
was important to feed the children, pay for school fees and buy clothes. It was 
thought that by giving the children a decent education, they might be able to rise on 
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the social ladder and become teachers, civil servants or even members of 
parliament; this would help them to shake off their stigmatised identity and become 
full and equal citizens. 
Another reason for choosing the benefit sharing agreement was that money could 
give them the possibility of starting their own development projects so they would 
not be further dependent on government handouts. Starting small farming and 
agricultural projects topped the list of what could be done with the money. Often, it 
was also mentioned that in order to start small cultivating and herding projects, they 
first had to have access to land and it was hoped that the money would allow them 
to buy land. They also thought that by having money, other people would treat them 
with more respect. It was particularly interesting that buying the land was described 
as a community project. Buying land, farming and empowerment were all expressed 
as community-based achievements. It was repeatedly mentioned that they had to 
work together as a community to achieve something. Even when people chose 
money as the preferred option, they made it clear that the rationale behind this 
option was not related to the accumulation of personal wealth but for community- 
based development projects. 
The difference between the preferences of men and women may relate to gender 
inequality. Exposure to other cultures has undermined the traditional gender 
equality of the San. San women have lost influence and autonomy as a result of 
sedentarisation, shift to pastoralism and wage-labour and the influence of male- 
dominated neighbouring communities (Kent, 1993; Felton and Becker, 2001). 
Furthermore, the labour market in which the San have been employed (i. e. 
agriculture) favours men over women. This has pushed the San women further into 
the Margins of the cash economy. Exclusion from the cash economy may explain 
why more women chose the benefit sharing agreement. Since more men than 
women have access to money, the men also tend to have more control over the 
financial resources within the family. Interestingly, subsistence gathering for family 
sustenance remains predominantly a woman activity, but the harvesting of natural 
resources for cash income has become a male activity. In short, it is expected from 
San women that they take care of their family, while it is the men who are to a 
wider extent involved in the cash economy. This could explain why women gave 
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the lowest preference for intellectual property rights (option 3) - it is likely to be 
negotiated by men, excluding the women from decision making. 
Men on the other hand seemed very keen to have legal rights and protection 
(intellectual property rights / option 3). Gaining rights was not limited to property 
rights over knowledge. When it was discussed what sort of problems the 
community was facing, the lack of access to land and the lack of rights over natural 
resources were often mentioned as the two most important causes for their poverty. 
Some also argued that gaining rights over knowledge, natural resources and land 
was crucial for restoring their human dignity. Only a handful of interviewees 
mentioned that they have special 'indigenous' rights over their traditional and 
ancestral land. Even men who preferred the first option did this on the basis that 
keeping their tradition and knowledge alive was their natural right and not because 
the knowledge was sacred. Men who mentioned that they wanted to keep the 
knowledge to themselves did this because they were worried that something might 
go wrong if they started to share the knowledge on a large scale: the medicinal 
plants could stop working or become poisonous 152 . Furthermore, there was lack of 
trust in the benefit sharing option and a disbelief that legal rights would be granted 
considering their. experience of marginalisation. Keeping the knowledge for 
themselves seemed then the safest option. On a few occasions, and it was actually 
more women who said this, it was thought that keeping knowledge to themselves 
would give them a chance to restore the traditional way of life. The protective 
behaviour of women could be explained on the basis that, traditionally, women 
were in charge of collecting plants; perhaps they feel more affiliated with this 
practice than the men and hence are more protective. 
The differences in opinion between the three different communities are also highly 
significant. Vergenoeg is characterized by a very strong preference for option 3, 
which is five times more popular than option 2. However, in Vergenoeg, no fewer 
than one in four found it difficult to chose, a problem that was hardly encountered 
in the other communities. In Blouberg, two-thirds of the respondents chose option 2 
and one third chose option 1. Opinions were most divided in Andriesvale: just over 
132 Women also used this as an argument for wanting to keep the knowledge to themselves. 
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half the respondents chose option 3, just over a third chose option I and one in 
twelve preferred option 2. This may be related to the diversity within this 
reconstructed community. 
The outspoken preference for option 3 in Vergenoeg is likely to be related to the 
Sustainably Harvested Devil's Claw Project (SHDC), which started as a pilot 
scheme in 1997 in Vergenoeg. The NGO CRIAA SA-DC started to organise groups 
of registered harvesters in order to set up networks of knowledge exchange about 
sustainable resource use and management. Harvesters became increasingly involved 
in ecological surveys to determine sustainable harvesting quotas and to monitor 
compliance with the surveys and quotas. Prior to the establishment of the SHDC 
project, harvesters could not bargain from a position of strength and were forced to 
sell at whatever price they could get. Often they only obtained a price of less than 
N$1 . 00153 
for a kilo of dried and sliced Devil's Claw. However, harvesters were 
also paid in alcohol or other consumer goods. The harvesters had no direct contact 
with the exporters and were abused by a strong force of middlemen. Furthermore, 
the harvesters had no idea for what purposes the Devil's Claw was being used, 
outside their own local use; neither did they have an idea where it was going once it 
was sold. Harvesters had limited awareness over ecological and sustainability issues 
and, very importantly, had no voice in the industry or the opportunity to take up 
such issues with other stakeholders. According to CRIAA SA-DC (2003), this 
situation changed radically with the SHDC project. In 2002, the harvesters received 
a guaranteed minimum of N$20.00 for a kilo of dried and sliced Devil's Claw. 
Since the installation of the pilot scheme, the harvesters deal directly with the 
exporters and are able to develop a practical and operational relationship with the 
exporters. They have an understanding what the product is used for and have in 
some cases met the importers of their products. It raised the harvesters' profile at 
national and international Devil's Claw stakeholder forums. The SHDC project has 
made the San in Vergenoeg aware that their natural resources are valued in the 
marketplace and that control over both harvesting and selling is required in order to 
demand a fair price. This has made them more attentive to the importance of control 
and ownership of natural resources and the related knowledge over these resources. 
153 The exchange rate of one Namibian Dollar (N$) 
is about LO. 10 (2005). The Namibian Dollar is 
pegged to the South African Rand at the rate of 1: 1. 
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The SHDC may also explain why respondents in Vergenoeg have not opted for the 
first option, viz. they have a positive experience in sharing their knowledge. 
The situation in Blouberg, the poorest community, illustrated that extreme poverty 
and exclusion from the market or cash economy can translate into a more pragmatic 
and utilitarian response, viz. selecting the benefit sharing agreement. People in 
Blouberg complained that they were without food for days and had to live on 
handouts. Unlike Vergenoeg, the people in Blouberg did not participate in the 
CHDC or any other project. Sharing knowledge in return for money was considered 
as a means to end poverty. When the results are compared against income similar 
results emerge, i. e. respondents with an income were more likely to choose option 3 
and to a lesser extent option 1. However, the interviewees without a source of 
income opted for the benefit sharing agreement in the hope that this could generate 
an income. Also the respondents who received a pension (they are 65+ of age) 
seemed more protective than the younger generation; they were more likely to pick 
option 1, not sharing their knowledge. The respondents in Blouberg who opted for 
not sharing their knowledge were mainly women. As explained previously, women 
seemed in general to be more protective than men when it comes to sharing 
medicinal knowledge. 
All the respondents in Andriesvale knew about the Hoodia benefit sharing 
agreements. Only a handful of 'elite' San in Namibia knew about this agreement; 
community members who have been elected as representatives in national and 
international organisations. Yet the respondents in Andriesvale rejected the bcncrit 
sharing option as their preferred solution; interviewees complained that they had not 
been involved in the procedures and expressed feelings of exclusion and being 
neglected (see Vermeylen, forthcoming). 
Probably as result of the Hoodia and CRIAA experiences, the interviewces in 
Andriesvale and Vergenoeg were more aware of the value of their knowledge and 
natural resources and were keen to gain more control in the dissemination and 
commodification of that knowledge. Contrary to Vergenoeg and Bloubcrg, the 
respondents in Andriesvale were less concerned with their poverty, but highlighted 
that gaining control over natural resources and knowledge would empower them 
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and saw it as a recognition of their human rights and identity. But then the people in 
Andriesvale were visibly better off, the pension money was twice as much as in 
Namibia and young mothers received money for childcare. Most of the people 
interviewed also confirmed that winning the land claim has improved their social 
situation and made them feel proud to be San. 
Conclusions 
This research illustrates that, amongst many individuals in these four San 
communities, there is an understanding of the concept of intellectual property rights 
and sense of ownership over both tangible and intangible aspects of traditional 
medicine. There was a widespread interest in the commodification of traditional 
medicinal knowledge, but under certain conditions related to trust, reciprocity and 
control through contracts with the community. However it would be wrong to assume 
that there is a generic form of collective or community-based intellectual property 
rights system, as opinions varied between individuals and communities. Factors such 
as the level of poverty and marginalisation, the extent of existing resource rights, and 
previous experiences (good and bad) in dealing with outsiders helped to explain much 
but not all of this diversity. This shows that although from an ethical point of view, 
critiques about the dangers of individual property rights and commercialism arc 
valuable, but it would be wrong to transfer these critiques to a specific context without 
verification on the ground. 
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Appendix 3- Shortcomings of the Human Rights 
Framework 
Mutua (2002) argues that whole body of human rights should be more responsive 
towards the needs of Africa. The inspiration could come from the Banjul Charter 
(African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights) in which close attention is 
given to both rights and duties. Especially the focus on the latter could reintroduce 
values such as: commitment, solidarity, respect and responsibility; see also Murray 
and Wheatley (2003) who argue that a human rights regime developed under the 
Charter might be more compatible with the expression of rights of minority groups, 
including indigenous peoples. 
An-Na'im and Hammond (2002) argue that transplanting the fully developed, 
conclusive and rigid concept of human rights from one society to another will not 
work. Human rights as a concept needs to be presented in local terms by local people 
if it is to give actual meaning and value to people's lives. 
Chanock (2002) concludes that the scholarly discussion of rights (and culture for that 
matter) is too much framed in a meta-narrative of rights declarations and international 
law and how these narratives can fit in meta-cultures, or in other words a variation on 
the universal versus cultural relativism debate. Chanock calls this the 'sacralised 
discourse' of human rights, but argues that precisely this sort of discourse can be held 
accountable for ignoring the realities in which oppressions take place. The focus of 
attention, according to Chanock, should shift towards addressing tile detailed needs of 
those affected by the wrongs. 
According to Wright (2001), the origins of human rights can be found in natural law 
theories which, she argues, carry a significant limitation for non-Europcans because 
there is a strong relationship between the development of international law and the 
expansion of European colonialism. The commentators of natural law (like Grotius, 
de Vattel) ignored the claims of indigenous peoples while preaching about principles 
of war and intemational law that furthered the colonial project. Wright argues that 
many scholars have avoided analysing the historical context in which human rights 
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have developed. According to Wright, the discourse about human rights is too often 
bounded within a Eurocentric framework which makes the rights of the vast majority 
of human beings seem marginal, alternative or irrelevant. Embedding the human 
rights discourse more in a historical context can empower all human beings and can 
bring the marginalised into the centre of the discussion over the division of resources 
and power in this world. 
In the edited volume, Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights, Bradley and 
Petro (2002) explore the possibilities of an 'expansive humanistic interpretive' human 
rights framework. They argue that in the past the scholarly literature on human rights 
has been too much focused on the realisation of a Kantian endpoint characterised by 
achieving global rights, justice and welfare. They argue that it is important to question 
more critically the foundations of these normative claims that are firmly embedded in 
the moral principles of natural rights as formulated by Ilugo Grotius and John Locke. 
They question whether we should take these normative ontologies for granted. 
Furthermore, the authors that have contributed to this volume argue that it is time to 
move beyond the oppositional debates (individual versus collective, West versus East, 
masculine versus feminine, and so forth). Instead, they argue to focus more on the 
'dialogical encounter' between the local and the global. 
According to Massa Arzabe (2001) the human rights paradigm is difficult to 
implement since pre-eminence is given to civil and political rights over social, 
economic and cultural rights. The emphasis on civil and political rights has its roots in 
liberal culture. She further argues that the dissociation between tile two groups of 
rights contributes to inequality and the continuation of social exclusion and extreme 
poverty. Massa Arzabe laments the fact that the international legal system is based on 
the liberal principles of autonomy, free will, universality and abstraction. Such a focus 
prevents special treatment of the poor. Human rights should be more related to human 
dignity. This would allow concentrating on the empowerment and participation of 
concrete persons rather than abstract enforcement of human rights. The strong 
emphasis on human dignity is also shared by Van Gcnugten and Pcrcz-Bustillo 
(2001). 
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Steiner and Alston (2000) question, inter alia, why the current human rights 
framework is founded and embedded in the rhetoric and concept of rights; whether the 
('rights' language is essential to the values and goals of the human rights movement; 
and whether this language is accepted because of its strong roots in liberal political 
theories. They question whether other cultures necessarily have to accept the value of 
the rights discourse; would it be possible and acceptable to have a Universal 
Declaration of Human Duties? 
Chandler argues that there is a danger that a strong emphasis on the normative ethical 
framework of human rights will not empower the underclasses such as: "women, the 
racially discriminated, the poor and the hungry " (2001: 87). He defines the normative 
human rights theory as theory-making that is concerned with 'what ought to be' or in 
other words the current focus is on the moral precepts of universal human rights, 
while Chandler argues that the focus should shift to the "what is". 
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Appendix 4- Property Rights as Part of Human Rights 
Property rights are recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 154 (see 
e. g. Article 17 155) . The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 56 
(ICCPR) protects the more specific indigenous rights (see e. g. Article l(l) and (2) 157 ; 
Article 26 158 ; Article 27159). The ICCPR also protects the rights and interests of 
indigenous peoples under the rights to family and privacy in Article 17, rights to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 18 and the right to protection 
of the family in Article 23 160 . As with regards to the binding status of these articles, 
Article 1 (1) of the ICCPR has the status of customary law and is a binding norm of 
international law. The rights guaranteed by Articles 1(2) and 27, along with other 
provisions of the ICCPR dealing with privacy and family, are at least evolving non-ns 
and are arguably binding customary law. Proof of the international rule remains, 
however, the most vexed problem for domestic courts in applying international law 
(Triggs, 2003). 
"I Namibia became a member of the United Nations on 23 April 1990 and it is generally understood 
that by becoming member of the United Nations, member states also endorse the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 
155 Article 17: Everyone has a right to own property alone as well as in association with others; and no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
156 Namibia signed the Covenant on 28 November 1994 and the Covenant became effective in Namibia 
on 28 February 1995. 
157 Article 1 (1): All peoples have the rights of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
detennine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
Article 1(2): All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
(yi, In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
Article 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to tile 
equal protection of the law [ ... ] the law shall prohibit any discrimination [ ... ] on any ground such as 
race [ ... 
]. The principle of non-discrimination is also embedded in the African Charter or I luman and 
Peoples' Rights, the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms or Racial 
Discrimination, the Women's Convention and Protocol to the African Charter on I luman and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
'59 Article 27: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
160 In Hopu v France, the Human Rights Committee considered a claim that the construction ora hotel 
in Tahiti located on ancestral grounds, of which the traditional owners had been dispossessed in 1961, 
would destroy their traditional burial grounds and have a strong impact on their fishing activities. 
Adopting a wide view of family and taking into account past cultural traditions, tile Committee 
concluded that the construction would interfere with the rights to family and privacy, in violation or 
Articles 17(l) and 23(l) of the ICCPR. The majority accepted that visits to ancestral lands can play an 
important role in a person's identity (Triggs, 2003). 
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Article 27 of the ICCPR, which was originally not intended to apply to indigenous 
peoples because it is an individual not a group right, has nevertheless proved to be the 
most fruitful provision of the ICPPR in generating jurisprudence on indigenous 
peoples' rights. For example, the Human Rights Committee has considered 
complaints under Article 27 which are very relevant for indigenous peoples because 
the Commission has shown a willingness to intervene in situations where the rights of 
indigenous peoples in general are j eopardised 161 (Triggs, 2003). 
Furthermore the Human Rights Committee has also explicitly linked the right of 
indigenous peoples to enjoy their culture with indigenous land as illustrated in the 
case Lovelace v Canada. The Committee found that a member of a Canadian 
indigenous group, the Maliseet Indians, had been denied her rights of access to native 
culture and language when one member of the group was prevented from residing on 
a tribal reserve. In 1995, the Human Rights Committee concluded that: 'Culture 
manifests itself in manyforms, including a particular wa of life associated with the Y 
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples J The enjoyment 
of those rights may require positive legal measures ofprotection and measures that 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions 
which affect them' (Triggs, 2003: 395). The functioning of the Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR could potentially be very important for indigenous 
peoples. The Commission has actively recognised that economic and resource 
activities play an important role in the maintenance of the cultural rights protected by 
Article 27 and in the possibility of protecting indigenous interests in indigenous land 
through rights such as privacy and family life. It is likely, for example, that Article 27 
will evolve to protect indigenous rights to harvest natural resources where it can be 
shown that the activity is an integral part of the indigenous culture (Triggs, 2003). 
161 In Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, the Human Rights Committee considered a complaint by an indigenous 
person from Sweden relating to the right to carry out reindeer husbandry. The Committee found that, 
while the regulation of an economic activity is normally a matter for the state, there will be a violation 
of Article 27 if the activity in issue is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic community. 
Similarly, in Ominayak v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee found a Canadian Government lease 
over Indian land violated Article 27, where the lease was to be used for commercial timber activities, 
on the grounds that this could destroy the traditional life of the Lubicon Lake group (Triggs, 2003). 
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Other provisions that protect indigenous rights are: Article II of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162 (ICESCR) which provides for 
the rights to livelihood and obliges states to '[ .. j recognise the rights of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himseý( and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing, housing, and to continuous improvement of living condition'. Article II (a) 
of the ICESCR suggests measures such as improvement of production methods and 
land reform. 
That land reform falls within the scope of basic human rights standards becomes even 
more clear from Article 14 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights 
which states that 'The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interests of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance ofthe provisions ofappropriate laws'. 
162 Namibia signed the Covenant on 28 Novembcr 1994 and the Covenant became cffcctivc in Namibia 
on 28 February 1995. 
312 
Appendix 5- San Settlements and the 'Illusion' of 
Community 
While some of the generational farm workers can be said to live roughly in the same 
area as their ancestors prior to the arrival of white or black farmers, many other San 
individuals and families have moved over long distances to escape persecution, to 
seek better living conditions or because they have been moved there by the 
authorities. Some of the Hai//om. San inhabitants of Etosha Pan national park were 
deliberately distributed over white farms far away from the park so they would be less 
likely to escape and go back into the park from which they were evicted. Other San 
groups, such as many of the Vasekele from Angola, were resettled by the South 
African army for both ideological and practical purposes as many San men were 
recruited to work for the South African army during their fight against SWAPO. 
During a period of unrest in the Caprivi strip in the late 1990s, part of the Khwe 
community (where many had served in the South African Army) fled to Botswana in 
fear of violent reprisals from the Namibian army. They ended up near Francis Town, 
some 700 km away. Although the situation had been quiet in the Caprivi since about 
200 1, some of the Khwe still had not returned by 2005. 
There are many examples of San settlements, i. e. settlements where the San are a 
majority, which consist of people from a varied cultural and geographical background. 
These differences can be very important for people whose traditional identity was 
primarily centred on kinship. Some Vasekele can be found amongst the Kwc in 
Divundu (West Caprivi). Following the independence of Namibia, some Kwc and 
Vasekele soldiers in the South African army were settled with their families in 
Smidsdrift, South Africa, some 1500 krn from their ancestral land. The current 
JKhomani in South Africa consist of descendants of a local group speaking the Nju 
language and two Khoekhoegowap speaking groups (the language which is also 
spoken by the Nama, Damara and Hai//om) who came from deep within Namibia, 
fleeing the brutality of the German colonial army: the INamani or tall buslimcn and 
the $Hanasen. The latter is the group around David Kruiper who appear to be the most 
traditional (dressing up in traditional clothes and making a living by selling crafts to 
tourists) and who initiated the land claim. Vergenocg community in the Onialickc 
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region consists of Nharo and ! Xo. Smaller settlements within West Tsumkwe district 
(former Bushman land) include Pespeka which is inhabited by JuPhoansi people 
evicted from the Khaudom Game Reserve and Luhebo, which is inhabited by Angolan 
Vasekele. However perhaps nowhere is the population more mixed than in Omatako, 
the largest settlement in West Tsumkwe district. The diversity of the people residing 
there and the wide geographical distribution of their kinship relations can be 
exemplified and illustrated (see map overleaf for the location of places) by the 
background of seven non-related residents of Omatako: 
Male, late 20s. Nharo, from the Omaheke region where his parents still live. His job is 
that of the secretary of the ! Kung traditional authority. 
Male, 50-60. ! Kung. From Otjituo where he grew up on a Herero farm. Ile came to 
Omatako in 2001 with his family and some cattle after discussions with the chief and 
being offered a position as one of the councillors of the traditional authority. 
Male, 20, JuPhoansi. Comes from Tsumkwe. Moved to Omatako in 2003 when he 
was asked to work as a translator at the rest camp. Wife is Rung from Omatako. 
Male 30-40. Hai//om from Tsintsabis. Came to Bushmanland to work for South 
African army. Wife is ! Kung. 
Female, 3 1. Hai//om (as is her father; her mother is Damara). Born in West Bushman 
land. Moved to Tsumkwe, then to Omatako because of her husband's job (he is 
teacher). Eldest son is in secondary school in Okahandja (where he can stay with 
family). Her brother works in Rosh Pina (a mining town). 
Male, about 45. Vasekele. His parents are from Angola. lie was born in Omcga wherc 
his father worked for the South African army. 
Fcmale, 60+ Mung from Mpongo. Came to Omatako on behest of her sons who wcrc 
working for the S. A. army and were based in Bushmanland. 
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Map 4: A wide geographical dispersion of kinship relations: Each place name 
represents the location of birth or the residence of parents, children or siblings of 
seven (non-related) San residents of Omatako. 
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